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Introduction  
A successful pseudoscience is a great intellectual 
achievement. Its study is as instructive and worth 
undertaking as that of a genuine one. – Frank Cioffi 
(Cioffi 1998, p. 115) 
 
Let us not, in the pride of our superior knowledge, turn 
with contempt from the follies of our predecessors. The 
study of the errors into which great minds have fallen in 
the pursuit of truth can never be uninstructive. – Charles 
Mackay (1974 [1841], p. 84) 
Pseudosciences have stirred relatively little philosophical excitement when compared 
to the ―real thing‖. In certain respects, this is understandable. Why should philosophers 
waste time with the fake and phony, with that which fails to live up to its pretensions? 
Isn‖t there enough real science out there to tickle our philosophical curiosity? Not only 
have contemporary philosophers been largely indifferent to pseudoscience, but 
sometimes they have been downright suspicious of the subject. It is widely 
acknowledged that the very project of distinguishing science from pseudoscience, i.e. 
the traditional demarcation project, has fallen on hard times. Following the influential 
critiques of the likes of Larry Laudan (1983), most philosophers today shy away from 
branding theories as pseudoscience, and enthusiasm for demarcationism has waned 
significantly over the past decades. Not only has Laudan proclaimed that all 
philosophical attempts to distinguish science from non-science have failed, but he has 
also complained that the very terms “pseudoscientific” or “unscientific”, with their 
connotations of dismissal and disapproval, are “hollow phrases which do only emotive 
work for us” (1983, p. 125). According to Laudan, such parlance should be erased from 
our philosophical vocabulary altogether, because it is inspired by a naïve conception of 
the nature of science, assuming a simple dividing line between pseudoscience and the 
real thing. 
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To be sure, subsequent philosophical analyses of traditional demarcation solutions 
(e.g. in terms of falsifiability) have exposed several shortcomings. Laudan is right that 
the search for a silver bullet of demarcationism, i.e. a small set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for neatly separating science from non-science, is a philosophical 
dead end. However, as we will see, even if the project of a sharp and clear-cut 
demarcation between science and pseudoscience is futile, and even if the term 
“pseudoscience” could certainly benefit from increased rigor, this does not mean that 
the difference is simply non-existent. A pragmatic ballpark definition is not difficult to 
come up with. If a theory deviates from scientific standards and epistemic virtues by a 
sufficiently wide margin, while it is touted as scientific by its advocates, we may 
reasonably brand it as ―pseudoscience‖ (Boudry 2010). 
Even if philosophers have not come up with a single criterion to separate the wheat 
from the chaff, can‖t we all agree that some theories clearly belong to the one rather 
than the other? Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, a second major explanation for the 
philosophical disinterest in pseudoscience is the widespread sentiment that some ideas 
are so obviously wrong that we should not even bother arguing about them, let alone 
investigating them. But this casual attitude underestimates the ways in which 
“obviously wrong” ideas can be wasteful and dangerous in society at large (Pigliucci 
2010). The number of people who put faith in bogus treatment and relinquish any form 
of scientific medicine is alarmingly high. Cults and sects based on pseudoscientific belief 
systems continue to attract followers. Huge amounts of intellectual resources are 
wasted in far-fetched conspiracy theories or in shoring up discredited theories like 
homeopathy and psychoanalysis, not to mention the never-ending quest for evidence of 
the paranormal. In other words, we ignore pseudoscience at our own peril.  
But aren‖t there professional skeptics of pseudoscience out there for cleaning up the 
mess as the need arises? Shouldn‖t we just be thankful to them for providing this service 
and move on to more interesting and weighty philosophical matters? In a foreword to 
Michael Shermer‖s Why people believe weird things, the late Stephen Jay Gould noted that  
[S]kepticism or debunking often receives the bad rap reserved for activities — like 
garbage disposal — that absolutely must be done for a safe and sane life, but seem 
either unglamorous or unworthy of overt celebration. (Gould 1997, p. ix)  
After reading the skeptical investigations of Larry Kusche and Joe Nickell into, 
respectively, the Bermuda Triangle mysteries and the miracle stories surrounding the 
shroud of Turin, philosopher John Earman (2000, p. 3) confesses that he finds such 
readings “often unrewarding” and even “downright tedious”: 
[a]fter a few chapters the reader hankers after a silver bullet that will spare us 
further details by putting an end to all nonsense. (Earman 2000, p. 3) 
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But of course, as Earman recognizes, it is precisely this silver bullet which the likes of 
Laudan have disarmed and snatched from the philosophical arsenal. Before the reader is 
discouraged from reading any further, however, we want to mention a number of 
reasons for why a philosophical study of pseudoscience is rewarding in its own right, 
even apart from gaining insight into a pernicious phenomenon in society at large: 
(1) More often than not, scientists and philosophers agree on which theories do not deserve to 
be called scientific, but their opinions diverge over why exactly this is so. Where exactly 
does a pseudoscientific endeavor go awry? How do we identify the false premises and 
fallacies in a pseudoscience? From a historical perspective, when did a theory or a project 
cease to be respectable, if indeed it ever was? Which pseudosciences suffer from intrinsic 
flaws, and which ones simply lack scientific credentials due to a contingent state of affairs 
(i.e. lack of empirical evidence)? 
(2) In light of the previous point, we need to carefully consider what is the appropriate way to 
deal with pseudosciences in public debate and in society at large. What burden of proof do 
we impose on pseudoscientists? In other words, what kind of evidence or theoretical 
progress would convince us of the value of some pseudoscientific doctrine, or at least 
would incline us to take that doctrine seriously?  
(3) What are the common fallacies and flaws of reasoning which pave the road to 
pseudoscience? By peering into the dark mirror of science, and by retracing the ways in 
which pseudoscience goes wrong, we gain better insight into the frailties and limitations of 
human reasoning. Successful pseudosciences are informative because they reflect the 
forms of irrationality people are particularly vulnerable to. What are the cognitive and 
psychological underpinnings of pseudoscience? What is the role of fallacies and reasoning 
heuristics? 
(4) What makes for a successful pseudoscience, and how do seemingly weird belief systems 
propagate in the face of adverse evidence and criticism? What is the epistemic structure of 
pseudoscientific theory, and what kind of methodology do the supporters of such a theory 
apply?  
(5) The study of pseudoscience and irrationality furthers our understanding of rationality 
itself. To which extent do the classical canons of rationality differ from or resemble those 
employed by pseudoscientists?  
On medieval land maps, dragons and other mythological creatures were often depicted 
over unexplored or dangerous regions. On the philosophical map, the territory of bona 
fide sciences has been charted quite thoroughly. Although many philosophers have 
attempted to trace the boundaries separating science from non-science, by and large 
the hinterland of science itself remains terra incognita. The present works intends to 
demonstrate that a journey through these little known regions, and a study of the 
strange beasts dwelling there, can be an exciting philosophical adventure. 
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Science, supernaturalism and design 
The first part of this dissertation, which was partly written in collaboration with my 
colleague Stefaan Blancke and my supervisor Johan Braeckman, provides a discussion of 
supernaturalism and design with respect to science. The family of doctrines that go 
under the banner of creationism, among which its most recent offspring, Intelligent 
Design theory, have been univocally rejected as pseudoscience by all major scientific 
organizations. Likewise, in the philosophical community, barring a few theistic 
dissenters (e.g. Paul Nelson, Alvin Plantinga), there is a broad consensus that Intelligent 
Design Creationism (IDC) is not science and hence does not deserve a place in the 
biology classroom. On closer inspection, however, this consensus disguises some 
important quarrels over the proper rationale for excluding IDC and other controversial 
theories from the corpus of modern science.  
According to a widespread philosophical opinion, which has been adopted in the 
judicial ruling in the Kitzmiller v. Dover case on the teaching of IDC in biology 
classrooms, and which has been embraced by a large number of scientists and 
philosophers, the scientific enterprise is intrinsically limited to natural explanations, 
and it is not equipped to evaluate supernatural claims. In Chapter 1, we dissect this 
commitment of science to methodological naturalism (MN), arguing that there is an often-
neglected distinction between two forms of MN, each with its respective rationale and 
view on the proper role of MN in science. In contrast to the philosophical standard view 
(Intrinsic MN), according to which the commitment to naturalistic causes and 
explanations is an a priori and self-imposed limitation of science, we argue that MN is a 
provisory and well-tried rule of thumb that simply reflects the past experiences of 
scientists, viz. the consistent success of natural explanations and the dismal failure of 
supernatural ones. Evidently, the discussion is intimately linked to the traditional 
project of demarcating science from pseudoscience: is the exclusive commitment to 
natural explanations a necessary condition of science? In other words, is IDC 
pseudoscience or non-science because it violates Intrinsic MN, or do its problems lie 
elsewhere? 
In this chapter, we explore what, if anything, would constitute compelling evidence 
for supernatural phenomena, and what this tells us about the shortcomings of IDC 
theory. Along the way, we touch upon issues such as the fallibility of science and its 
openness to new evidence, indispensable procedural assumptions in scientific practice, 
and the theoretical possibility of causal interaction with supernatural entities. 
The philosophical analysis in Chapter 1 clears the ground for Chapter 2, in which we 
spell out the implications of this neglected distinction for the public image of science 
and for the vexed issue of the relationship between science and religion. We argue that 
ruling the supernatural out of science by philosophical fiat (Intrinsic MN) has been grist 
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to the mill of IDC, and has fostered misconceptions about science and about the 
empirical evidence for evolution. We draw upon examples from the history of science 
and we retrace the political strategies involved in these seemingly arcane philosophical 
issues. By discussing the literature of IDC advocates and their theological adversaries, 
theistic evolutionists, and by scrutinizing the theological arguments launched from 
both camps, we try to find out how the conception of MN bears on the (pseudo)scientific 
status of IDC theory and the conflict between science and religion. 
This second chapter drives home the point that exposing the lack of scientific 
credentials of a theory is not merely a tedious task reserved for skeptics, but has actual 
import for the public understanding of science and the acceptance of a foundational 
theory like evolution. Lest we play in to the hands of creationists, we have to devise 
careful philosophical arguments for deciding what is and is not science.  
In Chapter 3, which is a collaborative effort with biologist and philosopher Massimo 
Pigliucci, we follow a similar dialectic, this time with regard to the use of 
machine/information type metaphors in biology and science education. In popular 
scientific writings and biology textbooks, genes are often described as the “blueprint” 
for the construction of an organism, and cells are likened to biochemical “factories”, 
complete with assembly lines, transportation systems, information carriers, etc. Tracing 
back these design metaphors in the mechanical philosophy of the 17th century and the 
emerging program of natural theology, we argue that such a conception is out-dated 
and makes little biological sense today. Importantly, the frequent employment of these 
metaphors fosters widespread misconceptions and design intuitions about biological 
systems, which IDC advocates have been quick enough to exploit, pushing the design 
analogy to the point of identity: biological systems look designed because they are 
designed.  
As these chapters on design metaphors and methodological naturalism make clear, 
pseudoscientists may well be irredeemably wrong or misguided, but they can 
unwittingly force us to think more clearly about established scientific theories, and may 
inadvertently reveal problems that we had not noticed before. As Pigliucci himself put it 
in his book on creationism: 
Often evolutionary biologists dismiss creationist arguments out of hand because 
they are “obviously” wrong, without realizing that even a wrong argument can 
point the way to a legitimate question underlying the fabric of evolutionary 
theory. (Pigliucci 2002, p. 236) 
In Chapter 4, we have taken up the subject of the biological design argument, around 
which the program of natural theology was centered from the end of the 17th century 
onwards, and which still forms the central tenet of the contemporary IDC movement. 
This chapter, which connects with the first chapters on methodological naturalism, 
bears on an important question in the philosophy of biology: was it Darwin who gave 
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the final deathblow to the design argument, by offering a genuine naturalistic 
explanation for the phenomena that inspired the natural theologians, or had David 
Hume already shattered the argument by sheer logical force? As a reference point, this 
chapter focuses on the recent reconstruction of the design argument by philosopher of 
science Elliott Sober in the framework of Bayesian probability theory. We discuss the 
intrinsic objections which Sober has leveled against the design argument with regard to 
its choice of auxiliary assumptions (about the attributes of the designer). Along the way, 
we explore some issues relating to the problem of accommodation versus prediction in 
the philosophy of science, the explanatory virtue of unification, and the practice of 
gerrymandering and ad hoc reasoning in pseudoscience. This paper lends further 
support to the thesis on the a posteriori and pragmatic nature of methodological 
naturalism in science, as developed in the first two chapters. 
The structure of pseudoscience 
In the second part of this doctoral thesis, we delve into the heart of darkness, dissecting 
the structure of pseudosciences and weird belief systems in general. In Chapter 5, we 
provide a theoretical framework of different immunizing strategies and epistemic 
defense mechanisms that are often encountered in pseudoscientific theories and a 
variety of other “weird” belief systems. Immunizing strategies are defined as arguments 
that are brought forward from outside a theory to forestall refutation and ward off 
criticism, whereas epistemic defense mechanisms are conceived as structural and 
theory-internal features that have the same effect of insulating the theory in question. 
The distinction is presented as a matter of gradients, and different examples of each 
category are provided. We discuss the use of face-saving auxiliaries in bona fide science 
and connect our discussion with Imre Lakatos‖ notion of progressive and degenerative 
research programmes. By acknowledging that many a scientific theory displays a 
“protective belt” of auxiliaries around its core hypothesis, we avoid the pitfalls of naïve 
falsificationism, while retaining some valuable insights about the virtues of empirical 
boldness and vulnerability to refutation.  
In Chapter 6, we develop this theoretical analysis further and apply the same 
framework to the discussion about ad hoc reasoning in the philosophy of science, which 
can be construed as part of the traditional demarcation problem facing any 
sophisticated falsificationist. What, if anything, distinguishes the legitimate recourse to 
auxiliaries in science from illicit ad hoc moves? Instead of rehearsing the classic 
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examples of successful and more debatable introductions of face-saving auxiliaries in 
science, our strategy consists of focusing on examples of blatant ad hoc reasoning from 
the domain of pseudoscience. The motivation behind this approach is that, as we have 
more robust intuitions about the fishiness of such palpably ad hoc moves, they allow us 
to get a better grasp on what it is precisely that we find objectionable about ad hoc 
reasoning, and how we recognize a theoretical move as such. This discussion of 
adhocness connects with our assessment of the design hypothesis in Chapter 1 and 
particularly our critique of Elliott Sober in Chapter 4, while it illustrates again our 
general contention that a careful study of pseudoscience may throw light on a number 
of unresolved issues in the philosophy of science.  
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, we develop two case studies exemplifying the use of 
immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms in the Intelligent Design 
literature. In the first case study, we dissect the equivocations in the IDC concept of 
irreducible complexity on different levels, documenting how this conceptual incoherence 
has allowed IDC advocates to switch back and forth between different versions and 
make a moving target out of their claims. The point of departure of this analysis is a 
problem reminiscent of Chapter 2: evolutionary theorists and philosophers critical of 
IDC all agree that the argument from irreducible complexity is a spurious attempt to 
demonstrate design in nature, but they seem to pursue two different, seemingly 
contradictory lines of criticism. In this case, as we explain, IDC advocates themselves are 
to blame for the confusion. Depending on how we reconstruct the elusive concept of 
irreducible complexity, a different line of criticism is in order. In the shorter Chapter 8, 
we take issue with the way Intelligent Design advocates have applied the No Free Lunch 
theorem, a mathematical result in optimization theory, to the process of evolution by 
natural selection and the modeling of such evolutionary processes in computer 
simulation. Once again, we encounter instances of bait-and-switch reasoning regarding 
the concept of teleology, and the notion of “tailoring around” biological fitness functions.  
In Chapter 9, which was written in collaboration with philosopher of language Filip 
Buekens, we provide a second case study of an epistemic defense mechanism, this time 
focusing on the obscurity and hermeticism of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and particularly 
the different rationalizations that have been put forward for the incoherence of Jacques 
Lacan‖s pronouncements. Not only are these arguments either circular, unsound or 
simply inconsistent, but interestingly, they draw on the internal conceptual resources 
of Lacanian theory. Seeing an epistemic defense mechanism in action illustrates how 
pseudoscientific or pseudo-philosophical belief systems succeed in fending off critical 
arguments from outsiders, and how the whole project of questioning the value of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, by pointing out contradictions and obfuscation in Lacan‖s 
pronouncements, may appear to miss the mark entirely from the Lacanian point of 
view.  
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Chapter 10 harks back to the original, Freudian version of psychoanalysis, and 
confronts it with a controversial program in the philosophy of science that goes under 
the name of Social Constructivism (SC). As it turns out, certain robust forms of SC 
unwittingly offer an uncanny description of the epistemic predicament in which 
Freudian psychoanalysts find themselves. In virtue of some of psychoanalysis‖ well-
known methodological deficiencies and conceptual problems, we argue that this most 
exquisite of pseudosciences exemplifies what science would look like if it were to 
function as SC claims it does. A number of theoretical results about ad hoc reasoning and 
immunization from earlier chapters will resurface in this discussion of psychoanalysis. 
In addition, our analysis allows for the development of a new and independent 
argument against SC as an account of bona fide science, thus making the connection 
again with the literature on the demarcation project.  
In Chapter 11, we draw on psychological research on the frailties of human reasoning 
to find out where the appeal and cultural success of certain weird belief systems derives 
from. After providing a summary of the psychological findings on belief perseverance, 
cognitive dissonance and rationalization, we assemble the theoretical findings from 
Chapter 5 on epistemic defense mechanisms and challenge the common assumption 
about the alleged fragility of weird belief systems. In the second part of this chapter, we 
insert both theoretical perspectives in an epidemiological framework on the 
construction and dissemination of belief systems. By outlining the epistemic rationale of 
pseudosciences and other weird belief systems, it will transpire from this 
epidemiological model that their pervasiveness and continuing popularity is a 
predictable result of the way our mind operates. Although our epistemological analysis 
is informed by research in cognitive psychology, it provides a level of explanation in its 
own right, revealing patterns and epistemic structures that are not visible on the lower 
level of cognition. This chapter also sheds new light on the question of the sincerity of 
believers and on the level of conscious deliberation that is implied in our talking of 
―strategies‖ and ―defenses‖. 
The final chapter of this dissertation brings these insights on self-validating belief 
systems to bear on the psychology of petitionary prayer and the modus operandi of 
supernatural beings. In this case study, we take as a point of departure a series of 
interesting studies on the psychology of divine causation and petitionary prayer 
conducted by Justin Barrett. This chapter elaborates on the mechanisms of 
psychological self-correction and cultural selection that are suggested in the account of 
Chapter 11, and explores how they play out in the formation of beliefs about the efficacy 
of petitionary prayer. This chapter is intended as a contribution to the burgeoning field 
of the cognitive science of religion (CSR), which brings research in cognitive and 
evolutionary psychology to bear on the study of religion. It also connects with the 
problem of supernatural versus natural causation which we tackled in Chapter 1. In this 
sense, but hopefully in this sense only, it brings us right back where we started.  
  
Part 1 – Science, Supernaturalism and Design 
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Chapter 1.  
How Not to Attack Intelligent Design Creationism: 
Philosophical Misconceptions about 
Methodological Naturalism 
Even postulating an unobserved Creator need be no more 
unscientific than postulating unobserved particles. What 
matters is the character of the proposals and the ways in 
which they are articulated and defended. – Philip Kitcher 
(1982, p. 125) 
 
 
Abstract.1 In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the 
principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an 
often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with 
its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. 
According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of 
science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the 
supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and 
empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent 
success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations 
in the history of science (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on 
supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five 
arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the 
                                                     
 
1 This chapter has previously been published in Foundations of Science (Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010a). Some 
paragraphs have been added for the purpose of this dissertation. 
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definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper 
argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We 
conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised 
strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if 
they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling 
them out by philosophical fiat.  
1.1 Introduction 
In the recent debates between evolutionists and proponents of Intelligent Design 
Creationism (IDC), the principle of Methodological Naturalism (MN) has been an 
important battleground. In response to typical creationist accusations about science‖s 
alleged metaphysical bias towards naturalism and materialism, some philosophers and 
scientists have pointed out that science is naturalistic only on the level of its 
methodology (MN), but is neutral with respect to metaphysics. The principle MN has 
itself become the “focal point of intense criticism” (Miller 2009, p. 118) by 
antievolutionists, and there has also been some discussion among philosophers of 
science about the correct understanding of MN in relation to its metaphysical 
counterpart (Edis 2002; Forrest 2000; Koperski 2008; Miller 2009; Nelson 1996; Pennock 
1999; Plantinga 2001b; Richter 2002; Ruse 2005; Shanks 2004; Smith 2001).  
In fact, there is an important divergence of opinion on the rationale of MN and its 
proper role in science. We will argue that the most widespread view, which conceives of 
MN as an intrinsic or self-imposed limitation of science, is philosophically indefensible. 
On that account, it is also an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC and other 
forms of creationism.2 In Chapter 2, we will see that opponents of evolution have 
exploited the philosophical flaws in this popular presentation of MN to accuse scientists 
of philosophical prejudice and dogmatism (Boudry 2009b). Alternatively, we will defend 
MN as a provisory attitude of science based on the successful track record of natural 
explanations and the miserable track record of supernatural explanations. Supernatural 
claims do not fall beyond the reach of science; they have simply failed.  
                                                     
 
2 As the principle of MN has in the past been attacked by advocates and sympathizers of the IDC movement, we 
would like to state at the outset, and to avoid any possible confusion, that we do not in any way defend IDC. We 
completely agree with the majority opinion among philosophers and scientists that IDC has no scientific 
merits whatsoever, but we differ as to the proper grounds for rejecting IDC. 
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1.2 Naturalism in Science 
In the past, creationists have often taken offence at what they saw as the ―dogma‖ of 
naturalism and materialism in science. They complained that the hypothesis of special 
creation is rejected in favor of evolution by natural selection simply because scientists 
dogmatically cling to metaphysical naturalism, i.e. the claim that nature is all there is. In 
this worldview, supernatural forces are dismissed out of hand, and there is only place 
for blind material forces and processes. For instance, already in 1971 Norman Macbeth 
wrote: “If a Watchmaker is thus carefully excluded at the beginning, we need not be 
surprised if no Watchmaker appears at the end. The dice have been loaded against him” 
(Macbeth 1974, p. 126). According to Duane Gish, the universal acceptance of 
evolutionary theory has nothing to do with scientific evidence but everything with 
metaphysical prejudice:  
The reason that most scientists accept the theory of evolution is that most 
scientists are unbelievers, and unbelieving, materialistic men are forced to accept 
a materialistic, naturalistic explanation for the origin of all living things. (Gish 
1973, p. 24)  
With the advent of IDC, this philosophical argument rose to prominence, as Phillip 
Johnson made it the central tenet of his influential Darwin on trial (Johnson 1993). In 
response to this accusation, many evolutionary scientists and philosophers of science 
have claimed that creationists misconstrue the nature of naturalism in science. They 
argue that science is committed to Methodological Naturalism (MN), but not to 
Ontological/Metaphysical Naturalism (ON). For example Robert Pennock: 
Ontological Naturalism should be distinguished from the more common 
contemporary view, which is known as methodological naturalism. The 
methodological naturalist does not make a commitment directly to a picture of 
what exists in the world, but rather to a set of methods as a reliable way to find 
out about the world – typically the methods of the natural sciences, and perhaps 
extensions that are continuous with them – and indirectly to what those methods 
discover. (Pennock 1999, p. 191) 
The principle of MN demands that scientists appeal exclusively to natural causes and 
mechanisms. We want to distinguish two conceptions of MN, along with their respective 
rationale and their different perspective on the proper role of MN in science.  
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1.3 Two versions of Methodological Naturalism 
In the first version, MN is conceived of as an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of 
science, as something that is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition. 
We will term this view Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism (IMN). In the Kitzmiller vs. 
Dover case on the teaching of IDC in biology lessons, Judge John E. Jones denied the 
status of science to IDC because it “fails to meet the essential ground rules that limit 
science to testable, natural explanations” (Jones 2005, p. 70). Based on the testimonies of 
Kenneth Miller, Robert Pennock and John Haught, Jones stated that “This rigorous 
attachment to ―natural‖ explanations is an essential attribute to science by definition 
and by convention” (Jones 2005, p. 66). Philosopher of science Michael Ruse, among 
others, agrees that science “by definition deals only with the natural” (Ruse 1982, p. 322; 
see also Maienschein 2007; Miller 2009; Scott 2004, 1998; Strahler 1992).3  The position of 
IMN is also endorsed by the National Academy of Sciences in their official booklet 
Teaching about Evolution and the Nature of Science: 
Because science is limited to explaining the natural world by means of natural 
processes, it cannot use supernatural causation in its explanations. Similarly, 
science is precluded from making statements about supernatural forces because 
these are outside its provenance. (National Academy of Sciences 1998, p. 124)  
Defenders of IMN claim that science has no bearing on questions of metaphysics and is 
not equipped to deal with claims about the supernatural. Therefore, science is not 
committed to metaphysical naturalism. As John Haught explained: “By its very nature, 
science is obliged to leave out any appeal to the supernatural, and so its explanations 
will always sound naturalistic and purely physicalist” (Haught 2004, p. 231; Miller 2009). 
Similarly, science cannot negate the existence of the supernatural either. In the words 
of Eugenie Scott, executive director of the National Center for Science Education 
“Science is a way of knowing that attempts to explain the natural world using natural 
causes. It is agnostic toward the supernatural – it neither confirms nor rejects it” (Scott 
1999, p. 29; see also Scott 1998). 
In contrast with this view, which we will criticize in the section below, we defend an 
alternative view of MN and of its legitimate function in scientific practice. According to 
what we call Provisory or Pragmatic Methodological Naturalism (PMN), MN is a 
provisory and empirically grounded commitment to naturalistic causes and 
                                                     
 
3 In his recent writings, Ruse takes a more pragmatic approach, arguing that scientists adopt MN because it 
has proven successful in the past. See for example Ruse (2006, pp. 47-51). 
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explanations, which in principle is revocable by extraordinary empirical evidence. 
According to this conception, MN did not drop from thin air, but is just the best 
methodological guideline that emerged from the history of science (see also Shanks 
2004; Coyne 2009a; Edis 2006, pp. 16-17; Sarkar 2007), in particular the pattern of 
consistent success of naturalistic explanations. Appeals to the supernatural have 
consistently proven to be premature, and science has never made headway by pursuing 
them. The rationale for PMN thus excludes IMN: if supernatural explanations are 
rejected because they have failed in the past, this entails that, at least in some sense, 
they might have succeeded. The fact that they didn‖t is of high interest and shows that 
science does have a bearing on the question of the supernatural. 
Although the focus in this paper is on different conceptions of MN, we note that 
Intrinsic MN should not be confused with a form of ON that is traditionally called 
philosophical naturalism (PN). According to this position, which has exerted a strong 
influence on the early scientific revolution, the notion of a supernatural explanation is 
simply incoherent.4 The proponent of PN maintains that only physical causes can bring 
about physical effects (the thesis of ―causal closure‖), and hence that the notion of a 
supernatural or non-physical cause is conceptually confused.  
As PN rejects appeals to the supernatural a priori, it seems more akin to IMN than to 
PMN, which discards supernatural explanations merely on the basis of their miserable 
track record. However, PN is a much more stronger position than IMN. Whereas IMN 
claims that science is ill-equipped to deal with supernatural causes, leaving open the 
possibility that they exist, PN rules out their existence altogether.  
1.4 Five arguments in support of Intrinsic Methodological 
Naturalism 
1.4.1 ARGUMENT 1 – argument from the definition of science 
The foremost argument in support of IMN is that MN is simply part of science by 
definition. Michael Ruse, for example, maintains that science “by definition deals only 
with the natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law” (Ruse 1982, p. 322). In 
                                                     
 
4 Problems with the definition of ―supernatural‖ will be considered below. 
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his memorandum opinion of the Kitzmiller v. Dover case, Judge John E. Jones concluded 
that the “rigorous attachment to ―natural‖ explanations is an essential attribute to 
science by definition and by convention” (Jones 2005, p. 66). However, there have been 
many attempts in the past to define science in terms of a small set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, and none of them has achieved general consensus among 
scientists and philosophers of science (Laudan 1996a; Edis 2006). It is true that the 
notion of ―supernatural‖ is completely absent from the corpus of modern scientific 
knowledge. But does that mean that supernatural events, if any of these would ever 
occur in our universe, are necessarily beyond the reach of science?  
The definition argument for IMN sits uncomfortably with the fact that reputable 
scientists and skeptics have investigated allegedly paranormal phenomena which, if 
corroborated through repeatable and careful experiments, would point to the existence 
of supernatural forces, or at least so they claim. In a famous study by Benson et al., for 
instance (Benson, Dusek et al. 2006), the therapeutic effect of intercessory prayer in 
cardiac by-pass patients was investigated through a methodologically sound RCT-trial. 
Although the study failed to demonstrate any effect, prima facie it is an honest attempt 
to establish supernatural intervention by scientific means. If intercessory prayer really 
did help patients to recover from illness, one would expect this to become visible 
through carefully conducted trials like these. 
If defenders of IMN are correct that science cannot deal with the supernatural “by 
definition”, does it mean that these experiments were pointless to begin with, or that 
scientists are not entitled to be skeptical about the therapeutic effect of intercessory 
prayer, because such purported phenomena necessarily lie beyond the epistemic reach 
of science?  
The solution depends on one‖s definition of the term ―supernatural‖. At least one 
philosophical approach vindicates IMN and argues that scientific experiments like the 
one mentioned are either logically absurd, or what they purport to demonstrate is not 
―supernatural‖ after all. We argue that this approach is philosophically defensible but 
sterile, and we propose a more fruitful definition. 
1.4.1.1 How unnatural is the supernatural? 
The philosophical way to vindicate IMN straight away is to define ―supernatural‖ as any 
phenomenon that is inaccessible by scientific means in principle. Thus, as soon as an 
allegedly supernatural phenomenon becomes scientifically detectable, it ceases to be 
supernatural and must thenceforth be reconsidered as ―natural‖.5 ―Scientific‖ evidence 
                                                     
 
5 Another way to uphold this analytic definition is to maintain that science simply ceases to be scientific as 
soon as supernatural explanations would become successful. Michael Ruse, for example, wrote that “even if 
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for the existence of supernatural forces is immediately precluded by analytic definition. 
In her discussion of supernaturalism, Barbara Forrest adopts this analytic approach 
(although her actual position is more complicated, see below). 
To become more than a logical possibility, supernaturalism must be confirmed 
with unequivocal empirical evidence, and such confirmation would only 
demonstrate that this newly verified aspect of reality had all along never been 
supernatural at all, but rather a natural phenomenon which just awaited an 
appropriate scientific test. (Forrest 2000, p. 25) 
Robert Pennock, for his part, wrote that “if we could apply natural knowledge to 
understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be supernatural” 
(Pennock 1999, p. 290). However, if the scope of the term ―naturalistic‖ is simply 
extended to whichever new aspect of reality science might discover, it becomes almost 
trivial to uphold MN in scientific practice. How could the principle of MN possibly have 
any adversaries on Pennock‖s definition of natural and supernatural, or, alternatively, 
what exactly would it mean to defend MN? As one broadens the scope of the natural and 
narrows down the reference domain of the supernatural, one‖s commitment to natural 
explanations loses any practical import.  
Consider the claims of IDC. Although in their public pronouncements defenders of 
IDC tend to be reluctant to identify their Intelligent Designer as the Judeo-Christian God, 
there is no doubt that their views are religiously motivated and indebted to the 
tradition of natural theology (see Chapter 4). But if God has left observable traces in our 
material universe, as IDC proponents claim He did, these are in principle open to 
scientific investigation, and thus God would be reduced to the realm of the ―natural‖, by 
a matter of philosophical definition. Pennock thinks it is ironic that, in the course of 
introducing God in science, IDC theorists actually naturalize God without seeming to 
realize. That may well be true according to Pennock‖s definition of ―supernatural‖, but by 
the same token IDC theory does not violate the strictures of IMN any longer, and 
Pennock‖s argument on the basis of IMN misses the mark. Pennock‖s conception of 
supernaturalism is so restricted that there is nothing left for him to reject as a naturalist.  
Imagine that IDC theorists, contrary to the actual state of affairs, had provided us 
with clear and unmistakable evidence for intelligent design behind functional biological 
complexity (in the next section we will consider what could constitute such evidence). 
Even if the designer were to reside beyond the dimensions of the known material 
universe, causing major metaphysical upheaval, it would not fit the bill of a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific 
explanation or origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific 
explanations of origins” (Ruse 1982, p. 322; see also Haught 2000, p. 201). 
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“supernatural entity” according to Pennock‖s logic, and hence our reply to the IDC 
proponents would have to be along the following lines: ―You see, now we have a scientific 
proof for Intelligent Design. By definition, that means that we are dealing with a natural 
phenomenon. Thus, I was right after all, supernatural causes and forces have no place in 
science.‖ 
But why would the IDC theorist be bothered that some philosophers regard his 
hypothesis as ―natural‖ after all? If he had really succeeded in demonstrating the 
existence of an intelligent creator residing outside the known material universe, that 
terminological discussion would probably be the least of his worries. Therefore, when 
Pennock and Forrest adopt this analytical definition of the ―supernatural‖, they cannot 
longer challenge IDC by using IMN as a philosophical shield, because it misses the mark 
by their own definition. Instead, they will have to convince IDC theorists that the so-
called Intelligent Designer would be ―natural‖ like anything else. This is a different route 
to the same conclusion we are defending in this article: that claims of IDC have to be 
confronted head on, and rejected on scientific grounds, instead of being excluded by fiat 
on shaky philosophical grounds.6  
A being that would be truly ―supernatural‖ under the analytic definition would have 
to be completely isolated from our material universe, and not be able (or willing) to 
interact with it at all. But this hypothetical being is completely irrelevant for our 
concerns and is surely not the ―intelligent designer‖ that the IDC theorist (or any 
sensible theist, for that matter) believes in. The controversial claim of IDC theory is 
precisely that an Intelligent Designer meddled very directly in terrestrial affairs during 
the course of evolution: he constructed the flagellum of the bacterium E. coli, for one 
thing (an act with tangible consequences if there ever was one).7 
                                                     
 
6 The discussion between Alvin Plantinga and Michael Ruse on this point is interesting. Plantinga objects to 
Ruse‖s appeal to the definition argument that “it is hard to see how anything like a reasonably serious dispute 
about what is and is not science could be settled just by appealing to a definition” (Plantinga 2001b, p. 345). In 
his reply, Ruse seems to admit that deciding the matter by means of simple analytic definitions would be 
unsatisfactory, and he goes on to deny that this was his intention. He agrees that this victory “would 
altogether be too easy to achieve” (Ruse 2005, p. 50). In trying to explain what he did mean by his definition 
argument, however, Ruse gets entangled in his own reasoning:  
What I am trying to do is to offer a lexical definition: that is to say, I am trying to characterise the use of 
the term “science.” And my suggestion is simply that what we mean by the word “science” in general 
usage is something that does not make reference to God and so forth, but that is marked by 
methodological naturalism. I am not saying anything at all about whether or not God exists, or has any 
role in the world or anything like that. I am simply saying that science does not allow for this possibility, 
judged qua science. (Ruse 2005, p. 50) 
But it is hard to see how a lexical definition of science carries any more epistemic weight than an analytical 
definition. 
7 Although the analytic definition of the supernatural misses the mark of IDC and is therefore uninteresting in 
this context, we have to note that it accords well with the psychological function of the vulgar notion of the 
―supernatural‖, and the very reason for the widespread fascination with the topic. People are attracted to the 
mysterious, to that which seems to defy ordinary experience and scientific explanation, and call this 
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1.4.1.2 A tentative definition of the supernatural 
In accordance with our reconstruction of MN as an empirically grounded and 
provisory methodological guideline of science (PMN), we propose to define 
―supernatural‖ as referring to any phenomenon which has its basis in entities and 
processes that transcend the spatiotemporal realm of impersonal matter and energy 
described by modern science (for a similar approach, see Stenger 2008, pp. 14-16). In 
contrast with the foregoing analytical take on the issue, if any such supernatural force 
were to intervene in our material universe (and of course these are the cases of particular 
terrestrial interest) we insist on terming it ―supernatural‖ here.8 As we will see, this 
definition is closer to the IDC‖s conception of supernatural agency, and it is more 
relevant to the discussion of MN.  
Thus, if we possessed compelling empirical evidence for some intelligent entity 
residing beyond our spatiotemporal universe, but nonetheless capable of interfering 
with our material world (see below), we would have a demonstration of a ―supernatural‖ 
phenomenon. To be sure, as far as we can see there is absolutely no such evidence (but 
see Swinburne 2004, for an opposing point of view), and therefore scientists are well 
advised not to waste too much time pursuing supernatural explanations (PMN).9 
However, that does not mean that such evidence would be intrinsically impossible, or 
that it falls beyond the reach of science.  
1.4.2 ARGUMENT 2 - Lawful regularity and the supernatural - Anything 
goes? 
Biologist J. B. S. Haldane once said that, when he designed an experiment, he assumed 
that “no god, angel, or devil is going to interfere with its course” (Haldane 1934, p. vi). 
Many defenders of IMN are concerned that, if the idea of supernatural interference 
were allowed in science, experimental practice would become impossible. Biologist 
Richard Lewontin sets up a stark contrast between two “irreconcilable world views”: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
―supernatural‖ or ―paranormal‖. Once a phenomenon has been given a proper and scientific explanation, it no 
longer satisfies the craving of many for the mysterious, and hence they look for something else.  
8 If one adopts the position of philosophical naturalism (PN), this causal influence will be ruled out. The 
problem is the one Descartes encountered when he proposed the pineal gland as the place where the human 
soul interacts with the body. However, we are willing to grant, for the sake of the argument, the logical 
possibility of the idea of supernatural interventions.  
9 Already in 1748 David Hume warned: “The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and 
supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect 
themselves by their absurdity, prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and 
the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. (Hume 2000 [1748], 
p. 89)  
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Either the world of phenomena is a consequence of the regular operation of 
repeatable causes and their repeatable effects, operating roughly along the lines 
of known physical law, or else at every instant all physical regularities may be 
ruptured and a totally unforeseeable set of events may occur. . . . We cannot live 
simultaneously in a world of natural causation and of miracles, for if one miracle 
can occur, there is no limit. (Lewontin 1983, p. xxvi) 
Therefore, science simply has to adopt the principle of MN, lest the whole enterprise be 
compromised. As creationist Phillip Johnson put it bluntly: “there is no way to tell God 
when he has to stop (Johnson 2001, p. 65).  
Consider Robert Pennock‖s elaboration of this argument in terms of natural laws. 
Pennock points out that “science does not have a special rule just to keep out divine 
interventions, but rather a general rule that it does not handle any supernatural agents 
or powers since these are taken by definition to be above natural laws” (Pennock 1999, 
p. 284).10 For Pennock, this constitutes the most important reason for disallowing them 
in scientific practice: 
Lawful regularity is at the very heart of the naturalistic worldview and to say that 
some power is supernatural is, by definition, to say that it can violate natural laws. 
[…] Controlled, repeatable experimentation […] would not be possible without the 
methodological assumption that supernatural entities do not intervene to negate 
lawful natural regularities. (Pennock 1999, p. 321)  
In her discussion of metaphysical and methodological naturalism Barbara Forrest 
presents basically the same argument: 
Introducing supernatural explanations into science would destroy its explanatory 
force since it would be required to incorporate as an operational principle the 
premise that literally anything which is logically possible can become an actuality, 
despite any and all scientific laws; the stability of science would consequently be 
destroyed. (Forrest 2000, p. 10; for other examples, see Lewontin 1997; Scott 1998, 
p. 20; Strahler 1992, pp. 13-15) 
We think there are two problems with this argument. First, Forrest and Pennock do not 
explain why any occurrence of supernatural intervention in the natural realm would 
necessarily frustrate all experimental work or automatically “destroy the stability of 
science”. That anything logically possible can become an actuality is not as dramatic as 
                                                     
 
10 He admits that hypotheses involving supernatural causation have uniformly proven unsuccessful in the 
history of science, but in the end he does not think this is the fundamental rationale for MN (see also Scott 
2004). “Clearly, it is not just because such persistence has proven successful in the past that science 
encouraged this attitude” (Pennock 1999, p. 196). 
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it seems – in fact, it just restates the definition of logical possibility. Second, even if 
mysterious supernatural forces acting in the natural world would make scientific 
endeavors impossible, by itself this does not amount to a good argument for adopting 
IMN. 
As for the first argument, suppose the RCT in American Heart Journal turned out to 
confirm the hypothesis of therapeutic efficacy of intercessory prayer. Moreover, 
suppose that further experimental work following this demonstration, which would 
arguably mark a complete revolution in science, established that this form of 
supernatural causation displays certain predictable regularities. For instance, it works 
only with prayers officially sanctioned by the Catholic Church, only if the ill person is 
baptized by a Catholic priest, etc. Though it may be ridiculous to speculate that 
anything of the sort would ever happen, as no alleged case of miraculous healing has 
even been authenticated scientifically11, if it would, there is no obvious reason why the 
scientific enterprise would collapse at a single stroke.12 The fact that some prayers 
actually do help people recover would admittedly cause a complete metaphysical 
revolution in science (imagine the enthusiasm of theologians), but if the range of action 
of this supernatural power turned out to be restricted, why would it endanger the rest 
of our scientific endeavors? 
Pennock thinks this is because the idea of supernatural design is a “one-size-fits-all” 
(Pennock 2007, p. 319) explanation and will therefore leave the door wide open to all 
sorts of appeals to the supernatural. For example, it would make the practice of law 
open to “both suits and defenses on a range of possible divine and occult interventions” 
(Pennock 1999, p. 295). But while this suspicion is certainly justified in the case of the 
contemporary IDC movement and its political agenda (Forrest, Barbara C. and Gross, 
Paul R. 2007), we have to ask whether it is an intrinsic problem with supernatural 
explanations. Let us grant, for the sake of the argument, that defenders of IDC intend to 
appeal to the supernatural only if their own criteria – irreducible complexity, complex 
specified information – compel them to do so. Behe for example tries to reassure us that 
“hypotheses for the involvement of an intelligent agent in the development of life or 
other historical events have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis” (Behe 2006, p. 242).  
This seems reasonable, and skeptical investigators of the paranormal and 
supernatural would undoubtedly concur. However, as many scientists and philosophers 
                                                     
 
11 In order to be beatified by the Roman Catholic Church, a person has to perform a miraculous healing from 
beyond the grave. At some point in the procedure, the alleged miracle has to be investigated by the Consulta 
Medica, a board of doctors appointed by the Vatican, to determine whether the recovery was sudden and 
permanent, and to rule out any scientific explanation for the healing. However, these putative miracles are 
not accepted by the scientific community at large.  
12 True enough, any such supernatural intervention would force us to revise the fundamental law of energy 
conservation, or at least allow some exceptions.  
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have amply demonstrated (Miller 2000; Pennock 1999; Shanks 2004), Behe‖s notion of 
irreducible complexity and Dembski‖s criterion of complex specified information are 
simply very bad filters for detecting design, because they single out biological 
phenomena that present no problem whatsoever for standard evolutionary 
explanations (see also Chapter 7). Thus, it is true that if we would allow the appeal to 
supernatural causation on so flimsy evidential grounds as the IDC movement wants us 
to do, in practice that would be an invitation for more spurious appeals to the 
supernatural. But this is a general logical point: if we allow a particular form of sloppy 
thinking on one occasion, we are left with no grounds for disallowing the same 
reasoning in other cases. Thus, the claims of IDC are invalidated by specific flaws of 
reasoning and by the simple lack of evidence, not because of some perceived intrinsic 
problem associated with supernatural explanations.  
Our second and more fundamental objection is that reasoning from the perceived 
―danger‖ of allowing supernatural explanations amounts to an argumentum ad 
consequentiam. Pennock and Forrest would probably admit that supernatural 
interventions in the natural world are at least logically possible, because if they did 
involve logical inconsistencies, that would rule them out ontologically as well, a 
conclusion Pennock clearly wants to avoid (otherwise he would not insist on the 
distinction between ontological naturalism and IMN). The point is that we cannot 
exclude the possibility of massive supernatural interference in the universe a priori. For 
example, if we were stuck in this universe with a whimsical and meddlesome creator, 
we would simply have no other option than to resign to the impossibility of reliable 
natural knowledge about the world. After all, when Haldane assumed that no God or 
devil interfered in his experimental practice, he did this not because of the perceived 
danger for the stability of science, but because of his own professional experience and 
the empirical success of this methodological guideline: “this assumption has been 
justified by such success as I have achieved in my professional career” (Haldane 1934, p. 
vi). Thus, if the devil were to thwart Haldane‖s experiments, that would just be too bad 
for Haldane, and too bad for science.  
In 1775, the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris issued a statement that it “will no 
longer accept or deal with proposals concerning perpetual motion”. Numerous attempts 
had been made to construct a perpetuum mobile, and many had claimed success, but none 
of the devices could withstand critical scrutiny. Even in 1775, well before the full 
theoretical development of thermodynamics, the decision of the Royal Academy of 
Sciences was quite reasonable. To review all these complicated devices was very time-
consuming, and the consistent failure of all proposals in the past suggested that the 
physical possibility of perpetuum mobiles was very unlikely. Nowadays, we know that 
they would violate the first law of thermodynamics (the conservation of energy), which 
is as rock solid as anything in modern science. However, even such a theoretical 
consideration does not warrant the conclusion that a device for creating energy ex nihilo 
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is absolutely impossible. It would simply require extraordinary evidence to convince the 
scientific community, because its existence would completely overthrow our 
fundamental laws of physics. The fact that serious scientists no longer deal with 
proposals for a perpetuum mobile does not mean that science cannot deal with them, or 
that scientists have to assume that perpetuum mobiles are impossible because these 
would “destroy the stability of science”. This attitude of scientists is simply a good rule 
of thumb for not wasting too much time on highly improbable claims. 
1.4.3 ARGUMENT 3 - Science Stopper 
Apart from the previous objection, Robert Pennock offers an argument for IMN that 
goes back as far as Francis Bacon.13 According to Pennock, the argument from design, 
and the appeal to supernatural explanations in general, are nothing but “science 
stoppers”. If we would allow such arguments in science, “the scientist‖s task would 
become just too easy” (Pennock 1999, p. 292). With no prospect of a methodology to deal 
with supernatural phenomena and to proceed with scientific investigation, the 
supernatural is just a dead end. By adopting the IDC approach and making the design 
inference, “any motivation for further research would end” (Miller 2009, p. 130).  
[i]f one were to find some phenomenon that appeared inexplicable according to 
some current theory one might be tempted to attribute it to the direct 
intervention of God, but a methodological principle that rules out appeal to 
supernatural powers prods one to look further for a natural explanation (Pennock 
1999, p. 293),  
Pennock is right, of course, that in practice Behe‖s argument from irreducible 
complexity and Dembski‖s argument from complex specified information boils down to 
a facile science stopper. However, we think Pennock‖s formulation is unsatisfactory 
because it circumvents a more sound argument for dismissing these particular science 
stoppers, which again boils down to PMN. We claim that the appeal to supernatural 
explanations of IDC proponents is unscientific, not because it is the easy way out per se 
(although of course it is), but because it is the easy way out in the face of the very 
                                                     
 
13 “For the handling of final causes mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and 
diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and 
specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery.” Cited in Ruse (2004, p. 16)  
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reasonable prospect – based on our long-standing experience – that a little more effort 
will yield perfectly reasonable naturalistic explanation (Dennett 2003, p. 395).14 
Consider Pennock‖s analogy that “[s]cience is godless in the same way as plumbing is 
godless” (Pennock 1999, p. 282). As far as we can see, however, plumbers abstain from 
supernatural explanations for stopped drains not because such an explanation is the 
easy way out per se (although presumably it is) but because the idea of a supernatural 
Obstructor did not prove to be a particularly fruitful hypothesis for plumbing work. We 
tend to overlook this simple pragmatic rationale simply because we live in a world 
where looking for natural explanations for stopped drains is so dead obvious. 
Returning to the world of living systems, what reasons do we have, apart from our 
successful track record and the global materialistic picture emerging from science, to 
believe that we will eventually come up with naturalistic explanations for all biological 
phenomena? The more general point lurking here connects with the previous argument 
about the stability of science as well: what a priori guarantee do we have that nature is 
structured for the convenience of human scientific inquiry? As Alvin Plantinga writes: 
“Obviously we have no guarantee that God has done everything … in such a way as to 
encourage further scientific inquiry, or for our convenience as scientists, or for the 
benefit of the National Science Foundation” (Plantinga 2001b, p. 357). Although we 
certainly do not share Plantinga‖s theistic premises, his point is equally valid for the 
non-theist. How can we be so sure that the universe is structured in a way that is 
favorable or rewarding to scientific inquiry, and that is comprehensible to the human 
mind? As we saw in the previous section, if God or the devil chose to thwart our every 
attempt at scientific inquiry, we would have no other option than to resign ourselves to 
that. In a world like that, science is simply useless as way of obtaining knowledge. 
Our brains evolved primarily to deal with the adaptive problems our ancestors faced 
in Pleistocene environments. If one considers the opportunistic process of tinkering  
and modifying by which natural selection typically arrives at adaptive solutions, it 
would not have been terribly surprising if our brains were “cognitively closed” for the 
fundamental structures of the universe that surrounds us. For example, the phenomena 
described by quantum mechanics and general relativity theory are so difficult to grasp 
because our minds were simply not designed to cope with phenomena on a cosmological 
or microscopic scale. Only with a lot of mental effort and mathematical equipment have 
                                                     
 
14 Darwin seems to have advocated this sober rationale for the pursuit of naturalistic explanations as well. In 
The Expressions of the Emotions in Man and Animals, he wrote: “No doubt as long as man and all other animals are 
viewed as independent creations, an effectual stop is put to our natural desire to investigate as far as possible 
the causes of Expression. By this doctrine, anything and everything can be equally well explained; and it has 
proved as pernicious with respect to Expression as to every other branch of natural history.” [our italics] 
(Darwin 1965 (1872), p. 12) (quoted in Shanks 2004, p. 62) 
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scientists been able to overcome these cognitive limitations.15 As Einstein once 
remarked: “The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that it is 
comprehensible”. 
Moreover, the mere fact that an explanation is easier in terms of intellectual effort 
does not mean that it is less likely. For example, Freudian dream interpretations, with 
their intricate associations and multiple levels of unconscious meaning, are certainly 
more demanding on an intellectual level than ―resorting‖ to the idea that dreams are just 
incoherent fragments of nocturnal brain activity. However, the Freudian theory of 
dreams is wrong beyond any reasonable doubt. Modern psychology discourages the 
search for hidden meaning in dreams, just like it discourages the search for a perpetuum 
mobile. In these cases, stopping further inquiry has been reasonable. Thus, Plantinga has 
a point when he writes: “The claim that God has directly created life […] may be a 
science stopper; it does not follow that God did not directly create life” (Plantinga 2001b, 
p. 357). The mere fact that it is a “science stopper” cannot be a knockdown argument. 
However, when we consider that stopping the search for natural explanations in the 
face of biological complexity has always been premature, and that creationists have never 
grown tired of searching for new candidates of insurmountable ―gaps‖ when the old ones 
had worn out, we do have very good reasons to dismiss the current spate of challenges 
to evolutionary theory.  
Finally, it is not even obvious that invoking a supernatural force in an explanation 
would automatically necessitate that one ceases to investigate the phenomenon 
altogether (Koperski 2008). One may be confident that, on the contrary, such 
supernatural phenomena would attract lots of attention from the scientific community 
at large. 
1.4.4 ARGUMENT 4 – Procedural Necessity  
In her discussion of MN, Barbara Forrest uses another argument in defense of IMN, 
although her position turns out be somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, she does 
refer to the historical failure of supernatural explanations, and she defends a 
“tentative” denial of the supernatural: “the more science successfully explains, the less 
justification there is for the supernatural as an explanatory principle” (Forrest 2000, p. 
11). This certainly suggests that she is on the PMN side of the debate. On the other hand, 
however, Forrest relies on the sterile definition of the supernatural we quoted above, 
                                                     
 
15 Colin McGinn has claimed that the human mind is cognitively closed for some fundamental problems (see 
McGinn 1994). 
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which simply equates it with “that which is beyond the reach of science”. Thus, she 
claims that a proof for the supernatural is procedurally impossible, because it is impossible 
“to prove the existence of something about which nothing can be known through 
scientific investigation” (Forrest 2000, p. 10). IMN thus follows naturally: 
Methodological Naturalism does exclude the supernatural as an explanatory 
principle because it is unknowable by means of scientific inquiry. (Forrest 2000, p. 14)16 
But if the possibility of scientific evidence for the supernatural is already excluded from 
the very start, why would the unsurprising failure of supernatural explanations be of 
any interest to Forrest? Why would the metaphysical naturalist appeal to “the lack of 
explanatory success of supernaturalism” (Forrest 2000, p. 14), as Forrest does, if that 
success were procedurally impossible? Or, to approach the dilemma the other way around: 
if supernatural explanations are deemed to have failed in the past, in a non-trivial sense, 
it follows that they might have succeeded. It seems that Forrest wants to have her cake 
and eat it too. This leads her to a paradox, which she acknowledges but never resolves: 
“Paradoxically, supernatural claims are the kind of propositions for which empirical 
evidence is required, but impossible to obtain” (Forrest 2000, p. 16). 
In Steven Schaferman‖s defense of naturalism, we find a similarly ambivalent 
position. On the one hand, he writes that naturalism is a “hypothesis that has been 
tested and repeatedly corroborated, and so has become reliable knowledge itself” 
(Schafersman 1997). Schafermans takes this to be evidence of metaphysical naturalism 
as well, which is not exactly the topic of this paper, but his reasoning is certainly in line 
with our outline of PMN (and we would concur with his tentative metaphysical 
conclusions). On the other hand, however, Schaferman thinks that evidence for the 
supernatural is a procedural impossibility in science:  
It is doubtful whether any empirical evidence can possibly exist that would prove, 
demonstrate, or even suggest the existence of the supernatural. Such evidence 
posited by philosophical supernaturalists would certainly be labeled incomplete, 
incoherent, illogical, meaningless, misunderstood, or misinterpreted by philosophical 
naturalists, and thus rejected as reliable evidence. (Schafersman 1997) 
Thus, he writes that naturalism is a “methodological necessity” in the practice of 
science and even an “ontological necessity for understanding and justifying science by 
scientists.”  
We think this paradox can be resolved if Forrest and Schafersman plainly choose the 
P-horn of the MN-dilemma and abandon the uninteresting and sterile definition of the 
                                                     
 
16 For another example of this argument, see Miller (2009, p. 127) 
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term ―supernatural‖, which, as we discussed, is not relevant for the claims of IDC 
anyway. The whole argument about the “procedural necessity” of MN can then be 
dropped. 
From our perspective, the consistent failure of supernatural explanations is not only 
the rationale for PMN, but also provides the main argument for (provisionally) 
endorsing metaphysical naturalism. Forrest, however, maintains that IMN, grounded by 
the principle of procedural necessity, “provide[s] an epistemologically stable foundation 
for a metaphysics” (Forrest 2000, p. 14). We think this is peculiar, because the whole 
point of IMN, according to its defenders, is to separate methodology from metaphysics 
(Pennock 1999, p. 191). More specifically, as we will see in Chapter 2, defenders of IMN 
want to assure religious believers that science is only naturalistic as far as its 
methodology is concerned, and that it has no bearing on questions of metaphysics. 
Forrest‖s claim that IMN provides a foundation for metaphysical naturalism, conjoined 
with the contention that IMN is an intrinsic part of science, lends ammunition to the 
false creationist charge that scientists are dogmatic metaphysical naturalists (Boudry, 
Blancke et al.).17  
1.4.5 ARGUMENT 5 - Methodological Naturalism and Testability 
A last and important concern about supernatural explanations, which for some 
philosophers constitutes the main reason to dismiss them a priori, is that they are 
intrinsically untestable.  
[Science] rejects the possibility of supernatural explanations not as a matter of 
principle, but of methodology: What kind of research would one do, what kind of 
methodology would one use, if the premise were that God can do whatever He 
pleases whenever He wishes to do it? (Pigliucci 2002, p. 29) 
If there is an omnipotent force in the universe, it would by definition be 
impossible to hold constant (to control) its effects. […] The reason that the 
ultimate statement of creationism cannot be tested is simple: the actions of an 
omnipotent creator are compatible with any and all observations of the natural 
world. (Scott 2004, pp. 19-20) 
                                                     
 
17 Apart from that, we completely agree with Forrest‖s argumentation for metaphysical naturalism as 
“founded upon the methods and findings, respectively, of modern science” and “the only reasonable 
metaphysical conclusion—if by reasonable one means both empirically grounded and logically coherent” 
(Forrest 2000, pp. 8,9). 
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A supernatural agent is unconstrained by natural laws or the properties and 
capabilities of natural entities and forces – it can act in any way and accomplish 
any conceivable end. (Miller 2009, p. 128)  
We submit that Scott and Pigliucci are attacking specific kinds of supernatural claims 
to derive unwarranted conclusions about supernatural explanations in general. In fact, 
their unfalsifiability objection applies only to an omnipotent God who either 
deliberately conceals his own existence, or who has chosen to create exactly the world 
one would expect if there were only blind and material forces at work. Take for example 
the Omphalos hypothesis of Philip Gosse (1857), according to which God deliberately 
planted forged evidence for an old earth to test our faith, including dinosaur fossils and 
far-off stars. As many critics noted, the idea is as gratuitous as the idea that God created 
the world 5 minutes ago, and there is no conceivable way to refute it. However, we 
should note that the same holds for any number of supernatural and natural conspiracy 
hypotheses about the world, for example the claim that there are elves in my backyard 
who disappear whenever someone is watching them or trying to capture them on 
videotape. If a hypothesis is designed to be impervious to falsification, scientists are 
justified in dismissing it, and in that sense we completely agree with Scott and Pigliucci.  
Critics have also pointed out that proponents of supernatural claims, notably IDC 
theorists, often make use of evasive maneuvers that render their theories immune to 
empirical falsification (see Chapter 5). For example, in response to the argument from 
imperfection and bad design, Michael Behe has simply replied that we cannot gather 
any scientific information about the character and intentions of the Designer, that His 
reasons are unfathomable and that any speculation about them is pure metaphysics. 
Pennock has rightly dismissed this immunizing strategy:  
[I]t provides the design argument with a virtually impenetrable shield […] Behe 
has successfully insulated the design argument against the imperfection 
argument. Equipped with such bumpers it can now withstand any impact. 
(Pennock 1999, p. 249)  
As we will see in Chapter 4, Darwin observed that many supernatural ―explanations‖ of 
the biological and physical world are merely “re-stating the fact in dignified language” 
(Darwin 1998 (1859), p. 151). They do not generate novel predictions, because they were 
“explicitly designed to yield the already known facts […] and nothing more” (Worrall 
2004, p. 68). 
However, we have to be careful not to misconstrue the immunizing strategies and ad 
hoc amendments of creationists as intrinsic problems with supernatural claims. It is true 
that IDC proponents are guilty of immunization strategies, but as far as we can see, this 
unwillingness to take empirical risks is just an indication of the dismal state of their 
research programme. As we will see in Chapter 5, resorting to immunization strategies 
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is a typical feature of pseudo-science, supernatural or otherwise (Boudry and 
Braeckman 2010).  
Thus, if only they chose to do so, IDC proponents could fashion a supernatural 
designer with specific attributes and intentions in such a way that the design hypothesis 
would yield unexpected predictions and is not “compatible with any and all observations 
of the natural world”, as Scott claims (Scott 2004, p. 20; Richter 2002, p. 21). For example, 
if one supposes that the Designer is benevolent and has created the universe with good 
purpose, as almost any theist does, one is confronted with the problem of evil and 
suffering in the world (Hume 2007 [1779]; Kitcher 2007, p. 130). As Reed Richter pointed 
out, in response to Scott‖s defense of IMN, “―[s]upernatural‖ does not automatically 
imply arbitrary, capricious action as Scott implies”. 
 
Figure 1 Scientists witnessing extraordinary evidence for supernaturalism. Or do they? 
(based on a cartoon by Sidney Harris) 
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Moreover, even if we are talking about an omniscient and omnipotent God, the mere 
fact that He can make his own existence completely undetectable does not mean that He 
chooses to do so. An omnipotent God could as well prefer to reveal himself to the world 
and leave unmistakable traces of His creative activity, as the natural theologians from 
the 19th century thought He did. As an interesting analogy, consider the story Non 
Serviam by Stanislaw Lem, in which computer scientists have managed to create 
conscious life forms in an artificial mathematical environment whose properties are 
fundamentally different from the three space dimensions and single time dimension of 
their creator‖s world (Lem 1999, pp. 167-196). While the programmer is observing and 
monitoring the actions and behavior of these ―personoids‖, he discovers that the 
creatures start to speculate about their own origins and the possible existence of a 
creator. Throughout the story, their creator remains completely imperceptible for the 
personoids themselves, but this is only because the programmer has decided not to 
reveal his existence to them, and to strictly adhere to the principle of non-intervention 
(which he does for ethical reasons). If only he chose to do so, however, the programmer 
could easily reveal his own existence to his creatures. From the point of view of the 
personoids, the action of the programmer would be completely “miraculous”, i.e. a 
breach in the fabric of their world, completely unexplainable in terms of their 
“physics”, but with detectable consequences nonetheless. 
There is no rational reason at all to believe that we are in the predicament of the 
personoids in Non Serviam, but the story makes clear that supernatural intervention 
could be quite straightforward and scientifically detectable (Richter 2002), even if we 
would have no full ―access‖ to this supernatural realm, on account of our limitations as 
three-dimensional beings composed of matter and energy. In line with Lem‖s story, 
Taner Edis has developed a hypothetical metaphysical picture based on the analogy of a 
computer program, which nicely illustrates that a supernatural designer residing 
beyond the material universe could still be able to “acquire information about the world 
and act on it.” (Edis 2002, p. 41). Victor Stenger even made up a list of hypothetical 
observations that would favor the God hypothesis (Stenger 2008, pp. 231-234). We 
mentioned the alleged therapeutic effect of intercessory prayer as one possible source 
of scientific evidence for the supernatural. In general, if one wants to demonstrate the 
supernatural, one has to “seek ways in which the natural order is disrupted, indicating a 
reality beyond the material world” (Edis 2002, p. 43). Repeated miracles or psychic 
wonders, established through carefully controlled experiments, would “put an 
unbearable strain on a naturalistic view of the world” (Edis 2002, p. 188). And if we could 
detect specific patterns in the incidence of these miracles, they might provide us with 
clues about the nature of the supernatural cause behind them, or even the intentions of 
the supernatural being responsible for them.  
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We conclude that the argument from ―intrinsic unfalsifiability‖ misconstrues typical 
immunization strategies and ad hoc maneuvers of creationists as general and intrinsic 
problems with supernatural explanations.  
1.5 Discussion & Conclusion 
In this paper, we reviewed five arguments in favor of the conception of MN as an 
intrinsic property of science (IMN), and we found them all wanting: the argument from 
the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper 
argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. 
Instead, we defended MN as a provisory and empirically grounded commitment of 
scientists to naturalistic causes and explanations, which is in principle revocable by 
overwhelming and unmistakable empirical evidence (PMN). Evolutionary scientists are 
on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential 
grounds, and not by philosophical fiat.  
The numerous attempts to establish the existence of supernatural and paranormal 
phenomena might have succeeded (Humphrey 1996, pp. 23-28; Edis 1998). As we argued 
in the last section, unless the alleged supernatural Creator is involved in a cosmic 
conspiracy that makes his existence completely undetectable to us, it would not be 
terribly difficult to look out for scientific evidence for his presence.  
In a letter to biologist Asa Gray, Darwin wondered what would convince him of design 
(see also Coyne 2009a):18 
If I saw an angel come down to teach us good, and I was convinced from others 
seeing him that I was not mad, I should believe in design. If I could be convinced 
thoroughly that life and mind was in an unknown way a function of other 
imponderable force, I should be convinced. If man was made of brass or iron and 
no way connected with any other organism which had ever lived, I should perhaps 
be convinced. But this is childish writing. (Darwin 2000, pp. 169-170) 
Although the idea of one unmistakable ―smoking gun‖ for design is probably misguided, 
one can easily imagine a collection of observations that would lend plausibility to the 
                                                     
 
18 A similar argument is brought forward by Cleanthes in Hume‖s Dialogues concerning natural religion (Hume 
2007 [1779]) 
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hypothesis of a supernatural origin of life (see also Coyne 2009a; Richter 2002). Suppose 
that species just popped into the fossil record without any discernible traces of 
evolutionary descent and without demonstrable relationship to other species. Suppose 
that all available dating methods concurred on a 6000 year old earth and universe, and 
that all attempts to explain living systems by any combination of natural mechanisms 
consistently failed. To top it all, suppose that the letters of the book of Genesis were 
discovered to be encoded in human DNA (for a discussion of deliberate signatures from 
Designers, see Dennett 1996, pp. 316-318). This may seem like a preposterous thing to 
imagine, but it does not involve any logical contradictions, and it is difficult to deny that 
it would constitute compelling evidence for the hypothesis of supernatural interference 
in the universe.19 
One final argument for resisting this conclusion is based on Arthur C. Clarke‖s third 
law, which states that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from 
magic”. The idea is that we are never in a position to exclude advanced natural 
technology (for example, from extraterrestrial beings) in accounting for an apparent 
miracle, and hence that it is impossible to ever establish the occurrence of a 
supernatural event. First, it remains to be demonstrated that there is no logically 
possible event the occurrence of which would entitle us to conclude that a fundamental 
law of nature had been violated. Second, the argument on the basis of Clarke‖s third law 
is in fact a weak logical point, not unlike Duhem‖s underdetermination thesis. Although 
it is framed in the context of miracles, it is not restricted to the question of supernatural 
causation. Take any scientific explanation for a natural event. No matter how plausible, 
parsimonious and well-established our best explanation, we can never logically rule out 
a far-fetched conspiracy theory that is observationally equivalent to the explanation we 
accept. For example, any sufficiently powerful Cartesian demon may have orchestrated 
the events reported in a local news bulletin. Likewise, even if we can never logically rule 
out advanced extraterrestrial technology, that does not mean that the balance of 
probabilities will always tilt in favor of the space aliens. 
The argument reminds one of the village skeptic in bad horror movies, a cliché 
character who typically remains unmoved even after having witnessed the most 
outlandish supernatural events (the point presumably being that skeptics are such 
stubborn and closed-minded people). But we don't think that is how a rational person 
would react in the face of massive breaches in the laws of the universe, Clarke's third 
law notwithstanding. 
                                                     
 
19 Philosopher of science Elliott Sober has recently argued that the design argument is intrinsically defective 
(Sober 2008, pp. 109-188). In the end we think his a priori objections are unavailing, because his own 
reconstruction of the argument of design in terms of “likelihood” does not capture the argument 
satisfactorily. See Chapter 4. 
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Figure 2 Arthur C. Clarke‖s Third Law, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is 
indistinguishable from magic”, as interpreted by Calvin & Hobbes. 
We conclude that naturalists do not need to resort to the claim that scientific 
evidence for anything supernatural is logically or conceptually impossible, and in any 
case it is imprudent to do so. As Sahotra Sarkar noted, philosophical modesty teaches us 
that all scientific knowledge is fallible and that we cannot rule out any metaphysical 
picture with absolute certainty. Metaphysical transformations, although not quite so 
radical, have happened before, for example with Newton‖s theory of gravity (the notion 
of ―action at a distance‖) and particularly with the advent of quantum mechanics (the 
demise of classical determinism). Compelling empirical evidence, however unlikely, 
would in the end trump methodological scruples (Sarkar 2007; see also Koperski 2008).  
In the next Chapter, we argue that the principle of IMN is also an ill-advised attempt 
to reconcile science and religion. By excluding the supernatural from science by 
philosophical fiat, IMN has been grist to the mill of anti-evolutionists intent on accusing 
scientists of philosophical prejudice and dogmatism. To this end, they have exploited 
some of the specific philosophical weaknesses discussed in this paper. In our view, the 
conception of PMN salvages these philosophical problems and provides a more accurate 
picture of the proper role and rationale of science‖s naturalistic methodology. 
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Chapter 2.  
Grist to the Mill of Intelligent Design Creationism: 
The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural out 
of Science a priori 
Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every 




Abstract.20 According to a widespread philosophical opinion, the methodology of science 
is intrinsically naturalistic. It is simply not equipped to deal with supernatural claims, so 
it has no authority on questions of metaphysics. This (self-imposed) limitation on the 
epistemic reach of science is often used as a way to divorce evolutionary science from 
metaphysical naturalism or atheism. We argue that ruling the supernatural out of 
science for intrinsic reasons is not only philosophically untenable, but has actually been 
grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism. The philosophical weakness of this conception of 
naturalism in science has been eagerly exploited by proponents of Intelligent Design 
Creationism to bolster their claims about scientists‖ alleged naturalistic bias and 
dogmatism. We argue that it fosters a misleading image of evolutionary theory and that 
it sits uncomfortable with the foremost arguments for evolution by natural selection. 
                                                     
 
20 This chapter has been provisionally accepted in History & Philosophy of the Life Sciences. Parts of it have been 
presented at the conference 150 Years After Origin: Biological, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives at Victoria 
College, University of Toronto, November 2009 (Boudry 2009b). 
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Thus, we conclude that the attempt to reconcile evolutionary science and religion on 
the basis of this philosophical doctrine is doomed to fail.  
2.1 Introduction 
For over a long time, creationists and intelligent design proponents have complained 
that modern science, and evolutionary theory in particular, is biased towards 
materialism and naturalism, and that it rules out any supernatural forces by fiat (Gish 
1973; Macbeth 1974; Johnson 1993; Nelson 1996; Behe 2006). In response to these 
charges, a substantial number of philosophers and scientists have recently argued that 
science is only committed to something they call methodological naturalism. As we saw in 
Chapter 1, however, there has been some philosophical discussion about the correct 
understanding of methodological naturalism and its proper role in science (Nelson 1996; 
Pennock 1996; Forrest 2000; Behe 2006). In section 1.3, we have made an often neglected 
distinction between two conceptions of methodological naturalism, which involve two 
quite different views on the limits of science and the proper role of a naturalistic 
methodology (Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010a).  
To briefly rehearse this distinction, a widespread philosophical opinion conceives of 
methodological naturalism as an intrinsic and self-imposed limitation of science, as 
something that is part and parcel of the scientific enterprise by definition. According to 
this view (Intrinsic MN or IMN), science is simply not equipped to deal with the 
supernatural and therefore has no authority on the issue (Pennock 1999; Scott 1998; 
Haught 2004; Ruse 2005; Jones 2005; Fales 2009). We reviewed five arguments for this 
conception of IMN but found none of them convincing. Instead, we defended 
methodological naturalism as a provisory and empirically grounded commitment of 
scientists to naturalistic causes and explanations, which is in principle revocable in the 
light of extraordinary empirical evidence (Provisory or Pragmatic MN – PMN). In this 
view, MN derives its justification from the impressive dividends of naturalistic 
explanations and the consistent failure of supernatural explanations in the history of 
science (Edis 2002; Shanks 2004; Coyne 2009a; Fishman 2009). 
In this paper we analyze the wider implications of this important distinction between 
IMN and PMN for the status of evolutionary theory and its relationship with religion. 
We claim that ruling the supernatural out of science by definition or for intrinsic 
reasons proves a counterproductive strategy against Intelligent Design Creationism 
(IDC), and, for that matter, against any theory involving supernatural claims. As we will 
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show, IMN is actually grist to the anti-evolutionist mill on several accounts, and the 
attempts to reconcile religion and science on its basis are doomed to fail.  
2.2 The theological friends of IMN 
According to PMN, a reasonable scientist today will no longer pursue supernatural 
explanations, because these have proven to be a waste of time and effort. But that is not 
to say that they cannot possibly be true. All scientific knowledge is fallible, and in 
principle supernatural explanations might be vindicated one day, although the 
prospects are rather dim, to say the least. Defenders of IMN, however, want to exclude 
supernatural explanations from science for intrinsic reasons. They think that the 
commitment of scientists to natural explanations is unalterable in the light of future 
scientific developments, and the idea of a ―supernatural explanation‖ in science is 
nothing but an oxymoron.  
On the face of it, therefore, PMN seems to take the claims of supernaturalism more 
seriously than does IMN. This does not mean, however, that IMN is typically advocated 
by adversaries of religion and supernaturalism, quite to the contrary. Precisely because 
IMN shuts the door for the supernatural completely, it is often used, in the words of one 
of its proponents, as a way to “divorce [evolutionary science] from supposedly atheistic 
implication” (Ruse 2005, p. 45). 
The term ―methodological naturalism‖ itself was coined in 1983 by evangelical 
Christian and philosopher Paul deVries, who used it to make room for “other sources of 
truth” besides science.  
If we are free to let the natural sciences be limited to their perspectives under the 
guidance of methodological naturalism, then other sources of truth will become 
more defensible. However, to insist that God-talk be included in the natural 
sciences is to submit unwisely to the modern myth of scientism: the myth that all 
truth is scientific. (deVries 1986, p. 396) 
Not surprisingly, IMN is typically embraced by philosophers sympathetic to religion, by 
theistic evolutionists and religious liberals intent on safeguarding a special epistemic 
domain for religious faith (Haught 2000), but also by ―accommodationist‖ atheists who 
simply wish to temper the heated opposition between religion and science (Ruse 2001, 
2005). Although both theists and atheists have brought forward philosophical 
arguments for IMN that command our attention, it is also apparent from their writings 
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that their position is partly inspired by the desire to “protect the religious sensibilities 
of theistic evolutionists” (Schafersman 1997). In a way similar to Stephen Jay Gould‖s 
principle of Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA) (Gould 1999), in the eyes of many IMN 
embodies the modern modus vivendi between science and religion. However, not every 
theist is content with this polite stand-off between science and religion…  
2.3 The theological enemies of IMN  
With the principle of IMN coming to the fore of the debate, proponents of IDC have 
certainly not backed down on their claim that evolutionary biologists are guilty of 
philosophical and naturalistic prejudice. Phillip Johnson even made it the central tenet 
of his influential Darwin on trial (Johnson 1993): 
For all the controversies over these issues, however, there is a basic philosophical 
point on which the evolutionary biologists all agree. … The theory in question is a 
theory of naturalistic evolution, which means that it absolutely rules out any 
miraculous or supernatural intervention at any point. Everything is conclusively 
presumed to have happened through purely material mechanisms that are in 
principle accessible to scientific investigation, whether they have yet been 
discovered or not. (Johnson 2001, p. 61)  
IDC proponents have consistently treated IMN as a token of the same old metaphysical 
prejudice, this time in a thin methodological disguise: for on what grounds, other than 
metaphysical bias, could one dismiss one class of explanation in favor of another? 
Robert Pennock among others has claimed that Johnson simply fails to appreciate the 
difference between methodological and metaphysical naturalism (Pennock 1999, p. 192; 
Pennock 1996), but we will argue that the situation is more complicated. In fact, 
Johnson‖s remarks illustrate that IMN, clearly being the target of his attack here, is 
actually grist to the IDC mill. The attempt to reconcile science and religion on this 
philosophical basis is a strategic failure. 
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2.4 Four reasons not to adopt IMN 
2.4.1 A counterproductive strategy 
Advocates of IMN attempt to give the naturalistic methodology of science a solid 
philosophical underpinning. In doing so, however, they have divorced the methodology 
of science from the successful track record of naturalistic explanations. This makes it 
look as if science has never bothered to consider supernatural explanations, and had 
discarded them already at the outset. IDC proponents, always eager to cast evolutionists 
in the role of dogmatists with naturalistic blinders (Pennock 1996), while picturing 
themselves as nothing but neutral and open-minded observers, have repeatedly 
exploited this philosophical weakness of IMN.  
Philip Johnson, as one would expect from a ―good‖ lawyer, has seized upon this weak 
spot in the defense of his opponent and turned it to his advantage: if science is supposed 
to be neutral with respect to metaphysics, as defenders of IMN claim, why is the 
hypothesis of supernatural design already “disqualified at the outset” (Johnson 2001, p. 
67; see also Plantinga 1996; Dembski 1999, pp. 97-121)? Elsewhere, Johnson has 
complained that “[b]y the use of labels, objections to naturalistic evolution can be 
dismissed without a fair hearing” (Johnson 1993, p. 7; see also Dembski 1999). Critical 
and open-minded scientists, according to Michael Behe, have to follow the evidence 
wherever it leads, instead of ruling out some options for philosophical reasons (Behe 2006, 
p. 243; see also Nelson 1996; Nelson 1998; Dembski 2004, pp. 168-172; Bledsoe 2006, pp. 
255-256). Anti-evolutionists have repeated their complaints about scientists‖ naturalistic 
bias over and over, almost invariably choosing IMN as their target. 
Consider how Alvin Plantinga has spelled out the implications of IMN from a 
historical perspective:  
Well, suppose we adopt this attitude [IMN]. Then perhaps it looks as if by far the 
most probable of all the properly scientific hypotheses is that of evolution by 
common ancestry: it is hard to think of any other real possibility. […] So it could 
be that the best hypothesis was evolution by common descent – i.e. of all the 
hypotheses that conform to methodological naturalism, it is the best. But of 
course what we really want to know is not which hypothesis is the best from some 
artificially adopted standpoint of naturalism, but what the best hypothesis is 
overall. […] (Plantinga 2001c, pp. 137-138) 
Plantinga‖s argument illustrates how IMN backfires on science, because it suggests that 
the philosophical dice have always been loaded against the supernatural:  
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The believer in God, unlike her naturalistic counterpart, is free to look at the 
evidence for the Grand Evolutionary Scheme, and follow it wherever it leads, 
rejecting that scheme if the evidence is insufficient. (Plantinga 2001c, p. 138; see 
also Dembski 2004, pp. 170-171) 
In the eyes of IDC advocates, it is precisely this rigid methodological exclusion that 
makes scientists, and evolutionary biologists in particular, myopic to what they 
perceive as the self-evident fact of supernatural intervention. If it were not for IMN, so 
the argument goes, intelligent design would long have been vindicated.  
Although this may seem like an arcane philosophical matter, IDC proponents never 
fail to point out to the public that it must be a very bad theory that needs to be shored 
up by shaky philosophical arguments. For creationist Paul Nelson, IMN is a desperate 
move to keep theology out of science (Nelson 1998; Bledsoe 2006). For sociologist and ID-
sympathizer Steve Fuller, it is “as if contemporary science was so indefensible on its 
own merits that it required a philosophical fig leaf for protective cover” (Fuller 2007, p. 
117).  
Many defenders of IMN insist that IDC advocates simply fail to grasp the difference 
between methodological and metaphysical naturalism (Scott 1998; Pennock 1999; Miller 
2009). But the confusion is partly theirs. As we argued in Chapter 1, a complete 
disregard for potential supernatural causes makes sense only if we possess of airtight a 
priori reasons that the supernatural does not exist (a view to which defenders of IMN 
don‖t want to be committed), or that if it does, it never interferes with our material 
universe. This point has not escaped the attention of the more sophisticated creationists 
(Dilley 2010; Nagel 2008). In the absence of a sound rationale for disqualifying the 
supernatural, the dictum of IMN to proceed “as if” only natural causes are operative 
looks quite arbitrary.  
Imagine what would happen if supernatural forces were really operative in our 
universe. In such a world, IMN would be a very bad methodological device indeed, 
because it would exclude a real and tangible factor governing the universe from 
scientific consideration. As Richard Dawkins wrote (see also Edis 2002, 1998):  
A universe with a supernatural presence would be a fundamentally and 
qualitatively different kind of universe from one without. The difference is, 
inescapably, a scientific difference. (Dawkins 1997, p. 399) 
This is the reason why, despite the disclaimers of Scott and Pennock, IDC theorists who 
read about the principle of IMN persist – albeit falsely – that scientists must be dogmatic 
metaphysical naturalists (Johnson 1995; Dembski 1999; Dilley 2010). In the conception of 
PMN we defend, science provides support for, but does not collapse into metaphysical 
naturalism.  
Exploring the hinterland of science 
 41 
The writings of ID creationists show that this image of ―unfair exclusion‖ is actually to 
their strategic advantage. Consider Richard Lewontin‖s often-quoted statement about 
materialism in science:  
It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept 
a material explanation of the world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by 
our a priori adherence to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation 
and a set of concepts that produce material explanations [...]. Moreover, that 
materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in the door. (Lewontin 
1997, p. 28 ) 
Phillip Johnson lauds this paragraph as “the most insightful statement of what is at 
issue in the creation/evolution controversy that I have ever read from a senior figure in 
the scientific establishment” (Johnson 1997, p. 23). Michael Behe quotes molecular 
biologist Richard Dickerson‖s discussion of IMN in full, in which Dickerson argues that 
science is “a game with one overriding and defining rule”, namely that of IMN. In the 
discussion that follows, Behe has IMN where he wants to have it: “the clear implications 
is that [the supernatural] should not be invoked whether it is true or not” (Behe 2006, p. 
239). Behe opposes Dickerson‖s conclusion: “Science is not a game, and scientists should 
follow the physical evidence wherever it leads, with no artificial restrictions” (Behe 
2006, p. 243).  
Defining the supernatural out of science is thus counterproductive and weakens the 
scientific case against design (Kurtz 1999, p. 28; Stenger 2008). It lends ammunition to an 
accusation that was already voiced by young-earth creationists in the seventies (Gish 
1973, p. 24; Macbeth 1974, p. 126), namely that evolution by natural selection appears to 
win the scientific debate only because supernatural designers were already carefully 
excluded from the outset. Borrowing from IDC‖s own metaphoric imagery, IMN may 
very well be the philosophical crack into which IDC theorists are now trying to drive 
their wedge. 
Before moving on, we should note that some advocates of IMN have made an 
analogous claim to the opposite effect, namely that rejecting the supernatural on 
empirical grounds is counterproductive. For example, theologian and theistic 
evolutionist John Haught maintains that those who place the God hypothesis within the 
reach of science deprive themselves of the best philosophical argument against IDC:  
[I]n wedging ultimate explanation into what should be a purely scientific channel 
of inquiry [evolutionary materialists] are doing exactly what their ID adversaries 
do: they are conflating science with a worldview. […] By promoting their own 
peculiar alliance of science and philosophical belief they leave themselves with no 
methodological high ground to stand when they complain about ID‖s mixing of 
biology with theology. (Haught 2000, p. 207) 
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First, Haught‖s argument begs the question: of course, if one presupposes that science is 
not equipped to deal with supernatural claims, it follows naturally that those who think 
that evolution disfavors the God hypothesis are conflating science and metaphysics. But 
this is precisely the issue at hand. If IMN is philosophically untenable, as we claim, and if 
scientific knowledge does bear on the God hypothesis, materialism is no longer just a 
“philosophical belief”, but the most rational conclusion emerging from the scientific 
data. Second, even while he presents the views of his opponents, Haught curiously holds 
on to the claim that the only way to attack IDC is to claim “methodological high 
ground”, whereas this is precisely what “scientific materialists” (in our terms, defenders 
of PMN) are trying to avoid. As Haught should know, evolutionary materialists concur 
with IDC proponents in their view that a supernatural designer, if any such entity exists, 
is in principle within the reach of science. They are not the ones to complain about any 
conflation of science and theology on the part of IDC, and indeed, it would be 
inconsistent for them to do so.  
2.4.2 Making sense of the history of science 
Where did the idea originate that science cannot deal with supernatural causes? 
Attempts to explain mysterious phenomena that were previously attributed to deities in 
terms of natural causes date back to early Greek philosophy, and came to typify the 
activity of Christian natural philosophers from the Middle Ages onward (Numbers 2003, 
p. 266). Early pioneers of the scientific revolution like Galileo Galilei were the first to 
apply a naturalistic methodology to the study of the visible world with great success. 
This development culminated in Newton‖s vision of a clockwork universe, in which 
natural phenomena were described solely in terms of simple interactions and 
movements of matter. However, scientific pioneers such as Newton were certainly not 
metaphysical naturalists (Schafersman 1997), as they left the door open for a 
supernatural presence in the natural world. Famously, Newton resorted to supernatural 
intervention to explain the stability of the solar system. 
Although natural philosophers and scientists following Newton professed their 
preference for naturalistic explanations above divine miracles and interventions, many 
were convinced that the living world and especially the human mind would forever defy 
a naturalistic understanding. Over time, however, the track record of naturalism 
became ever more impressive, and even phenomena that were previously deemed to 
require supernatural causes yielded to a naturalistic description. For example, this 
happened with Newton‖s problem of the stability of the solar systems, the origin of 
species and the problem of biological adaptations, the human moral sense, the 
phenomenon of mystic experiences and so forth (Tyson 2005). Especially in the wake of 
Darwin‖s theory, which delivered a promissory note for a complete naturalistic picture 
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of the living world (Bowler 2007), many scientists removed the supernatural from their 
explanatory resources altogether.  
Ironically, this progressive naturalization has in retrospect fostered the ill-founded 
opinion that science is simply not equipped to evaluate supernatural claims in any case, 
and that the very notion of a supernatural explanation is an oxymoron. In their polite 
reluctance to make theists face the embarrassment, defenders of IMN now pretend that 
there really was no dispute to begin with, because science simply cannot deal with 
supernatural causes in principle. IMN suggests that natural explanations inevitably had to 
come out at the end of the day, and that things could not have been otherwise. But even 
after the advent of Darwin‖s theory, there was still substantive discussion – justifiable or 
not – about supernatural guidance in nature. Many scientists did accept the fact of the 
common ancestry of species, but they rejected Darwin‖s main mechanism, natural 
selection (Bowler 2007). Although the idea of special creation of individual species 
moved decidedly out of fashion, scientists still toyed with the idea that some sort of 
teleological driving force, or a form of supernatural guidance, was indispensable to 
account for evolutionary progress and biological complexity (Bowler 2007, p. 108). 
Eventually, with the development of the Modern Synthesis in the 1930s and the 
revolution of molecular biology, even these teleological and supernatural explanations 
were gradually abandoned.  
From the perspective of IMN, chasing God from science is a matter of enhanced 
philosophical understanding of the nature of science. For example, Michael Ruse 
maintains that theories and hypotheses in the history of biology have been scientific 
only insofar as they began to adhere to the strict prescript of MN. 
[E]volutionism grew up from being a pseudoscience, through being a popular 
science, to being what I term a mature or “professional” science. At various stages 
along this process, one sees a transformation as evolution does become more 
subject to the strict dictates of methodological naturalism. (Ruse 2005, p. 48)  
But Ruse‖s accounts sets the cart before the horse. It is not very different from saying 
that, at the turn of the 19th century, physicists became more and more subject to the 
“strict dictates of atomism”, as if atomic theory was itself not a result of contingent 
scientific discoveries. As Taner Edis wrote; “[t]here is no Scientific Method residing in a 
realm separate from the results of science; our methods are our results” (Edis 2002, p. 
258). To suggest that the naturalization of evolutionary biology is simply the result of 
some timeless philosophical insight having dawned on biologists is to obscure the 
evidential reasons for these developments. Therefore, calling the efforts of early 
biologists “unscientific” with hindsight is inappropriately anachronistic. As Taner Edis 
wrote: 
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Nineteenth-century biologists did not come to think special creation was a 
hypothesis they were not allowed to entertain. They rejected it, deciding 
evolution explained life better. And intelligent design is still, on the face of it, a 
straightforward fact claim. (Edis 2002, p. 58) 
The pioneers of the life sciences could very well have bumped into phenomena that 
defied their every attempt at naturalistic explanation (but they didn‖t). In the world we 
happen to live in, science is capable of offering a comprehensible natural explanation 
for many phenomena that were previously deemed ―mysterious‖. But apparently this 
perspective can easily distort our view on what is logically and metaphysically possible. 
We are so accustomed to the absence of any credible evidence for the supernatural that 
we are tempted to conclude that such evidence has to be impossible. But as Koperski 
noted regarding science‖s naturalistic methodology, it is wrong to think that “once a 
concept achieves the status of shaping principle it becomes an immutable axiom for all 
future science” (Koperski 2008, pp. 437-438). 
2.4.3 The retreat of the theologians 
Evolutionary science has been increasingly successful in finding impersonal and blind 
material explanations for phenomena that were previously held to be inexplicable in 
anything other than supernatural terms. Not surprisingly, evolutionary theory has 
attracted the attention of many a worrisome theologian. Theological doctrines have 
been revised in the light of new scientific developments, and metaphysical theories 
have over time been converted into vague metaphors (Bowler 2007). Some theologians, 
among whom defenders of IMN, have been quick to argue that the whole project of 
finding God in nature was misguided in any case, and they have tried to erect 
philosophical walls that safeguard a place for God (Edis 2002, pp. 51-58; see also Dennett 
1996; Stenger 2008). As Taner Edis wrote, however: 
Those scientists and theologians who looked to nature to find God had good 
reasons to do so. It was always possible that natural science would confirm the 
glory of God. It just did not happen. There is no averting disaster by retroactively 
calling the whole enterprise a religious mistake. (Edis 2002, p. 108) 
IDCers have rightly sensed that this enormous success of naturalism makes the idea 
of a supernatural creator alarmingly implausible. By contrast, advocates of IMN, atheists 
and theists alike, have tried to soft-pedal these implications. For example, Robert 
Pennock, in his otherwise very informative book on IDC, reassures his readers that 
“[s]cience is godless in the same way as plumbing is godless” (Pennock 1999, p. 282). But 
Pennock‖s analogy is highly misleading. If the explanatory domain of modern science 
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did merely consist of stopped drains and water pipes (or something equally modest), of 
course one could still comfortably resort to God when it comes to weightier matters of 
explanation. But as Pennock surely knows, modern science has extended its explanatory 
reach far beyond, including many domain that were traditionally reserved for God: the 
origin of life, the beginning of the universe, the human mind, the edges of the 
observable world etc. That God turned out to be superfluous in all these domains is of far 
greater importance than that He is of no use to plumbers.21 Ironically, Pennock tries to 
present this conspicuous absence of God from modern science, which is the logical 
result of His superfluity on every level of scientific explanation, as an indication of 
science‖s metaphysical neutrality.  
Nowhere in evolutionary theory does it say that God does not exist, for the simple 
reason that, like cell theory and relativity theory and every other scientific 
theory, it says nothing at all about God. But to say nothing about God is not to say 
that God is nothing. (Pennock 1999, p. 333) 
But nowhere in biology does it say that Bigfoot does not exist either. Surely Pennock 
does not want to conclude that biologists are completely neutral on the question of 
Bigfoot‖s existence?  
As another example, consider Christian philosopher Howard Van Till‖s claim that 
science is “religiously inconclusive”: “[m]odern scientific theories concerning the 
properties, behaviour and formative history of the physical universe are logically 
independent of both theism and naturalism, favoring neither one nor the other” (see 
also Van Till 2001, p. 153; Haught 2003, p. 776). But, as Alvin Plantinga has correctly 
pointed out, the claim that science cannot logically exclude theism is “a statement weak 
in excelsis” (Plantinga 2001a, p. 202). Logical possibility is a very weak criterion for belief, 
because there is precious little that science can logically exclude (even Bigfoot). The 
argument from logical consistency is a red herring that diverts attention away from the 
fact that evolutionary science has dramatically undermined a whole class of positive 
arguments for the God hypothesis.22 
                                                     
 
21 Massimo Pigliucci, even though his position is close to IMN, has correctly pointed out that it is perfectly 
rational to spell out the “philosophical” implications of modern evolutionary theory: 
Although asserting that evolution is purposeless is indeed a philosophical conclusion, it follows from 
everything we know and is consistent with the assumption in every science (not just evolutionary 
biology) that we can explain nature without recourse to the supernatural (gravitation seems as 
undirected and purposeless as evolution). (Pigliucci 2002, p. 258) 
22 Defenders of IMN often point out that many prominent scientists were religious believers and scientific 
naturalists nonetheless. Gregor Mendel, for example, was a metaphysical supernaturalist, but he developed his 
knowledge of the laws of heredity using natural causes only. First, simply because Mendel used only 
naturalistic explanations in his particular domain does not commit him to the idea that science in general is 
only allowed to use naturalistic explanations. Maybe he found naturalistic ones simply the most successful or 
fruitful explanations in the science of heredity? Second, and more importantly, the case of a scientist 
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In this context, defenders of IMN often set up a straw man for the alternative view, 
namely the argument that science has conclusively proven that atheism is correct. 
Evolutionary biologist and Roman Catholic Kenneth Miller sets up this false dilemma:  
[T]he conflict depends […] on an unspoken assumption. That assumption is, if the 
origins of living organisms can be explained in purely materialistic terms, then 
the existence of God – at least any God worthy of the name – is disproved. (Miller 
2000, p. 190; see also Scott 1998; Sober 2010) 
But who has defended that “unspoken assumption”? Even Daniel Dennett, whom Miller 
explicitly lists among the strident atheists allegedly sharing this assumption, is careful 
enough to argue that “[u]ndermining the best argument anybody ever thought of for 
the existence of God is not, of course, proving the nonexistence of God” (Dennett 2007, 
p. 139). Of course it is impossible to definitely prove that God does not exist, but it does 
not follow that scientific findings have no bearing whatsoever on the plausibility of the 
God hypothesis. We cannot disprove Russell‖s teapot either, but that doesn‖t make its 
existence a bit more plausible. 
Defenders of IMN think that the mere logical consistency of science with the God 
hypothesis closes the case, but they ignore other important ways in which evolutionary 
science can bear on the God hypothesis. Although this strategy may be well-intended as 
a means to protect religious sensibilities, and may look like a convenient solution in the 
context of the separation of Church and State in the US, it does not hold up to 
philosophical scrutiny and is arguably a little sanctimonious. 
2.4.4 Good fences make good neighbors? 
Defenders of IMN hold that the epistemic authority of science is limited to the natural 
realm. In the words of geologist Keith B. Miller: 
Science is a methodology that provides a limited, but very fruitful, way of 
knowing about the natural world. This method works only if science confines 
itself to investigation of natural entities and forces. (Miller 2009, p. 117)  
This self-imposed restriction to the “natural domain”, which is implicit in the view of 
IMN, invites one to infer that, for sure, there exist other domains beyond the natural 
realm, but that they just happen to fall outside the scope of science (McMullin 2001, p. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
professing to be a religious believer only proves that believing in God and defending science are 
psychologically compatible for some people, not that it makes much philosophical sense (Coyne 2009a).  
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168). At best, theistic defenders of IMN view science and religion on a par, as two 
valuable and non-overlapping sources of knowledge. However, from the claim that 
science is strictly involved with the natural domain, it is a small step to the conclusion 
that science is “limited” and only religion can offer us deep knowledge. For example, 
Reformed Christian Howard Van Till is a strong defender of science and IMN, but he 
does not buy any of its naturalistic conclusions: 
As I see it, granting the limited competence of natural science is not a concession 
to naturalism; rather, it is simply a recognition that we have empirical access only 
to creaturely phenomena. […] science [provides] an incomplete picture of reality 
because of its inability to probe beyond the creaturely realm. (Van Till 2001, p. 
161) 
For his part, theologian John Haught has embraced IMN in almost lyrical terms, as it 
resonates with his conviction that theology offers us ―deeper‖ knowledge than science 
can attain:  
Theology is now freed from moonlighting in the explanatory domain that science 
now occupies, so that it may now gravitate toward its more natural setting - at 
levels of depth to which science cannot reach. (Haught 2004, p. 236) 
But as we have shown in Chapter 1 (Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010a), if supernatural forces 
were to intervene in the natural world, as IDC proponents and other theists maintain, 
that would inevitably involve empirically detectable changes, and these are in principle 
open to scientific investigation. 
If religion really were to constitute an equally valid source of knowledge, as 
defenders of IMN suggest, it would be all the more unreasonable to refuse taking into 
consideration its “deeper knowledge” for such questions as the origin of life. As Alvin 
Plantinga wrote, “surely the rational thing is to use all that you know in trying to 
understand a given phenomenon” (Plantinga 2001b, p. 341). But this is exactly what 
defenders of IMN try to avoid. 
2.4.5 The empirical case against supernatural design 
In On the Origin of Species Charles Darwin took the reigning paradigm of natural theology 
very seriously. Rather than dismissing special creation out of hand, he repeatedly 
contrasted the hypothesis with his own account of evolution by natural selection. In 
particular, Darwin devotes considerable time to anomalous phenomena which he argues 
are “inexplicable on the ordinary view of the independent creation of each species”, and 
which support his “one long argument” for evolution through natural selection (Darwin 
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1998 (1859)): homologies, imperfect and rudimentary organs geographical distributions, 
embryology etc. For instance, Darwin writes: 
On the ordinary view of each species having been independently created, why 
should that part of the structure, which differs from the same start in other 
independently-created species of the same genus, be more variable than those 
parts which are closely alike in the several species? I do not see any explanation 
can be given. But on the view of species being only strongly marked and fixed 
varieties, we might surely expect to find them still often continuing to vary in 
those parts of their structure which have varied within a moderately recent 
period, and which have thus come to differ. (Darwin 1964, p. 155) 
And on the graduated variety in nature, he wrote: 
[N]ature is prodigal in variety, but niggard in innovation. Why, on the theory of 
Creation, should this be so? Why should all the parts and organs of many 
independent beings, each supposed to have been separately created for its proper 
place in nature, be so invariably linked together by graduated steps? Why should 
not Nature have taken a leap from structure to structure? On the theory of natural 
selection, we can clearly understand why she should not; for natural selection, we 
can clearly understand why she should not; for natural selection can act only by 
taking advantage of slight successive variations; she can never take a leap, but 
must advance by the shortest and slowest steps. (Darwin 1964, p. 194) 
Even now, many scientists consider the imperfections and oddities of nature more 
compelling arguments for evolution than the examples of ―perfect‖ adaptation, because 
the latter just mimic the actions of an alleged intelligent creator (Gould 1980). The point 
is that such empirical objections make sense only if one takes the theory of special 
creation seriously as an alternative scientific explanation. IMN inadvertently sabotages 
this empirical case against design, rendering Darwin‖s arguments against design 
superfluous. Worse still, defenders of IMN commit themselves to the peculiar view that 
a considerable part of On the origin of species is ―unscientific‖, because it discusses and 
evaluates supernatural explanations (even if in a purely negative way). After all, if 
supernatural explanations should be ruled out from the outset for intrinsic reasons, it 
makes little sense to argue that the empirical evidence speaks ―against‖ them. If 
supernaturalism fails on empirical grounds in the life sciences, this entails that, at least 
in some sense, it might have succeeded, something which is only allowed by PMN. The 
problem reminds one of an old Jewish joke: someone borrowed a copper kettle from B 
and after he had returned it, he was sued by B because the kettle now had a big hole it. 
His defense was: "First, I never borrowed a kettle from B at all; secondly, the kettle 
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already had a hole in it when he gave it to me him and thirdly, I gave the kettle back 
undamaged”.23 By setting up an artificial dividing line between science and supernatural 
claims, IMN has shot itself in the foot. 
In Chapter 1, we argued that, not only in the life sciences, but also in other domains 
of inquiry, skeptics and parapsychologists have investigated extraordinary claims 
which, if corroborated, would substantiate the existence of immaterial and supernatural 
entities (e.g. ghosts, extra-sensory perception, the healing power of prayer; see 
Humphrey 1996). IDCers like Paul Nelson have been quick to point out that the 
empirical arguments against supernatural design sit uncomfortably with the widely 
advocated principle of IMN in science (Nelson 1996, 1998; Dembski 1999; Woetzel 2005; 
Dilley 2010), and on that particular point they are quite right. As Thomas Nagel put it in 
his own rapprochement with IDC theory: 
The conceivability of the design alternative is part of the background for 
understanding evolutionary theory. To make the assumption of its falsehood a 
condition of scientific rationality seems almost incoherent. (Nagel 2008, p. 201) 
Indeed, the problem has been apparent in the ambivalence of defenders of IMN 
themselves concerning the epistemic reach of science. For example, Robert Pennock 
acknowledges the historical failure of supernatural explanations in the life sciences, but 
he thinks this cannot be the “main reason” for rejecting design explanations, and he 
then gives several intrinsic reasons for ruling the supernatural out of science (Pennock 
1999). Or consider Barbara Forrest‖s discussion of scientific naturalism. On the one hand, 
she offers a definition of the ―supernatural‖ that renders supernatural explanations in 
science procedurally impossible or even constituting a contradictio in terminis. On the 
other hand, she proposes a “tentative rejection” of the supernatural “in light of the 
heretofore consistent lack of confirmation of it” (Forrest 2000, p. 23), a claim with which 
we can heartily agree. As we saw in section 1.3, however, the two conceptions of 
methodological naturalism are mutually exclusive and should not be conflated: either 
one defends PMN, implying that supernatural explanations might have succeeded, or 
one chooses IMN, which is to rule them out of science a priori. 
                                                     
 
23 The example is given in Freud‖s The Interpretation of Dreams. 
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2.5 Functional Integrity and God as a Creature 
Regarding the question of how to attack IDC, we have sided with those who confront the 
claims of IDC head on, and against the accommodationist policy of IMN. For the most 
part, this is an internal dispute among scientists and philosophers who are in any case 
firm advocates of evolutionary theory. Some defenders of IMN are metaphysical 
naturalists and atheists all the same, but they simply feel that this is a purely 
philosophical discussion which should be separated from scientific issues (Pigliucci 
2010).  
However, it is interesting to have a look at a parallel debate which has been raging 
between those who concur on a completely different metaphysical outlook, that of 
theism, but who quarrel over the proper way to support their case and the correct way 
to think about the relation between religion and science. Both camps disagree over this 
fundamental question: is there any sound theological argument to accept that 
supernatural claims fall beyond the epistemic purview of science, and hence to endorse 
the strictures of IMN?  
From our perspective, only a world in which God does not intervene directly is a 
world in which IMN makes sense. If God really performed miracles, he would be on the 
scientific radar. But liberal theologians think that a worthy deity cannot but have a non-
interventionist policy. Several theological justification for that assumption have been 
put forward, among which that of Diogenes Allen: 
God can never properly be used in scientific accounts, which are formulated in 
terms of the relations between the members of the universe, because that would 
reduce God to the status of a creature. According to a Christian conception of God 
as creator of a universe that is rational through and through, there are no missing 
relations between the members of nature. If in our study of nature, we run into 
what seems to be an instance of a connection missing between members of nature, 
the Christian doctrine of creation implies that we should keep looking for one. 
(Allen 1989, p. 45)24  
One the one hand, miraculous interventions would reduce God to the sorry state of a 
creature. On the other hand, the Christian God would not allow for gaps in the natural 
economy of his creation. The latter assumption was coined the thesis of “functional 
integrity” by Howard Van Till:  
                                                     
 
24 Cited in Plantinga (2001b, p. 347).  
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In such a Creation there would be no need for God to perform acts of ―special 
creation‖ in time because it has no gaps in its developmental economy that would 
necessitate bridging by extraordinary divine interventions of the sort often 
postulated by Special Creationism. (Van Till 1996, p. 21) 
This theological position safeguards religion from direct confrontations with science, 
provided that scientists themselves are prepared to honor the same philosophical 
boundary with non-theistic rationalizations of their own. On the other side of the 
theological debate, however, we find IDC proponents such as Alvin Plantinga and 
William Dembski, who dismiss these arguments as half-hearted rationalizations of an 
untenable retreat of theology.  
The ill-conceived arguments of IDC advocates against evolution being what they are, 
it is difficult not to sympathize with them on this point. As Johnson succinctly put it in 
an exchange with Van Till about IMN: 
Effectively, that means that God must be exiled to that shadowy realm before the 
Big Bang, and He must promise to do nothing thereafter that might cause trouble 
between theists and the scientific naturalists. (Van Till and Johnson 1993) 
According to Dembski, the thesis of the self-sufficiency of nature “artificially constricts 
the range of things God may ordain” (Dembski 1999, p. 64; see also Plantinga 2001b). 
Liberal theologians, however, fear that the idea of direct interventions by God in the 
course of nature is equivalent to the God of the gaps theology. This theological view 
postulates divine action to account for those phenomena which science has left 
unexplained. Many theologians find the idea unacceptable, because it would restrict 
God‖s action only to particular aspects of reality, which science might be able to explain 
later on. Plantinga, however, among other defenders of IDC, has pointed out that 
believing in divine intervention does not commit one to the ―God of the gaps‖ theology 
at all, a position which he himself forcefully dismisses as an “anemic and watered-down 
semideism” (Plantinga 2001b, p. 350). One can still perfectly maintain, as Plantinga does, 
that God constantly and directly sustains the whole of his creation, natural laws 
included.  
Why, then, is the God of the gaps theology used as a red herring in the context of 
IMN, and why do theologians like McMullin, Van Till and Allen accept this retreat of God 
into the “shadowy realm before the Big Bang”? We think it suggests a different 
explanation: theological defenders of IMN seem to be aware, unlike Plantinga and IDC 
proponents, that appealing to supernatural explanations in the face of unresolved 
scientific problems has always been premature, and that such problems have consistently 
yielded to a naturalistic framework. From their perspective, pursuing arguments like 
―irreducible complexity‖ in biology is a guaranteed dead-end for theology (see Chapter 
7). Because they do not share Plantinga‖s misconceptions about evolutionary theory, 
they do realize that the scientific evidence for evolution by natural selection is 
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overwhelming. If science has failed to unearth any evidence for a supernatural Creator 
of the universe, what better solution than to pretend that it simply has no bearing on 
the supernatural at all? In this light, it is not surprising that some theologians have tried 
to reach a mutual understanding with those evolutionary scientists who, for their part, 
have no intention to tread on the domain of metaphysics. Faced with a pending defeat, 
liberal theologians have simply opted for a draw.  
On the other side of the debate, Plantinga, Johnson and Dembski are keenly aware 
that, if the theory of evolution by natural selection is true, this constitutes an enormous 
threat to religious belief. In fact, it reduces the theistic God to little more than a logical 
possibility, which is a very weak basis for belief. In the words of Dembski:  
Atheists, materialists and naturalists had been offering promissory notes that 
natural laws were sufficient to explain life. It was Darwin‖s theory, however, that 
put paid to these promissory notes. […] By giving a plausible picture of how 
mechanization could take command and make life submit to mechanistic 
explanation, [Darwin] cleared the ground for the triumphant march of 
mechanistic explanations in biology. (Dembski 1999, pp. 83-84) 
The only solution from their perspective is simply to resist the claim that naturalistic 
evolution tells the whole story. As they are confident that the existence of God can be 
scientifically demonstrated, they will have none of the rationalizations offered by Allen, 
Van Till and others (Van Till and Johnson 1993; Dembski 1999; Plantinga 2001a). In a 
certain sense, they can‖t be blamed.  
2.6 Confusion about methodological naturalism 
As is clear from our discussion, we think the real issue in the debate about 
methodological naturalism with respect to IDC is not the confusion between 
metaphysical and methodological naturalism, as Eugenie Scott and others like to think, 
but the distinction between IMN and PMN. We think that the current divergence of 
opinion on the subject of methodological naturalism deserves more attention. IDC 
theorists often present the Intrinsic version of methodological naturalism as the 
consensus opinion among scientists, because they obviously perceive it as an easy target 
(see for example Johnson 2001, p. 61; Dembski 1999, pp. 117-119, 2004, pp. 170-171). This 
is not altogether unsurprising, as some scientific and philosophical advocates of IMN 
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themselves write as if IMN were universally accepted among scientists and philosophers 
(Edis 1998; Sarkar 2009).  
Unfortunately, even some writers whose position is in line with what we call PMN fail 
to notice the popular appeal of the alternative view. For example, in his excellent 
critique of IDC, Niall Shanks has no patience with the suggestion that science is by 
definition restricted to natural causes and explanations, which he labels as a “smoke-
and-mirrors strategy” (Shanks 2004, p. 139) of IDC advocates. But this is to 
underestimate the confusion on the issue among defenders of evolutionary theory. 
Shanks is right to dismiss Dembski‖s complaint that “methodological naturalism is the 
functional equivalent of a full-blown metaphysical naturalism” (Dembski 1999, p. 119), 
because in Shank‖s presentation it amounts to no such thing. However, Shanks seems to 
be unaware that the popular IMN version that Dembski attacks (but wrongly assumes to 
be the scientific consensus view), indeed only makes sense if we have prior reason to 
accept metaphysical naturalism (see for example Dembski 2004, p. 191; Nagel 2008, pp. 
193-194).  
Thus, Shanks writes that “the methodological naturalist will not simply rule 
hypotheses about supernatural causes out of court” (Shanks 2004, p. 141), whereas this 
is exactly what authors like Eugenie Scott, John Haught and Robert Pennock do. In a 
review of Shanks‖ book, IDC sympathizer Del Ratzsch unsurprisingly accuses Shanks of 
misrepresenting even the views of his evolutionist allies, and he confronts him with a 
catalogue of favorite quotes from IMN advocates (Ratzsch 2005, pp. 39-48).  
In a reply to Paul Nelson‖s critique of methodological naturalism (Nelson 1996), 
philosopher of biology Kelly C. Smith rightly points out that science “is not in the 
business of ruling things impossible” (Smith 2001, p. 713), and he emphasizes that 
whenever supernatural explanations were invoked in the history of science, they never 
survived critical scrutiny for very long. However, Smith‖s article leaves the reader with 
the impression that there is no discussion among philosophers of science about this 
approach, whereas many of his colleagues hold views incompatible with his own. For 
example, would Eugenie Scott agree that in principle science is always open to the 
possibility of supernatural explanations? 
2.7 Discussion 
At some point in David Hume‖s Dialogues concerning natural religion (Hume 2007 [1779]), 
Philo and Demea take sides together against Cleanthes‖ a posteriori arguments for the 
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existence of God. They maintain that the human mind is simply too limited to be able to 
grasp the unfathomable nature of God, that His existence is self-evident and can be 
known a priori. Arguably, Philo (or Hume) is also just being careful to avoid that his 
skeptical arguments against the design argument collapse into outright atheism. Demea 
for his part does not want to make God‖s existence dependent on something as mundane 
as an a posteriori argument. Fallible and imperfect as these are, they would make the case 
for religious faith too vulnerable to atheist attacks.  
In a similar manner, the philosophical principle of IMN has tried to consolidate a 
truce between (evolutionary) science and religion. In the context of the ongoing efforts 
by IDC advocates to sneak their pseudoscience in the classroom, this may look like a 
convenient and well-intended solution to uphold the separation between church and 
state (Scott 2004; Jones 2005). In Chapter 1, however, we concluded that the attempt to 
rule IDC out of science with intrinsic arguments does not hold up to philosophical 
scrutiny. As Young and Edis succinctly wrote, “scientists reject claims of intelligent 
design because of their failure, not because intelligent design is indelibly stamped with a 
philosophical scarlet letter” (Young and Edis 2006, p. xii).  
In this paper, we developed our argument further and demonstrated that IMN also 
fails from a strategic perspective: not only does it fail to counter the classical creationist 
accusation of naturalistic bias in science and evolutionary biology in particular, but it 
actually makes matters worse. The philosophical weakness of IMN has been eagerly 
exploited by IDC theorists to repeat their old accusations, to cast themselves in the role 
of open-minded truth-lovers, and to point out the discrepancy between the letter of 
IMN and actual scientific arguments against supernatural design. With IDC proponents 
becoming ever more prominent and philosophically sophisticated, IMN will be 
subjected to more and more philosophical pressure. For that reason, excluding 
supernatural explanations from science with muddled philosophical arguments is 
certainly a bad idea. Moreover, IMN compromises the epistemic status of science and 
suggests that it is just one way of knowing – even a “limited” one - among others. 
Finally, it soft-pedals the metaphysical reverberations of evolutionary theory, and fails 
to appreciate the unremitting process of naturalization in the history of science. 
These problems show that maybe IMN does not fail so much as a strategy, but 
because it was set up as a political strategy in the first place.25 The main motivation 
                                                     
 
25 Although we maintain that IMN is philosophically and historically unsound, we have to acknowledge the 
possibility that it has proven fruitful in bringing about the success of the scientific enterprise. Since IMN 
provides a convenient way to reconcile science and religion, it helps in uniting many people from different 
backgrounds and with different worldviews in the collaborative enterprise that science is. Arguably, this 
would have been more difficult if the naturalistic program of science and evolutionary theory in particular 
had been perceived as an immediate threat to religion. Up to the present day, scientific organizations like the 
NCSE and the NAS have won the continuing support of progressive theologians and religious scientists for 
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behind IMN seems to be a desire to reassure the faithful and retain the support of 
theistic evolutionists and religious liberals in the battle against anti-evolutionist forces. 
Understandable as this may be from a political perspective, the purported 
reconcilement between science and religion on the basis of IMN happens at the expense 
of philosophical and scientific integrity, and is therefore misguided. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
evolution by trying to “divorce [evolutionary science] from supposedly atheistic implication” (Ruse 2005, p. 
45) 
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Chapter 3.  
Blueprint and Machine Metaphors in Biology and 
Science Education 
 To the few this is as clear as daylight, and beautifully 
suggestive, but to many it is evidently a stumbling-block. 
- Alfred Russel Wallace to Charles Darwin, on the use of 
the metaphor of natural selection 
 
The price of metaphor is eternal vigilance. – A. 
Rosenblueth and N. Wiener 
 
 
Abstract.26 Genes are often described by biologists using metaphors derived from 
computational science: they are thought of as carriers of information, as being the 
equivalent of “blueprints” for the construction of organisms. Likewise, cells are often 
characterized as “factories” and organisms themselves become analogous to machines. 
Accordingly, when the human genome project was initially announced, the promise was 
that we would soon know how a human being is made, just as we know how to make 
airplanes and buildings. Importantly, modern proponents of Intelligent Design, the 
latest version of creationism, have exploited biologists‖ use of the language of 
information and blueprints to make their spurious case, based on pseudoscientific 
concepts such as “irreducible complexity” and on flawed analogies between living cells 
and mechanical factories. However, the living organism = machine analogy was 
                                                     
 
26 This chapter has been adapted from Pigliucci & Boudry (in press). One technical section on inheritance and 
gene-centrism has been left out for the purpose of this doctoral thesis.  
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criticized already by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In line 
with Hume‖s criticism, over the past several years a more nuanced and accurate 
understanding of what genes are and how they operate has emerged, ironically in part 
from the work of computational scientists who take biology, and in particular 
developmental biology, more seriously than some biologists seem to do. In this article 
we connect Hume‖s original criticism of the living organism = machine analogy with the 
modern Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) movement, and illustrate how the use of 
misleading and outdated metaphors in science can play into the hands of 
pseudoscientists. Thus, we argue that dropping the blueprint and similar metaphors will 
improve both the science of biology and its understanding by the general public. 
3.1 Introduction: the machine metaphor in biological science 
and education 
Scientific thinking and education are rife with the use of metaphors. Well-known 
examples include physics (heavy objects on a blanket as an image of space-time 
curvature), chemistry (atoms as miniature solar systems), ecology (the planet Earth as a 
homeostatic organism), and many others (Condit, Bates et al. 2002; Brown 2003). In 
biology and biological education in particular, metaphors are pervasive at almost every 
level of description and explanation. Brown (2003, p. 159) has even argued that “biology 
today reveals more forcefully than any other area of science the essential role of 
metaphor in scientific reasoning and communication.” Perhaps this pervasiveness of 
metaphors is an inevitable result of the way human beings think (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980; De Cruz and De Smedt 2010), but it has consequences for both science education 
and scientific research, and not necessarily for the better. For instance, Fox Keller (1995) 
made that case concerning information-type metaphors in the broad field of genetics 
(see also Nelkin 2001), while Martin (1994) has done the same for the more specific area 
of immunology and HIV-AIDS research.  
The simple empirical observation that science talk depends heavily on analogical 
thinking mandates that we examine the consequences of deploying certain metaphors 
on how students and the public at large end up understanding science, and that we be 
attentive to the way pseudoscientists often seize upon these metaphors to foster 
misunderstandings. Specifically, if we want to keep Intelligent Design out of the 
classroom, not only do we have to exclude the ―theory‖ from the biology curriculum, but 
we also have to be wary of using scientific metaphors that bolster design-like 
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misconceptions about living systems. We argue that the machine-information metaphor 
in biology not only misleads students and the public at large, but cannot but direct even 
the thinking of the scientists involved, and therefore affect the sort of questions they 
decide to pursue and how they approach them. For instance, there undoubtedly were 
very good reasons to pursue the Human Genome Project during the 1990s and the early 
part of the 21st century, but obtaining the “blueprint” for how human beings are made 
(and therefore cure genetic-based diseases like cancer) was certainly not one of those 
good reasons. Yet, it was the blueprint rhetoric — based on the actual informatics-
directed thinking of the scientists involved — that helped sell the 4.2 billion effort (in 
2009 dollars) to the American public27, not to mention redirect the research time and 
intellectual efforts of tens of thousands of scientists and graduate students the world 
over. 
Similarly, the never ending debate in science education between creationists and 
evolutionary biologists hinges on the persistent (mis-)understanding of biological 
organisms as “machines,” an understanding that is perpetuated by biologists 
themselves in textbooks and lectures. The organism-as-machine metaphor goes much 
further back in time than the decidedly modern genome-as-blueprint one, to René 
Descartes and other mechanistic philosophers. Interestingly, as we shall see, attempts to 
point out its misleading effects are also quite old, beginning with David Hume‖s 
devastating critique of the idea of intelligent design. 
In this paper we discuss the effect of what we call the machine-information metaphor 
(or family of metaphors, to be more precise) in the areas of science education and 
scientific research. In the first case, we examine the ―debate‖ about Intelligent Design 
and argue that some defenders of evolution themselves (unwittingly) keep fueling the 
widespread misunderstanding among the general public, because they accept the 
fundamental soundness of their opponents‖ characterization of organisms as machine-
like. In the second case, we argue that thinking of genomes as blueprints has not only 
led the general public astray but may have also delayed the incorporation of 
developmental biology into evolutionary theory, and is still delaying the expansion of 
the general concept of heritable information to phenomena that rightly should fall 
within its purview, like epigenetic, behavioral, cultural and even environmental 
transgenerational effects. We conclude with a brief look at a few alternative metaphors 
and suggest that biological research and teaching could and should actually be done 
without much use of grand metaphors, although the widespread tendency to employ 
the latter may be used as a critical thinking tool in both general and graduate level 
education to produce more science-savvy citizens and scientists 
                                                     
 
27 See http://www.genome.gov/11006943 
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3.2 Machine metaphors, Intelligent Design and science 
education 
When delving into unknown territory, scientists have often naturally relied on their 
experiences in more familiar domains to make sense of what they encounter (De Cruz 
and De Smedt 2010). In the early days of the scientific revolution, mechanical metaphors 
proved to be a powerful instrument to get a grip on new discoveries about the living 
world and the universe at large. According to Niall Shanks, we can trace back the 
emergence of machine metaphors at least to the Middle Ages, when new achievements 
of technology had a profound cultural influence and captured the collective imagination 
(Shanks 2004, pp. 25-27). Against this background of technological innovation, it is not 
surprising that the pioneers of anatomy and physiology relied on the metaphor of the 
animal body as a complicated piece of machinery to make sense of their discoveries. The 
mechanical language provided a richness of meaning and allowed them to structure the 
new phenomena in terms of familiar experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For 
example, the image of the human heart as a pump with intricate mechanical 
components played an important role in William Harvey‖s discoveries about blood 
circulation. 
In the course of the 17th century, a new philosophy of nature became prominent that 
developed a conception of the universe in purely mechanical terms. According to this 
mechanical philosophy, which was developed by thinkers like René Descartes, Pierre 
Gassendi and Robert Boyle, the phenomena of nature can be understood purely in terms 
of mechanical interactions of inert matter (Ashworth 2003). This mechanization of 
nature proved an important driving force behind the Scientific Revolution, and at the 
end of the 17th century culminated in Newton‖s theory of motion. Newton‖s description 
of planetary orbits following the fixed laws of gravity conveyed an image of a clockwork 
universe set in motion by an intelligent First Cause. In fact, that was exactly how 
Newton conceived the universe and its relation to the Creator. For Newton and many of 
his contemporaries, the importance of the mechanical conception of nature was greater 
than the mere term ―metaphor‖ would suggest, as the development of mechanistic 
philosophy was itself largely inspired by religious motivations (Ashworth 2003). As 
Shanks wrote in his account of the history of the design argument, “the very 
employment of machine metaphors invited theological speculation” (Shanks 2004, p. 
32). 
In the second part of the 17th century, the mechanical pictures of living organisms 
and of the cosmos at large converged into an intellectual tradition where theology and 
science were intimately intertwined: natural theology. The most famous representative 
of this tradition was William Paley, whose work Natural Theology, of Evidence of 
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Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature (1802) 
made a deep impression on the young Charles Darwin. As the title of the book makes 
clear, Paley and the natural theologians conceived of Nature as a complicated 
machinery of intricate wheels within wheels, in which every organism has its proper 
place and is adapted to its environment. According to Paley, the contrivance and 
usefulness of parts exhibited by living organisms attests to the intelligence and 
providence of a benevolent Creator. This so-called ―design argument‖ already had a long 
intellectual pedigree, dating back to Plato, Cicero and Thomas Aquinas, but its most 
famous formulation is found in the first chapter of Natural Theology, in which Paley 
relies on the analogy between living organisms and a pocket watch to support his design 
inference.28 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how 
the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that for any thing I know to 
the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show 
the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, 
and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should 
hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for any thing I knew, the 
watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the 
watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case as in 
the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz., that when we come to inspect the 
watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts 
are framed and put together for a purpose . . . This mechanism being observed . . . 
the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that 
there must have existed, at some time, and at some place of other, an artificer or 
artificers, who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who 
comprehended its construction, and designed its use. (Paley 1802, p. 5)  
The idea is that without having witnessed the creation of the watch, without even 
knowing anything about the identity of the designer, the purposeful arrangement of 
parts forces the conclusion of intelligent design on the observer. Of course, there is at 
least one fundamental dissimilarity: human artifacts don‖t propagate, whereas living 
organisms do. However, Paley did not think this significantly endangers the analogy. 
Instead, he argued that it actually strengthens the design inference for the case of living 
organisms. After all, continues Paley, suppose that the watch we found in the heath did 
not only indicate the time, but was also capable of producing another watch with the 
                                                     
 
28 Paley was not the first to pursue the analogy with a pocket watch. In fact, Paley borrowed the famous 
paragraph in the first chapter of his work from the book Regt gebruik der werelt beschouwingen (1715) by the 
Dutch physician Bernard Nieuwentijt, who was himself probably influenced by thinkers like William Derham, 
John Ray and Robert Boyle. 
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same features. Wouldn‖t this even more “increase [our] admiration of contrivance”? 
(Paley 1802, p. 9) Living organisms, according to Paley, surpass the ingenuity and 
complexity of human artifacts “in a degree which exceeds all computation” (Paley 1802, 
p. 13), and are worthy of a divine Creator alone. Even Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, 
clearly struggled with the apparently purposeful design of living organisms. Although 
he was wary of teleological accounts, always preferring “efficient” mechanical causes 
for explaining the world, he acknowledged that living systems necessarily had to be 
explained “as if” they were teleological in nature. Thus, he maintained that “it is absurd 
to hope that another Newton will arise in the future who shall make comprehensible by 
us the production of a blade of grass according to natural laws which no design has 
ordered” (Kant 2007 [1790], p. 185). It seems that for beings such as ourselves, used to 
associate functional complexity with intelligence, it is very difficult to escape the 
impression of design in nature, and the adaptive complexity of living organisms 
certainly demands a special explanation. Darwin‖s theory of evolution by natural 
selection eventually provided such explanations, fatally undermining Paley‖s argument, 
and flagrantly contradicting Kant‖s pessimism on the matter. 
While Darwin was the one who gave the most decisive blow to the design argument 
by suggesting a natural explanation for adaptive complexity in the living world, many 
philosophers would agree that David Hume foreshadowed its demise (see Chapter 4), by 
exposing several problems with the central analogy. In his work Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion (Hume 1998 [1779]), which actually predates Paley‖s magnum opus by 
more than 50 years, we find a discussion of the design argument among Philo, the 
skeptical character that voices Hume‖s ideas, Demea, the orthodox religious believer, 
and Cleanthes, the advocate of natural theology. 
After Cleanthes has set out the design argument in terms foreshadowing Paley‖s 
analogy of the watch, Philo objects that it is dangerous to derive conclusions about the 
whole of the universe on the basis of a spurious analogy with one of its parts. Given that 
our experience with design is limited to human artifacts only, we have to proceed with 
great caution, and it would be presumptuous to take so minute and select a principle as 
the human mind as the model for the origin of the whole universe.29 Hume realized that, 
at least in some cases, appearances of intelligent design can be deceptive. In the words 
of Philo: 
                                                     
 
29 Philo says that “it is a palpable and egregious partiality to confine our view entirely to that principle by 
which our own minds operate” (Hume 1998 [1779], p. 46). 
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If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the 
carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and beautiful a machine? And what 
surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, 
and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, 
mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually 
improving? (Hume 1998 [1779], p. 36) 
In contemplating that “[m]any worlds might have been botched and bungled, 
throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out”, Hume (p. 36) even comes close 
to Darwin‖s crucial insight about the power of natural selection.  
Although Hume does not deny that we can discern similarities between nature and 
human artifacts, he warns us that the analogy is also defective in several respects. And if 
the effects are not sufficiently similar, conclusions about similar causes are premature. 
To illustrate this, Philo proposes another possible cosmogony on the basis of the 
analogy between the world and an animal: 
A continual circulation of matter in [the universe] produces no disorder; a 
continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: The closest sympathy is 
perceived throughout the entire system: And each part or member, in performing 
its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. 
The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal. (Hume 1998 [1779], p. 39) 
Philo further speculates that the world even more resembles a plant, and that it could 
have come into existence by a process analogous to reproduction or vegetation. While 
the others protest at his arbitrary speculations, Philo maintains that his analogies, 
though certainly defective in some respects, are no more so than the machine analogy. 
“[I]n such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views may preserve a kind 
of imperfect analogy, and invention has here the full scope to exert itself” (Hume 1998 
[1779], p. 49). Aware of the fallibility and imperfections of human reasoning, Hume 
remains highly skeptical about the design inference and the machine analogy, even 
though he was not able to provide a satisfactory explanation for the appearance of 
design in nature. 
In the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin (1859) finally proposed a natural explanation 
for the phenomenon that inspired Paley but failed to convince Hume. Although the 
design argument is still of interest to philosophers and historians of science (see 
Chapter 4), it has been widely discarded in the scientific community. However, the 
analogy on which Paley based his inference seems to be alive and well, not only in the 
minds of creationists and IDC proponents, but also in the writings of science 
popularizers and educators (and even in actual scientific work, as we will see in the next 
section). Many scientists have actually argued that Paley at least offered an incisive 
formulation of the problem as there is indeed a hard-to-shake intuition of contrivance 
and intelligent design in nature. As one of the most ardent defenders and popularizers 
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of evolutionary theory put it, “Biology is the study of complicated things that give the 
appearance of having been designed for a purpose” (Dawkins 1991, p. 1). Adaptive 
complexity, then, is still regarded as something that requires a special explanation. 
 In textbooks, science educators have presented the comparison of living organisms 
and man-made machines not just as a superficial analogy, but carrying it out to a 
considerable level of detail. For example, the cell has been described as a miniature 
factory, complete with assembly lines, messengers, transport vehicles, etc. Consider the 
following quote from Bruce Alberts, former president of the National Academy of 
Sciences: 
The entire cell can be viewed as a factory that contains an elaborate network of 
interlocking assembly lines, each of which is composed of a set of large protein 
machines. … Why do we call the large protein assemblies that underlie cell 
function protein machines? Precisely because, like machines invented by humans 
to deal efficiently with the macroscopic world, these protein assemblies contain 
highly coordinated moving parts. Given the ubiquity of protein machines in 
biology, we should be seriously attempting a comparative analysis of all of the 
known machines, with the aim of classifying them into types and deriving some 
general principles for future analyses. Some of the methodologies that have been 
derived by the engineers who analyze the machines of our common experience 
are likely to be relevant. (Alberts 1998, p. 291) 
Similarly, in their popular high school textbook Biology, Kenneth Miller and Joe Levine 
develop an extensive analogy between the living cell and a manufacturing plant Levine 
and Miller 1994 (Levine and Miller 1994). In Miller‖s own words: 
The nucleus is the factory‖s main office, the mitochondria its power plants, the 
ribosomes its manufacturing equipment, and the Golgi apparatus its shipping and 
receiving department (Miller 2008, p. 27).  
In line with the machine metaphor, scientists have also conceived of the genome as a 
―blueprint‖ for the organism, written in a four-letter alphabet and in a language that 
scientists have deciphered. In the wake of the Human Genome Project, many scientists 
have enthusiastically described the human DNA sequence as “the book of life” or “the 
blueprint for a human being” (for an overview, see Nelkin 2001)). In an interview for 
Time about the Human Genome Project, biochemist Robert Sinsheimer has described 
the genome as “the complete set of instructions for making a human being […] written 
in the language of deoxyribonucleic acid, the fabled DNA molecule” (Jaroff 1989). 
According to Miller, machine metaphors are useful because they allow teachers to get 
across complicated material, since they are “easy to remember and make scientific 
sense” (Miller 2008, p. 27). However, we will see that analogies between living organisms 
and machines or programs (what we call “machine-information metaphors”) are in fact 
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highly misleading in several respects. Bearing in mind that metaphors are powerful 
persuasive tools that can deeply affect the way we look at the world, we think the 
pervasiveness of extensive machine analogies in science education is in fact 
unfortunate. 
Creationists and their modern heirs of the Intelligent Design movement have been 
eager to exploit mechanical metaphors for their own purposes (Perakh 2008). For 
example, Bruce Alberts‖ description of the living cell as a factory has been approvingly 
quoted by both Michael Behe and William Dembski, two leading figures in the IDC 
movement. For IDC proponents, of course, these are not metaphors at all, but literal 
descriptions of the living world, arching back to Newton‖s conception of the Universe as 
a clock-like device made by the Creator. The very fact that scientists rely on mechanical 
analogies to make sense of living systems, while disclaiming any literal interpretation, 
strengthens creationists in their misconception that scientists are ―blinded‖ by a 
naturalistic prejudice. And of course, the idea of a genomic ―blueprint‖ is highly 
congenial to the theistic worldview of IDC proponents.30 In the creationist textbook Of 
Pandas and People, which has been proposed by IDC advocates as an alternative to 
standard biology textbooks in high school, we read that “Intelligent design […] locates 
the origin of new organisms in an immaterial cause: in a blueprint, a plan, a pattern, 
devised by an intelligent agent” (Davis, Kenyon et al. 1993, p. 14).31 
The analogy between living organisms and man-made machines has proven a 
persuasive rhetorical tool of the IDC movement (for a thorough examination of IDC, see 
Pennock 1999; Pigliucci 2002; Shanks 2004). In fact, for all the technical lingo and 
mathematical ―demonstrations,‖ in much of their public presentations it is clear that IDC 
theorists actually expect the analogies to do the argumentative work for them (Young 
2004). In Darwin‖s Black Box, Behe takes Alberts‖ machine analogy to its extreme, 
describing the living cell as a complicated factory containing cargo-delivery systems, 
scanner machines, transportation systems and a library full of blueprints. Here is a 
typical instance of Behe‖s reasoning: 
In the main area [cytoplasm] are many machines and machine parts; nuts, bolts, 
and wires float freely about. In this section reside many copies of what are called 
master machines [ribosomes], whose job it is to make other machines. They do 
this by reading the punch holes in a blueprint [DNA], grabbing nuts, bolts, and 
other parts that are floating by, and mechanically assembling the machine piece 
by piece. (Behe 2006, pp. 104-105)  
                                                     
 
30 A survey by Condit et al. about the perception of the blueprint and recipe metaphor suggests that deeply 
religious people prefer the blueprint metaphor precisely because of its theistic connotations (Condit, Bates et 
al. 2002, p. 312). 
31 Thanks to Stefaan Blancke for this reference. 
Here be dragons 
66 
Behe‖s favorite model of biochemical systems is a mechanical mousetrap, the familiar 
variant consisting of a wooden platform, a metal hammer, a spring etc. According to 
Behe, if any one of these components is missing, the mousetrap is no longer able to 
catch mice. He has termed this interlocking of parts “irreducible complexity” and thinks 
it characterizes typical biochemical systems. As Shanks wrote: “[t]he mousetrap is to 
Behe what the well-designed pocket watch was for Paley” (Shanks 2004, p. 165). But 
whereas Paley can be excused on the grounds of the state of scientific knowledge in the 
18th century, for Behe the situation is a little different. Modern biochemistry, nota bene 
Behe‖s own discipline, has revealed that biochemical systems are not like mechanical 
artifacts at all (Shanks and Joplin 1999).32 Moreover, even biological systems that are 
irreducibly complex under Behe‖s definition pose no problem for evolution by natural 
selection, see for example Miller (2000) and Chapter 7).  
IDC proponents have buttressed their analogies between living systems and 
mechanical contraptions with a lot of visual rhetoric as well. The flagellum of the 
bacterium E. coli, the hallmark of the IDC movement, has been represented as a full-
fledged outboard rotary motor, with a stator, drive shaft, fuel supply etc. It features on 
the cover of Dembski‖s book No Free Lunch and has been used numerous times in 
presentations and online articles. The idea seems to be that if it looks designed, it has to 
be designed. But as Mark Perakh has documented, IDC supporters invariably use 
idealized and heavily stylized representations of the flagellum, in order to make it more 
resemble a man-made contraption (Perakh 2008).  
                                                     
 
32 See our discussion of “brittleness” below. 
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3.1 A highly stylized and mechanical illustration of a bacterial flagellum, created by 
Discovery Media Productions, and used as the front cover of William Dembski‖s No Free Lunch 
(2002) 
Another striking example of this visual rhetoric is a new video by Discovery Institute 
president Stephen C. Meyer33, which presents a computer-simulated – and again heavily 
stylized – journey inside the cell, and describes the biochemical processes in terms of 
“digital characters in a machine code,” “information-recognition devices” and 
“mechanical assembly lines.” Meyer commented that evolutionists will have a hard time 
now dissuading the public from the fact that “the evidence for design literally unfolds 
before them”. 
                                                     
 
33 See http://www.journeyinsidethecell.com/ 
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Figure 3 A snapshot from the Discovery Institute‖s video Journey inside the cell. 
Of course, the mere observation that creationists have seized on machine metaphors 
in biology does not suffice to demonstrate that these metaphors do not make scientific 
sense. However, the fact that they tend to do so systematically, using full-length quotes 
from respectable scientists, should make us weary of the possible dangers of misleading 
metaphors. If the rhetoric of the IDC movement is demonstrably based on these 
mechanical analogies, it can be instructive to reexamine their scientific merits. In the 
next section, we argue that the machine-information analogy has indeed influenced the 
way scientists themselves think about biological structure, function, and evolution. By 
analyzing the consequences of and reactions to this analogy in actual biological 
research, we show that its scientific merits are very week indeed, and that its place in 
modern biology has become questionable. 
 
3.2 Another idealized reproduction of the bacterial flagellum, featuring on numerous IDC 
websites and on the homepage of William Dembski‖s blog Uncommon Descent 
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Figure 4 An electronic micrograph of a real bacterial flagellum, which resembles nothing like 
a man-made contraption. 
3.3 Machine metaphors and the practice of biological 
research 
The idea of the organism as a machine, a device that stores and acts on information, has 
permeated not just education about biological science, but the practice of that science 
itself. Descartes (1972 [1648]) in L‖Homme developed the fundamental idea that living 
organisms, including human beings (but in the latter only as far as the “vegetative” 
aspects of the body are concerned) are machines, whose function can be understood in 
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terms of simple mechanical forces and interactions. This was part of Descartes‖ overall 
program of countering Aristotelian science and developing a new physics based on the 
“mechanical philosophy” that was inspiring Galilei and later found full fruition in 
Newton, giving birth to what we recognize as modern science. Biology, however, has 
always also been characterized by the presence of an anti-reductionist, vitalistic streak, 
which ironically periodically arches back to Aristotle (350BE/1991) and his conception 
of vegetable and animal “souls” as presented in his De Anima. 
This back and forth between mechanistic and vitalistic conceptions of living 
organisms characterized debates among biologists during the 19th century, when 
Darwin‖s ideas can be seen as certainly more mechanistic in nature than, say, those of 
Lamarck. The vitalistic position gained new prominence again at the beginning of the 
20th century, largely through the efforts of Henri-Louis Bergson, but evolutionary 
biology kept moving steadily in a mechanistic direction throughout the Modern 
Synthesis of the 1930s-40s (Mayr and Provine 1998). The coup de grace was then given 
to vitalism by the onset of the molecular revolution, first anticipated in Schrödinger‖s 
What is Life? (1992 [1944]) and then definitely playing a determinant role in late 20th 
century biology after the discovery of the structure of DNA (Watson and Crick 1953). 
Ever since the 1950s what we might more properly call the machine-information 
metaphor has been prevalent in molecular biology and, because of the tremendous 
success of the molecular revolution, throughout the biological sciences (despite 
continued pockets of resistance within the more organismally oriented disciplines of 
biology, chiefly ecology and evolutionary biology). It is sometimes argued by biologists 
that the use of machine-information metaphors is limited to popular writings of the 
type discussed in the previous section, and that they do not inform actual research 
papers. But this is quickly dispelled by an even cursory examination of databases such as 
Web of Science or PubMed. 
Let us take, for instance, the idea that genes are “blueprints,” i.e. that they contain 
the information to build proteins or more broadly any aspect of the phenotype. Hassoun 
et al. (2009) talk about “differentiation of the principal body axes in the early vertebrate 
embryo [being] based on a specific blueprint of gene expression” and say that the 
“mouse and rabbit show distinct structural differences in APD [anterior pregastrulation 
differentiation] and the[ir] molecular blueprint.” Iimura et al. (2009) refer to “the 
colinear disposition of Hox genes expression domains [which] provides a blueprint for 
the regionalization of the future vertebral territories of the spine” in vertebrates. 
Uttamchandani et al. (2009) are confident that the sequencing of the human genomes 
“provided a wealth of information about the genomic blueprint of a cell” (though they 
do acknowledge that this does not provide “the entire story” of life and living 
processes). Rutka et al. (2009) affirm that “the human genome project has been 
completed providing a blueprint for the human species.” Saminathan et al. (2009) 
maintain that their “neuronal transcripts were further analyzed to provide a genetic 
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blueprint that can be used by neurobiologists to unravel the complex cellular and 
molecular mechanisms underlying biological functions.” And the list could easily be 
extended to encyclopedic proportions. 
One of the obvious patterns emerging from any such search of the recent literature is 
that words like “blueprint” are rarely if ever used within the context of organismal (as 
opposed to molecular) biological research, and indeed there is a sustained effort on the 
part of (some) ecologists and evolutionary biologists to counter what they see as the 
hyper-reductionist approach brought about by the molecular revolution. This is 
particularly evident when we focus on ongoing discussions on the scope and results of 
“evo-devo” (evolution of development), the relatively new field that is supposed 
precisely to bridge the gap between organismal and molecular biology, all the while 
finally bringing developmental biology into the broad fold of the standard theory of 
evolution known as the Modern Synthesis (e.g. Minelli and Fusco 2005; Hendrikse, 
Parsons et al. 2007; Muller 2007; Pigliucci 2009). This resistance against the machine-
information metaphor, however, cannot and should not be read as a resurgence of 
vitalism, as no evo-devo author has moved in that direction. Rather, it is the result of a 
genuine tension between the undeniable successes of the molecular-reductionist 
approach on the one hand, and the limits that such approach seems to reach when it 
tackles issues pertinent to the structure and evolution of complex phenotypes. 
We argue that part of this tension is in fact the result of, or is at least fostered by, the 
deployment of the machine-information metaphor as a guiding idea of the molecular 
biological research program (see the sample of recent references provided above), and 
that new ways of thinking about development and evolution are building a conceptual 
vocabulary that increasingly distances itself from the machine-information metaphor. 
Let us consider two broad categories of examples, what we will be referring to as “the 
problem of development” and “the problem of environment”. 
The problem of development has arguably been present in one form or another 
throughout the history of biology, and in modern shape constitutes the central aim of 
the research program in evo-devo. If living organisms are sufficiently analogous to 
programmable machines, then the problem of development largely reduces to 
identifying which pieces of the “program” (i.e., genes) “control” which parts of the 
hardware to be assembled (the organism itself). That this is a line of inquiry actually 
pursued by biologists over the past few decades — and not just a matter of idle talk — is 
evident from the bewildering literature on “genes for” a particular phenotype, even 
though the very notion of a gene being “for” a phenotype is in fact justified only in very 
restricted cases (Kaplan and Pigliucci 2001). While it can certainly be argued that the 
approach has been successful, in reality that success is largely limited to one of two 
areas: the identification of few complex phenotypic traits that do show a relatively 
simple “mapping” between genotype and phenotype, e.g. eye color in vertebrates 
(Sturm and Larsson 2009), or the cataloguing of large numbers of genes affecting a given 
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phenotype (often, in the case of humans, a disease-related one), where however each 
genetic element statistically accounts for a minute fraction of the variation in the 
phenotype, and often only in a particular subset of populations within a given species 
(Tian, Gregersen et al. 2008; Wu and Zhao 2009). 
Recent advancements in theoretical biology and computational science may help us 
to articulate the fundamental reasons why the problem of development cannot be 
solved by more and better Genotype ⇒ Phenotype mapping. Ciliberti et al. (2007) have 
pointed out that “direct encoding systems”, such as human-designed software, suffer 
from “brittleness”, that is, they break down if one or a few components stop working, as 
a result of the direct mapping of instructions to outcomes. If we think of living 
organisms as based on genetic encoding systems — like blueprints — we should also 
expect brittleness at the phenotypic level which, despite the claims of creationists and 
IDC supporters that we have encountered above, is simply not observed. On the 
contrary, biological developmental systems tend to be very robust to both internal (i.e., 
genetic) and external (i.e. environmental) perturbations. In other words, pace Behe and 
other IDC advocates, removing one component in a complex biochemical pathway 
typically does not cause the system to “effectively cease functioning” (Behe 2006, p. 39). 
Indeed, the fact that biological organisms cannot possibly develop through a type of 
direct encoding of information is demonstrated by calculations showing that the gap 
between direct genetic information (about 30,000 protein-coding genes in the human 
genome) and the information required to specify the spatial position and type of each 
cell in the body is of several orders of magnitude (Stanley 2007). Where does the 
difference come from? 
An answer that is being explored successfully is the idea that the information that 
makes development possible is localized and sensitive (as well as reactive) to the 
conditions of the immediate surroundings. In other words, there is no blueprint for the 
organism, but rather each cell deploys genetic (Johannes, Colot et al. 2008) information 
and adjusts its status to signals coming from the surrounding cellular environment, as 
well as from the environment external to the organism itself. The way this works, then, 
is through two phases: in the signaling phase information is deployed locally, within a 
given circuit (in computational science models) or cell (in biological systems). The 
second phase is that of the expression of a particular functional status, which depends 
on the input received so far by each circuit or cell. In computational science, 
interestingly enough, this approach is known as “developmental encoding” or “artificial 
development” and is in fact inspired by a more realistic view of what sort of systems 
living organisms actually are (Hartmann, Haddow et al. 2007). 
One of the most interesting outcomes of shifting our thinking from direct/genetic 
encoding to indirect/developmental encoding of information is that we then have an 
immediate link between developmental biology and evolution: not only is research on 
localized encoding showing it to be a better model for understanding development, but 
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it turns out that artificial systems based on developmental encoding are much more 
efficient at searching for more robust solutions to whatever problem is posed to them, 
i.e. they evolve faster than genetic encoding systems and produce phenotypes that are 
fault-tolerant — to use software engineering terminology — because they are not brittle 
(Hartmann, Haddow et al. 2007): giving up talk of blueprints and computer programs 
immediately purchases an understanding of why living organisms are not, in fact, 
irreducibly complex. 
Developmental encoding has yet another advantage over genetic encoding, which is 
proving interesting to software engineers while simultaneously shedding light on the 
way living organisms develop: in the case of direct/genetic encoding, the length of the 
program grows proportionally to the complexity of the phenotype, which quickly 
makes the system unwieldy and again slows down its evolution. By comparison, 
indirect/developmental encoding means that a relatively small number of 
“instructions” can produce a variety of phenotypes, depending on the interactions 
among parts of the system and among these and the external environment. Complex 
phenotypes, then, can be evolved without the necessity to also evolve proportionally 
large genetic systems (Roggen, Federici et al. 2007). Looking at evolution through these 
lenses may also provide us with insights into one of the fundamental questions in 
biology: why did development evolved in the first place? As it turns out, when the 
phenotypes are simple, genetic and developmental encoding are roughly equally 
efficient at evolving new solutions, because the genetic system is not too complicated. It 
is only when more complex phenotypes are favored that the advantage of indirect 
encoding becomes apparent (Roggen, Federici et al. 2007): perhaps this is why 
comparatively simpler life forms like bacteria do not need developmental encoding and 
better approximate the simple Genotype ⇒ Phenotype mapping assumed by the 
blueprint metaphor. But when evolution began to favor — for whatever reason — more 
complex, multicellular life forms, a new way of encoding information also evolved. 
While much of the preceding discussion was framed in terms of the “problem of 
development,” the second issue, which we referred to above as “the problem of 
environment”, is actually conceptually analogous and can be thought of in a similar 
fashion. Biologists have known since immediately after the beginning of genetics, in 
1900, that the same genotype often develops different phenotypes in different 
environments. This is difficult to make sense of if one thinks of genomes as a simple 
blueprint-like reservoir of information. Accordingly, this phenomenon — known as 
phenotypic plasticity (Pigliucci 2001) — has remained largely in the background of 
biological research for most of the 20th century. 
During the last couple of decades, however, studies of phenotypic plasticity have 
taken center stage in evolutionary biology, ecology, and even molecular biology, 
because of the realization of the near-universality of the phenomenon. As usual, the 
initial approach to the study of the genetic basis of plasticity was guided by the 
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blueprint metaphor, with researchers attempting to identify and map “genes for” 
plastic responses of a variety of phenotypes to a variety of environmental conditions. It 
quickly became clear, however, that plasticity is a complex developmental 
phenomenon, which requires a more nuanced approach and is no different, in principle, 
from the study of any other complex outcome of development. Indeed, if standard 
development can be thought of as the response of indirect/developmental encoding to 
the internal environment surrounding each cell, then plasticity can be seen as the 
similar response of indirect/developmental encoding to signals originating in the 
environment external to the organism (Jablonka 2007). 
If the problem of environment is conceptually analogous to the problem of 
development, and both require a more sophisticated view of how organisms deploy 
genetic information, then we begin to see the possibility that the notion of genetic 
“information” itself is not quite so straightforward, and certainly is not one that fits 
comfortably with ideas like blueprints and machines. While there is no question that the 
“molecular revolution” has been a central and positive development in biology, and 
indeed in science in general, throughout the second part of the 20th century, it is also 
becoming increasingly clear that the overly reductionist approach inspired and fueled 
by machine-information metaphors is running out of steam and needs to be replaced 
with more sophisticated and realistic thinking (a kind of reasonable, or non-greedy 
reductionism, so to speak). Is it then time to retire metaphors like blueprints and 
machines, and to seek an alternative way to conceptualize biological organisms, or 
would it perhaps be better to abandon the use of metaphors in this field altogether? 
3.4 The search for new metaphors 
In their classic work on metaphors, Lakoff & Johnson (1980) argue that the basic 
function of metaphorical concepts is to structure a new kind of experience in terms of a 
more familiar and delineated experience. In science as well as in everyday language, 
metaphors highlight particular aspects of whatever it is we are trying to grasp, but they 
will inevitably distort others. For example, the image of the ―tree of life,‖ with new 
species branching off as budding twigs and extinct species as dead branches, is an 
instructive approximation of the relations of evolutionary descent. However, it can also 
foster misconceptions about ―progress‖ in evolution, or lead to a simplistic conception of 
speciation events, or to a downplay of horizontal gene transfer and reticulate (i.e., by 
inter-species hybridization) speciation events. To give one more example, in physical 
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chemistry the model of the atom as a miniature solar system, with electrons orbiting 
the nucleus as planets, though still having wide public appeal, is fundamentally 
inaccurate. 
Of course, no metaphor will do its job perfectly, but it is crucial to realize, as Lakoff & 
Johnson (1980) have shown, that the widespread deployment of a particular metaphor 
can have a feedback effect on the way we perceive things, not just how we present them 
to others. In the examples discussed in this paper, the lure of machine-information 
metaphors in the history of biology has invited scientists to think of genomes as 
―blueprints‖ for organisms, written in the four-letter alphabet of DNA and readable in a 
manner analogous to a computer code. But as we have argued, the machine-information 
conception of living systems has led both the public and the scientific community 
astray. 
In response to this problem, some scientists and science educators have proposed 
several alternative and improved metaphors to characterize the relationship between 
genotype and phenotype. Biologist Patrick Bateson, for instance, was probably the first 
to compare the DNA sequence of living organisms with a recipe for a cake (Dawkins and 
Wong 2005, p. 414). The idea of a genetic recipe has several advantages over the 
blueprint metaphor, the most important being that it takes into account pleiotropy (one 
gene affecting more than one trait) and epistasis (gene-gene interactions), and that it is 
more sensitive to what we termed the problem of environment and the problem of 
development in the previous section. As a consequence, the simple picture of a one-to-
one (or close to) correspondence between particular genes and phenotypic traits is 
abandoned, which becomes clear when one considers that there is no way to locate 
particular ingredients in individual crumbs of a cake (Dawkins 1991, pp. 295-296). 
Accordingly, there is no possibility of reverse-engineering the end product to the set of 
procedures (the ―recipe‖) that made the final product possible.  
Of course, if carried too far, the recipe metaphor can in turn be quite misleading. To 
get the desired result, a cook has to lump together different ingredients in the correct 
proportions, and follow a set of instructions for handling the dough and preparing the 
oven. But as we saw, developmental encoding is an enormously more complex and very 
different sort of procedure, which is also highly dependent on epigenetic factors and 
unpredictable vagaries of the external environment. The expression of specific genes in 
the course of development resembles nothing like the way a cook handles the 
ingredients of a recipe. Living organisms are also highly differentiated in a number of 
functional parts or components (cell types, tissues, etc.), in contrast with the 
homogenous cake that comes out of the oven. Moreover, the genome is not written in 
anything like a “language,” as in the case of a recipe, and it certainly does not contain a 
description of the desired end product in any meaningful sense of the word 
“description”. 
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Condit et al. have discussed the recipe metaphor as an alternative to talk of 
blueprints, pointing out that it was adopted “with surprising swiftness” by science 
popularizers and the media in the 1990s (Condit, Bates et al. 2002, p. 303). However, they 
also remark that, as a new “master metaphor” to capture the relationship between 
genotype and phenotype, the image of a recipe for a cake has little to recommend 
either. For example, evoking recipes can invite people to think of the genome as a step-
by-step manual that describes “how to make a human,” in that sense falling into the 
same trap as the idea of a blueprint. 
That being said, if contrasted with the blueprint metaphor, the recipe metaphor 
conveys the point about lack of one-to-one correspondence between genes and 
phenotypes very well, and hence it highlights an important fact about development and 
the Genotype ⇒ Phenotype map. If the recipe metaphor is used within this restricted 
context, for example in explicit contrast with the characteristics of a blueprint, it is 
immediately clear what are the salient points of connection with living systems, and 
people are less likely to be misled by stretching the metaphor beyond usefulness. If the 
recipe metaphor is presented as ―the‖ alternative to the blueprint, however, it is bound 
to mislead people no less than its rival. 
The same point applies to other interesting metaphors that have been proposed in 
this context, for example Lewis Wolpert‖s comparison of early embryonic development 
with the Japanese art of origami (Wolpert and Skinner 1993; Dawkins and Wong 2005). 
The analogy highlights the circuitous step-by-step development of the early embryo34, 
but of course in a piece of origami art the structure is imposed top-down from an 
intelligent agent, whereas the functional differentiation in the embryo is regulated 
bottom-up by a complex interaction between genes and environment. Moreover, 
origami simply is folded to yield the final product, which in a very real sense is already 
there from the beginning. This is definitely not the way embryos develop, with their 
ability to respond to local and external environmental fluctuations. 
The general problem that we have been discussing seems to us to be not just that one 
kind of metaphor or another is woefully inadequate to conceptualize biological 
organisms and their evolution. It is that it simply does not seem to be possible to come 
up with a metaphor that is cogent and appropriate beyond a very limited conceptual 
space. Although some of the alternatives are more accurate than the blueprint 
metaphor (in some respects), we certainly have not found one that we would 
recommend as a replacement. Should we therefore try to avoid the use of metaphors in 
biological teaching and research altogether? Or do we simply expect too much from 
metaphors in science and education? 
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http://origamiembryo.cba.arizona.edu/ 
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3.5 Conclusion: metaphors as teaching moments in scientific 
research and education 
Analogical and metaphorical thinking is widespread among human beings, although of 
course different cultures and historical moments inspire people to use different 
metaphors. After all, a metaphor is an attempt to make sense of novel concepts by 
pairing them with known ideas to increase our overall understanding. Metaphorical 
thinking is therefore part of our language, and language is inextricably connected to our 
thinking, but to put it as Wittgenstein did: “It is, in most cases, impossible to show an 
exact point where an analogy starts to mislead us” (Wittgenstein 1972, p. 28). Yet a great 
part of doing philosophy consists precisely in clarifying our language in an attempt to 
advance our thinking. To quote Wittgenstein (1951 [2009], § 109) again: “Philosophy is a 
battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language.” To 
complicate matters further, there is emerging empirical evidence that the human brain 
processes metaphors in a specific fashion: research on Alzheimer‖s patients, for instance 
(Amanzio, Geminiani et al. 2008), found that impairment of the brain‖s “executive” 
function, associated with the prefrontal cortex, leads to poor understanding of novel 
metaphors (while, interestingly, comprehension of familiar metaphors is unaffected). 
Metaphorical thinking seems to be a biologically entrenched functional mode of our 
brains, and may therefore be hard to avoid altogether. 
Both science and philosophy have made ample use of metaphorical and analogical 
thinking, sometimes with spectacularly positive results, at other times more 
questionably so. Nonetheless, it seems that nowhere is metaphorical thinking so 
entrenched — and so potentially misleading — as in biology. Given the maturity of 
biology as a science, and considering that it deals with objects whose nature is not as 
alien to our daily experience as, say, those of quantum physics, we do not actually see 
any good reason for clinging on to outdated metaphors in biological education and 
research for characterizing living organisms, their genomes and their means of 
development. Taking into account the fact that the machine/information metaphors 
have been grist to the mill of Intelligent Design Creationism, fostering design intuitions 
and other misconceptions about living systems, we think it is time to dispense with 
them altogether. Still, we are also not as naive as to expect that this advise will be 
followed by scientists and science educators any time soon, precisely because the 
machine/information metaphor is so entrenched in biology education. What to do 
then? We propose two approaches, one for science educators, the other for practicing 
scientists. 
In science education, talk of metaphorical thinking can be turned into a teaching 
moment. Students (and the public at large) would actually greatly benefit from 
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explanations that contrast different metaphors with the express goal of highlighting the 
limitations intrinsic in metaphors and analogies. So, for instance, science educators and 
writers could talk about the human genome by introducing the blueprint metaphor, 
only to immediately point out why it does not capture much of what genomes and 
organisms are about; they could then proceed to familiarize their students and readers 
with alternative metaphors, say the recipe one, focusing on its differences with the 
original metaphor while of course not neglecting to point out the (different) 
deficiencies of the new approach as well. The goal of this process would be to foster a 
cautious attitude about metaphorical thinking, as well as to develop a broader 
understanding of how unlike commonsense modern science really is. On the latter 
point, it is interesting to note, for instance, that a popular refrain among evolution or 
global warming deniers is that “simple common sense” shows that the scientists are 
wrong, a position that ignores the proper weight of technical expertise in favor of a folk 
understanding of nature. It is therefore crucial that the public appreciates the 
limitations of common sense thinking about science. 
There is an analogous teaching moment that can be brought to bear when research 
scientists engage in unbridled metaphorical thinking: we could refer to this as a 
philosophy-appreciation moment. Scientists are notoriously insensitive to, or even 
downright dismissive of, considerations arising from the history and philosophy of their 
discipline, and often for good practical reasons: modern science is a highly specialized 
activity, where there is barely enough time to keep up with the overwhelming literature 
in one‖s own narrow field of research, and certainly not enough incentive to indulge in 
historical readings or philosophical speculation. Nonetheless, historians and 
philosophers of science can easily show the pitfalls of metaphorical thinking (by using 
well-documented historical examples) and even get across to their colleagues some 
basic notions of philosophy (by analyzing the effects of particular metaphors on the 
development of specific lines of scientific inquiry). None of this will quickly amount to 
overcoming C.P. Snow‖s (1993 [1959]) infamous divide between “the two cultures,” but it 
may bring about better understanding and appreciation of philosophy by scientists, and 
perhaps even help science see new horizons that have hitherto been obscured by a 
superficially illuminating metaphor. 
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Chapter 4.  
Where the Design Argument Goes Wrong: Auxiliary 
Assumptions and Unification  
Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, 
namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly 
perceived in the things that have been made. – Romans 
1:20 
 
If only God would give me some clear sign! Like making a 
large deposit in my name in a Swiss bank. – Woody Allen 
 
 
Abstract.35 In Evidence and Evolution (2008), Elliott Sober reconstructs the biological 
design argument in the framework of likelihoodism, and proceeds to demonstrate that 
it is defective for intrinsic reasons. We argue that Sober‖s thesis on the adoption of 
auxiliary hypotheses is too restrictive, as it commits him to rejecting types of everyday 
reasoning that are valid. We propose a more lenient account of the choice of auxiliaries, 
based on the explanatory virtue of unification and the avoidance of gerrymandering. If 
only the design argument satisfied certain theoretical requirements, it could be 
rendered compelling in ways that violate Sober‖s restriction concerning the choice of 
auxiliaries. The present account shows that the design argument indeed fails, but not 
for the intrinsic reasons adduced by Sober. By the same token, Sober‖s critique of the 
                                                     
 
35 This chapter has been provisionally accepted in Philosophy of Science. 
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argument from imperfections and the argument from evil against design is off the mark, and 
fails to appreciate the weight of empirical evidence against the design hypothesis. 
4.1 Introduction 
Who gave the decisive deathblow to the argument from design on the basis of biological 
complexity? Both philosophers and biologists are divided on this point (Oppy 1996; 
Dawkins 1986; Sober 2008; Dennett 2007). Some have claimed that the biological design 
argument did not falter until Darwin provided a proper naturalistic explanation for 
adaptive complexity; others maintain that David Hume had already shattered the 
argument to pieces by sheer logical force several decades earlier, in his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion (Hume 2007 [1779]). Elliott Sober has been among the 
philosophers who maintain that, as Hume was not in a position to offer a serious 
alternative explanation of adaptive complexity, it is hardly surprising that “intelligent 
people strongly favored the design hypothesis” (Sober 2000, p. 36). In his most recent 
book, however, Sober (2008) carefully develops what he thinks is the most charitable 
reconstruction of the design argument, and proceeds to show why it is defective for 
intrinsic reasons (see also Sober 2002). Accordingly, Sober argues that the design 
argument can be rejected even without the need to consider alternative explanations 
for adaptive complexity  
To see why the design argument is defective, there is no need to have a view as to 
whether Darwin‖s theory of evolution is true.  
We argue that Sober‖s reconstruction suffers from several problems. His requirements 
regarding the choice of auxiliary hypotheses and his proposed independence relations 
are overly restrictive, as they commit him to rejecting types of reasoning that are 
obviously valid. We develop an alternative and more lenient account of auxiliary 
assumptions, based on the explanatory virtue of unification and the avoidance of 
gerrymandering. In our view, if only the design argument satisfied certain theoretical 
requirements, it could be rendered compelling in ways that violate Sober‖s restriction 
concerning the choice of auxiliaries. We conclude that the design argument does not 
                                                     
 
36 As we will see in 4.2.1, this statement is suprising given Sober‖s proclaimed contrastive approach to 
hypothesis testing. 
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suffer from any intrinsic flaws, but it has simply collapsed under the weight of evidence 
and has been outcompeted by evolutionary theory, which is all the more damaging to 
the epistemic status of the design hypothesis. Theoretical immunizations by design 
theorists and historical examples from natural theology are discussed to support this 
thesis. An important corollary of our view is that Sober‖s objections against the 
argument from evil and the argument from imperfections, which have been leveled 
against the design hypothesis ever since Darwin‖s seminal work, are equally misguided.37 
4.2 Likelihoodism and the design argument 
4.2.1 Reconstructing the design argument 
In his reconstruction of the design argument, Sober wants to arrive at “the strongest, 
most defensible, version of the argument” and then to show why he thinks the 
argument is “defective” (2008, p. 113). Sober‖s reconstruction has three features we 
should keep in mind. First, it is probabilistic, not deductive. Second, it is contrastive: he 
does not want to evaluate the design hypothesis in isolation, but only against competing 
hypotheses (but see 4.5.1 for Sober‖s ambiguity). Third, he favors a ―likelihood approach‖ 
over a Bayesian approach, because he refuses to assign prior probabilities to Darwin‖s 
theory of evolution, or to the existence of an intelligent designer, since these merely 
reflect “a subjective degree of certainty” (Sober 2008, p. 121). Sober applies the law of 
likelihood to William Paley‖s Natural Theology (1802), in which Paley pursued the analogy 
between the human eye and a pocket watch to drive home the design argument. Sober 
(2008, p. 122) arrives at the following reconstruction, where ―ID‖ is the hypothesis of 
intelligent design and ―Chance‖ is the old Epicurean hypothesis of pure chance:  
Observation O favors ID over Chance if and only if Pr(O | ID) > Pr (O| Chance) 
This likelihood reconstruction encounters one immediate objection. The value of Pr (O | 
ID) can be artificially raised to unity by tuning the hypothesis to the observations. For 
example, if “ID++ = there exists an omnipotent supernatural Creator for whom the 
creation of the bacterial flagellum is number one priority” and “O = there exists a 
                                                     
 
37 For a thorough critique of Sober's likelihood reconstruction of the cosmological design argument, see 
Weisberg (2005). 
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bacterial flagellum”, then the likelihood P (O | ID++) equals one. But why not build the 
observational outcome in the competing hypothesis instead? For example, if “Chance ++ 
= a chance-process produced the bacterial flagellum”, then Pr (O | Chance++) is likewise 
1. As is clear from these examples, the mere fact that the likelihood of some contrived 
hypothesis equals one, does not make it any more plausible.  
In Sober‖s words: “[w]ithin a likelihood framework, there is no beating a hypothesis 
that entails the observations” (Sober 2008, p. 131). If we allow the introduction of 
favorable (or unfavorable) assumptions to the central hypothesis, in casu assumptions 
about the intentions and attributes of the designer, we are left with no way in which an 
observation O can discriminate between the competing hypotheses. The evidential 
significance of the observation O “will be thoroughly obscured if we build the 
observational outcome into the theories we wish to test” (Sober 2008, p. 132, emphasis in 
original). 
4.2.2 Restrictions on auxiliary hypotheses 
If we want to avoid this problem, we somehow have to introduce restrictions on the 
choice of auxiliary assumptions for our central hypothesis. Sober‖s proposed solution is 
to demand “an independent reason for believing assumptions about goals and abilities” 
(Sober 2008, p. 144, 2002). More specifically, the introduction of an auxiliary hypothesis 
“must be justified without assuming H1 or assuming H2 or assuming O”, or more 
specifically, without assuming that H1, H2 or O are true (Sober 2008, p. 145).  
[S]uppose you are on a jury. Jones is being tried for murder, but you are 
considering the possibility that Smith may have done the deed instead. Evidence 
is brought to bear: A size 12 shoe print was found in the mud outside the house 
where the murder was committed, as was cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 
revolver. Do these pieces of evidence favor the hypothesis that Smith is the 
murderer or the hypothesis that Jones is? It is a big mistake to answer these 
questions by inventing assumptions. If you assume that Smith wears a size 12 
shoe, smokes cigars, and owns a Colt .45 and that Jones wears a size 10 shoe, does 
not smoke, and does not own a gun, you can conclude that the evidence favors 
Smith over Jones. If you make the opposite assumptions, you can draw the 
opposite conclusion. […] What is needed is independently attested information 
about Smith‖s and Jones‖s shoe sizes, smoking habits, and gun ownership. (Sober 
2008, p. 145) 
In relation to the design argument, this means that we cannot simply attribute 
intentions and motives to the designer if we don‖t have any independent justification 
for doing so. For example, from the fact that humans have eyes, we cannot conclude 
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that the intelligent designer, if such a being exists, must have had the intention for 
equipping humans with eyes: 
What is needed is evidence about what God would have wanted the human eye to 
be like, where the evidence does not require a prior commitment to the 
assumption that there is a God and also does not depend on looking at the eye to 
determine its features. (Sober 2008, p. 146) 
Without independently justified auxiliary hypotheses, we are left with a designer 
without attributes, and the likelihood that such a designer wanted to (and was able to) 
create the world we observe cannot be calculated. Thus, the design argument fails.38  
4.3 Criticism 
4.3.1 Background knowledge 
Sober‖s solution effectively prevents the practice of building observations into one‖s 
hypothesis, but we argue that it does much more than that and hence is too restrictive. 
Consider the murder scenario described by Sober, but in a somewhat different light. 
Does the available evidence provide support for the hypothesis that someone 
committed a murder in the first place? Suppose the landlord is nowhere to be found, we 
find blood stains and broken glass in his bedroom, and we possess all the other evidence 
Sober alludes to. If a detective wants to assess the murder hypothesis, we submit that 
she is justified in making the additional assumption that the hypothesized murderer, 
whoever it was, wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and used a Colt .45. 
O = a size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and shells from a Colt .45 revolver were found in 
the bedroom. 
H = the victim was murdered. 
A1 = the murderer wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and used a Colt. 45. 
                                                     
 
38 In his Philosophy of Biology Sober made a more provisional assessment: “Thus far, no argument has been 
stated that allows one to know which auxiliary assumptions should be adopted. Perhaps this will change, but 
until that happens, creationism cannot be tested” (Sober 2000, p. 54). 
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What justifies our adopting auxiliary hypothesis A1? In the first place, we are informed 
by background knowledge (K) on human beings wearing shoes, occasionally smoking 
cigars and even less occasionally murdering people, and on the Colt. 45 producing 
specific shells. But note that K, by itself, does not warrant our adopting A1. Only the 
conjunction of K with O does. Does the choice of A1 ―depend‖ on looking at O in a way 
that is not allowed by Sober? It seems so. At this point Sober‖s requirement commits 
him to rejecting types of everyday reasoning that are obviously valid, but there is a 
charitable way to reconstruct his argument, by fine-tuning the dependence relation as 
follows:  
If you want to construct an auxiliary hypothesis An for testing H with respect to O, 
then, though your adoption of An may be informed by O, it must be so in 
conjunction with at least one other, independent reason. By contraposition, if your 
choice of An is solely informed by O, then you are not conducting a proper test of 
H.  
Sober‖s intrinsic objection against the design argument can then be rephrased: as there 
is no independent background knowledge available about the designer over and above 
the empirical data we possess of, the biological argument does not get off the ground. 
We argue that this weaker version of Sober‖s argument is still indefensible, and that if 
only certain evidential standards were fulfilled, the design argument would not be in 
need of independent background knowledge.  
4.3.2 Ruling out uninteresting assumptions 
If Sober is right, design theorists are never justified in adopting such or such auxiliary, 
because they are completely in the dark as to the identity of the designer. But this 
seems to be too restrictive. In a preparatory stage of investigation, in which the theorist 
tries to bring her candidate hypothesis “into contact with the observation” (Sober 2008, 
p. 145), she concentrates on eligible auxiliary hypotheses, and she pays no attention to 
those that are extremely unlikely to yield the data we want to explain. If the detective 
wants to consider the murder hypothesis, and he finds Colt. 45 shells around the blood 
stains, he makes the additional assumption that someone murdered the victim with a 
Colt. 45, even if, at that point, the victim has not been found and no further evidence 
supports his tentative hypothesis.  
Sober‖s criterion seems to frustrate even this kind of tentative fleshing out of 
competing hypotheses. For example, suppose that William Paley, reflecting on the 
origin of the human eye, constructed the following design hypothesis, conjoined with 
two additional assumptions:  
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H = The human camera eye was created by an intelligent designer. 
A1 = The designer is interested in creating camera eyes. 
A2 = The designer is capable of designing something as complex as the camera eye. 
The adoption of both A1 & A2 seems reasonable enough, since their negation is 
completely uninteresting, in the sense of being very unlikely to yield the data in 
question: 
~A1 = The designer has no interest at all in creating camera eyes. 
~A2 = The designer is a bungler completely incapable of producing anything as 
complex as the camera eye. 
Evidently, the likelihood of both H & ~A1 and H & ~A2, viz. Pr (O | H & ~A1) and Pr (O | H & 
~A2) is extremely low. If we follow Sober‖s approach, however, this gives us no reason 
for adopting A1 & A2, because, in the absence of background knowledge about the 
designer, the independence rule is violated. But is this really where Paley‖s design 
argument goes off the rails? 
If we pause to think about it, there do not seem to be many ways of justifying the 
introduction of an auxiliary except by taking the observations into account which we set 
out to explain. Merely having independent reasons for accepting an auxiliary is not 
sufficient. Take for example: 
A1* = Naive set theory suffers from Russell‖s paradox. 
Arguably, Pr (O | ID & A1*) = Pr (O | ID) and Pr (O | Chance & A1*) = Pr (O | Chance). Even if 
we have (very good) independent reasons for accepting A1*, there is no use 
incorporating it as an auxiliary, because it has no bearing on our observations in any 
way.39 In short, unless we take into account the observations with which we want to 
bring the hypothesis into contact, we have no idea how to exclude such uninteresting 
auxiliary as A1*. 
                                                     
 
39 The fact that A1* is not an empirical statement is irrelevant here, since the same holds for  
A2* = Rome is the capital of Italy. 
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4.4 Introducing auxiliaries 
4.4.1 Gerrymandering and spurious unification 
The problem central to Sober‖s concern is the practice of gerrymandering hypotheses 
by inventing ad hoc auxiliaries to fit the data. This type of reasoning is pervasive in 
much creationist writings, and its problems were already spelled out by Darwin, in his 
discussion of the theory of special creation: 
On the ordinary view of the independent creation of each being, we can only say 
that so it is;—that it has pleased the Creator to construct all the animals and plants 
in each great class on a uniform plan; but this is not a scientific explanation. 
(Darwin 2006, p. 677) 
As Darwin noted elsewhere in the Origin of Species, the theory of special creation 
amounts to “restating the fact in dignified language” (Darwin 2006, p. 336). It is designed 
to yield the known observations and nothing more. By contrast, the main explanatory 
merit of evolutionary theory lies in its power to yield a “consilience of inductions” 
(Whewell 1840), by bringing together a wide array of facts from different domains and 
explaining them as following from the same basic principles: blind variation, heritability 
and selective retention (Kitcher 1985). 
The design theorist might object that his hypothesis also accomplishes this kind of 
unification, as every observation in the natural world is subsumed under the 
explanation of “God‖s will”.  
H = God wants it to be the case that O1…On. 
As Kitcher (1981, p. 528) has pointed out, however, in such an explanatory pattern the 
“nonlogical vocabulary which remains is idling” (Kitcher 1981, p. 528) The pattern does 
not impose constraints on the sentences that can be derived by using it, and thus it is 
able to accommodate any observation whatsoever. In Sober‖s vocabulary, the only 
reason for adopting the assumption that God really wants a specific fact O1 to be the 
case depends on looking at O1 and nothing else. Thus, in reality the design theorist 
simply posits a new divine disposition for each and every observation, and not a single 
unifying explanation. As Sober (2008, p. 181) writes, “the fact that the model postulates 
a single designer is besides the point”. 
Sober‖s principle that “auxiliary assumptions must be justified without assuming that 
O is true” effectively undermines this type of “spurious unification” (Kitcher 1981, p. 
528), together with other ways of gerrymandering, but does it leave any room for 
reasonable consideration of auxiliaries? The following reductio he offers in support of his 
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thesis is ineffective (Sober 2008, p. 145): If we assume that O is true, then so is the 
disjunction “either H1 is false or O is true”. If we take this disjunction as auxiliary 
hypothesis A1, then H1 & A1 entails O, even if H1 has nothing to do with O. Thus, 
according to Sober, we cannot allow our auxiliary hypothesis to depend on O. 
However, from the fact that one intuitively illegitimate move happens to violate 
Sober‖s rule, it does not follow that any violation runs into similar problems. To think 
otherwise is to commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. What Sober needs is an 
argument to the effect that, whenever his rule is violated, we are indeed dealing with a 
move that is epistemically suspect. In the next sections, we demonstrate how the design 
hypothesis could be made compelling in ways that violate Sober‖s restriction 
concerning the choice of auxiliaries. 
4.4.2 Unification 
A hypothesis can derive empirical support either by accommodating known 
observations in particular ways, or by successfully predicting new observations. 
Predictivists attach special epistemic status to successful predictions, but some 
philosophers have questioned this different assessment (Harker 2008). We will first 
focus on the case of accommodation, as we think that the ―mere‖ accommodation of 
known data in an appropriate way would already make the design argument convincing.  
The bugbear of accommodation is the temptation of the theorist to “overfit” the data, 
which consists of sacrificing the simplicity of one‖s hypothesis in order to attain a 
maximal fit with the available data (Hitchcock and Sober 2004). However, even 
philosophers who attribute special epistemic value to prediction acknowledge that 
accommodation need not be problematic, only that prediction guards the theorist 
against the temptation of overfitting.  
It is possible to accommodate data without overfitting them, but when one is 
accommodating data, the temptation to overfit is always present. By contrast, 
when one accurately predicts new data that were not used in formulating one‖s 
theory, there is no opportunity to overfit those data. (Hitchcock and Sober 2004, p. 
20) 
An appropriate measure against overfitting consists of balancing simplicity against fit 
with data, so that any loss of simplicity must be offset by a sufficient gain in fit with data 
(not just any gain of fit, see also Forster and Sober 1994; Leplin 1975). The ideal 
hypothesis, if any such is allowed by the available observations, is one that is both 
sufficiently simple and achieves a maximum data fit. For example, the murder 
hypothesis H is to be preferred if and to the extent that the detective, on adopting some 
suitable and simple set of auxiliaries A1…An, succeeds in unifying the available 
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circumstantial evidence O1…On in a way that cannot be accomplished as successfully 
without assuming H. Recall the observations: a size 12 shoe print, cigar ash, and shells 
from a Colt .45 revolver are found in the bedroom, we can see blood stains and broken 
glass on the floor, and the landlord is nowhere to be found. 
H = the landlord has been murdered. 
A = the murderer wears a size 12 shoe, smokes cigars and used a Colt. 45. 
It is not difficult to invent other hypotheses with suitable auxiliaries that also entail the 
observations. For example, “H* = the landlord left for an unexpected walk”, conjoined 
with the following auxiliaries: somebody just threw a stone through the window, the 
shells from the Colt .45 dropped out of a visitor‖s pocket, the landlord just slaughtered a 
pig in his house before his unexpected walk, etc. Or, alternatively, someone with 
inscrutable intentions has planted all the evidence. It is clear, however, that the murder 
hypothesis is superior, because it succeeds in unifying all the available data under a 
simple assumption.  
This is not to say that H outcompetes every possible hypothesis. For example, “H**= 
the landlord went underground” can account for the data if conjoined with the auxiliary 
“A**= in order to fake his own death, the landlord has left the shells, the blood stains, 
...”. Arguably, H** & A** is not far more complex than H & A, and it is equally unifying. 
Therefore, H** is an admissible competitor for H. 
How does this translate to the biological design hypothesis? Consider William Paley‖s 
Natural Theology (1802), which made a deep impression on the young Darwin. The main 
argument in Natural Theology states that adaptive complexity in the living world bears 
the mark of a designing intelligence: 
Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of 
instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind. (Paley 1802, p. 
12) 
Perceptive of the explanatory virtue of unification, Paley enumerates a wide variety of 
examples of contrivance and usefulness in nature, and he points out the coherence of 
animal body plans: 
[I]n comparing the eyes of different kinds of animals, we see in their resemblances 
and distinctions one general plan laid down, and that plan varied with the varying 
exigencies to which it is to be applied. (Sober 2008, p. 33) 
Apart from noting such similarities, however, Paley seems unable to discern any overall 
intentional plan in the creator‖s work, making only vague gestures in that direction. For 
example, a consideration of the bountiful diversity of nature “might induce us to believe 
that variety itself […] was a motive in the mind of the Creator, or with the agents of his 
will” (Paley 1802, p. 372).  
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Accordingly, Paley is unable to infer much about the designer‖s attributes and 
specific intentions, except for the point that he must have been at least as powerful and 
wise to be able to create all things we currently observe:  
The attributes of such a Being, suppose his reality to be proved, must be adequate 
to the magnitude, extent, and multiplicity of his operations. (Paley 1802, p. 474).  
In the penultimate chapter of Natural Theology, Paley attempts to demonstrate at least 
the goodness of the creator. Tellingly, however, he makes recourse to convoluted 
rationalizations to explain away the preponderance of evil in the world, notably to the 
argument that God‖s ways are inscrutable to humans (see 4.4.4). In the end, Paley‖s does 
not flesh out his design hypothesis any further, and he places his money on the 
explanatory necessity of a designer, for even a single instance of purposeful contrivance:  
[w]ere there no example in the world of contrivance except that of the eye, it 
would be alone sufficient to support the conclusion which we draw from it, as to 
the necessity of an intelligent Creator. (Paley 1802, p. 81) 
Modern IDC advocates have made little progress since Paley. To the extent that they 
have made attempts at all towards unification, they have mainly accomplished one of 
the “spurious” sort, attributing every particular observation to God‖s will and 
explaining that He moves in mysterious ways (see section 4.4.4). What is interesting for 
our critique of Sober‖s likelihood reconstruction, is the fact that the design argument 
might have achieved genuine unification, if only its advocates had succeeded in 
subsuming a wide array of natural phenomena under the assumption of a simple and 
distinct creative intention on the designer‖s part (or a simple set of intentions). If only a 
few ―parameters‖ in the design hypothesis were to provide an elegant explanation for 
phenomena that resist any conceivable naturalistic explanation, it seems that our 
worries about overfitting would be assuaged. The fact that the choice of auxiliaries 
about the designer‖s intentions and attributes (A1…An) would depend on the 
observations we set out to explain (O1…On), without the support of independent 
background knowledge, would then be of no concern.  
In what way could the design argument achieve such genuine unification? Reflecting 
on the vast number and variety of beetle species on earth, the biologist J. B. S. Haldane 
once quipped that the Creator, if He exists, has an “inordinate fondness for beetles”. 
Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that Haldane was making a serious theological 
point, as it stands his design argument is not very persuasive. Suppose, however, that 
Haldane happened to discover that beetles have minuscule Hebrew letters written on 
their shields, forming edifying Biblical messages. Let‖s say subsequent research 
demonstrates that beetles all over the world display these microscopic patterns, that 
they are encoded in beetle DNA, and that the fossil record suggests that beetles 
displayed these remarkable features even before humans arose on the scene.  
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The scenario is rather outlandish, but it will suit our purposes. There is no way in 
which Hebrew letters, as opposed to meaningless scribble, could confer any selective 
advantage on beetles, either through natural selection or sexual selection. It is even less 
plausible that the phenomenon would be the result of genetic drift or would be the by-
product of other evolutionary adaptations. In general, it is very hard to see how the 
explanatory repertoire of the naturalistic scientist, consisting of blind and unguided 
processes, could succeed in explaining anything like the existence of Hebrew beetle 
decorations (Clarke‖s third law notwithstanding, see section 1.5).  
In the described case, the design hypothesis, conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis 
about the designer‖s abilities and intentions, would allow us to explain otherwise 
puzzling phenomena.  
H = Beetles are created by an intelligent designer 
A1 = The intelligent designer has the ability to create beetles, is inordinately fond 
of them, and he has used their bodies to inscribe his Word 
One could object that, even in such an unlikely event, all the available evidence for 
naturalistic evolution still stands, and one anomaly does not suffice to undermine a 
well-substantiated scientific theory (Oppy 1996, p. 534). The point is well taken but 
ineffective, as we could easily fancy a world in which all the phenomena of biology would 
converge on the intelligent work of a creator who, judging from his works, bears a 
suspicious likeness to the Judeo-Christian God. For example, suppose that all living 
organisms in this world bore an autograph in Hebrew, unique for the species to which 
they belong, and that all the characters together formed the words of the Old 
Testament. Suppose, moreover that we would not witness any of the examples of 
imperfections, rudimentary organs and botched designs that are currently viewed as 
betraying an evolutionary heritage (see section 4.4.4). Or if this is not sufficient, think 
away the fossil record, the biogeographical and anatomical evidence for evolution, the 
evidence from genetics and embryology, etc. Surely there must be some point at which 
the evidence would tilt in favor of intelligent design at the expense of evolutionary 
theory. And so it should be. Which theories we can reliably accept about the world, 
depends for a large part on contingent matters of fact, on how the world looks like. An 
adherent of Sober‖s approach, however, would be unmoved even by such a fanciful 
scenario, because the adoption of auxiliary A1 (the properties of the Judeo-Christian 
God) still depends upon looking at O1…On (without independent background knowledge).  
This example illustrates that the problem with the biological design argument as it 
stands is not so much that it relies on observations of living organisms to provide the 
theorist with some clues as to the character and intentions of the alleged designer, but 
that it yields nothing beyond those observations. Thus, although we agree with Sober that 
we need some “independent” reasons, broadly construed, for adopting auxiliaries 
A1…An, over and above the mere observations we set out to explain, we think Sober has 
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construed these reasons too narrowly, neglecting the role played by explanatory 
unification. Sober mistakenly thinks that violating his independence condition always 
amounts to gerrymandering, apparently because he has extrapolated from a special 
problem with the construction of auxiliaries to a general assessment of design 
reasoning.40 
In fact, our approach is more faithful to Sober‖s commitment to contrastive 
hypothesis testing than Sober‖s own treatment of the design argument: the design 
argument is currently outcompeted by evolutionary theory (for a recent overview, see 
Dawkins 2009; Coyne 2009b), but if only design theorists would come up with evidence 
that defies all explanatory efforts in a naturalistic framework, and that is elegantly 
explained on some suitable design hypothesis (in the sense discussed above), they would 
certainly deserve our attention. It will be clear that this assessment is all the more 
damaging to the intelligent hypothesis (see 4.5.2). 
Interestingly, in his discussion of the model selection approach, Sober himself hints 
at the theoretical possibility of a design model of the living world that accomplishes 
such a unification. This is somewhat at odds with his assessment of the design argument 
as suffering from the “devastating objection” (Sober 2008, p. 126) about its auxiliary 
assumptions. From the perspective of the model selection framework, in order to 
evaluate the design hypothesis we have to “collect different observations together and 
view them as consequences of a single plan that the designer(s) has in mind” (Sober 
2008, p. 182). We think this is a much more promising tack, but Sober quickly brushes 
the idea aside: “How should this be achieved? I don‖t know: this is a task for intelligent-
design theorists to address.” True enough, but it is also the task of the philosopher 
assessing the design argument to find out whether such unification would be possible in 
principle. If this is indeed viable, and if we are right that the attributes of the designer 
                                                     
 
40 An additional problem of Sober‖s approach concerns the different non-trivial ways in which we can separate 
the central hypothesis from auxiliary hypotheses. For example, returning to Haldane‖s beetles, we could 
reconstruct different design arguments:  
H = God created the world and all living beings separately. 
O = There are a lot of beetles. 
A1 = God has an inordinate fondness for beetles. 
An alternative reconstruction would be to break H further up in a core hypothesis and a number of auxiliary 
hypotheses, for example: 
H* = an intelligent being X created the world. 
A2 = X created all living beings in the world separately. 
A3 = X is omnipotent, benevolent and omniscient (and God is the only person with these attributes). 
Where does the design argument go wrong, according to Sober? Depending on how we slice up the cake, 
different propositions will count as auxiliary hypotheses. If we take up the first reconstruction, Sober will find 
only the additional assumption A1 about God‖s fondness for beetles problematic (because it depends on O), 
whereas in the second reconstruction, the very attribution of omnipotence and benevolence to X, and the 
proposition about X‖s modus operandi, will be disallowed by Sober (because we don‖t have independent reasons 
for accepting A2 and A3). 
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would have to be inferred from the observations we set out to explain, then Sober‖s 
intrinsic argument against the design argument is off the mark.  
4.4.3 Prediction 
In the murder investigation we discussed, the detective need not predict the exact 
location of the murder weapon in order to convince the jury of his case, although of 
course such a feat would surely be impressive. Likewise, although the design hypothesis 
need not predict novel phenomena, this would of course be a way of boosting the 
plausibility of the design hypothesis dramatically. As we noted in the previous section, 
predictivists attach special epistemic status to successful predictions. Predictivism 
comes in many flavors, and some of these flavors have faced some important criticisms, 
most notably coming from Sober himself (Hitchcock and Sober 2004). Hitchcock & Sober 
distinguish between global and local predictivism. The first “maintains that a theory 
which successfully predicts some observation will always be superior to one that 
accommodates the same observation” (Hitchcock and Sober 2004, p. 3). For the latter, 
prediction is only sometimes superior to accommodation. Hitchcock & Sober‖s 
sympathies lie with the local variant, as they show that there are cases in which 
accommodation is better than prediction. For the sake of the argument, however, 
suppose we are confronted with a strong predictivist who would be unimpressed by the 
ability of the design hypothesis to unify and accommodate known data. Is there any 
―possible world‖ in which the design hypothesis can also achieve predictive success in 
addition to explanatory unification?  
Suppose that many different organisms bore an autograph in Hebrew, unique for the 
species to which they belong. Suppose also that these form a very large part of the Old 
Testament, except for some missing quotes. Then the hypothesis H and the auxiliary A1 
of the previous section may be used to predict that there exist organisms we have as yet 
not discovered or not studied carefully enough, which bear the requisite inscriptions 
(maybe some verses from the book of Jonah on the fin of a new whale species). If we are 
able to predict what are the missing inscriptions, this furnishes us with an extra reason 
to accept H & A1, in addition to their presumed unificatory power.  
It is not entirely clear, however, how Sober‖s restrictions apply to predictions of new 
data, as opposed to accommodation of known observations. If the design argument 
would allow us to make successful predictions of phenomena that have a very low 
probability on any non-contrived naturalistic hypothesis we can think of, would Sober 
still refuse to accept it? In the prediction case, the observation O that we use to test our 
competing hypotheses cannot enter into our considerations for choosing auxiliaries 
A1…An, because, by definition, O has not been observed yet. In what sense is the 
“independence” of A1…An to be understood? Is it acceptable if our justification of A1…An 
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depends on other observations that are already known? If so, why does Sober not leave 
room for such cases of predictive success in setting up his intrinsic argument against 
design? In any case, our argument does not hinge on Sober‖s approach disallowing some 
forms of successful prediction, as we have already demonstrated that it precludes valid 
forms of explanatory unification.  
4.4.4 Imperfections and evils  
Many philosophers and scientists, starting with Darwin himself (for recent examples, 
see Avise 2010b, 2010a; Coyne 2009b, pp. 86-91), have argued that the clumsy and 
botched works of nature provide evidence against the design hypothesis. According to 
Sober, both the argument from imperfections and argument from evil (Sober 2004)41 fall 
victim to the same objection which he leveled against the design argument itself, 
namely that they make unwarranted assumptions regarding the character and 
intentions of the alleged designer. For example, discussing Stephen Jay Gould‖s famous 
argument about the clumsy design of the panda‖s pseudo-thumb (Gould 1980), Sober 
charges Gould with simply “inventing assumptions” about the designer to reach a pre-
established conclusion (Sober 2008, p. 128). 
Sober‖s criticism is off the mark for both a specific and a more general reason. First, 
Sober fails to see that these arguments are put forward in the particular context of the 
widespread belief in a benevolent and omnipotent Creator with a purposeful creation 
plan. As soon as one accepts these traditional assumptions about the designer, as most 
theists do, including intelligent design theorists (Forrest, Barbara C. and Gross, Paul R. 
2007), the pervasiveness of botched design and especially the existence of needless 
suffering is most damning (Mackie 1955; Hume 2007 [1779]). It goes without saying that, 
if one relinquishes some of the traditional attributes of God, the argument from evil no 
longer has any force. But the same does not apply to many instances of the argument 
from imperfections, which brings us to the second and more general problem with 
Sober‖s argument.  
Even if a design theorist is not committed to any particular religious doctrine about 
the designer‖s attributes, the existence of puzzling imperfections and rudimentary 
organs, together with the countless instances of ineffective and wasteful processes, 
should worry her nonetheless. These senseless and botched structures present a 
challenge not just to the traditional theological account (as in the case of the argument 
                                                     
 
41 Sober (2008, pp. 164-167) rehearses the same line of reasoning, but he writes that he is not so sure anymore 
whether this puts the biological design argument on a par with the argument from evil.  
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from evil), but to any attempt at subsuming the phenomena of the living world under a 
coherent design plan, and thus to any attempt at genuine unification. This is not the 
proper place to enumerate examples or to give a full account of the argument from bad 
design, but let us briefly point out its logical impact. The thrust of the argument from 
imperfections is to disintegrate the design hypothesis and its auxiliaries. More 
specifically, the pervasiveness of imperfections of the particular kind that only make 
sense on an evolutionary understanding, forces the design theorist either to invent a 
particular intention on the part of the designer for each new observation, or to state 
that the designer must have wanted the world to look as though it evolved. In other 
words, the argument from imperfections challenges the sensible auxiliaries of the 
design hypothesis, and leaves over only the contrived ones (Kitcher 1993, pp. 18-25). 
The surest indication that the unification of biological phenomena under the design 
hypothesis, conjoined with some suitable auxiliaries, is an all but impossible challenge, 
is the fact that those who are eager to make a scientific case for design have never took 
up the challenge to do so (Dennett 2007). Indeed, William Paley himself made only vague 
gestures in that direction. Instead of fleshing out their design hypothesis, IDC theorists 
have insisted that the designer is inscrutable and his intentions unfathomable (see for 
example Johnson 1991, p. 67; Behe 2006, p. 223).42 They have even accused their critics of 
making unwarranted assumptions about the intelligent designer (Nelson 1996). For 
example, Michael Behe wrote: 
Another problem with the argument from imperfection is that it critically 
depends on a psychoanalysis of the unidentified designer. Yet the reasons that a 
designer would or would not do anything are virtually impossible to know unless 
the designer tells you specifically what those reasons are. (Behe 2006, p. 223) 
Surprisingly, but in conformity with his view on auxiliary assumptions, Sober grants 
that this is a “good reply by creationists” (Sober 2007, p. 4). However, we submit that 
Behe‖s response is an all too convenient way of insulating the design argument against 
empirical objections without adding any empirical substance to the theory (Pennock 
1999, p. 249). Behe‖s insistence on the inscrutability of the designer is not a sign of 
sensitivity to a pressing epistemological problem which his critics have overlooked, but 
it is an epistemological retreat that is symptomatic of a degenerated research program 
(Boudry and Braeckman 2010). As Philip Kitcher noted: 
                                                     
 
42 From a political perspective, the IDC movement wants to brush aside theological quarrels and fight for a 
common cause. The ―minimal‖ design hypothesis is interesting because IDC advocates think it allows them to 
circumvent the Establishment clause against the teaching of religion (Forrest, Barbara C. and Gross, Paul R. 
2007). 
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As the evidence accumulates, creationists increasingly must take refuge in 
responses Darwin saw as unsatisfactory evasions, appealing to the thought that 
these properties of life are unfathomable mysteries. (Kitcher 2007, p. 58) 
The evasive arguments of modern creationists indicate that there is no non-contrived 
way to flesh out the design hypothesis that will stand up to the facts, no matter what 
auxiliary hypotheses one adopts. Taking into account that the living world, and 
especially the peculiar examples of ―bad design‖, looks very much like the kind of world 
we would expect if there was no design at all but only mindless natural processes at 
work, the biological design hypothesis is effectively dead.  
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Conclusion 
Sober has correctly identified the main problem with the likelihood reconstruction of 
design reasoning, but his solution does not hold water. To demand that auxiliary 
hypotheses be justified “independently” of the available data one sets out to explain is 
overly restrictive, and commits one to rejecting forms of obviously valid reasoning. 
Even on a charitable reconstruction of his independence relation, Sober‖s intrinsic 
objection against the design argument fails, as he has mistakenly identified the 
creationist practice of gerrymandering as an inevitable trap into which all observation-
based introduction of auxiliaries must fall.  
In our view, advocates of Intelligent Design are perfectly free to construct auxiliary 
hypotheses about the intentions and attributes of their designer, provided that these 
assumptions are elegant and unifying, and are not just tailored to individual 
observations (which they often are). In fact, pace Sober‖s likelihood approach, this is 
what a reasonable critic would demand from them (Dawes 2007, pp. 78-79; Pennock 1999, 
pp. 199-201; Dennett 2007). As long as design theorists fail to flesh out their hypothesis, 
we are left with an unnamed and unknown designer, and we can do nothing beyond 
restating the facts in dignified language. Not surprisingly, therefore, design theorists 
have insisted that the whole affair is unfathomable, thus dodging the issue altogether. 
Sober‖s treatment of the design hypothesis sits uncomfortably with his intended 
“contrastive” approach to hypothesis testing: “to test a hypothesis requires testing it against 
alternatives” [emphasis in original] (2008, p. 52). This departure from the ethos of 
contrastive evaluation is all the more remarkable since, as we have seen, Sober (2000, p. 
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36) himself has earlier noted that, before a serious alternative explanation for adaptive 
complexity became available, it was not surprising that “intelligent people strongly 
favored the design hypothesis” and that “Darwin entirely altered the dialectical 
landscape of this problem.” However, in Evidence and Evolution, Sober (2008, p. 125) 
rejects that very claim in almost exactly the same wordings.43 
4.5.2 Taking the design argument seriously (and then rejecting it) 
Ever since the design argument was formulated, there have been philosophical attempts 
to demonstrate that it is guilty of some fundamental flaw of reasoning, and that we do 
not need an alternative explanation to see why this is so. Spinoza and Hume‖s Philo 
were among the first to argue against the program of natural theology (for more recent 
examples of this approach, see Oppy 1996; Pigliucci 2002; Scott 2004). We think that the 
design argument was difficult to resist before the advent of Darwin‖s theory, even 
though Hume had already pointed out some of the damaging problems it faces; note, 
however, that this historical assessment does not necessarily follow from the argument 
developed in this paper. Even if one accepts the claim that the design inference is not 
intrinsically defective, one is still free to maintain that the empirical evidence as it was 
available to natural theologians before Darwin never favored it (for a critical discussion 
of the evidential warrant of the design argument before Darwin, see Oppy 1996; Gliboff 
2000). 
Given the philosophical consensus view that the biological design argument is a 
failure, is it really important to quarrel over where exactly it goes wrong? We think it is. 
The fate that befell the design argument illustrates a number of important philosophical 
issues regarding the choice of auxiliary hypotheses, the problem of gerrymandering, 
and the explanatory virtue of unification. Moreover, different diagnoses of the design 
argument are wedded to different assessments of its epistemic status. One unexpected 
consequence of typical a priori or fundamental objections to the design argument is that, 
ironically, they are less damaging to the design hypothesis than a posteriori objections 
(Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010a). If we accept Sober‖s critique of auxiliary assumptions, not 
only is the design argument stillborn even before any empirical evidence can be 
brought to bear on it, but the empirical arguments against design will not get off the 
                                                     
 
43 In Evidence and Evolution, Sober writes that, according to a common opinion among biologists, “Paley 
reasoned correctly […] but that the dialectical landscape shifted profoundly when a third hypothesis [Darwin‖s 
theory of evolution] was formulated.” On the next page, he rejects this position and claims that Paley‖s design 
argument has always been flawed. In fact, we think Sober‖s later position is more consistent with his critique 
of auxiliary assumptions, which he already developed in (2000). After all, if correct, his argument applies 
equally to Paley. 
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ground either (Sober 2008, pp. 126-128). If advocates of design are not allowed to make 
unjustified assumptions about the designer‖s attributes, then neither are their critics. 
Hence, Sober‖s symmetric critique unwittingly suggests that the critics are equally 
unjustified in rejecting intelligent design as the advocates are in defending it. We think 
this is mistaken, and it is a conclusion which Sober would want to avoid. 
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Chapter 5.  
Immunizing Strategies & Epistemic Defense 
Mechanisms 
A successful pseudoscience is a great intellectual 
achievement. Its study is as instructive and worth 




Abstract.44 An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief 
system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less 
invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast, an 
epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which 
has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the 
remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense 
mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief systems. Five different types will be 
distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The 
difference between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and 
their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new light on the 
various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical 
evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of 
these belief systems‖ enduring appeal and tenacity.  
 
                                                     
 
44 This chapter is based on Boudry and Braeckman (2010). Excerpts of this paper were presented at the Fourth 
Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Analytic Philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven 
(2010). 
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5.1 Introduction 
Skeptics of pseudoscience and the paranormal have been puzzled and sometimes 
exasperated about the enduring popularity of beliefs that are either very implausible or 
impossible from a scientific and rational perspective (Benassi, Singer et al. 1980; 
Shermer 2002; Hines 2003). Although many of these belief systems have been 
thoroughly debunked, the critical efforts of skeptics are mostly unavailing. In this 
paper, we discuss the remarkable recurrence of immunizing strategies and defense 
mechanisms, which play an important role in the tenacity of these belief systems. We 
define an Immunizing Strategy as an argument brought forward in support of a belief 
system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less 
invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence.45 By contrast, an 
Epistemic Defense Mechanism is defined as an internal structural feature of a belief 
system, which has the same effect of deflecting rational arguments and adverse 
evidence. 
5.1.1 The demarcation problem 
The idea of immunizing strategies sometimes surfaces in the philosophical debate about 
the demarcation problem. Karl Popper famously argued that the most distinctive 
feature of the scientific attitude is the willingness to take bold empirical risks, and that a 
theory can only be regarded as scientific to the extent that it is open to empirical 
refutation. Of course, resorting to immunizing tactics to protect one‖s theory from 
falsification is doing exactly the opposite of taking empirical risks, and hence, according 
to Popper‖s view of science, it is the hallmark of pseudoscientific thinking. However, 
naive falsificationism has been widely abandoned in philosophy of science (Laudan 
1983), and the enthusiasm for the demarcation project has waned significantly. A more 
sophisticated philosophy of science accepts that every scientific research programme 
builds up a “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses around its “hard core” claims 
(Lakatos and Musgrave 1970; Lakatos 1968). Thus, to a certain extent ―immunizing 
strategies‖ can be found in bona fide science as well, and scientists are certainly not 
                                                     
 
45 In our immunization metaphor, theory-external arguments are introduced from outside as a means of 
protection. In that sense, the metaphor is more in line with immunization as a health policy (vaccination) 
than with the body‖s internal immune system. 
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immune to the use of dubious arguments to deflect valid criticism (Hines 2003; Park 
2002).  
Nevertheless, Popper‖s basic insight about the value of boldness in conjecture making 
is still valuable, and survived in a more sophisticated form in Lakatos‖ philosophy of 
science. In Chapter 6, we will see that, if the sole effect of introducing an auxiliary 
hypotheses is to protect the core theory from refutation, without yielding some form of 
theoretical progress, we are dealing with a degenerating research programme, and 
hence with bad science. In line with this view, the systematic reliance on defensive 
maneuvers, evasive arguments and ad hoc excuses is still widely regarded as a telltale 
feature of pseudoscientific discourse (e.g. Derksen 1993; Hines 2003).  
5.1.2 Overview 
In this chapter we are not so much involved with immunizing strategies as a proposed 
solution to the demarcation problem. Instead, we present a descriptive classification of 
different types of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms, and we discuss their 
epistemological status. To be sure, many of the belief systems we discuss are 
traditionally regarded as pseudoscience, but as we are not particularly interested in 
traditional demarcationism, we will also offer examples from different domains, for 
instance cult belief systems, pseudo-philosophy, magic and religion. Indeed, one of the 
main purposes of this paper is precisely to draw attention to the pervasiveness of 
immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms across widely different 
domains.  
We provide an overview of the different ways in which a belief system can be 
rendered immune from criticism and adverse evidence, but our list is not intended to be 
exhaustive. In discussing these examples, it will transpire that it is often difficult to 
separate the theory-as-such from the ―immunizing strategies‖ used by its defenders. 
Thus, the strict distinction between immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms will 
be called into question.  
5.2 Theory change and degenerating research programmes 
How exactly do immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms relate to the problem of 
theory change in science, in particular to progressive/degenerating research 
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programmes and pseudoscience? The history of science has witnessed numerous 
examples of theories that are widely abandoned today but that were initially promising 
and respectable in the scientific community. What often happens is not that a single 
crucial experiment discredits a theory in one fell swoop, but that a broader research 
programme runs into ever more anomalies and conceptual problems, increasingly 
requiring the sort of changes that Lakatos denoted as “degenerative”. Max Planck wrote 
that science advances “one funeral at a time”, but while the sudden demise of a well-
established theory has been observed (as when physicists abandoned Newton‖s theory 
of physics almost overnight following Eddington‖s famous eclipse observations), most 
theories “die the death of a thousand excuses”. Examples include phrenology, the 
theory of ―cold fusion‖ in physics, Lamarckism in biology, Marxist theories about the law 
of profit and the demise of capitalism, or more recently, the Duesberg hypothesis on the 
non-infectious nature of AIDS. Although it is often difficult to identify a moment when a 
theory or a research programme collapses under the weight of anomalies, it is widely 
acknowledged that there are certain indications of a degeneration into bad science or 
pseudoscience.  
On the one hand, advocates of a theory may resort to certain generic strategies for 
protecting a cherished theory from mounting adverse evidence: cherry-picking the 
data, shooting the messenger, distorting findings, special pleading, discrediting the 
methods employed in research with unwelcome results, accusing the new ―orthodoxy‖ of 
a hidden agenda etc. These generic methods can be broadly construed as ―immunizing 
strategies‖, but they are not particularly interesting from a philosophical perspective, 
and we will not be much concerned with them in this paper.  
On the other hand, a theory-in-crisis is often belatedly modified by its advocates so as 
to be less vulnerable to refutation, by introducing ad hoc elaborations (see Chapter 6) 
and special clauses that explain away apparent failures and reduce the empirical 
content of the theory. As every scientific theory makes use of a protective belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses, these amendments can seem scientifically respectable at an early 
stage, and there is often no clear point at which they collapse into pseudoscientific 
immunizing strategies.  
Insofar as it is possible to separate the original theory from later (pseudoscientific) 
modifications, we prefer to use the term ―immunizing strategies‖, which are brought 
forward at some point to rescue the original theory from refutation. However, in more 
complicated cases, these protective strategies progressively become integral part of the 
theory proper (see examples of parapsychology and psychoanalysis in 5.3.5.1). They are 
not any longer ―strategies‖ to which its advocates resort when the theory runs into 
trouble, but they have become integrated in the explanatory resources and conceptual 
structure of the theory. We designate these internal, structural features as epistemic 
―defense mechanisms‖.  
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In some interesting cases, as we will see, the defense mechanisms of a belief system 
even follow naturally from its conceptual nucleus (see the example of conspiracy 
theories in 5.3.3). As a result of their inbuilt defense mechanisms, these belief systems 
exhibit a self-perpetuating rationale, and are particularly interesting from an 
epistemological perspective. This topic will be further developed in Chapter 11. We will 
also briefly return to the conceptual distinction between immunizing strategies and 
defense mechanisms in 5.4.1. 
5.3 Immunizing strategies & epistemic defense mechanisms 
5.3.1 Conceptual equivocations & moving targets 
Pseudoscientists often make use of conceptual equivocations to transform their theory 
into a moving target. This may be achieved in two different ways: either one makes a 
series of ambiguous and open-ended claims that are construed in such a way that one 
can conveniently switch back and forth between specific and broad interpretations. 
Alternatively, one defends a theory that appears specific and exciting on a first 
inspection, but when it runs into trouble, one belatedly deflates it to make it trivial or 
uninteresting. The two immunizing strategies are sometimes difficult to distinguish, 
and some successful pseudoscientists will use them in tandem. 
5.3.1.1 Multiple endpoints 
Skeptics have often remarked that astrologers and soothsayers shy away from making 
bold and specific statements. For example, the predictions in a horoscope typically have 
multiple endpoints (Gilovich 1991, pp. 58-59), so that they can be matched 
retrospectively to a wide range of events. In fact, a ―good‖ horoscope contains 
predictions that are amenable to both specific interpretations and a range of broad and 
metaphorical ones. Inevitably, people will perceive some matches with real events, and 
they will immediately see this as the intended or real interpretation of the prediction, 
ignoring the other ways in which it might have been ―borne out‖. As a result, they will be 
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unduly impressed by its accuracy.46 Even if not all predictions yield an uncanny match 
with a real event, the astrologer – or the naive interpreter – can always resort to one of 
the broad interpretations, thus avoiding the impression that a prediction has failed. 
Naturally, people will tend to remember the predictions belonging to the first category. 
Thus, the technique of multiple endpoints creates an in-built asymmetry between what 
will count as hits and misses for astrological predictions, the effect of which is to 
immunize astrology against refutations.  
As an example of this asymmetry, consider the case of Nostradamus‖ prophecies, 
which, as is well-known, allow for almost unlimited allegorical and metaphorical 
interpretation (Marks 2000, pp. 262-266; Hines 2003). As soon as interpreters have found 
a ―fit‖ with actual historical events, the congruency seems so compelling that they are 
unable to read the prophecies in any other light. The abundance of quatrains and the 
problem of multiple endpoints guarantee that people will find a lot of tenuous matches, 
some of which even look striking. As for the other predictions, one can readily persist 
that these have yet to be borne out, or that their ―true‖ meaning has not yet been 
discovered.  
As there is nothing in astrological theory that dictates the use of equivocations and 
multiple endpoints, we may regard this technique as an immunizing strategy used by 
some astrologers to forestall predictive failure, as opposed to a defense mechanism. On 
the other hand, the practice is so common that it has become inseparable from the field 
of astrology, and several authors have devised convenient rationalizations for it. For 
example, Nostradamus explained that he deliberately obscured his predictions so as to 
avoid persecution by the Inquisition. 
5.3.1.2 Deflationary revisions 
As an example of the second type, consider the case of the Jehovah‖s witnesses who, 
after the prediction of the Second Coming of Christ in 1873-74 failed to come true, 
argued that Christ had returned as predicted, albeit as an invisible spirit being (Zygmunt 
1970, p. 931). Zygmunt has demonstrated that, over the course of history, Jehovah‖s 
witnesses have consistently “redefined [failed prophecies] in retrospect in a manner 
which provided nonempirical confirmation” (Zygmunt 1970, p. 934). Often enough, 
these took the form of deflationary revisions of the original prediction. In Evelyn 
Waughs novel Brideshead Revisited, quoted by philosopher Frank Cioffi (1998, p. 220), the 
                                                     
 
46 It is a well-known psychological finding that people have difficulties assessing the specificity of ambiguous 
statements once they have found a fitting interpretation. For example, people will rate the results of a bogus 
personality test as accurate descriptions of themselves, even if these results contain only vague and 
ambiguous claims that are applicable to virtually anyone, a phenomenon that is known as the Barnum effect 
or Forer effect. 
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character Rex Mottram is questioned by his Jesuit instructor in order to ensure his good 
Catholic Faith.  
 ―Supposing the Pope looked up and saw a cloud and said “It‖s going to rain,” 
would that be bound to happen?‖ ―Oh yes, Father.‖ ―But supposing it didn‖t?‖ He 
thought a moment and said, ―I suppose it would be sort of raining spiritually, only 
we were too sinful to see it.‖ 
Cioffi has documented an interesting case of belated deflationary revisions in Freud‖s 
theory of the libido. As is well-known, Freudian psychoanalysis makes the sweeping 
claim that the root of all neuroses is to be found in repressed ―libido‖. Freud‖s intended 
interpretation was clearly sexual. For example, one can only understand why fathers 
threaten their sons with penile amputation if one accepts that the desires of the sons 
were very carnal indeed. Freud elevated this sexual etiology of all neuroses to a central 
dogma of psychoanalysis, and he derided others when they were compromising on this 
point. When presented with empirical difficulties, however, Freud resorted to just such 
a fuzzier interpretation, widening the scope of the libido concept so as to make it 
encompass “what Plato meant by ―Eros‖ and St. Paul by ―love‖” (quoted in Cioffi 1998, p. 
16). For example, in Freud‖s explanation of the ―war neuroses‖ following the First World 
War, only a deflationary interpretation of ―libido‖ as a general kind of self-love allowed 
him to maintain his sweeping universality thesis. In the case of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, the equivocations surrounding the concept of libido (and other 
pseudoscientific concepts, see section 5.3.2 and also Chapter 10) were arguably always 
an integral part of the theory, so that one may properly speak of a defense mechanism.  
The strategy of belated deflationary revisions is also rampant in a great deal of 
postmodernist and social constructivist literature, where it is used in tandem with a 
maneuver in the opposite direction. André Kukla has coined these strategies 
“switcheroos” and “reverse-switcheroos”:  
One commits a switcheroo by starting with a hypothesis that's amenable to a 
range of interpretations, giving arguments that support a weak version, and 
thenceforth pretending that one of the stronger versions has been established. 
(2000, p. x) 
What Kukla terms “reverse switcheroos” corresponds to what we term a deflationary 
reinterpretation: 
you put forth a strong version of the hypothesis, and when it gets into trouble, 
you retreat to a weaker version, pretending that it was the weaker thesis that you 
had in mind all along. Switcheroos and reverse switcheroos can be performed in 
tandem, and the cycle can be repeated ad infinitum. A judicious application of this 
strategy enables one to maintain an indefensible position forever. (2000, p. x)  
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A skilled pseudoscientist switches back and forth between different versions of his 
theory, and may even exploit his own equivocations to accuse his critics of 
misrepresenting his position. Philosopher Nicholas Shackel has termed this strategy the 
“Motte and Bailey Doctrine” (Shackel 2005; see also Fusfield 1993), after the medieval 
defense system in which a stone tower (the Motte) is surrounded by an area of open 
land (the Bailey): 
For my purposes the desirable but only lightly defensible territory of […] the 
Bailey, represents a philosophical doctrine or position with similar properties: 
desirable to its proponent but only lightly defensible. The Motte is the defensible 
but undesired position to which one retreats when hard pressed. (Shackel 2005, p. 
298) 
Analogous to Kukla‖s analysis of switcheroos, Shackel argues that a successful 
application of this strategy requires a “systematic vacillation between the desired 
territory and retreating to the Motte when pressed” (Shackel 2005, p. 298). Again, this 
retreat to the Motte corresponds to what we call deflationary revisions.  
Some recent examples of these Motte and Bailey strategies can be found in the 
literature of Intelligent Design Creationists. In Chapter 7, we will argue in detail that the 
central concept of “irreducible complexity” introduced by Intelligent Design advocate 
Michael Behe vacillates between an empirically adequate but somewhat trivial 
observation, and an exciting but completely unfounded claim (see also Chapter 8 for 
similar equivocations regarding the concept of teleology). Behe writes that a system is 
irreducibly complex when the removal of any one of its components lead to a 
breakdown in functioning. He has argued that “any precursor to an irreducibly complex 
system that is missing a part is by definition non-functional” (Behe 2006, p. 39), and that 
therefore evolution by natural selection is ruled out. However, evolution by natural 
selection often works by indirect routes and by co-opting existing systems to perform 
other functions. When pressed on this point, Behe retreats to a deflationary 
interpretation of irreducible complexity, which simply amounts to the claim that some 
biological systems cease functioning when one or more components are removed. But 
after he has given arguments for this defensible but uninteresting position, Behe again 
proceeds to use his concept as though it posed a major problem for evolutionary theory. 
This equivocation, which allows Behe to keep on moving the goalposts, is inherent in 
the very definition of irreducible complexity, so that one may regard it as a defense 
mechanism of Behe‖s Intelligent Design Creationism (Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010b). 
The work of William Dembski, another leading theorist of the IDC movement, is 
similarly based on bait-and-switch strategies. In the use of his notion of complex 
specified information (CSI), Dembski systematically switches back and forth between 
Shannon‖s mathematical definition of information, which is simply a measure of 
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randomness, and the common notion of information as “meaningful message” (Perakh, 
Mark 2004, pp. 64-75). 
5.3.2 Postdiction and feedback loops 
Unobservable entities are routinely invoked in scientific explanations, and there is 
nothing wrong per se with theories that make use of them. However, if particular 
defense mechanisms are present, belief systems about unobservable entities and their 
causal workings are completely impervious to falsification. The recipe for such a belief 
system is as follows: postulate the existence of certain invisible or imponderable causes 
to account for a range of phenomena, and maintain that the working of these causes can 
only be inferred ex post facto from their effects. Provided that the effects themselves are 
hard to assess, and that the causal relations in the belief system are not sufficiently 
specified, believers can get entangled in subtle feedback loops between theory and 
observations, which keep the belief system forever outside the reach of empirical 
refutation. 
As an example, consider the belief in the efficacy of rituals and magical interventions. 
Anthropologists have noted that the question whether a performed ritual is ―genuine‖ is 
often underspecified by its constitutive components, and can only be determined ex post 
facto dependent on the expected outcome. If the result is successful, one can infer that 
the intervention was the right one and was properly performed. If it was not, obviously 
―something must have gone wrong‖ during the intervention, or the intervention was not 
of the appropriate type. Indeed, the very idea of a failed ritual loses any meaning, 
because any apparent failure ―shows‖ that it was just not performed properly, or not 
with the right material, or that some other and equally invisible force interfered with 
the ritual (additional immunizing strategies are possible). According to anthropologist 
Evans-Pritchard, belief in ritual efficacy is protected by a whole repertoire of 
“secondary elaborations” for explaining away particular failures in the expected effects 
(Evans-Pritchard 1965). In this way, the general causal principles themselves remain 
immune from disconfirmation.  
As a result, the taxonomic identification of objects as having certain magical 
properties, or the identification of a person as a ―real‖ shaman, tends to feed back into 
causal assumptions, engendering a form of vicious circularity. As Pascal Boyer noted: 
“taxonomic assumptions are the basis of causal expectations, and conversely, causal 
expectations lead to innovations or corrections in the taxonomic identification” (Boyer 
1994, p. 144). For example, the efficacy of a magic spell to chase away evil spirits is 
assessed on the basis of how the patient‖s condition develops, but the question whether 
the patient is now really liberated from these evil spirits is itself determined by the 
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―genuineness‖ of the magic spell (which may depend on the conditions of the exorcism 
or the reputation of the healer).  
As another example, consider the belief in the therapeutic power of healing crystals, 
chakra stimulation or even homeopathy. On the one hand, the causal relations in these 
belief systems are always underspecified: what kind of crystal is appropriate for which 
patients, how long it takes for chakras to open, what kind of homeopathic medicine is 
suitable for which patient, etc. Different interventions are ―allowed‖ by the belief system, 
and the one that coincides with the moment of recovery can be used to construe the 
apparent cause. On the other hand, the therapeutic effects themselves are often difficult 
to ascertain straightforwardly. For example, what exactly are the visible results of 
having one‖s ―energy levels restored‖ again, or having one‖s ―chakras released‖, according 
to alternative therapists? As a result of these defense mechanisms, causal inferences 
feed back into each other in a way that always protects the belief system from 
refutation.  
The technique of postdiction also underlies an elegant rationalization for data 
mining, confirmation bias and explaining away null results in parapsychology (Gilovich 
1991, p. 21). Parapsychologists have tried out a whole range of different experimental 
set-ups and procedures to summon psi phenomena. When confronted with a pattern of 
alternate successes and failures, many parapsychologists have explained that psi is an 
elusive and unpredictable force. As a result, they find it easy to interpret the patterns of 
hits and misses ex post facto as the result of the intermittent workings of psychic powers, 
and to explain away failures as due to settings that were simply not psi-conducive. 
James Randi recounts the remarkable case of a water diviner who, after being queried 
why he did not count his failures in a series of experiments, replied that “obviously, 
when I fail, the powers aren‖t working at that time, and, after all, I‖m counting 
percentages on the cases where I‖m divining, not when I‖m just guessing!” (Randi 1981, 
p. 13), Randi notes that even many highly regarded psi experiments include a series of 
preliminary “warm-up” sessions. In this context, the technique of postdicting psi-
activity is very tempting: “Ok, that was just warming-up” – “It seems I‖m getting a little 
tired” – “There are obviously bad vibes around that are distracting me”. On a more 
academic level, postdiction is often used for rationalizing the practice of data-mining. 
As Richard Wiseman noted, if a pool of parapsychological experiments is sufficiently 
extensive and heterogeneous, it is not difficult to “‖[explain] away‖ overall null effects 
by retrospectively identifying a subset of studies that used a certain procedure and 
yielded a significant cumulative result” (Wiseman 2010, p. 38).  
Depending on one‖s understanding of parapsychological theory, the practice of 
postdiction can be regarded as an immunizing strategy or a defense mechanism. If one 
holds that the characterization of psi as elusive and unpredictable is just a 
pseudoscientific excuse that has nothing to do with parapsychology proper, one may 
regard it as an immunizing strategy. By contrast, if one maintains that the elusive and 
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unpredictable nature of psi is a central thesis of parapsychology (see 5.3.5.1), one may 
properly call it a defense mechanism of the belief system. 
A beautiful example of postdiction can also be found in, once again, Freudian 
psychoanalysis. In the etiology of psychological illness, Freud hypothesized that there is 
an unobservable ―quantitative factor‖ in the patient‖s libidinal economy that had to be 
taken into account. After all, according to psychoanalysis, ―normal‖ persons harbor the 
same repressed wishes and complexes that are found in neurotic patients. The 
difference between the two groups is only to be found in the quantitative factor in their 
mental economy, which ultimately determines if and when an unconscious complex will 
develop into neurosis. Tellingly, Freud admitted that this factor could only be inferred 
ex post facto to account for the unexpected presence or absence of any given symptom.  
We cannot measure the amount of libido essential to produce pathological effects. 
We can only postulate it after the effects of the illness have manifested 
themselves. (Freud 1924, p. 119) 
5.3.3 Conspiracy thinking  
5.3.3.1 Turning the evidence on its head 
Conspiracy theories are very interesting from an epistemological perspective, and 
certainly deserve a more extensive discussion than the one we can offer within the 
confines of this chapter (Clarke 2002; Keeley 1999). For our present purposes, we want to 
highlight the fact that all conspiracy theories share a fundamental template of 
epistemic defense mechanisms. Conspiracy theories purport to provide an explanation 
of a historical event that differs markedly from the received view or official account. 
According to conspiracy theorists, the event in question was brought about by a group 
of actors who have been secretly pulling the strings behind the scenes, and who have 
tried to cover up their actions by spreading a false story. This false account is the 
received view, which they are trying to fool us into believing. However, the conspirators 
have not been completely successful, and they have left traces that allow the conspiracy 
theorist to reveal their evil plot.  
Conspiracy theorists point to incongruities and anomalies in the official account of 
events, and try to account for these by constructing a unifying alternative explanation. 
Brian Keeley (1999, p. 118) has termed these the “errant data” with which conspiracy 
theories are constructed, and he distinguishes two classes: data that are unaccounted 
for on the official account, and data that actually contradict it.  
If the conspiracy hypothesis should fail to be confirmed by further investigations, 
however, or if new evidence should turn up that flatly contradicts it, conspiracy 
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theorists typically turn the evidence on its head, arguing that an apparent accordance 
with the official story is of course predicted by their theory. After all, successful 
conspirators may be expected to deliberately lay out forged evidence to lead us astray, 
to cover up the traces of the secret plot, to bribe those who witnessed the cover-up, etc. 
As Clarke (2002, p. 135) notes: “the apparent plausibility of the nonconspirational 
received view is a consequence of the success of the cover story or cover-up, according 
to conspiracy theorists”. This pattern of epistemic defense mechanisms, in which any 
apparent contradiction can be turned into a confirmation, is a common feature of all 
global conspiracy theories.47 
Thus, confronting ardent conspiracy theorists with adverse evidence and eyewitness 
accounts is generally to no avail. In the believers‖ eyes, this apparent evidence merely 
constitutes further proof of the cunning and power of the conspirators. The 
epistemological situation of the conspiracy thinker reminds one of the hollow face 
illusion. Either way we look at the mask of a hollow face, from the front or from behind, 
we always ―see‖ a normal convex face staring at us (Gregory 1997). In a similar way, no 
matter how the evidence stares at the conspiracy theorist, he or she will always ―see‖ the 
action of conspirators.  
                                                     
 
47 For an analogy between conspiracy thinking and Freudian psychoanalysis from an epistemological 
perspective, see section 10.3.3. 
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Figure 5 The hollow face illusion. To the left is a mask of a normal convex face, while the 
right picture is the same mask viewed from behind. Although the left face is concave, we 
have a strong visual bias to interpret both images as convex faces.  
5.3.3.2 Explaining the motives for disbelief  
A special defense mechanism implicit in conspiracy theories allows the believer to 
explain the existence of disbelievers within the framework of the belief system itself. 
For example, Sigmund Freud thought he was able to account for the ―resistance‖ of his 
opponents in psychoanalytic terms:  
Psycho-analysis is seeking to bring to conscious recognition the things in mental 
life which are repressed; and everyone who forms a judgment on it is himself a 
human being, who possesses similar repressions and may perhaps be maintaining 
them with difficulty. They are therefore bound to call up the same resistance in 
him as in our patients; and that resistance finds it easy to disguise itself as an 
intellectual rejection and to bring up arguments like those which we ward off in 
our patients by means of the fundamental rule of psycho-analysis. (Freud 1957, p. 
39) 
Thus, people attack psychoanalysis because they themselves harbor the repressed 
wishes and complexes revealed by the theory. Being under the spell of unconscious 
forces, the critics are not even aware of their unconscious motivations, because these 
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are ―disguised‖ for them as rational arguments.48 As a consequence, any objection, 
however seemingly reasonable, can be dismissed by the psychoanalyst as unconscious 
resistance in disguise (Gellner 1985). Hence, it is the perfect joker card of the 
pseudoscientist. Defenders of Marxism sometimes use a similar immunizing argument, 
labeling criticism from outsiders as manifestations of ―bourgeois class consciousness‖, 
thus demonstrating the very theory the critics were objecting to.49  
The argument from resistance is not just a form of rhetoric that some psychoanalysts 
happen to resort to in the face of valid criticism – rather, it is “an imperative emanating 
from the heart of the psychoanalytic vision” (Crews 1986, p. 14). Indeed, if Freud‖s model 
of the human mind were accurate, we would expect the kind of disguised resistance he 
was alluding to. Hence, in our terminology, the argument plainly is an epistemic defense 
mechanism of the psychoanalytic belief system. 
Essentially, the argument from resistance is structurally identical to any form of 
conspirational suspicion that takes the attacks of critics as lending further support to 
the belief system. This style of reasoning is remarkably widespread, even outside 
classical conspiracy theories. For example, many creationists believe that evolution is 
an invention of the devil to deceive faithful Christians and lure them into disbelief. For 
example, Henry Morris, co-author of the seminal work The Genesis Flood that sparked the 
Young Earth Creationism movement in the 1960s, actually believes that the theory of 
evolution was given by Satan himself to Nimrod, at the Tower of Babel. Morris wrote 
that “[b]ehind both groups of evolutionists one can discern the malignant influence of 
'that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world'” (Morris 
1963, p. 93). 
In his conspiracy book on UFOs and alien abductions, history professor David Jacobs 
explains that the evidence for his views is so weak and sketchy because the aliens have 
carefully installed a “wall of secrecy” (Jacobs 1998, p. 117): they “cloud” the experience 
of their abductees, implant false memories, and they “perceptually alter potential 
witnesses” (Jacobs 1998, p. 112). In this way, skepticism and disbelief is easily explained: 
“The aliens have fooled us. They lulled us into an attitude of disbelief, and hence 
complacency, at the very beginning of our awareness of their presence” (Jacobs 1998, p. 
258). An even more extreme example of this defense mechanism is found in the way 
Scientology members handle criticism from outsiders. Notoriously, Scientologists 
systematically try to silence their critics by spreading false allegations and smearing 
                                                     
 
48 It is not even clear that ―we‖ concocted those arguments rather than a mental entity that is independent 
from ―us‖, which is precisely what caused Wittgenstein to remark that Freud had made an “abominable mess” 
of the reasons and causes of our behavior. 
49 According to Popper (2002), in contrast with Freudian psychoanalysis, Marx‖s initial theory was predictive 
and not without scientific merits, and it degenerated into pseudoscience only when some of his defenders 
resorted to ad hoc revisions and immunizing tactics.  
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their reputation.50 In an internal policy letter, founder Ron L. Hubbard makes clear that 
critics can only have one incentive for attacking Scientology: 
There has never yet been an attacker who was not reeking with crime. All we had 
to do was look for it and murder would come out. […] They fear our Meter.51 They 
fear freedom. They fear the way we are growing. Why? Because they have too 
much to hide. (Foster 1971, p. 134) 
Interestingly, this alleged motive for attacking the Church is explained by the theory of 
Dianetics in terms that are almost identical to Freudian psychoanalysis. According to 
Scientologists, people naturally have a ―reactive mind‖ full of unconscious impressions 
and traumas that are called ―engrams‖. Members of the Church are called Clears, because 
they are liberated from the influences of this reactive mind. The non-members of the 
Church, however, which are called ―pre-clears‖, are still struggling with their engrams, 
and they will try anything to hide them from view. Hence their attacking Scientology. 
5.3.4 Changing the rules of play 
By undermining the standards of reasoning employed in a rational debate, one can 
safeguard one‖s position from valid criticism. In many instances of this immunizing 
strategy, the very attempt at criticism is condemned as fundamentally misguided. 
Sometimes, reasons for this short-circuiting of criticism are dictated by the belief 
system itself, in which case we have to do with an epistemic defense mechanism (see 
our account of Lacanian psychoanalysis in Chapter 9).  
For example, according to postmodernist philosophers and radical social 
constructivists, there are no objective canons of rationality, only different social 
constructions of rationality that are all equally valid. Therefore, occupying a position at 
all amounts to pretending that some positions are more defensible than others, which is 
already misguided. Therefore, the postmodernist tries to occupy what philosopher 
Nicholas Shackel has termed the “No-Position Position” (Shackel 2005, pp. 311-319). This 
conveniently allows him to “use normative notions of rationality while evading 
accountability to rational standard” (Shackel 2005, p. 312). The self-excepting nature of 
the “No-Position Position” reminds one of what the philosopher David C. Stove termed 
the Ishmael Effect, after Ishmael‖s epilogue to Melville‖s Moby Dick: “and I only am 
                                                     
 
50 Ron L. Hubbard wrote: “Don't ever defend. Always attack. Find or manufacture enough threat against them 
to cause them to sue for peace. Originate a black PR campaign to destroy the person's repute and to discredit 
them so thoroughly they will be ostracized...” (Foster 1971). 
51 The E-meter is an instrument used by Scientologists to measure stress and detect engrams. 
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escaped alone to tell thee”. It refers to the claimed ability of some philosophical theory 
to escape the fate to which it condemns all other discourse.52 Because the postmodernist 
pretends not to be accountable to any normative notion of rationality, the very act of 
criticizing his ―position‖ misses the point, and thus postmodernism is rendered 
completely immune to criticism. Shackel has meticulously demonstrated that, while 
being obscured by the insinuation of the “No-Position Position”, self-refutation is 
inevitable in postmodernist discourse.  
The postmodernist rejection of reason is an extreme example of stonewalling, but 
one can find other exponents of this argument, which are not so sweeping as to entail 
self-refutation. For example, in discussions about alternative medicine one often hears 
the claim that each person or patient is “radically unique”, thus frustrating any form of 
systematic knowledge about diseases and treatments. Of course, advocates of unproven 
medical treatments use this argument as a way to deflect the demand for randomized 
and double-blind trials to substantiate their therapeutic claims (Williams 1980; Gordon 
1996). If each patient is radically unique, there is no point in lumping patients together 
in one treatment group and statistically comparing them with a control group. 
Homeopathy, for example, “considers the single patient as indivisible and unique [...] as 
not accessible to the method of measuring” (Guttentag 1940, p. 1177). Indeed, the whole 
idea of a classification systems of diseases is perceived by many advocates of alternative 
medicine as a form of greedy reductionism that eradicates the human subject. The 
argument is so convenient that it has been borrowed as an immunizing strategy by 
countless alternative therapists, including, inevitably, psychoanalysts (Boudry 2009a).  
5.3.5 Invisible escape clauses  
A last popular immunizing strategy of pseudoscientists – and in some cases taking the 
form of a full-blooded defense mechanism – consists in the systematic ad hoc invocation 
of invisible or imponderable causes that conveniently account for such a pattern of 
observations as would have been expected if the theory were false. As in the case of 
conceptual equivocations above, the availability of these escape clauses is initially 
obscured, and they come out of the closet only when the theory runs into trouble, 
giving the pseudoscientist‖s initial claims a spurious sense of empirical boldness. Again, 
we can distinguish two subtypes: 
                                                     
 
52 The problem is also similar to the Mannheim paradox: if all discourse is ideological, how is it possible to 
have non-ideological discourse about ideology? 
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5.3.5.1 Tailoring around the phenomena 
In the first subtype, the pseudoscientist invokes an invisible cause that is neatly tailored 
to an observational pattern of apparent failure, thus protecting the theory from 
refutation. An extreme example of this strategy is the so-called Omphalos hypothesis by 
Philip Gosse (1857), a variant of creationism according to which God forged all the 
geological evidence for an ancient universe to test our faith. In fact, this is a limiting 
case of a conspiracy theory, in which there is only ―inverted‖ evidence for the theory: all 
the observations point in the direction of an old universe, which is exactly what one 
would expect from a deceitful divine being intent on testing our faith.  
One among many interesting examples of this immunizing strategy in 
parapsychology is the idea of negative psi emitted by skeptical minds and 
experimenters in general (Wiseman 2010), which is a popular excuse when psi 
experiments fail (see for example Sheldrake 1995). Some authors have given it 
impressive labels like “catapsi”, which is defined as “the generation of ―static‖ that 
cancels out regular psi powers within its range” (Bonewitz 1989, p. 55). The idea that the 
presence of inquisitive minds disturbs paranormal phenomena already occurred to 
Franz Anton Mesmer and his fellow magnetizers, who believed that the skeptical 
presence weakened the force of the magnetic fluid. The instructions for magnetizers of 
Joseph P. F. Deleuze were clear enough: “Never magnetise before inquisitive persons!” 
(quoted in Mackay 1974 [1841], p. 290). 
Parapsychologists have also invented the “error phenomenon” (Rao 1968), which 
refers to the finding that, when there is an error in the methodology or procedure of an 
experiment, this leads to better results, because these errors tend to activate psi 
(Humphrey 1996, p. 152). The famous psychical researcher John Beloff argued that psi 
phenomena are “actively evasive” (Beloff 1994, p. 7) and he has coined the “decline 
effect” (1994, p. 11) to describe the puzzling tendency of psychics to lose their powers as 
they are tested more extensively. Some parapsychologists have hypothesized that the 
primary function of psi is to “induce a sense of mystery and wonder”, which allegedly 
explains its elusive character (Kennedy 2003, p. 67). Several other elaborate immunizing 
strategies have been devised for explaining why psi seems to actively avoid 
corroboration, some of which border on paranormal conspiracy theories (for an 
overview and discussion, see Kennedy 2001). Again, insofar as one takes these concepts 
to be an integral part of parapsychology, they are no longer immunizing strategies, but 
they have to be characterized as full-fledged defense mechanisms.  
However one decides the question, all of these fanciful concepts and explanations 
have one thing in common: they seem designed so as to mimic the observations one 
would expect if the alleged psi phenomena were due to deception, trickery and 
methodological defects. They function as simple escape clauses for experimental failure, 
rendering psi theory immune from falsification.  
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5.3.5.2 Imponderabilia 
The second subtype is related to the first, but with a different emphasis. Sometimes a 
pseudoscientist belatedly adds an extra factor to his theory that confounds the initial 
expectations it generated. A good example is the astrologer‖s belated invocation of the 
formation of stars at the moment of conception – which is of course very hard to 
determine – when his prediction on the basis of the birth date has failed. Another 
example is the amusing suggestion by believers in Bigfoot that the creature is possibly 
“extradimensional”, so that any failed attempt to catch it can be explained by arguing 
that Bigfoot has escaped “into another dimension” (Zuefle 1999, p. 27; for the same trick 
with aliens, see for example Mack 1995).  
As we will see in Chapter 10, Freudian psychoanalysis contains a host of escape 
clauses and methodological joker cards that make the theory eminently resilient to 
potential disconfirmations (Cioffi 1998; Esterson 1993). To give just one example, 
consider the way in which the already reviewed ―quantitative factor‖ in the patient‖s 
libidinal economy confounds empirical expectations initially engendered by the theory. 
Cioffi quotes several passages in which Freud leaves the reader with the impression that 
he has offered assessable hypotheses about the traumatic sexual events that predispose 
one to neurotic illness. On later occasions, however, Freud admits that some people who 
fall ill have experienced none of these events, after which he resorts to the 
imponderable quantitative factor that can only be inferred ex post facto. As Cioffi (1998, 
p. 119) writes, “our hopes that Freud might be placing a limit on the kinds of events or 
states which are conducive to the onset of neurosis and might then go on to tell us what 




In philosophy of science, some authors have emphasized that it is imperative not to 
confuse the theory-as-such with the immunizing tactics of its defenders (Grünbaum 
1979, 2008). In regard to Freudian psychoanalysis, Adolf Grünbaum has insisted that the 
falsifiability of the theory-as-such be distinguished from the tenacious unwillingness of 
some psychoanalysts to face adverse evidence. Although we agree that, inasmuch as 
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possible, it is important to make the distinction Grünbaum insists on, in general it is not 
clear who is authoritative to decide where the theory-as-such ends and where the 
pseudoscientific immunizing strategies of its defenders begin (Cioffi 1998, p. 300). 
Consequently, there is often no objective way to distinguish immunizing strategies from 
internal defense mechanisms. For example, the immunizing strategies used by 
parapsychologists to account for apparent experimental failure in fact follow naturally 
from the intrinsically elusive nature of the alleged psi force. Who has the authority to 
decide whether this characterization of psi has nothing to do with proper 
parapsychology, or whether it is an integral part of parapsychological theory? When is 
the belated deflation of a theoretical claim really a revision of the original, and when is 
it just an elucidation based on equivocations that were always there? And what if 
immunizing gambits and conceptual joker cards emanate directly from the core 
conceptual structure of the theory, as in Freudian psychoanalysis (see section 10.3.2)? 
We will return to this problem in relation to the problem of ad hoc reasoning in Chapter 
6, where we try to distinguish between core theory and auxiliaries.  
Throughout this paper, we have used intentional language such as ―strategies‖, 
―evasions‖ and ―maneuvers‖ for describing the ways in which pseudosciences and other 
belief systems are immunized against disconfirming evidence and rational criticism. In 
Chapter 11 (Boudry and Braeckman forthcoming), however, we argue that there need 
not be much conscious deliberation involved in such moves. The overall impression of 
strategic convenience we are left with when confronted with immunizing strategies and 
defense mechanisms may well derive from the latter‖s internal epistemic rationale, 
rather than from conscious deliberation and strategic planning on the part of believers.  
5.4.2 Conclusions 
In this paper, we reviewed several ways in which a belief system can achieve epistemic 
invulnerability against falsification and rational criticism: (1) the use of conceptual 
equivocations & moving targets, either through the technique of multiple endpoints or 
that of deflationary revisions; (2) the postdiction of invisible causes and unassessable 
effects; (3) the double evidential standard of conspiracy thinking, including the practice 
of explaining disbelief; (4) the practice of changing the rules of play in a rational debate 
and thus short-circuiting any form of criticism; (5) the invocation of invisible escape 
clauses, either by tailoring the theory around the phenomena or by invoking 
imponderable causal factors that confound expectations. As we noticed throughout our 
discussion, these techniques can be found across widely different domains: 
parapsychology, pseudo-philosophy, belief in magic, conspiracy theories, alternative 
medicine, religious cults, etc. 
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At the outset of this paper, we have distinguished immunizing strategies, which are 
brought forward by proponents from without a belief system, and epistemic defense 
mechanisms, which are structural parts of the belief system itself. However, in running 
through our classification, we have found that this distinction is sometimes difficult to 
maintain. First, an ad hoc elaboration that was introduced at some point to rescue a 
belief system from apparent falsification may gradually develop into an integral part of 
that belief system. In this way, the distinction between immunizing strategies and 
epistemic defense mechanisms is blurred. Second, although in some cases an evasive 
maneuver can be easily detached from the theory-in-itself, in other cases escape 
maneuvers were already implicit in the conceptual structure of the theory. Contra 
Grünbaum, there is not always a clear point at which the theory-as-such ends and the 
immunizing tactics of its defenders begin.  
Our classification shows that proponents of belief systems that are either highly 
implausible or impossible from a scientific perspective, are in fact well-prepared to 
withstand the impact of empirical refutation and the force of critical argument. In 
Chapter 11, we further develop this account from a cognitive and psychological 
perspective, explaining why immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms 
are so pervasive, and why rational arguments are generally unavailing in debating 
believers (Boudry and Braeckman forthcoming).  
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Chapter 6.  
The Hypothesis that Saves the Day. Ad hoc 
Reasoning in Pseudoscience  
It is error only, and not truth, that shrinks from inquiry. 
– Thomas Paine 
 
 
Abstract.53 What is objectionable about ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper‖s 
falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion 
about what constitutes adhocness, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate 
auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples 
from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad 
hoc hypotheses. Our approach retains the colloquial, pejorative connotation of 
adhocness, and calls attention to the way in which the context of a theoretical move 
bears on the charge of adhocness. We also discuss the role of motivations and aims 
implicit in the concept of adhocness, and the way ad hoc moves draw on theory-internal 
rationalizations. 
                                                     
 
53 This paper is due to appear in Logique et Analyse (Boudry in press) 
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6.1 Introduction 
In both academic and popular discussions on the scientific status of controversial 
theories, a hypothesis or explanation is often rejected as being ad hoc. In philosophical 
discussions about the demarcation project, the practice of resorting to ad hoc moves in 
the face of anomalous data is often regarded as a distinguishing feature of bad science or 
pseudoscience. However, traditional analyses of adhocness along Popperian lines have 
been confronted with several shortcomings, and more recent developments in 
philosophy of science have complicated the picture outlined by Popper and his 
followers. As with many concepts that are intuitively clear at a first glance, it has 
proven surprisingly difficult to unpack the notion of adhocness. 
In this paper, we draw on distinct examples of bad reasoning from disciplines that are 
widely regarded as ―pseudoscience‖, in order to clarify what is objectionable about ad hoc 
moves. Rather than rehearsing the standard examples from the history of science (e.g. 
the postulation of an extra-Uranian planet, Pauli‖s neutrino hypothesis, the Lorentz-
Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis), on which philosophical opinion is divided, our 
strategy is to focus on specimens of reasoning that are blatantly fishy in a sense that we 
intuitively recognize as ad hoc. Taking these clear-cut examples as a starting point, we 
may be better able to explicate what underlies our intuitions of ―adhocness‖, and we 
should be better capable of evaluating more complicated examples. We discuss the 
motivational and psychological component of ad hoc reasoning and rely on the concepts 
of immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms, as explored in Chapter 5. 
6.2 Falsificationism and ad hoc reasoning 
Karl Popper famously argued that the distinguishing feature of the scientific attitude is 
the willingness to make bold empirical conjectures and subject them to successive 
attempts at refutation. According to Popper, a theory can only be regarded as scientific 
if it forbids certain states of affairs, and the paragon example of a scientific theory is one 
that takes the boldest empirical risks. A hypothesis can be corroborated if it survives 
attempts at falsification, but when it runs against empirical observations, it has to be 
abandoned. However, sometimes an auxiliary assumption is incorporated in the theory 
in order to rescue it from falsification. According to the traditional Popperian view, this 
resort to ad hoc reasoning is illegitimate and even the hallmark of pseudoscience: 
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Such a procedure […] rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of 
destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status. (Popper 2002, p. 48) 
In accordance with the Quine-Duhem problem of underdetermination, however, 
philosophers of science after Popper have acknowledged that, in order to bring a 
hypothesis into contact with reality, one always needs a number of auxiliary 
hypotheses. In other words, hypotheses are always tested in conjunction and never in 
isolation. If a “bundle” of hypotheses is tested and the observations do not accord with 
what was predicted, from a logical point of view any one of the auxiliary hypotheses (or 
the core hypothesis) could be blamed. Indeed, when scientists devise a test for such a 
conjunction of hypotheses, what counts as the central hypothesis under test and what 
counts as background knowledge is a matter of methodological decision. Lakatos has 
attempted to correct Popperian falsificationism taking this problem into account:  
No theory forbids some state of affairs specifiable in advance; it is not that we 
propose a theory and Nature may shout NO. Rather, we propose a maze of 
theories, and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT. (Lakatos 1968, p. 162) 
Falsificationists after Popper – and Popper himself in his more cautious moments – have 
allowed for modification of auxiliary hypotheses in the face of refutation, provided that 
the latter are independently testable and do not reduce the empirical content of the 
theory. If these conditions are not met, according to the falsificationist, the auxiliary 
hypothesis has to be discarded as ad hoc. Thus, a more sophisticated falsificationist 
philosophy of science accepts that every scientific research program builds up a 
“protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses around its “hard core” claims (Lakatos and 
Musgrave 1970; Lakatos 1968). As such, adjustments and revisions in the face of 
empirical anomalies are not necessarily problematic. Scientists routinely resort to 
auxiliary hypotheses to rescue a theory from apparent refutation, and significant 
progress has been made by doing so. The example of Leverrier‖s and Adams‖s successful 
postulation of an extra-Uranian planet (Neptunus) to account for the perturbations in 
the orbit of Uranus provides a case in point.  
However, the explication of adhocness in terms of reduced empirical content is still 
wanting. Although an auxiliary may not have known testable consequences at the time 
of its introduction, further developments and new experimental procedures may render 
it testable after all (Grünbaum 1976). Bamford (1993) argues that Popper equivocates 
between the colloquial sense of adhocness on the one hand and a technical definition on 
the other hand, calling attention to instances of genuine scientific progress in which the 
appeal to an ―ad hoc‖ auxiliary did not increase the empirical content of the original 
theory. According to Bamford, the very idea of a hypothesis which has no testable 
consequences other than the observation it was introduced to account for, is difficult to 
make sense of in any case. Finally, even if it were possible for an auxiliary not to be 
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independently testable from the main hypothesis at all, this is not to say that such a 
modified theory would be necessarily false. At most, one may argue that adhocness is 
generally not conducive to scientific progress.  
In light of these and other problems, some authors have abandoned the project of 
explicating adhocness in a pejorative sense, and have portrayed the concept as a neutral 
methodological or epistemic attribute. Grünbaum (1976) offered a purely descriptive 
hierarchy of three senses of adhocness, and Laudan (1977) has even suggested that the 
extent to which a theory allows for ad hoc moves is a redeeming feature of that theory. 
However, others have unpacked the notion of adhocness in a way that retains the 
colloquial, pejorative meaning. For example, Leplin (1975) has reserved the term for 
auxiliary hypotheses the introduction of which results in a loss of theoretical simplicity 
that is not off-set by a proportionate gain of fit with the data (see also Kitcher 1982).  
6.3 Adhocness in pseudoscience  
Although Popper‖s demarcation criterion has been decidedly out of philosophical 
fashion for several decades, the charge of adhocness as a strategy for evading 
falsification, and thus as the very antithesis of empirical boldness, is still often leveled 
against controversial theories. As we saw in Chapter 5, an increasing dependence on ad 
hoc moves is widely regarded as a telltale sign of pseudoscientific discourse (e.g. Derksen 
1993; Hines 2003; Carroll 2003; Pigliucci 2010; Kitcher 1982). Unless these critics of bad 
science are entirely misguided, there must be some virtue to empirical boldness and 
non-adhocness that requires further explication, even if Popper‖s demarcationism has 
been overly simple.  
The problem is that many major episodes in the history of science in which the 
charge of adhocness played a role prove to be ambiguous. In real-life scientific disputes, 
it is not always clear when exactly a theory starts to require too much gerrymandering 
to accommodate anomalies. Examples include phlogiston theory, phrenology, 
Lamarckist evolution, or the steady state model of the universe. In many of these cases, 
there is no clear point at which the theory collapses under the weight of empirical 
anomalies, and when it ceases to be rational to defend it. Often enough, crucial 
experiments and fatal anomalies are only to be identified in retrospect, when the theory 
has been entirely abandoned. This shows that the concept of adhocness is somewhat 
complicated and may be a matter of gradients, but not that it is fundamentally 
incoherent.  
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Indeed, if we accept that non-adhocness is an epistemic liability, and given that we 
are dealing with serious scientific disputes, we can reasonably expect that charges of 
adhocness are somewhat ambiguous and open to discussion. If advocates of a theory X 
are confronted with empirical anomalies, they will reasonably try to save X in a way 
that is least open to the charge of adhocness, at least as long as this is possible. When 
the evidence against a theory is so overwhelming that it would require blatant ad hoc 
moves to save it, that theory is unlikely to be the subject of serious scientific debate for 
a long time, and will either disappear or persist merely on the fringes of science. 
Notorious pseudosciences are only rarely the subject of philosophical discussions about 
adhocness, but this is unfortunate. By having a look at blatant examples of ad hoc 
reasoning from the hinterland of pseudoscience, we may be better able to make sense of 
charges of adhocness in more complicated cases.  
6.3.1 Escape Clauses 
In section 5.3.5, we discussed a number of immunizing strategies and epistemic defense 
mechanisms for protecting parapsychology against adverse evidence. These theoretical 
moves can be reconstructed as ad hoc auxiliaries to the central hypothesis of psi forces. 
For example, some parapsychologists have proposed a negative form of psi (catapsi) 
emitted by inquisitive observers that cancels out regular psi activity (Wiseman 2010; 
Humphrey 1996). In the same vein, parapsychologists have explained away evidence by 
relying on the “error phenomenon” (Rao 1968) and “decline effect” (1994, p. 11), or by 
claiming that psi is “actively evasive” (Beloff 1994, p. 7) (for further details, see section 
5.3.5). 
The most conspicuous feature shared by these theoretical moves is that they are 
conveniently tailored around some empirical anomalies, while at the same time being 
too vague and non-specific to allow for novel predictions, and failing to provide any 
form of explanatory unification (see section 4.4). With this explanatory resource at their 
disposal, parapsychologists are in a position to explain away not just one particular 
anomaly, but potentially any number of negative experimental results. Hence, the error 
phenomenon and catapsi effect account for precisely what would have been expected if 
the alleged psi phenomena were entirely due to deception, sloppy experimental design 
and methodological defects.  
What do we mean when we reject such moves as ad hoc? What is problematic is not 
just the logical relation between main hypothesis and auxiliary, but rather the 
circumstances in which the latter is introduced, and its (potential) range of application. 
To further illustrate this point, consider again the case of an astrologer who belatedly 
invokes the formation of stars at the moment of conception when his prediction on the 
basis of the birth date has failed. Or similarly, consider the defender of biorhythm 
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theory who resorts to the hypothesis that some people are “arrhythmic” some of the 
time when his predictions do not fit the observed patterns (Carroll 2003, p. 7). Why are 
we entitled to reject these moves of ad hoc? Because we realize that, by the same token, 
any type of observation can be handled, and hence that there are no constraints on the 
use of the (type of) auxiliary hypothesis in question. In Freudian psychoanalysis, the so-
called “hereditary factor” was often invoked when traces of allegedly repressed 
infantile desires were unforthcoming. This meant that, if the patient had not personally 
experienced the sexual traumas required by the theory, Freud argued that traces of 
“phylogenetic memory” – recollections of ancient traumas inherited over the 
generations – could fulfill the same role (Cioffi 1998, p. 108).  
The other side of the coin, as far as the ―no constraints‖ objection is concerned, is that 
the concept on which the ad hoc move relies is indeterminate enough to be conveniently 
ignored as long as the data align with the theory. Consider the same astrologer who, as 
long as his birth date-based predictions do not run against the facts, does not bring up 
the moment of conception as an allegedly crucial factor, and boasts that his predictions 
have been successful. Or consider Freud‖s neglect of phylogenetic inheritance when he 
wanted to explain a patient‖s symptoms in terms of the absence of a powerful father 
threatening with castration. Whereas such concepts are invoked on particular occasions 
to explain away predictive failure, they are inconsequentially ignored on other 
occasions. Thus, there is an asymmetry in the use of the auxiliary hypothesis in question.  
As is clear from these examples, the broader context of a theoretical move is 
fundamental with regard to its being ad hoc. Although the presumption of ad hoc 
reasoning is strongest when we have actually witnessed several instances of 
opportunistic and inconsequential use of an auxiliary hypothesis, suspicion can also be 
warranted on the basis of a single case, provided that the lack of constraints is 
immediately obvious, and that it is clear that the hypothesis can yield nothing beyond 
explaining away particular failures. 
6.3.2 Patterns of systematic ad hoc reasoning 
When we dismiss a theoretical move as being ad hoc, we seem to be saying that its 
introduction is only motivated by the particular anomaly encountered, and that there 
are no further theoretical reasons at play. In an important sense, however, this 
assumption has to be corrected. In some cases, ad hoc reasoning is not just based on 
spurious extensions or modifications of a theory, but a systematic pattern of ad hoc 
reasoning emerges from the very epistemic structure of a theory. In Chapter 5, we 
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distinguished immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms as two ways in 
which a theory can achieve invulnerability from criticism and empirical refutation. 54 In 
the case of epistemic defense mechanisms, the theory itself proffers ample opportunity 
for rationalizations and evasive responses in the face of counterevidence. One of the 
ways in which this may happen is if structural features of a theory invite a systematic 
pattern of ad hoc reasoning.  
Consider the phenomenon of postdiction and feedback loops we discussed in section 
5.3.2: an unobservable force or cause is posited to account for a range of observations, 
while believers have no precise understanding of the causal mechanisms involved, and 
at the same time go about inferring the activity of these invisible forces ex post facto 
from their effects. In shamanistic healing practices, the success of magic rituals depends 
on a number of elaborate procedures, taboos and prescripts, the violation of which may 
interfere with the workings of the ritual. As the proper performance of the ritual is 
partly inferred from the therapeutic outcome itself, believers are invited to interpret 
unexpected outcomes not as a failure of the ritual per se, but as an apparent sign that 
―something must have gone wrong‖: the intervention was not of the appropriate type, a 
taboo has been breached, the ritual was not performed properly, evil magic has 
interfered with the ritual. Again, similar moves may be made by a scientist making an 
unexpected observation under a microscope, but in such a case there are indirect and 
independent checks available.  
In his seminal study on witchcraft and magic among the Azande, Evans-Pritchard has 
termed these ad hoc moves “secondary elaborations” (Evans-Pritchard 1965), which 
have the effect of making the belief systems internally coherent and impervious to 
refutation ( a second class of such secondary elaborations is available when the alleged 
effect is itself extra-empirical or otherwise difficult to observe, see section 5.3.2). 
In the field of parapsychology, a poor causal understanding of alleged paranormal 
forces likewise invites a systematic pattern of ad hoc reasoning in the face of alternate 
successes and failures. Feedback loops between the interpretation of observations and 
the theoretical characterization of psi will almost inevitably arise. Psi-activity may be 
postdicted whenever the results are successful, and because of the underspecified causal 
mechanisms of psi, virtually any contextual factor may be invoked as an ad hoc 
explanation for failure (Wiseman 2010). Note that, according to parapsychologists, psi 
powers may disappear over time or work only intermittently, and that this can only be 
                                                     
 
54 The use of intentional language such as ―strategies‖, ―evasions‖ and ―maneuvers‖ for describing the ways in 
which pseudoscience and other belief systems are immunized against disconfirming evidence and rational 
criticism is not always to be taken literally. In Chapter 11, we will argue that the overall impression of strategic 
convenience we are left with when confronted with immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms may well 
derive from the latter‖s internal epistemic rationale, rather than from conscious deliberation and strategic 
planning on the part of believers. 
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inferred from experience. What is objectionable about parapsychology and other 
magical belief systems is not so much the introduction of a single auxiliary hypothesis, 
but rather a systematic practice of ad hoc reasoning, which is part and parcel of the 
pseudoscientific theory itself. In other words, we find that there are simply no constraints 
on the use of such evasive auxiliaries. 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Unobservability 
As many of the examples of ad hoc reasoning we have reviewed rely on unobservable 
entities and forces, one may wonder whether unobservability has any bearing on the 
accusation of adhocness. Leplin (1975) has argued, against the received view of ad hoc 
reasoning, that unobservability in principle mitigates the condition of being de facto 
unobservable. Indeed, the failure to detect X is less damaging if we possess of good, 
independent reasons to presume that X must be intrinsically unobservable. By contrast, 
if there is no good theoretical reason for X‖s unobservability, then we have no excuse 
for failing to detect X. For example, astronomers have postulated the existence of an 
invisible planet, Vulcan, or an invisible asteroid belt, to account for anomalies in the 
orbit of Mercury. The main reason why these auxiliaries to the Newtonian model of the 
solar system were quickly discarded, however, was that no satisfactory explanation was 
given for why these objects should be invisible to observers on earth. In other cases, 
such as the postulation of quarks and other subatomic particles, auxiliaries can derive 
support from other considerations: accordance with well-established theories, indirect 
experimental support, unification of a range of data etc. In the pseudoscientific 
examples we reviewed, however, the activity of X in question is merely postdicted on 
the very phenomena which X was supposed to account for, without any offset in the 
form of other explanatory virtues. These considerations justify the labeling of the 
invocation of X as ad hoc, not so much the alleged unobservability of X. 
6.4.2 Adhocness and psychological motivation 
An important problem confronting the reconstruction of adhocness in a pejorative 
sense is the distinction between the methodological and psychological components of 
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the concept, both of which are often conflated in traditional discussions of ad hoc 
reasoning (Bamford 1993; Bamford 1999). As Laudan (1977, p. 117) writes, underlying 
many discussions of adhocness is the conviction that “there is something suspicious 
about any change in a theory which is motivated by the desire to remove some 
anomaly.” Is our discussion of ad hoc reasoning in pseudoscience guilty of this confusion 
as well? 
In the received view, an auxiliary is typically dismissed as ad hoc because its 
introduction is said to be motivated to explain away some bothersome anomaly. This is 
misleading, because a theoretical solution is not invalid simply because it happens to 
fulfill the desire to rescue a theory. Even deliberately searching for a suitable auxiliary 
assumption to that end is not a bad thing per se. For example, even if a scientist 
introducing auxiliary X intended to explain only a particular anomaly, this does not 
preclude that X has other (perhaps unintended) testable consequences (Bamford 1999, 
pp. 379-380). A scientist may just be lucky that his personal desire (to prove a theory 
right) is borne out by nature. That being said, few would deny that a strong desire to 
protect a theory may be a good proxy for explanatory problems with the auxiliary 
hypothesis one comes up with in the face of anomalies. If A is desperate to save one 
particular theory at all costs, and B has no stakes in the debate, it is more likely, other 
things being equal, that the resolution A comes up with is more biased, compared to B‖s 
take on the issue. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suspect A‖s solution as having been 
motivated solely by the desire to persevere in his cherished ideas.  
The same problem pertains to any account of motivations with regard to theory 
choice. For instance, the very fact that A is motivated by his religious views to favor a 
hypothesis does not immediately invalidate A‖s choice, since strong religious 
motivations are compatible with sound reasoning. However, if A favors a theory that fits 
well with A‖s religious views, at least the suspicion may be raised that A‖s religious zeal 
has trumped epistemic considerations. More importantly, in absence of good epistemic 
reasons, A‖s religious views constitute the best candidate for explaining why A has 
endorsed such or such view. Thus, if understood properly, there is nothing wrong with 
dismissing a theory as “ideologically motivated”, or with objecting to an ad hoc move 
because it is “simply motivated by the desire to save the theory”. The latter should be 
viewed as an elliptic expression, which means nothing more than that, in the absence of 
proper epistemic reasons, the only plausible motive is the desire to rescue the theory at all 
costs.  
6.4.3 Core theory and ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses 
In most philosophical accounts, an auxiliary is labeled as ad hoc in relation to some 
original theory or core hypothesis. In philosophy of science, however, some authors 
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have emphasized that it is imperative not to conflate ad hoc maneuvers for rescuing a 
theory with the theory-as-such. Notably, in regard to Popper‖s verdict on Freudian 
psychoanalysis as an unfalsifiable pseudoscience, Adolf Grünbaum commented: 
The (revocable) falsifiability of the theory-as-such in the context of its semantic 
anchorage is a logical property of the theory itself, whereas the tenacious 
unwillingness of the majority of its defenders to accept adverse evidence as 
refuting is an all too human property of those advocates. (Grünbaum 1979, pp. 
137-138) 
According to Grünbaum, the latter point merely comes down to the “sociological 
objection that Freudians are evasively unresponsive to criticism of their hypotheses” 
(Grünbaum 2008, emphasis in original). Although we agree that, inasmuch as possible, it 
is important to make the distinction Grünbaum insists on, often it proves difficult to 
separate the theory-as-such from the ad hoc reasoning and immunizations used by its 
defenders (Boudry and Braeckman 2010; Cioffi 1985, 1998). For example, the pattern of 
ad hoc reasoning found in parapsychology has been given a theory-internal explanation, 
viz. the elusive nature of psi forces, its wonder-inducing function, its intermittent 
efficacy, etc. For many parapsychologists, this feature of psi is one of the central 
findings of their research program (Kennedy 2003, 2001). Whom do we have to consult 
to find out whether the resort to the shyness of psi is an ad hoc maneuver which has 
nothing to do with proper parapsychology, or whether it is an intrinsic part of 
parapsychological theory?  
Grünbaum‖s own example of Freudian psychoanalysis is particularly instructive in 
this regard. In Chapter 10, we will see that the practice of ad hoc reasoning on the part of 
Freudian psychoanalysts emerges naturally from (i) the flexible and indeterminate 
conceptual structure of the theory (ii) Freud‖s dynamic system of repressions, 
inversions and projections between antagonistic mental subsystems, in which anything 
can stand for either itself or its counterpart; (iii) the countless theoretical joker cards 
and immunizing gambits in psychoanalytic theory, which are almost impossible to resist 
in interpretive practice (Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998; Boudry and Braeckman 2010). If 
Freudian theory itself is the source of systematic ad hoc reasoning, we submit that there 
is something more going on than the mere “tenacious unwillingness of the majority of 
[psychoanalysts]” to accept disconfirming evidence. Although reasons of space prevent 
us from providing a detailed discussion of this problem, we hope that these examples 
have at least challenged the idea that the purported distinction between the theory-as-
such and its advocates‖ lapses into ad hoc reasoning is not a straightforward matter. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
What, if anything, distinguishes ad hoc reasoning from the legitimate introduction of 
auxiliary hypotheses in science? In order to get a clearer view on this matter, we have 
tried to find species of reasoning that are blatantly ―ad hoc‖ in the colloquial and 
pejorative sense, borrowing examples from disciplines that are widely regarded as 
pseudoscience. 
First, we have reviewed the opportunistic and inconsequential resort to invisible 
escape clauses that are conveniently tailored around observational anomalies. Second, 
we have shown that the structure of some pseudosciences is such as to invite a 
systematic pattern of ad hoc reasoning, by making use of secondary elaborations 
regarding ambiguous causal mechanisms and unassessable effects.  
As these examples from pseudoscience make clear, an explanation or auxiliary 
hypothesis deserves to be labeled ad hoc if it merely explains away particular anomalies 
without yielding any form of theoretical progress or empirical unification. The concept 
of adhocness, in the pejorative sense we have construed here, is sensitive to the 
particular context in which a theoretical move is made. An accusation of adhocness is 
more damning if it can be shown that there are no demonstrable constraints on 
application (i.e. the move can be used to explain away any bothersome anomaly) and if 
it is being used inconsequentially (i.e. it is conveniently ignored on other occasions). 
Precisely because the introduction of an ad hoc auxiliary serves no proper epistemic or 
explanatory goals, the move is often condemned as psychologically motivated to save the 
theory at all costs. This way of framing the complaint of adhocness is strictly speaking 
inaccurate, but it is understandable as a shorthand. If a theorist is strongly motivated to 
rescue a theory at all costs, this is a good reason to be suspicious, and if no proper 
epistemic reasons for his move are apparent, we may safely conclude that we are 
dealing with a case of wishful thinking.  
If we put this motivational component of adhocness into proper perspective, and if 
we move beyond a naïve falsificationist view about unobservability and testability, the 
concept of non-adhocness may be retained as capturing an important liability for 
theorizing and explanation.  
  133 
Chapter 7.  
Irreducible Incoherence and Intelligent Design: A 
Look into the Conceptual Toolbox of a 
Pseudoscience  
Si la nature nous offre un nœud difficile à délier laissons 
le pour ce qu'il est et n'employons pas à le couper la main 
d'un être qui devient ensuite pour nous un nouveau 
nœud plus indissoluble que le premier. - Denis Diderot 
 
 
Abstract.55 The concept of Irreducible Complexity (IC) has played a pivotal role in the 
resurgence of the creationist movement over the past two decades. Evolutionary 
biologists and philosophers have unambiguously rejected the purported demonstration 
of “intelligent design” in nature, but there have been several, apparently contradictory, 
lines of criticism. We argue that this is in fact due to Michael Behe‖s own incoherent 
definition and use of IC. This paper offers an analysis of several equivocations inherent 
in the concept of Irreducible Complexity and discusses the way in which advocates of 
the Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) have conveniently turned IC into a moving 
target. An analysis of these rhetorical strategies helps us to understand why IC has 
gained such prominence in the IDC movement, and why, despite its complete lack of 
scientific merits, it has even convinced some knowledgeable persons of the impending 
demise of evolutionary theory. 
                                                     
 
55 This chapter has previously been published in Quarterly Review of Biology (Boudry, Blancke et al. 2010b). 
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7.1 Introduction 
Until its dramatic legal defeat in the Kitzmiller v. Dover case, Intelligent Design 
Creationism (IDC) had been one of the most successful pseudosciences of the past two 
decades, at least when measured in terms of cultural influence. It is interesting to 
explore the way this species of creationism had achieved this success, notwithstanding 
its periodic strategic setbacks as well as its complete lack of scientific merits. Of course, 
a full explanation would include religious, socio-political, and historical reasons; 
instead, in this paper, we will take a closer look at the conceptual toolbox and rhetorical 
strategies of the ID creationist. As a case study, we will concentrate on the central 
concept of “irreducible complexity” (IC), but other examples can be found that support 
our assertions (see Chapter 8). Our analysis shows that the conceptual equivocations 
inherent in the concept of IC — in particular its potential to be employed as a moving 
target in discussions (Boudry and Braeckman 2010) — may help further our 
understanding of the superficial appeal of the design argument based on IC, which is 
only the most recent in a long series of creationist challenges mounted against 
evolutionary theory. 
7.2 Irreducible complexity 
In 1996, biochemist and IDC proponent Michael Behe introduced the infamous concept 
of irreducible complexity (IC) in his book Darwin’s Black Box. Although Behe‖s critics 
univocally agreed that he failed to demonstrate evidence of “intelligent design” in 
nature, there have been several, seemingly inconsistent lines of criticism. Some 
evolutionary scientists claim that biological systems do sometimes exhibit IC as Behe 
defines it, but they deny that this poses a problem for evolutionary theory (e.g. Orr 1997; 
Shanks and Joplin 1999; Miller 2000), while others maintain that Behe has never 
demonstrated the existence of bona fide instances of IC in nature (e.g. Pigliucci 2002; 
Forrest, Barbara C. and Gross, Paul R. 2007). Pennock (1999, pp. 264-272)concurs with 
this criticism but grants the possible existence of biological IC systems, arguing that, in 
any case, these would not threaten evolutionary theory.  
We propose that this seemingly contradictory criticism is in fact due to Behe‖s own 
disjointed definition and misleading use of IC. First, we introduce Behe‖s concept and 
briefly recount the most important empirical objections against it. Then, we analyze the 
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conceptual equivocations inherent in Behe‖s approach on several levels (see also 
Dunkelberg 2003). Finally, we argue that these kinds of equivocations allow Behe and his 
IDC fellows to make a moving target out of their theory, hence serving to insulate it 
against criticism.  
7.2.1 The evolution of irreducible complexity 
The concept of IC has an interesting “evolutionary” pedigree (Forrest, B. C. and Gross, P. 
R. 2007, p. 302). In the 1970s and 1980s, young-Earth creationists used similar terms to 
describe biological systems that were alleged obstacles to evolutionary theory. In 1974, 
Henry Morris, founder of the Institute for Creation Research and father of the Creation-
Science movement, argued in his influential book Scientific Creationism that “The 
problem is simply whether a complex system, in which many components function 
unitedly together, and in which each component is uniquely necessary to the efficient 
functioning of the whole, could ever arise by random processes” (Morris 1974, p. 59). In 
1980, young-earth creationist Ariel Roth argued that “Creation and various other views 
can be supported by the scientific data that reveal that the spontaneous origin of the 
complex integrated biochemical systems of even the simplest organisms is, at best, a 
most improbable event” (Roth 1980, p. 83). Behe has simply adapted these creationist 
notions to his own ends. Consider his definition of IC in Darwin‖s Black Box: 
By irreducibly complex I mean a single system composed of several well-matched, 
interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the removal of any 
one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning. An irreducibly 
complex system cannot be produced directly (that is, by continuously improving 
the initial function, which continues to work by the same mechanism) by slight, 
successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an 
irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition non-functional. 
An irreducibly complex biological system, if there is such a thing, would be a 
powerful challenge to Darwinian evolution. (Behe 2006, p. 39) 
7.2.2 Redundant and irreducible complexity 
Behe then proceeds to argue that many biological systems exhibit IC, especially at the 
subcellular level (e.g., the bacterial flagellum). However, many critics have noted that 
the components of a typical biological system manifest considerable functional overlaps 
and redundancy. Contrary to Behe‖s assertions, living systems are often quite robust to 
perturbations, despite, or even because of, their complexity (Ciliberti, Martin et al. 
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2007). Overall these system exhibit what has been termed “redundant complexity” 
(Shanks and Joplin 1999). For example, if we eliminate one or even several elements 
from the blood clotting cascade, which Behe cites as an instance of an IC system, the 
system still manages to perform its function, albeit not as swiftly or efficiently as before. 
From the perspective of evolutionary theory, this is hardly surprising; natural selection 
is a clumsy and opportunistic process that tinkers with the available material. Thus, the 
widespread phenomenon of redundant complexity makes it perfectly clear that 
evolution by natural selection can gradually produce increasingly complex systems 
without the guidance of an intelligent designer (see below).  
7.3 Equivocations 
7.3.1 Conceptual double life 
To be sure, it is not difficult to find examples of biochemical systems in which the 
removal of just one part damages the whole system. But consider Behe‖s phrases 
“effectively ceases functioning” and “by definition non-functional.” There are two 
possible reconstructions of his definition: 1) the term “functioning” refers exclusively to 
the basic function currently performed by the whole system (e.g., the rotary motion of 
the bacterial flagellum) and does not pertain to other possible functions, in other 
contexts, when one or more components are removed; and 2) the phrases “effectively 
ceases functioning” and “non-functional” include any function that the impaired 
system or one of its components may perform in other contexts. In principle, it is not 
very hard to discover whether a system exhibits IC in the first, weak sense. Leaving 
aside the ambiguity regarding the natural “parts” into which the system must be 
decomposed (Dunkelberg 2003; Sober 2008, pp. 135-160), it suffices to knock out these 
parts one after the other to see if the system can still perform its basic function. Again, 
evolution by natural selection is perfectly capable of producing complex functional 
systems exhibiting IC in this weak sense. For example, Lenski et al. (2003) used a 
population of “digital organisms” (i.e., computer programs) to simulate the evolution of 
a complex functional system. By performing a series of knockout experiments on one of 
the complex functions that emerged from their simulation, Lenski et al. were able to 
determine how many genomic “instructions” were involved in its functioning. The 
researchers found that the function “depends on many interacting components” 
(2003:141), the removal of any of which causes the system to break down.  
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In fact, only an IC system in the second, strong sense would be an obstacle to 
evolutionary theory, because it would rule out evolutionary precursor systems and 
function shifts of the system‖s components. However, it is hard to see how Behe could 
even begin to demonstrate the existence of such a system without defaulting to the 
classical “argument from ignorance” (Pigliucci 2002, p. 67). Interestingly, Behe has 
disingenuously taken advantage of this very ambiguity in answering his critics. 
In his initial definition, Behe seems to intend the weak interpretation, but he then 
proceeds to use the concept in a line of reasoning that only makes sense under the 
strong interpretation. Precisely because the bacterial flagellum is IC, Behe tells us, it 
could not have evolved by means of random mutation and natural selection. However, 
when critics object that the system‖s components may well be able to perform other 
functions in other contexts, thus pointing to the possibility of indirect evolutionary 
pathways, Behe switches back to the weak definition and claims that his critics have 
misrepresented his argument. 
7.3.2 A conceptual mousetrap 
Robert Pennock (1999, p. 267) objected to Behe‖s design argument that “even if a system 
is irreducibly complex with respect to one defined basic function, this in no way implies 
that nearby variations might not serve other nearby functions”. Reasonably, Pennock 
construes Behe‖s argument in a sense that is intended to preclude any functional 
intermediate on a direct or indirect evolutionary path to the current system: 
Behe claims that there could never be any functional intermediates that natural 
selection could have selected for on the way to any irreducibly complex system, 
but he can‖t get the empirical conclusion from his “by definition” conceptual 
argument (Pennock 1999, pp. 267-268) 
Pennock‖s reasoning is correct, of course, but in the afterword to the tenth anniversary 
edition of Darwin‖s Black Box, Behe (2006, p. 258) retorts that “Pennock [simply] 
substituted his own concept of irreducible complexity for mine,” whereupon he shifts 
back to the weak version of the concept, which merely rules out direct improvements 
on the system: “On the contrary, on page 40, I point out that, although irreducible 
complexity does rule out direct routes, it does not automatically rule out indirect ones” 
(see also Ratzsch 2005). Thus, Behe protests that Pennock has “overlooked important 
qualifications” (Behe 2001, p. 707) and has simply “constructed his own rigid straw man 
definition for IC.” But Behe himself has boldly stated that any IC system is a “powerful 
challenge to Darwinian evolution” (2006, p. 39), and that “[w]e know of no other 
mechanism, including Darwin‖s, which produces such complexity” (1996, p. 25). Thus, 
the fact that Behe‖s own qualifications are inconsistent with his boastful presentation of 
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IC as a major stumbling block for evolution is hardly Pennock‖s problem. Behe did 
acknowledge that Pennock exposed another weakness in the definition of IC, owing to 
its focus on already functioning systems rather than on the evolutionary development 
of such systems. Although he promised to “repair this defect in future work” (Behe 2001, 
p. 695), so far Behe has not lived up to that promise, instead seeming to ignore the 
problem altogether. 
The neglect of evolutionary development in Behe‖s definition is hardly a trivial 
matter, however, and his concession concerning indirect routes is quite an important 
one, which seems to be completely absent from his original definition (see also Sober 
2008, pp. 161-162). As early as the beginning of the 20th century, geneticist Herman 
Muller explained how biological systems that depend on the complex “interlocking” 
actions of many different components could come about by evolutionary processes: 
“Many of the characters and factors which, when new, were originally merely an asset 
finally became necessary because other necessary characters and factors had 
subsequently become changed so as to be dependent on the former” (Muller 1918, pp. 
463-464). Thus, redundant complexity can eventually generate IC (under the weak 
interpretation). More recently, biochemist and molecular biologist A. G. Cairns-Smith 
proposed the analogy of “scaffolding” in the construction of an arch to explain the 
evolution of systems that are IC according to Behe (Cairns-Smith 1986; see also Orr 1997; 
Pennock 2000). A classical stone arch is IC in the weak sense, because the structure will 
collapse as soon as one removes either the keystone or one of the other stones. The 
support of scaffolding is necessary in building a stone arch, but once the arch is 
completed, the scaffolding can be safely removed. In a similar vein, a biochemical 
structure may have functioned as a scaffold in the evolution of an IC system before 
becoming dispensable and disappearing. That is, “Before the multitudinous components 
of present biochemistry could come to lean together they had to lean on something 
else” (Cairns-Smith 1986, p. 61). 
Behe has performed a similar conceptual sleight of hand in dealing with the 
objections of molecular biologist Kenneth Miller (2000). Miller accepts that some 
biological systems are IC as Behe defines it (weak version), but he objects to the anti-
evolutionist conclusions that Behe derives from IC. As a counterexample of Behe‖s claim, 
Miller offers a plausible reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the five-part 
auditory apparatus in mammals, which he argues fulfils the definition of IC. Miller 
demonstrates that the individual parts of the auditory apparatus—mallens, incus, and 
stapes—evolved from the rear portion of the reptilian jaw. It is important to note that 
before they migrated to the middle ear and were adapted for their new purposes, these 
structures were indeed perfectly functional. Therefore, Miller concludes that Behe‖s 
statement (2006, p. 39) that “any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is 
missing a part is by definition non-functional” is plainly wrong. Miller challenges strong 
IC and demonstrates the crucial point, which is that the “interlocking necessity [of the 
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parts of the final working system] does not mean that the system could not have 
evolved from a simpler version” (2000, p. 139). 
Behe, however, has responded by asserting that Miller “concocted his own, private 
definition of irreducible complexity, and then argued against that” (2006, p. 259). It is 
quite possible, he goes on to explain, that individual components of an IC system can 
perform functions in different contexts. Thus, according to Behe (2006, p. 260), Miller 
has “redefined irreducible complexity to mean that none of the component parts of an 
IC system could have its own function separate from the system”. 
Yet again, the equivocation is in Behe‖s definition, not in Miller‖s criticism. Bearing in 
mind that Behe treats IC as if it were an insurmountable obstacle for evolution, which is 
already clear from the very wording of the term “irreducible,” the critic naturally 
confronts Behe‖s claim of “non-functionality” by pointing to the different functions 
performed by evolutionary precursors of IC systems, which may or may not have 
contained parts of the current system.  
After all, if we bear in mind that biological systems can be adapted over the course of 
evolution for another function than that for which they were originally selected—for 
instance, by being integrated as part of a new system performing a different function—
then Behe‖s non-functionality claim becomes either trivial (weak version) or plainly 
wrong (strong version).  
7.3.3 Dembski‖s conceptual remedy 
In No Free Lunch (2002), Behe‖s creationist ally William Dembski proposed to remedy the 
conceptual problems of IC. Dembski believes that the concept of IC is “salvageable” 
(2002, p. 280), and after a series of modifications, he arrives at the following new 
definition:  
Definition ICfinal – A system performing a given basic function is irreducibly complex 
if it includes a set of well-matched, mutually interacting parts such that each part 
in the set is indispensable to maintaining the system‖s basic, and therefore original, 
function. The set of these indispensable parts is known as the irreducible core of the 
system. (Dembski 2002, p. 285, emphasis in original) 
Accordingly, Dembski argues, the IC of a system is a straightforward empirical question: 
Individually knocking out each protein constituting a biochemical system will 
determine whether function is lost. If it is, we are dealing with an irreducibly 
complex system (Dembski 1999, p. 148).  
Clearly, Dembski has “fine-tuned” the concept of IC in the direction of the weak 
interpretation, restricting the definition to the basic, original function of the system. 
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His updated version has the merit of conceptual clarity (but see Perakh 2002), but, in 
remedying Behe‖s conceptual ambiguity, Dembski actually takes the sting out of the 
whole argument. IC thus conceived is perfectly consistent with indirect and circuitous 
routes, scaffolding, and exaptations. So what is all the fuss about? The collapse of IC in 
Dembski‖s hands illustrates that the conceptual ambiguity he was trying to salvage was 
actually very convenient for Behe.  
7.4 Moving the goalposts 
7.4.1 Never enough 
Despite Dembski‖s remedy, other equivocations in the concept of IC have yet to be 
resolved. Having failed to provide an objective criterion that makes evolutionary 
accounts impossible, the IDC proponent retreats to a weaker probabilistic claim; as the 
number of individual components in an IC system increases, the plausibility of a gradual 
succession of slight modifications becomes vanishingly small. “The strength of the 
inference depends on the number of parts, and the more intricate and sophisticated the 
function, the stronger is our conclusion of design” (Behe 2006, p. 265). Leaving aside the 
problems regarding this alleged correlation between the numbers of parts and the 
strength of the design inference, which are amply documented by Pennock (1999, p. 
270), we still seem to be left with a testable statement. If we can find a well-functioning 
precursor for one of the systems discussed by Behe (or for one of its components), or if 
we can construct a plausible evolutionary pathway for one of Behe‖s examples, the 
“probability” argument collapses.  
Behe‖s claim has indeed been tested against the facts and has been found wanting 
(Miller 2000; Lenski, Ofria et al. 2003; Young and Edis 2006; Forrest, B. C. and Gross, P. R. 
2007). In response to these demonstrations, however, IDC proponents belatedly 
“reinterpret” their initial claims in order to lift them out of the critic‖s reach. A first 
strategy to this end consists of shifting the burden of proof from plausible evolutionary 
pathways to the actual evolutionary story, and thus to protest that the broad outlines of 
a plausible evolutionary account amount to nothing more than Darwinian wishful 
thinking and speculation. The same bait-and-switch technique can be discerned here: IC 
is constantly boasted as a point of principle for ruling out the possibility of evolutionary 
explanations, but as soon as it is challenged on that ground through a discussion of 
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plausible evolutionary scenarios, ID creationists contend that they were talking about 
actual evolutionary pathways all along.  
When they are confronted with tangible evidence of actual evolutionary history, IDC 
theorists resort to a second strategy, shifting their design claims to the remaining parts 
of the evolutionary puzzle, as if the “real” problem was always there. For example, 
Kenneth Miller (2004) beautifully demonstrated the structural similarities between one 
component of the flagellum and the so-called type III-secretory system. He convincingly 
argued that the former is a very plausible evolutionary precursor of the latter, which 
has been co-opted by evolution to perform a new function (see also Pallen and Matzke 
2006). In response to this embarrassing demonstration, Behe (2001, pp. 689-690) simply 
shifted his attention to the complexity of the newly discovered system by itself, while at 
the same time stubbornly insisting that the assemblage of these precursors into the 
flagellum system is still impossible without the helping hand of a Designer (Behe 2004, 
p. 359). 
In light of these evasions, one may wonder whether there is any amount of 
comparative genetic evidence, or any level of evolutionary reconstruction, that would 
make Behe and his allies abandon their design claims. Because of the sloppiness of the 
probabilistic IC claim, which is not based on any serious quantification of probabilities, 
IDC theorists can continue to raise the evidential bar up to a point where the concept of 
IC is lifted outside of the empirical domain altogether. Indeed, when pressed on the 
available scientific knowledge of a particular complex system that he cites, Behe has 
made it clear that only a complete, quantitative, and fully-detailed description of what 
actually happened over the course of the ages would convince him of its evolutionary 
origin (Behe 2007). In his testimony at the Dover trial, Behe conceded:  
Not only would I need a step-by-step, mutation by mutation analysis, I would also 
want to see relevant information such as what is the population size of the 
organism in which these mutations are occurring, what is the selective value for 
the mutation, are there any detrimental effects of the mutation, and many other 
such questions. (2005, p. 19) 
But this is an absurd demand, which is never met in any other scientific domain, and is 
certainly not met by ID creationists themselves when they propose “design” as an 
alternative explanation. Indeed, despite his demand for such a high level of evidence for 
the evolution of what he claims are IC systems, Behe himself has been completely 
unwilling to flesh out his design hypothesis to any degree at all, insisting that the 
motives and character of the designer are in fact inscrutable, and he provides us with no 
clue as to his modus operandi. As for Behe‖s request for fully detailed knowledge about 
evolutionary history, Pigliucci (2002, p. 240) has warned biologists not to be 
overconfident in taking up creationist challenges, and not to mistake partial 
reconstructions and plausible scenarios for a complete understanding of evolutionary 
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development. Indeed, evolutionary theorists are better advised to explain why the 
burden of proof insisted on by creationists is absurd, and to point out that scientific 
knowledge will never be complete in this respect. 
In any case, what is disingenuous in Behe‖s presentation is that this preposterous 
challenge to offer a complete and step-by-step evolutionary account of IC systems is not 
spelled out from the beginning, but is a belated revision of his original claim, based on 
ambiguities in his definition of IC. In Darwin’s Black Box, Behe leaves us with the 
impression that the unevolvability claim of IC is in principle easy to challenge, but when 
his critics take up the gauntlet, as we saw in the discussion with Pennock and Miller, 
Behe simply dodges and weaves like a hunted rabbit. Thus, what remains of Behe‖s 
argument boils down to the same old “argument from personal incredulity” (Dawkins 
1991, p. 38), which is a far cry from the “objective criterion” for design that IDC theorists 
had promised.  
It is interesting to note that the same pattern of reasoning has always been rampant 
in traditional creationist arguments regarding the so-called “gaps” in the fossil record. 
Creationists claim that they would readily accept evolution if only the “missing links” 
between the taxonomic groups turned up in the fossil record, but, whenever such a 
fossil is found, they complain that the intermediate is not really the ancestor of the 
present organism—an impossible demand for the fossil record—or even that Darwinists 
now face an ever bigger hurdle, because they are left with two gaps to explain. The 
latter principle has been coined “Gish‖s law” by geologist Robert S. Dietz (1983), after 
young-earth creationist Duane Gish.  
7.4.2 Falsification and failure of instantiation 
The design argument based on IC always allows for a final retreat. Suppose we can 
provide IDC proponents with a fully-detailed description of the evolution of the 
bacterial flagellum. Even if their stubborn insistence on the flagellum‖s exhibiting IC 
would at that point become absurd even in their own eyes (although one can never be 
too sure about that), they would surely regard this not as a refutation of IDC as such, but 
merely as a specific case in which IC turns out not to be instantiated. The expectation 
that this particular biological system would exhibit IC and hence be one of those 
unmistakable traces of design would simply be disappointed, and the search for new 
obstacles to evolution could begin.  
In fact, this is what the history of the creationist movement is all about: if the case for 
evolution by natural selection becomes too overwhelming, creationists typically drop 
their favorite examples of complexity and come up with fresh ones, whose evolutionary 
origins are still relatively obscure (Pennock 1999, pp. 171-172). For example, the 
traditional objection against evolution used to be the vertebrate eye. Nowadays, the 
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evolutionary development of the vertebrate eye is well-understood and it has become 
an outdated argument against evolutionary theory. It is not even a particularly difficult 
example for evolutionary theorists, as it involves relatively straightforward selection 
pressures.  
As the evolutionary history of the bacterial flagellum and the blood clotting system 
are being unraveled, the next generation of creationists can always disclaim the 
examples of their IDC forebears, and a new round of pointless arguments can begin—
although they would at least have to admit that their former “design criterion” was 
defective because it generated false positives. However, the retreat into unknown 
territory cannot go on indefinitely. In fact, as Robert Pennock (1999, p. 171) remarked, 
the current preoccupation of IDC theorists with invisible biochemical niceties such as 
the propeller system of E. coli bacteria indicates “just how far creationists have had to 
retreat to find significant explanatory gaps in evolutionary theory”.  
7.4.3 Bait-and-switch strategies 
The most conspicuous feature of the concept of IC is not so much its ambiguity, but the 
discrepancy between what it seems to promise and what it eventually delivers, as far as 
testable empirical claims are concerned. On first reading Behe‖s argument, the 
unsuspecting reader may be left with the impression that Behe really sticks his neck out 
and presents evolutionists with a clear empirical challenge. However, this apparent 
rigor of the IC concept as an objective criterion for design, which arguably makes it 
appealing to anti-evolutionists, evaporates upon closer inspection. Under the weak 
interpretation, the concept describes a well-known phenomenon in the living world 
that is unproblematic for evolutionary theory. Under the strong interpretation, IC 
systems would indeed confront evolutionary theory with serious problems, but Behe 
has not given us an inkling of how we could ever demonstrate whether a system 
qualifies as IC in this sense. Indeed, it would require ruling out any conceivable 
evolutionary history, and would thus amount to showing that no part or precursor of 
the system in question is able to perform any other function, in any other situation and 
at any time.  
This allows for an interesting bait-and-switch strategy, which one could summarize 
as follows: “First, present evidence for weak IC in the living world, then pretend that 
strong IC has been demonstrated and continue to equate IC with ―unevolvability.‖ If 
challenged on empirical grounds, jump back to the weak version and claim that your 
critics are misrepresenting your argument. Switch the IC claim to subsystems and 
assembly of components, keep raising the standards of evidence, and reassert that all 
this directly follows from the simple objective criterion of IC. Finally, when really 
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pressed against the wall, give up this particular system and quickly find a new one. 
Repeat the circle ad libitum”. 
7.4.4 Further equivocations 
Behe‖s concept of IC is not the only instance of conceptual equivocation in the IDC 
literature. Two examples may be the subject of further research. First, when writing 
about “information,” William Dembski surreptitiously switches between its standard 
interpretation in information theory, in which it is a measure of the randomness in a 
system, and its colloquial use in the sense of “meaningful message” (Perakh, Mark 2004, 
pp. 64-75). This ambiguity allows him to fool the reader into believing that the 
“information” encoded in DNA, for example, points in the direction of an intelligent 
designer. For a similar discussion regarding the term “teleological”, see Blancke, Boudry 
& Braeckman (2010). 
A second example is the IDC response to the series of mousetraps that John McDonald 
devised to refute the claim that gradualist evolution of IC systems is impossible (with 
the mechanical mousetrap as a paradigm example). Instead of admitting to their lack of 
imagination, IDC theorists have responded by complaining about the intelligent 
guidance used in constructing this evolutionary progression of mousetraps (Behe 2004, 
pp. 364-366). Amazingly, they argue that McDonald‖s mousetraps unwittingly 
demonstrate that an IC system always requires an Intelligent Designer. But this reply 
illegitimately shifts the discussion—which is actually about a human artifact and thus is, 
in any case, irrelevant—from the IC of a system to the blind and unguided character of 
evolution.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Although the IDC movement has been damaged, in terms of its credibility, by the 
Kitzmiller v. Dover case, it does not show clear signs of disappearing. As Forrest and 
Gross note in an afterword to their meticulous study of IDC‖s politics and religious 
ideology, the movement has simply changed its strategy once again. After their recent 
legal setbacks, they have been forced to drop overt talk of “intelligent design” and to 
adopt code words like “academic freedom” and teaching “the strengths and weaknesses 
of evolution” instead (Forrest, Barbara C. and Gross, Paul R. 2007, p. 337). “Creationists 
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never give up. They merely change their strategy with each new defeat” (Forrest, B. C. 
and Gross, P. R. 2007, p. 309). 
As was apparent from its conception, the rapid success of the IDC movement was 
never driven by its arguments but by its religious ideology, which was epitomized in the 
so-called Wedge document of IDC‖s home base, the Discovery Institute (Forrest, Barbara 
C. and Gross, Paul R. 2007). Beyond religious motivation, one can point to sociological, 
cultural, and political factors to account for the remarkable success of IDC (outside the 
scientific community, to be sure), and it is plausible that the persistence of anti-
evolutionary sentiments and the continuing appeal of the design argument is also a 
function of deeply rooted cognitive dispositions and hard-to-shake teleological 
intuitions about the world (Kelemen and Rosset 2009; Kelemen 2004). 
Anti-evolutionism can take many different forms, however, and not all of them can 
achieve equal cultural success (see Chapter 11). In this paper, we have analyzed some of 
the rhetorical strategies that Behe and other IDC theorists have used for presenting 
their challenge to evolution and for deflecting valid criticism. On the one hand, we 
claim that Behe‖s presentation of IC has the appearance of an objective design criterion, 
which makes it superficially more respectable than the age-old “argument from 
personal incredulity.” On the other hand, the equivocations that are built into the 
definition of IC allow it to be used as a moving target (Boudry and Braeckman 2010), and 
as a kind of conceptual chimera that is hard to pin down by critics. These considerations 
partly explain why the concept of IC was hailed by the movement as the ultimate 
challenge to evolutionary theory, and why, despite its complete lack of scientific merits, 
it has convinced even some knowledgeable persons of the impending demise of 
evolutionary theory. As Robert Pennock wrote: 
We think of creationism as a cluster of ideas that reproduces itself by spreading 
from mind to mind and struggling with competing ideas for a home among a 
person‖s beliefs. Sometimes it loses out to more powerful rival ideas, but 
sometimes it finds receptive mental soil, takes root and waits to be passed on 
again. (1999, p. 1) 
Indeed, in the past two decades the concept of IC seems to have found receptive mental 
soil among anti-evolutionists. An analysis of the convenient conceptual equivocations 
inherent in IC, as well as of the rhetorical strategies with which IC has been presented, 
helps us to understand this remarkable fertility. 
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Chapter 8.  
Even Better than the Real Thing: Simulation of 
Biological Evolution under Attack  
 
 
Abstract.56 Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski (2002) has argued that the first 
No Free Lunch theorem, formulated by Wolpert and Macready (1997), renders 
Darwinian evolution impossible. Several of Dembski‖s critics have pointed out that the 
theorem is in fact irrelevant to biological evolution, but now mathematician Ronald 
Meester (2009) maintains that the theorem still applies to simulations of evolutionary 
processes. According to Meester, the theorem shows that simulations of Darwinian 
evolution, being typically set in advance by an intelligent programmer, are laden with 
teleology and therefore fail to capture properly Darwinian evolution. As a result, they 
are uninformative as to how complex biological adaptations arise in nature. We argue 
that Meester‖s use of the term “teleological” is particularly sloppy, and that he 
equivocates on the notion of “tailoring around” a fitness function, which is central to 
the NFL theorem. Meester is confused both about the NFL theorem and about the 
distribution of fitness functions in real life, and in the end his position is 
indistinguishable from that of Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) advocate William 
Dembski.  
                                                     
 
56 This chapter is loosely adapted from Blancke, Boudry & Braeckman (2010), which offers a specific rebuttal of 
Meester‖s claims in the journal Biology & Philosophy.  
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8.1 Introduction 
In No Free Lunch. Why specified complexity cannot be purchased without intelligence (2002), the 
leading IDC theorist William Dembski argues that the first NFL theorem prohibits the 
evolution of complex adaptations by Darwinian evolution. This theorem, first published 
by Wolpert and Macready in 1997, establishes that no optimization algorithm can 
outperform a random search when averaged over all fitness functions. In this way, the 
theorem rules out the possibility of a universal, free-for-all algorithm outperforming a 
random search on any fitness function. For an algorithm to perform better than mere 
chance over a particular fitness function, the algorithm has to be tailored around that 
fitness function.  
On the basis of this mathematical result, Dembski has argued that, for the algorithm 
of natural selection57 (NS) to outperform blind chance, extra information about the 
particular fitness function is required. This search for the required information input, if 
we are to be believe Dembski, is even harder to accomplish than the original search for 
fitness optima performed by NS. Dembski has termed this the displacement problem. In 
order to avoid infinite regress, extra ―information‖ must be supplied by an intelligent 
designer. More specifically, the parameters of the environment have to be fine-tuned by 
the designer to allow NS to work successfully.  
Dembski‖s book has met with devastating critiques. Some of Dembski‖s critics (e.g. 
Wolpert 2002; Shallit 2002) complained that his writings are so vague that it is almost 
impossible to pinpoint his actual position. As concerns Dembski‖s use of the NFL 
theorem, most critics concur that it is entirely irrelevant to biological evolution 
(Häggström 2007; Perakh 2002; Perakh, M. 2004; Rosenhouse 2002; Sarkar 2007). 
Darwinian evolution is the result of NS acting over specific fitness functions, i.e. the 
ones that we find in realistic biological environments; biological evolution is simply not 
concerned with averaging over all possible fitness functions. This means that, within this 
particular setting, nothing prevents NS from outperforming random search. As the NFL 
theorem does not apply for specific subsets of all possible fitness functions, in practice it 
is irrelevant to biological evolution.  
                                                     
 
57 See Dennett (1996) on NS as an evolutionary algorithm, and Wolpert and Macready‖s (1997) account of NS as 
an optimization algorithm  
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8.2 No Free Lunch and simulations 
In a recent paper in Biology and Philosophy, Ronald Meester (2009), a Dutch 
mathematician and IDC sympathizer58, has subscribed to this critique: “it is simply not 
the case that a biological fitness function can be viewed as an average over all possible 
fitness functions. […] Therefore the NFL theorem simply does not apply” (2009, p. 464). 
Unlike other critics, however, Meester believes that the “algorithmic ―NFL way‖ of 
thinking about evolution is very meaningful when it concerns computer simulations of 
certain evolutionary processes” (2009, p. 468). 
To support his argument, Meester discusses “two examples of the NFL theorem in 
action” (2009, p. 464). Both involve the use of a search algorithm to find a particular 
target in the form of a letter string. As in Richard Dawkins‖ (1986) illustration with a line 
from Shakespeare‖s Hamlet, an algorithm combining random variation and selective 
retention is shown to outperform mere chance in finding the target string (in Dawkins‖ 
case, ME*THINKS*IT*IS*LIKE*A*WEASEL; in Meester‖s version, the word YES). Meester 
draws on the NFL theorem to make the following argument: 
[the researcher‖s] algorithm is too efficient to be the result of averaging over all 
fitness functions; it is not likely that he chooses his fitness function uniformly at 
random over all possibilities at the start of each new search. No, it is reasonable to 
conclude that he uses the fitness function corresponding to the word YES, and that 
he uses the search algorithm associated with that word. Again, note that the 
conclusion is twofold: we know that he uses special fitness functions and we know 
that his search algorithm is tailored around his choice in order to get an efficient 
algorithm. (Meester 2009, p. 466) 
According to Meester, the programmer has already selected particular fitness functions 
and a suitable algorithm for reaching the target in advance, making sure that the 
algorithm is “very carefully tailored” (p. 471) around the fitness functions. This makes 
the whole affair “intrinsically” (p. 468) or “necessarily teleological” (p. 471). No 
simulation of the evolution of complex biological adaptations, no matter how 
sophisticated (e.g. Lenski, Ofria et al. 2003), escapes this conclusion. As Darwinian 
evolution is supposed to be non-teleological and undirected, computer simulations 
cannot deliver any understanding of real-world evolution. There are, however, several 
difficulties with Meester‖s position that radically undermine his conclusion.  
                                                     
 
58 For further documentation of Meester‖s endorsement of IDC, see Blancke et al. (2010). 
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8.3 Difficulties 
8.3.1 Setting a target 
Meester acknowledges that NS can be understood as an algorithmic search procedure 
(Meester 2009, p. 464). By implementing this algorithm in a computer simulation, 
however, Meester wants us to believe that, all of a sudden, it ceases to be same 
Darwinian algorithm. But why would this be so? The mere fact that we are dealing with 
a computer simulation instead of a real-life situation is irrelevant, for algorithms are 
substrate neutral. It does not matter whether an algorithm is implemented in a 
biological environment or in a silicon-based digital one. As long as the conditions of 
variation, differential survival and heredity apply, evolution by NS is bound to take 
place, irrespective of the medium (Dennett 1996). Running the algorithm of random 
variation and selection on a computer simulation does not alter its non-teleological 
character.  
On closer inspection, however, Meester‖s argument equivocates between two senses 
of the term “teleological”, which he applies indiscriminately to programs, simulations 
and algorithms. In one sense, “teleological” stands for “being aimed at a target“ or 
constructed “with insight into the future” (p. 470). If the programmer is modeling an 
algorithm with a preset target in mind, that makes his simulation “intrinsically 
teleological”.  
[…] the programmer chose his program with insight in the future goal he wanted 
to reach and hence the simulation was intrinsically teleological. (p. 468). 
By contrast, modeling bacteria resistance to antibiotics is deemed unproblematic by 
Meester, as their goal is “not to reach a special target, but instead to compare the 
―typical‖ behavior of related systems” (p. 470). In that sense of the word, however, the 
question of the “teleological” nature of simulations has no bearing on their validity. Of 
course the programmers have a “goal” in mind, but as long as they make sure that the 
algorithmic process itself, in particular the source of variation, is undirected, this does not 
affect the validity of the simulation. The algorithmic process is not ―teleological‖ in any 
interesting sense at all. 
If Meester‖s argument were to hold water, then almost any simulation or model of 
natural processes and phenomena, no matter how careful and sophisticated, would 
become ―teleological‖ and hence uninformative about the actual natural events. Weather 
forecasts, for example, are set up by intelligent humans with specific goals in mind, 
which would make them intrinsically teleological and hence unsuitable to talk about 
real weather phenomena, because the latter are thought of as undirected, natural 
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processes. Now, if any simulation is “vulnerable” to Meester‖s critique, this ultimately 
raises the question as to why Meester singles out simulations of biological evolution as 
his main target. 
8.3.2 Careful tailoring? 
Arguing on the basis of the NFL theorem, Meester claims that the search algorithm in a 
simulation is always “very carefully tailored” (p. 471) around particular fitness functions 
to get at a specific target. He points out that the programmers have not chosen the 
fitness functions in the simulation “at random over all possibilities” (p. 466). This is no 
wonder, however, because neither are they in the biological world. Fitness functions in real 
life exhibit a significant amount of what Häggström (2007) terms “clustering 
properties”, which means that the fitness values of two highly similar DNA sequences 
are not statistically independent. In particular, “similar DNA sequences will tend to 
produce similar fitness values” (2007, p. 228), allowing a search algorithm like NS to 
perform much better than blind chance. In other words, there are “slopes” around a 
local fitness optimum which NS can work with. As Perakh puts it: 
The evolutionary algorithms, both designed by intelligence and occurring 
spontaneously, deal with given, specific fitness functions and have no need to 
search the information-resource space [i.e. all possible fitness functions]. (Perakh, 
M. 2004, p. 170) 
Once we realize that the NFL theorem applies only when we average the performance of 
our algorithm over all possible fitness functions, then we see that the theorem is in fact 
a rather trivial mathematical result. With some justification, Häggstrom has written 
that the NFL theorem is a “fancy (and more general) way of phrasing the following fact”: 
If we spread a well-shuffled deck of cards face-down on a table and wish to find 
the ace of spades by turning over as few cards as possible, then no sequential 
procedure for doing so is better than any other. (Häggström 2007, p. 226) 
The same point applies to the search algorithm itself, which is “tailored” only in the 
sense that it is specifically programmed to mirror the actual biological search algorithm, 
i.e. random variation and selective retention. In fact, what Meester objects to in these 
simulations is precisely what makes them successful simulations in the first place, i.e. 
that they mimic real life condition. Meester thinks his position is different from 
Dembski‖s because he (Meester) tries to restrict the “NFL-way of thinking” to simulations 
of evolution. However, because his argument is based on a misunderstanding of the 
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distribution of fitness functions in real life, his position is actually indistinguishable from 
Dembski‖s.  
8.4 Conclusion 
Meester uses the term “teleological” in a sloppy and misleading way. After pointing out 
that simulations are designed by intelligent agents with particular goals in mind, 
Meester pretends that he has shown the algorithmic process in a simulation to be 
“teleological” in nature. Meester thinks the NFL theorems are relevant to evolution by 
NS because, following in Dembski‖s footsteps, he misunderstand the nature of actual 
fitness functions in real life. Furthermore, Meester equivocates on the technical term 
“tailoring around” to suggest that simulations are nothing but cheap tricks in which the 
outcome is already built in the program in advance. Pace Meester, a Darwinian 
algorithm does not cease to be Darwinian if simulated in a computer program. Meester‖s 
argument on the basis of NFL fares no better than Dembski‖s, and in fact their positions 
are all but indistinguishable. 
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Chapter 9.  
Obscured by Lacanian Clouds? Epistemic Defense 
Mechanisms and the Declarative Fallacy 
Having it both ways is essential to the appeal of 
postmodernism, for it is precisely by apparently speaking 
simultaneously of two different concepts with the same 
word that the appearance of giving a profound but subtle 
analysis of a taken-for-granted concept is created. – 
Nicholas Shackel (2005, p. 304) 
 
 
Abstract.59 Many philosophers, cultural theorists and psychoanalysts begin their project 
of elucidating Jacques Lacan‖s writings with explanations of and justifications for their 
master‖s obscure voice. Interestingly, these arguments often draw on theory-internal 
resources, and seem to take the reader hostage: the style and presentation of Lacan‖s 
writings are assumed to reflect his profound theoretical insights about unconscious  
meaning and language. We review several epistemic defense strategies for coping with the 
conceptual obfuscations of Lacanian theory and the obscurity of Lacan‖s discourse. 
Finally, we analyze the hermeneutic situation created by Lacanian obscurantism in 
terms of the Declarative Fallacy. 
                                                     
 
59 This chapter is a revised version of a paper that has been written together with Filip Buekens. A number of 
examples from the Lacanian literature are drawn from Buekens (2006b). 
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9.1 Introduction 
In a now famous summary discussion in the even more infamous Livre Noir de le 
Psychanalyse (The Black Book of Psychoanalysis), published in 2005, the French 
philosopher Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (2005, p. 180) argued that psychoanalysis, in its 
many (often incompatible) versions, is an empty theory (“une théorie vide”): the key 
concepts, he argued, have become ―empty signifiers‖, that could be interpreted at will 
(similar conclusions were anticipated by Cioffi 1998). Particularly in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis the vicissitudes of such central concepts like jouissance, the Other, the 
objet petit a or enigmatic claims as that “the unconscious is structured like a language” 
or that “The woman does not exist” are such that no one really understands what they 
mean or what they have meant in the hands of their originator. In the first part of this 
paper we explore a number of (post-)Lacanian arguments to the effect that the 
incoherence of key concepts in Lacanism reflects the very nature of the unconscious, 
and that the obscurity of Lacan‖s writings reflects his own profound insights about the 
unconscious and language. Such arguments can best be seen as examples of epistemic 
defense mechanisms explored in Chapter 5 (Boudry and Braeckman 2010), which offer a 
theory-internal rationale for fending off criticism. Appeal to this epistemic defense 
mechanism is provoked by committing what we call the Declarative Fallacy. 
9.2 Let there be more light 
In Chapter 5, we argued that epistemic defense mechanisms draw on internal 
conceptual resources to fend off criticism and adverse evidence. In practice, the 
distinction between immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms may 
prove difficult to maintain. An argument that was initially developed as an immunizing 
strategy may over time be integrated in the structure of the theory, thus blurring the 
distinction between the theory proper and the immunizing strategies that protect the 
theory that engenders it. Alternatively, defenders may find a way to short-circuit 
criticism that loosely draws on theory-internal resources, yet cannot be reasonably 
construed as an intrinsic part of the theory.  
From the perspective of the critical outsider, to rely on arguments that already 
presuppose the truth of the theory one tries to defend is obviously an instance of 
circular reasoning. But this observation does not reflect the persuasive force of such 
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arguments in the eyes of those who use the argument and accept the propositions or 
theories they are supposed to defend. The conspiracy theorist, for whom the very 
existence of adverse evidence attests to the extreme cunning of the conspirators, and in 
the eyes of whom disbelievers are themselves involved in the evil plot, offers a prime 
example. To argue that conspiracy theorists already presuppose the truth of the 
conspiracy, and are thus engaged in a form a circular reasoning, will evidently be to no 
avail in debating them. Indeed, the fact that a belief system can account for seemingly 
adverse evidence, that it makes the existence of disbelievers intelligible (and predicts 
their existence) is a very compelling fact for he who is already committed to that belief 
system. In this chapter, we will apply this perspective to the writings of Jacques Lacan 
and to different rationalizations of his obscurity that have been put forward.  
9.3 Obscured by clouds  
Interpreters of Lacan have proposed several theory-internal explanations for the 
notorious obscurity of his pronouncements (Buekens 2005) and other problematic 
features of his discourse. An intriguing version of the argument directly appeals to 
Freud‖s conception of dreams as decipherable rebuses in the Traumdeutung (Freud 1953a, 
1953b), of which Lacan said: “Cet ouvrage ouvre avec l‖oeuvre sa route royale à 
l‖inconscient” (Lacan 1966, p. 509). We are told that Lacan‖s work is a ―rebus‖, just as 
dreams are: underneath a manifest dream content is hidden a latent dream content the 
correct reconstruction of which will reveal a web of repressed desires that cast a 
shadow over the dreamer‖s life (Lacan 1966, p. 470). Freud‖s model of the dream and its 
alleged meaning can easily be applied to Lacan‖s writings: 
It does not seem unfair to characterize Lacan‖s writings in this way [as a rebus] 
…[f]or their substance deals with the nature of the unconscious as Freud 
understood it, hence with that dimension of human experience that lies beyond 
the kern of conscious, rational discourse and emerges into awareness only 
through a din of diffraction that may assume many forms – in the case of dream, 
for example, the form of a rebus. By saying, then, that Lacan‖s work, in terms of its 
substance, is a rebus, we mean to suggest that it is dealing with a theme that of its 
very nature escapes the constriction of rational exposition. (Muller and 
Richardson 1982, pp. 2-3) 
Some Lacanians have exploited this rebus metaphor to develop a theory-internal 
rationale for Lacan‖s obscurity. Madan Sarup develops the Imitation Argument as follows:  
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Lacan‖s writings are a rebus because his style mimics the subject matter. He not 
only explicates the unconscious but strives to imitate it. The unconscious becomes 
not only the subject matter but, in the grammatical sense, the subject, the speaker 
of the discourse. Lacan believes that language speaks the subject, that the speaker 
is subjected to language rather than master of it. (Sarup 1992, p. 80) 
Sarup appeals to Lacan‖s theory of the subject as constituted by language or discourse: 
―language speaks the subject‖ and ―the subject is not the master of its discourse‖. As the 
Lacanian psychoanalyst Paul Verhaeghe put it: 
From an analytic point of view [...] the subject does not speak, it is spoken. As a 
result, the subject floats on top of spoken words. Indeed, when ―I‖ speak, I do not 
know what ―I‖ am about to say, unless I am reading it or have learnt it by heart. In 
all other cases ―I‖ is spoken by a desire outside my consciousness that drives me, 
sometimes with approval, sometimes without. And what I do say always comes, in 
the final analysis, from the Other. (Verhaeghe 2004, p. 56) 
Lacan, we are told, serves as mouthpiece of the unconscious; his discourse is a perfect 
(and therefore instructive) imitation of the unconscious.60 Dany Nobus seems to confirm 
this view when he writes that:  
 [Lacan] modeled his own discourse on the very rhetoric of the unconscious which 
he believed to have discerned in Freud‖s foundational accounts of dreams, slips of 
the tongue and jokes (Nobus 2004b, p. 196) 
Muller and Richardson held that Lacan‖s Ecrits and the Séminaires are “essentially a 
concrete demonstration in verbal locution of the perverse ways of the unconscious as 
he experiences it” (Muller and Richardson 1982, p. 3). Analogous remarks can be found 
in Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986, p. 13) and Caudill (1997, p. 5). In other words, the 
obscurity of Lacan‖s writings reflects the obscure and symbolical nature of the 
unconscious, and its pervasive influence on our conscious speech acts. As we will see in 
the following section, one of the central tenets of Lacanian psychoanalysis is precisely 
that humans are trapped in a web of signifiers pregnant with unconscious associations, 
and that the real meaning of words can never be attained. Lacan‖s writings illustrate 
that communication can never succeed, because there is always an objet petit a (see 
below) eluding us and resisting further explication (Verhaeghe 2004). There is, 
                                                     
 
60 The verbal puns and wordplays in Lacan‖s discourse are justified by Stanley Leavy: “The theoretical basis of 
(his) playing with words is found in Lacan‖s dictum that ―the unconscious is structured like a language‖. In his 
playful punning this claim is concretized, embodied. The unconscious can speak truthfully, revealing the 
identity of the logically unrelated, cognitively distorted, affectively confused experiences” (Leavy 1983, p. 13). 
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therefore, an important sense in which Lacan‖s own theorizing and his expository style 
are a performative expression of the subject matter of the theory itself.  
These Lacanian pronouncements seem to defy any sensible notion of intentional 
speech acts and authorship61, but for many followers they constitute a suggestive and 
intriguing explanation of Lacan‖s obscurity. Ironically, the allegedly inscrutable 
character of a theory‖s subject matter entails that every effort to present Lacan‖s 
conception of the unconscious in a more or less streamlined fashion will eventually end 
up as a fatal distortion of the theory‖s subject matter.  Trying to present his thoughts in 
a systematic and orderly way, as countless interpreters of Lacan have been doing, will 
fatally misinterpret him (and the unconscious) if the Imitation Argument were sound. 
Thus, Lacanian discourse would forever be condemned to obscurity. 
If we are to understand Lacan, we must assume that his discourse is the expression of 
his unconscious, which is itself structured like a language.62 So, if the Imitation 
Argument is sound, readers are taken hostage: Lacanian insights reveal themselves only 
if (not: if) one takes the theory to be a correct imitation of the unconscious. By 
contraposition: if one denies that Lacan‖s simulation is faithful to the nature of the 
unconscious, the content of the theory will not reveal itself to the reader. The 
hermeneutic circle drawn by Sarup and others is so tight that there is no space left for 
reasonable dissent, and the whole theory is conveniently insulated against criticism.  
9.4 Momentary lapses of reason?  
Many critics of Lacan have taken issue with the conceptual incoherence of the different 
versions of his theory (Sokal and Bricmont 1997; Buekens 2006b; Borch-Jacobsen 1991). 
Lacan‖s pronouncements are couched in a number of highly abstract and complex 
concepts – the Other, the Symbolic, the objet petit a, jouissance, the Phallus etc. – which 
are notoriously difficult to understand. Indeed, even among Lacanians there is no 
                                                     
 
61 By definition, a theorist intends to say something when he says something. Indeed, the choice of words, the 
structure of arguments, the precise formulation of ideas constitute the very core of the intentional activity 
called 'theorizing'. 
62 “Le symptôme psychanalysable… est soutenu par une structure qui est identique à la structure du langage… 
la structure du langage telle qu‖elle se manifeste dans les langues que j‖appellerai positives, celles qui sont 
effectivement parlées par les masses humaines.‖ And: ―L‖inconscient est structuré comme un langage” (Lacan 
1966, p. 444).  
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consensus about their meaning (Nobus 1998) and deep theoretical divides continue to 
exist within the Lacanian community.  
An instructive example is the pivotal concept of the big Other, which Lacan 
characterizes as an abstract ―locus‖ in the psychic structure of the subject that can be 
―occupied‖ by a range of different signifiers/objects. These are said to represent or 
function as the Other for the subject. If one consults and compares different works by 
Lacanian interpreters, it turns out that the Other can stand for other individuals, 
society, the law, moral order, the mother-figure, the psychoanalyst himself, the 
opposite sex, a person‖s own body, Language, images or even – according to Slavoj Zizek 
– the simulated reality in the movie the Matrix. 
All these representations are said to ―occupy‖ the ―position‖ of the Other, but no 
meaningful conceptual unity can be discerned. A close analysis of the Lacanian 
literature reveals that a concept such as the Other functions as a container term into 
which any pseudo-theoretical insight about human psychology can be couched. In a 
paper entirely devoted to the concept, Derek Hook characterizes “the Other” as a 
“vanishing-point of inter-subjectivity”, as “simultaneously ―inside‖ and ―outside‖”, and 
he writes that the Other is “both embodiment of the social substance and yet also the 
site of the unconscious” (Hook 2008).  
Again, however, the followers of Lacan have drawn inspiration from his own arcane 
views on language and meaning to account for this conceptual befuddlement. The 
justifications exploit Lacan‖s idiosyncratic version of Saussurian linguistics, which 
emphasizes the primacy of the signifier, and Lacan‖s conception of the unconscious that 
is structured as a language. “Of course the concepts of the Other and the Real are difficult 
to explain coherently” we are told by the Lacanian theorist, “because meaning can 
never be fully grasped. As soon as we human beings enter the domain of the Symbolic, 
we are forever trapped in a web of signifiers.” Signifiers can never refer to something 
real out there, but merely to other signifiers. Because the matrix of signifiers 
constituting our language is a closed system from which we cannot escape, we are 
unable to grasp meaning and comprehend each other. When we speak, we are not aware 
of what we are saying. Lacan believes that language speaks the subject (Lacan 1966), that 
the speaker is subjected to language rather than master of it (Sarup 1992, p. 80). “―I‖ is 
spoken by a desire outside my consciousness that drives me” (Verhaeghe 2004, p. 56), 
and thus we are being spoken (“ça parle”). Indeed, some Lacanians believe that the very 
nature of the subject matter of Lacanian theory escapes rational discourse and scientific 
evaluation (Leguil-Badal 2006). Lacan himself wrote: “Le réel est, il faut bien le dire, sans 
loi. Le vrai réel implique l‖absence de loi. Le réel n‖a pas d‖ordre” (Lacan 2005, pp. 137-
138). In sum, Lacan‖s theory reflects profound theoretical insights into the nature of the 
unconscious and the structure of language. 
And what about the apparent contradictions and paradoxes in Lacan‖s work?  We are 
told that these reflect the divisiveness and structural ―lack‖ characterizing the human 
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subject. When we are being introduced in the Symbolic order, our psychic structure 
develops into certain “knots” that are irreducible to theoretical formulation. Lacan has 
designated this ineluctable lack as the locus of the objet petit a, a concept which, as 
Lacanian interpreter Bruce Fink himself acknowledges, “can take on many different 
guises” (Fink 1997, p. 52). According to Lacan, the objet petit a is that aspect of the Real 
that cannot be represented, that forms a structural break in the chain of signifiers. “The 
[object] a is what remains irreducible in the advent of the subject at the locus of the 
other, and it is from this that it is going to take on its function” (Lacan 2004, p. 189). The 
later Lacan coined the term ―sinthome‖ for that which is beyond meaning and 
unanalyzable in the so-called topology of the human mind. Other Lacanian concepts 
fulfill similar roles: 
The Borromean knot marks the outer limit of Lacanian theory, the point where 
the formalising ambition of the matheme finally collapses into the non-
theorizable, the untraslatable real of the symptom. (Thurston 1998, p. 158) 
In the same vein, some Lacanians have even tried to explain (and justify) the 
institutional crisis of their own discipline in theory-internal terms. Reflecting on the 
many theoretical schisms following the death of Lacan, and the feuds over his 
intellectual legacy, Nobus writes that knowledge is always “in a state of continuous 
dispossession”, and this has (of course) something to do with the mysterious Other: 
If psychoanalytic knowledge is by definition a knowledge in failure, isn‖t the crisis 
of legitimacy a necessary precondition for the discourse of the analyst to sustain 
itself? Perhaps the only agency that could ever be in the position of owning 
psychoanalysis is the (unconscious of the) analysand, the Other of psychoanalytic 
discourse [...] (Nobus 2004a, p. 222) 
Indeed, one can construe Lacanian arguments to the effect that the very act of 
questioning the truth value of Lacanian psychology becomes deeply misguided, because 
according to Lacan truth itself has a “fictional structure”. As Fink wrote in relation to 
the question of the scientific value of Lacanian theory:  
The fact remains that science is a discourse. [...] it implies a dethroning of Science 
and a reassessment of science as one discourse among many. [...] Lacan‖s discourse 
theory suggests that there are as many different claims to rationality as there are 
different discourses. (Fink 1995, p. 138) 
We now understand why, at least from a Lacanian point of view, any attempt to criticize 
the seemingly willful obscurity of Lacan is to reveal a complete lack of understanding of 
the fundamental Lacanian insights about language, truth and reality that are at stake. 
We also begin to see why Lacanian interpreters are hardly impressed by critics objecting 
to the conceptual vacuity or contradictions in his writings. From the theory-internal 
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perspective, the critic of Lacanian psychoanalysis can only be construed as one who fails 
to appreciate the divisive dimension of subjectivity, who ignores the elusive objet petit a 
of all our strivings, and who clings on to illusions of objectivity and comprehension. The 
fundamental tenets of Lacanian theory about the objet petit a, the primacy of the 
signifier and the divisive nature of the human subject are perfect instantiations of 
epistemic defense mechanisms, as explored in Chapter 5. They ensure that a critical 
analysis of Lacanian theory never succeeds in affecting the system.  
There is a deeply self-fulfilling dimension to Lacanian theory. For those impressed by 
Lacan‖s charismatic authority, his pronouncements about language, meaning and reality 
are compelling partly because they constitute such a remarkably apt account of the 
Lacanian edifice itself. After all, what better illustration of the primacy of the signifier 
over the signified and the elusiveness of meaning than Lacan‖s ever-shifting and 
abstruse conceptual apparatus? What better way to appreciate the controversial claim 
that meaning always escapes us than to spend a few hours reading Lacan‖s Écrits? 
Fundamental to the working of this epistemic defense mechanism is the inflation of 
Lacan‖s pronouncements in the restricted context of psychoanalytic therapy to 
profound insight into the structure of language, human communication, the status of 
knowledge, and even the nature of reality (―the real‖) etc. (to be sure, these 
extrapolations of psychoanalytic insights were already instigated by Lacan himself, 
particularly in his later years). By projecting the theoretical flaws and paradoxes of 
their own ―discourse‖ to any other theoretical endeavor and elevating them to deep 
linguistic and epistemological insights, Lacanians have tried to evade any accountability 
to traditional standards of conceptual clarity, consistency and explanatory power. 
Unfortunately, the Lacanian psychoanalyst has confused the predicament of his own 
belief system for that of the rest of the world. Paraphrasing Karl Kraus, one of Freud‖s 
earliest critics, one could say that Lacanian psychoanalysis is itself the disease of which 
it claims to be the cure. 
9.5 The declarative fallacy 
Having unraveled a deeply circular defense strategy, it remains a legitimate question 
what explains the fact that so many convinced themselves that there ever was any 
substance to the master‖s arcane pronouncements. For example, what exactly is it that 
makes Lacanians like Derek Hook wonder why the concept of the big Other has been 
“curiously neglected by critical social psychology” (Hook 2008)?  
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We propose that the persuasive effect of using these ―signifiers‖ in interpreting 
common experiences and the vicissitudes of life lurks in the declarative force of the 
speech acts in which they function (Searle 1969, 2010) and the meta-representational 
character of the key Lacanian concepts figuring in the sentences that are used as 
declaratives. Declaratives are a class of speech acts that combine the word-to-world 
direction of fit that characterizes orders, for example, with the world-to-word direction 
of fit that characterizes descriptive statements like assertions. Performatives are 
probably the best known examples of such speech acts, for they make something the 
case by declaring that it is the case (Searle 2010, p. 12). However, the phenomenon has 
wider application. When a key Lacanian concept is used in a declarative speech act, the 
speaker simultaneously declares that the sentence is true, thereby assigning to the 
Lacanian meta-representational concept that figures in it an extension that is intended to 
make the sentence true. It is because Lacan (or Zizek, or...) declares that phenomenon X is 
(an exemplification of) psychoanalytic phenomenon Y that X becomes (illustrates, 
exemplifies) phenomenon Y. When the truth of the ensuing pronouncement is duly 
accepted by the intended audience, the term Y is ipso facto accepted as having an 
extension that makes the statement true. The central concepts thus function as “meta-
representations” (Atran 2002, p. 276; see also Sperber 1997), in the sense that accepting 
the statement as true does not presuppose that one has understood the sentence in 
question – by accepting the sentence, the intended audience cooperates with the 
speaker in making the sentence true. Thus, the project of ―understanding‖ Lacan must 
proceed from the assumption that Lacan declares that certain propositions are true, for 
abandoning that assumption immediately exposes the empty character of his 
pronouncements. According to Sperber et al., this epistemic charity is typical for the 
deferential attitude towards religious authorities, gurus and other persons with inflated 
reputations: 
If [people] were to check the pronouncements of these sources (for instance, 
„Mary was and remained a virgin when she gave birth‟ or Lacan's „There is no 
such thing as a sexual relationship‟) for coherence with their existing beliefs, they 
would reject them. But this would in turn bring into question their acceptance of 
the authority of the source. A common solution to this predicament is to engage 
in a variant of Davidsonian „charitable interpretation‟, and to „optimize 
agreement‟ not by providing a clear and acceptable interpretation of these 
pronouncements, but by deferring to the authorities (or their authorised 
interpreters) for the proper interpretation, and thus accepting a half-understood 
or „semi-propositional‟ idea. (Sperber, Clément et al. 2010, p. 382) 
But this is a travesty of normal communication: while every interpretation requires a 
certain amount of charity on behalf of the intended audience, it cannot be allowed that, 
in order to understand what is being said, one must first accept them as declarative 
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pronouncements that create the truth of what they declare. This, we suggest, explains 
why almost every interpretation of Lacan begins with an explanation of his 
obscurantism, and then goes on trying to understand him as if everything he says (but 
in fact declares to be true) is true.  
It should be obvious that it is difficult to criticize a discourse that imposes on its key 
concepts (―signifiants‖) an ad hoc meaning such that whatever it means on the occasion 
of use will make the declarative pronouncement true. One is reminded here of the 
dialogue between Alice and Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll‖s Through the Looking Glass:  
 `When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `it means 
just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.'  
`The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many 
different things.' 
`The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master -- that's all.' 
(Carroll 1993, p. 223) 
We propose to coin this the Declarative Fallacy: ―When Lacan (or someone speaking on 
behalf of Lacan) declares that p, then p‖.63 The Declarative Fallacy exploits a familiar and 
extremely useful feature of language, viz. the fact that we are always free to introduce 
new terms or concepts via reference-fixing stipulations or baptisms (Kripke 1980). But if 
one introduces a term t, one must fix its reference in such a way that its future users are 
able to use it with the very same extension or referent its original user introduced 
(Kripke 1980); this assumes that the reference fixer remains constant and is open to all 
or that, as Wittgenstein taught us in the Philosophical Investigations, its meaning is 
“public”. In normal contexts, what fixes the reference of a term (often introduced via a 
declarative speech act) remains constant and later uses of a term t (in descriptive 
speech acts) respect the initial stipulation or baptism. The Declarative Fallacy allows 
users of Lacanian signifiers to employ a term or concept at will at any occasion in 
declaratives that give it an ad hoc meaning that makes the statement true, and thereby 
achieve immunity from criticism. Moreover, the fallacy requires a curious form of 
cooperation between speaker and intended reader or audience: the speaker must be 
taken to have the authority to declare that p, while the intended audience must accept 
those pronouncements as truths. This puts them in a position where they have to seek 
interpretations of the suspect concepts that make the sentences true and to seek 
justifications for why they do that – the defense strategies explained earlier. But this is a 
parody of hermeneutics and it explains why, as philosopher of language François 
Recanati once suggested, interpreters of Lacan “accept everything”, but “constantly 
                                                     
 
63 In Buekens and Boudry (in press) we have analysed further, and more disturbing effects of the Declarative 
Fallacy and its social acceptance conditions. 
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dispute what was said” (Recanati 2000, p. 263; see also Buekens 2005; Buekens 2006b). 
That is the real hermeneutic nightmare behind sustained conceptual obscurantism: 
everyone accepts what is declared to be true, but nobody understands what the 
statements mean. It might well be that this rather awkward situations characterizes 
what happens on the Lacanian couch, but if one wants to develop a theory about the 
human mind and its vicissitudes, the practice yields disastrous results. The effects of the 
declarative fallacy are pernicious exactly because the honest reader or interpreter is 
forced to manipulate his or her natural sense of charity: while a legitimate presumption 
of truth is a natural attitude in hermeneutics, in the case of Lacan the reader is forced in 
a position such that if she does not accept as true what is being said, she will never 
understand what Lacan intended to communicate. The reader is thus taken hostage by 
Lacan, and the latter inevitably becomes an invulnerable guru whose obscurantism 
must be legitimized by all available means if the intention to understand is to be 
maintained.  
9.6 Conclusion 
The pervasiveness of epistemic defense mechanisms and the declarative fallacy sheds 
light on the continuing appeal of Lacanian theory in the humanities and ―Cultural 
Studies‖. Lacan‖s ―open discourse‖ – itself often imitated by his followers – creates 
limitless possibilities for applying Lacanian theory to works of art, movies, politics, 
culture etc. In other words, it leaves an academic interpreter “without even a 
mathematical chance of having nothing to say” (Crews 2006, p. 61). The declarative 
fallacy suggests to the gullible reader that a profound insight is lurking right behind the 
corner, as something that can be glimpsed yet not fully grasped. At the same time, the 
theory-internal resources of Lacanian theory allow interpreters to explain away 
conceptual incoherence and obscurantism, and to protect the theory from critical 
outsiders.  
Consequently, we may expect that the Lacanian interpreter will perfectly 
―understand‖ our objections. Surely we are in a futile quest for the objet petit a of our 
desire to understand. Or maybe we cling to the sujet supposé savoir, and we are “divided 
subjects” (sujets barrés $) who are unable to confront their “master signifier” (significant 
maître S1). How could anything be meaningless in the eyes of the Lacanian beholder? 
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Chapter 10.  
The Epistemic Predicament of a Pseudoscience: 
Social Constructivism Confronts Freudian 
Psychoanalysis 
Apart from the lack of agreement with reality it is in any 
case a superb intellectual performance. – Albert Einstein 
on Hermann Weyl's unified field theory 
 
Reality is what refuses to go away when I stop believing 
in it. – Philip K. Dick 
 
 
Abstract.64 Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as 
inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this paper, we take the claims of robust 
social constructivism seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the 
epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in 
virtue of some of its well known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, 
provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other 
words, the features SC mistakenly ascribes to science in general correctly characterize 
the epistemic status of Freudian psychoanalysis. This sheds some light on the internal 
disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic movement, 
and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud‖s legacy with his critics. In addition, 
                                                     
 
64 This chapter is due to appear in Theoria (Boudry and Buekens 2011). 
Here be dragons 
166 
our analysis offers an indirect and independent argument against SC as an account of 
bona fide science, by illustrating what science would look like if it were to function as SC 
claims it does. 
10.1 Close encounter of a strange kind 
In recent controversies over psychoanalysis, which for their unremitting vehemence 
became known as the “Freud Wars”, the scientific status of Freud‖s legacy has been 
hotly disputed. Almost simultaneously, another war was being waged over the status of 
science itself. In the so-called “Science Wars”, social constructivist approaches to 
science were put against more traditional epistemic approaches to science and scientific 
rationality. Our aim in this paper is to show that classical Freudian psychoanalysis, in 
virtue of some of its well known epistemic deficiencies, methodological complications 
and conceptual confusions, provides an intriguing illustration of what science would 
look like if it were to function as SC claims it does. 
The analysis developed here yields an independent and indirect argument against SC 
as an account of bona fide science, and reveals a fascinating connection between the two 
“wars” (for previous encounters between SC and psychoanalysis, see Moore 1999; Gillett 
1998; Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2008). In particular, we show how the framework 
of SC sheds some light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the 
sociology of psychoanalytic movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over 
Freud‖s legacy with his critics. Our own approach partly builds on earlier work on the 
reconstruction of psychoanalytic hermeneutics as a system of unintended institutional 
facts (Buekens and Boudry 2010; Buekens 2006a), based on Searle‖s theory of 
institutional facts (1995). 
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10.2 Social constructivism (SC) 
10.2.1 Epistemological SC 
Social Constructivism (SC) comes in many flavors, and the term covers a broad variety 
of interrelated theories. This ranges from commonsense views about how artifacts and 
social institutions are constructed by human agents, to controversial and radical 
theories about the status of knowledge, science and the nature of reality. Noretta 
Koertge holds that terms like “social construction” or “constructivism”, “while they 
signal a certain sympathy towards nouveau ideas, have no precise referent” (Koertge 
1996, p. 269; compare with Haslanger 2003).65 In this article, we will be concerned with a 
robust version of SC as applied to scientific knowledge.66 We will not be concerned with 
normative and evaluative connotations often associated with constructivist approaches 
(Hacking 1999, p. 6), as these will not be directly relevant for our epistemological 
perspective.  
In traditional accounts of knowledge, it is taken for granted that “[u]nder the 
appropriate circumstances, our exposure to the evidence alone is capable of explaining 
why we believe what we believe” (Boghossian 2006, p. 22). By contrast, robust SC 
assumes, as Harry Collins put it in his seminal article, that “the natural world in no way 
constrains what is believed to be” (Collins 1981a, p. 54) and that “the natural world has a 
small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge” (Collins 1981b, p. 
3). According to SC, the natural world has no significant bearing on theory choice in 
science. In explaining the beliefs of scientists, the proponent of SC will not appeal to 
their exposure to the relevant evidence, but rather to non-epistemic factors, such as 
sociological context, ideological influences and material conditions. This approach is 
embodied in the so-called ―Strong Programme‖ for the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
as developed by David Bloor. More specifically, Bloor‖s methodological “symmetry 
postulate” for the explanation of scientific beliefs states the following: 
[The sociology of scientific knowledge] would be symmetrical in its style of 
explanation. The same types of cause would explain say, true and false beliefs. 
(Bloor 1991, p. 7)  
                                                     
 
65 Haslanger (2003, p. 301) remarks that “the variety of different uses of the term has made it increasingly 
difficult to determine what claim authors are using it to assert or deny”. 
66 Rather than exposing particular entities as socially constructed against a background of natural facts, we see 
SC as being involved in the revision of central concepts like knowledge, truth and reality, coined “elevator 
terms” by Hacking (1999, p. 21). 
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The symmetry postulate … enjoins us to seek the same kind of causes for both true 
and false, [and] rational and irrational, beliefs …. (Bloor 1991, p. 175)67 
This downplaying of epistemic considerations has important consequences for the 
question of theory change and paradigm shifts in science, as was pointed out by 
Golinski:  
Given sufficient creativity and resourcefulness on behalf of its defenders, any 
existing paradigm could be maintained indefinitely. [...] Why, then, should a 
paradigm ever change? (2005, p. 25) 
Following Bloor, Golinski argues that, in order to explain a paradigm shifts, we should 
pay attention to the “social characteristics of the paradigm community and the balance 
of forces within it”. As the natural world does not constrain theory choice or paradigm 
shifts, a scientific consensus merely reflects the contingent social and cultural 
preferences of the scientific community. Bloor does acknowledge that there “will be 
other types of causes apart from social ones” (Bloor 1991, p. 7), but presumably, the 
presence of such non-social causes does not account for the difference between true vs. 
false or rational vs. irrational beliefs. After all, the symmetry postulate invites us to look 
for the same type of causes in all cases. 
It is often noted that the revisionist proposals of robust SC entail bold or prima facie 
absurd claims, and one might wonder whether any self-proclaimed proponent of SC 
sincerely endorses them (see also footnote 67). Are the critics of SC attacking a straw 
man? According to Kukla, the situation is more complicated, as the field of SC abounds 
in what he terms “reverse switcheroos”:  
[Y]ou put forth a strong version of the hypothesis, and when it gets into trouble, 
you retreat to a weaker version, pretending that it was the weaker thesis that you 
had in mind all along. (Kukla 2000, p. x)  
Thus, while many proponents of SC try to disown these radical interpretations when 
pressed on the issue, their writings often do imply them. In any case, as we will see, the 
more robust version of SC turns out to be most interesting from an epistemological 
perspective.  
                                                     
 
67 Some adherents of the Strong Programme claim that the ―symmetry postulate‖ is a purely methodological 
precept that does not say anything about the actual causes of scientific belief, but this seems incoherent. If the 
natural world plays an important role in the construction of scientific knowledge after all, why would a good 
sociologist of science ignore this role in practice? 
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10.2.2 Standard objections to SC 
Excellent philosophical critiques of robust SC have been formulated by Kitcher (1998), 
Koertge (2000) and Boghossian (2006). The standard problems associated with SC can be 
briefly rehearsed. First, critics claim that SC is incapable of explaining scientific success. 
If the natural world does not significantly affect the course of scientific development, 
how are we to explain the successful applications of scientific knowledge? Second, SC is 
haunted by the specter of Epimenedes, the ancient Cretan who proclaimed that “all 
Cretans are liars”. If epistemic reasons never explain belief in a particular theory, what 
about the epistemic warrant for SC itself? The theory seems to be self-defeating.68 Third, 
critics of SC maintain that the theory rests on implausible generalizations and 
misconceptions of certain post-positivist developments in philosophy of science 
(Koertge 2000). For example, the well-known problem of theory-ladenness of 
observation (TLO) is often misconstrued as lending support to the SC claim that nature 
does not in any way put constraints on theory formation. However, TLO does not apply 
uniformly and with equal force in every scientific context, and it is premature to 
conclude that it is fatal to the epistemic warrant of scientific claims. By applying TLO 
indiscriminately in every context, a subtle and valuable insight in philosophy of science 
has been lost.69 The underdetermination of a theory by evidence (Quine 1953; Duhem 
1954) is another thesis that is often confused with the stronger SC thesis of the radical 
contingency of scientific knowledge. Whereas W.V. Quine made a purely logical point 
about the possibility to preserve a hypothesis in the face of conflicting evidence, leaving 
room for pragmatic considerations in theory choice (elegance, explanatory power, etc.), 
defenders of SC think that underdetermination makes science completely impervious to 
evidence (see Hacking 1999, pp. 71-75).70  
                                                     
 
68 David Bloor has tried to solve this problem by including the postulate of symmetry in his Strong 
Programme, stating that the principles of the Strong Programme should in principle be applicable to itself 
(Bloor 1991, p. 7). As it stands, however, Bloor has merely restated the problem, without discharging the 
objection of self-refutation.  
69 Once again, the danger of a vicious self-reference lurks, as Hacking observed: “To see all observations as 
equally loaded with theory is in itself to practice theory-laden observation, that is, observation loaded with a 
theory derived from Hanson the philosopher” (Hacking 1999, p. 200). In any case, scientists do not always have 
to decide in favour of one theory, but can also – and often do – suspend judgement, awaiting further empirical 
or conceptual developments (Slezak 1994, p. 281). 
70 Moreover, SC exaggerates the factors of individual epistemic distortions in scientific practice for example, in 
confirmation bias, prejudice, selective use of evidence or ideological bias. These distortions do occur in 
scientific practice, as in any other human activity, but in many cases the effects are sooner or later 
neutralized, because science is an eminently self-correcting social activity. 
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10.2.3 Science according to SC 
In this paper, we will approach SC from a different perspective and pose the following 
question: supposing that scientific inquiry and practice were to function as SC claims 
they do, what exactly would they look like? Can we find a theory which does actually 
instantiate the epistemic predicaments as described by SC? In the following sections, we 
show that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of well known and extensively 
documented defects in its epistemological foundations, methodology and conceptual 
apparatus, indeed exemplifies the general characteristics that SC (mistakenly) ascribes 
to serious science and scientific practice. Our analysis yields a new and independent 
strategy for challenging SC as a viable account of bona fide science, by offering a reductio 
of the SC program. In section 10.3 we briefly review a number of major conceptual and 
methodological flaws in Freudian psychoanalysis that have been extensively discussed 
elsewhere (Esterson 1993; Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998; Crews 1986). In section 10.4 we 
show how SC provides an excellent account of how psychoanalytic theories are 
developed and accepted. Philosophical worries about circularity in our argument will be 
addressed in section 10.5.1. 
10.3 Major defects in Freudian psychoanalysis 
10.3.1 The dynamic unconscious  
Freudian psychoanalysis consists of both a complex dynamic psychology, a method for 
investigating the human mind and a framework for interpreting human behavior (in 
this paper we are not concerned with the effects of psychoanalytic therapy). 
Psychoanalytic doctrine revolves around the notion of the dynamic unconscious, an 
imperceptible realm of the human mind full of repressed mental contents, mostly 
sexual fantasies and desires stemming from early childhood.  
The explananda of psychoanalytic interpretations cover a wide range of mental 
phenomena and their products, including neurotic symptoms, irrational thoughts and 
behavior, dream contents, slips of the tongue, works of art, social phenomena like 
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religions, etc.71 The structure of a psychoanalytic interpretation typically takes the form 
“X is/counts as Y”, where the Y-position is occupied by a psychoanalytic concept, and 
the X-position by an empirical description of observational source material, to which 
the psychoanalytic concept is assigned. According to the Freudian psychoanalyst, 
human thoughts and actions display certain anomalies, quirks and inconsistencies 
which betray the working of unconscious motives and fantasies. These psychological 
phenomena are supposed to reveal, through a sometimes complex chain of associations, 
hidden unconscious processes and meanings. Typical instances of psychoanalytic 
interpretations include: “your compulsive behavior is in fact an enactment of perverse 
childhood fantasies”, “the stranger in the dream represents your father” or “your 
emotional insecurity is a manifestation of infantile castration anxiety”.  
Although we deliberately restrict our analysis to classical Freudian psychoanalysis, it 
should be noted that the divergent psychoanalytic schools that followed Freud‖s seminal 
theory have typically retained much of the problematic methodology and epistemology 
instituted by Freud: the existence of the psychodynamic unconscious, the notion of 
repression, the method of free association and symbolic interpretation as the gateway 
to the unconscious, etc. To the extent that these psychoanalytic schools have relied on 
the same defective aspects of the theory, our arguments apply with equal force 
(Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998). 
10.3.2 Antagonistic subsystems 
According to Freudian psychoanalysis, the human mind is the playground of a constant 
struggle between different mental subsystems. On the one hand, Freud often describes 
these mental systems as possessing intentional content, characterizing them in terms of 
personal-level concepts borrowed from folk psychology. In his early work, Freud 
analyzes the purposeful interaction between the unconscious and a mental entity called 
the censoring mechanism, which attempts to keep repressed mental contents from 
entering consciousness by means of distortion and disguise. This dynamic framework of 
antagonistic subsystems was later developed into the tripartite division of Ego, Super-
Ego and Id. On the other hand, however, Freud also describes these different mental 
subsystems and their mutual interactions in purely mechanical terms, for example as 
being in the business of discharging and distributing a form of mental energy called 
                                                     
 
71 In Buekens and Boudry (2010) we defend that, in virtue of its pseudohermeneutical character, 
psychoanalysis is capable of understanding virtually every human phenomenon. 
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libido. This tension between personal-level psychology and an impersonal libidinal 
economy has persisted throughout psychoanalytic literature (Gardner 2000). 
Freud developed a complex set of technical concepts to describe dynamical 
interactions between different mental subsystems. For example, the concept of 
“negation” describes the transformation of an unconscious wish into a negative form 
(its denial) upon entering consciousness; “substitution” denotes the replacement of 
mental content by a substitute through a chain of unconscious association, in which the 
libido of the first content is transferred to the second, a process of displacement called 
“cathexis”. “Condensation” denotes the bringing together of libidinal energy in one link 
connecting two associative chains. “Inversion” and “repression” similarly represent 
mental mechanisms for transforming mental contents through an invisible libidinal 
economy.  
The vague and open-ended character of these concepts extends the possibility of 
drawing analytical inferences from observable source material (i.e. the explanandum in 
a psychoanalytic interpretation) to unconscious mental states and processes almost 
infinitely. In addition, Freud‖s psychology allows a single element in the empirical 
source material to have multiple unconscious determinants, a phenomenon often 
referred to as “overdetermination”. These conceptual resources enable the 
psychoanalyst to make creative use of different sorts of symbolic associations, linguistic 
connections, double-entendres and homonyms, creating multiple layers of 
psychoanalytic interpretation. Importantly, what critics perceived as methodological 
extravagance was for the Freudians themselves inextricably connected with the very 
nature of the object of inquiry: we are dealing with a dynamic and intentional 
unconscious after all, which is in constant struggle with the mechanism of censorship, 
and which seeks ingenious and deceitful ways to provide an outlet for amassed libidinal 
energy.  
Consider, for example, Freud‖s use of the concept of “inversion”. Frank Cioffi 
convincingly argued that, although Freud theorized that neurosis develops when 
perverse desires remain unsatisfied, he did not recognize that patients who overtly 
indulged in their perverse desires but were neurotic nonetheless, constituted a 
refutation of his theory (Cioffi 1998, pp. 119-121). In the case of patients who suffered 
from neurosis without displaying overtly perverse behavior, Freud explained the 
symptoms as an outlet for libidinal energy amassed in response to repressed 
perversities. In the case of overtly perverse neurotic patients, Freud maintained that the 
symptoms expressed a repressed aversion against their indulging in perversities, and 
constituted a case of “inversion”. 
Another example of typical psychoanalytic reasoning is the way apparent 
falsifications of the Oedipus complex were handled. For Freud, the affectionate behavior 
of little boys towards their mother was a manifestation of incestuous desire. On the 
other hand, if a boy showed affection towards the father and was cold or hostile towards 
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the mother, as in the famous case of Little Hans, Freud explained the behavior as a 
reaction formation against the actual incestuous desires, which he thought were 
partially repressed (Freud 1955a; Van Rillaer 1980, pp. 141-155). Thus, the concepts of 
inversion and reaction formation allowed Freud to account for virtually every 
observation. 
10.3.3 Conspiracy thinking 
The Freudian unconscious is an entity that actively resists interpretation, and that will 
always try to deceive us in unexpected and cunning ways (Gellner 1985).72 Thus, when 
Freud was unable to find traces of a pathological complex or unconscious desire to 
account for a patient‖s behavior, he was undeterred and treated this as a token of 
unconscious resistance. The more the material offered by a patient resisted 
interpretation, the more it counted in favor of the theory. This characteristic pattern of 
reasoning in psychoanalysis bears a striking resemblance to conspiracy theorizing 
(Farrell 1996). For example, consistent with his account of the unconscious, Freud 
believed that his patients (and his critics) harbored a secret and unconscious wish to see 
his theories and interpretations proven wrong, and so never to see their own 
unconscious desires exposed. For instance, one of Freud‖s patients dreamt that she had 
to spend her holidays with her despised mother-in-law. This seemed to belie Freud‖s 
claim that every dream is an unconscious wish-fulfillment, but within the framework of 
psychoanalytic thinking it could be turned into a confirmation of the theory. As Freud 
himself explained,  
The dream showed that I was wrong. Thus it was her wish that I might be wrong, and 
her dream showed that wish fulfilled. [italics in original] (Freud 1953a, p. 151) 
Freud argued that “these dreams appear regularly in the course of my treatments when 
a patient is in a state of resistance to me” and he predicted that the same would happen 
to his readers (Freud 1953a, pp. 157-158).73 Indeed, Freud and his followers became 
infamous for explaining away criticism from their opponents as tokens of unconscious 
resistance to the theory, thus further attesting to the truth of psychoanalysis: 
                                                     
 
72 Or more precisely, in both simple and far-fetched ways. The degree of complexity in psychoanalytic 
interpretations varies greatly, from very straightforward symbols for genitals on the basis of superficial visual 
similarities, to intricate, multi-layered and multi-lingual analyses.  
73 The quotation continues: “Indeed, it is to be expected that the same thing will happen to some of the readers 
of the present book: they will be quite ready to have one of their wishes frustrated in a dream if only their 
wish that I may be wrong can be fulfilled.” 
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They [the critics] are therefore bound to call up the same resistance in him as in 
our patients; and that resistance finds it easy to disguise itself as an intellectual 
rejection and to bring up arguments like those which we ward off in our patients 
by means of the fundamental rule of psycho-analysis. (Freud 1957, p. 39) 
As we argued in Chapter 5 and in section 6.4.3, such moves are not merely immunizing 
gambits which can be neatly disentangled from the theory, but are instead perfectly 
legitimate, explanatory moves within the psychoanalytic framework, and instantly 
recognizable as genuine psychoanalytic interpretations (Boudry and Braeckman 2010). 
This pattern of reasoning, which bears a striking resemblance to conspiracy thinking, is 
pervasive throughout psychoanalytic literature, and it follows directly from the 
characterization of the unconscious as an intentional and deceitful mental entity.  
10.3.4 The quantitative factor 
Freud treated a patient‖s explicit denial of his hypotheses – for example in his use of the 
concept of penis envy – as yet further confirmation of his claims, but that didn‖t mean 
that he was prepared to accept cases where patients readily accepted his interpretations 
as refuting his theory. Indeed, if the patient‖s dreams seemed to confirm Freud‖s notions, 
they could be explained as an example of “compliance towards the analyst”, and thus 
again be relegated to unconscious motives (Freud 1961, p. 117) Thus, neither the denial 
or the (belated) acceptance of an interpretation posed a problem from the perspective 
of Freudian theory. 
The difference between both forms of behavior could be explained by the analyst as 
the result of unobservable variations in the strength of unconscious resistance on the 
one hand and the intensity of libidinal energy on the other hand. This “quantitative 
factor” in the patient‖s mental economy had the effect of forestalling the falsification of 
what initially looked like testable predictions. As Freud himself made clear in a 
remarkably candid passage, it could always be invoked post factum to account for the 
unexpected presence or absence of any given symptom:  
 We cannot measure the amount of libido essential to produce pathological effects. 
We can only postulate it after the effects of the illness have manifested 
themselves. (Freud 1924, p. 119) 
10.3.5 Conceptual double lives 
Another important feature of Freudian psychoanalysis, which further contributes to its 
epistemic predicament, is that its concepts lead what may be called a “double life” 
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(Cioffi 1998, p. 118): sometimes they seem to be semantically-rich and clearly-
delineated, but on other occasions they are inflated so as to become almost indefinite 
and meaningless. This conceptual double life makes central psychoanalytic concepts 
virtually immune to refutation. Cioffi (1998, p. 15) mentions Freud‖s “disingenuous 
alternation” in the scope of the libido-concept, in which he switches between an 
explicitly sexual libido on the one hand and a general kind of love and affection on the 
other hand.74  
As pointed out earlier, many concepts in Freudian psychoanalysis (e.g. repression, 
projection, wish-fulfillment) alternate between personal-level psychology and blind 
libidinal economy, a form of equivocation that makes psychoanalytic interpretations 
particularly ambiguous and elusive (Gardner 2000). Esterson (1993, p. 230) has 
concluded that the functions of the central concepts in Freud‖s ego-psychology (Ich, 
Über-Ich, Es) “are so imprecisely delineated that they can be employed in almost 
arbitrary fashion to provide support for virtually any theoretical formulation.” 
Elsewhere (Buekens and Boudry 2010) we have argued that the extension of many 
psychoanalytic terms is not fixed until applied in interpretations, which goes some way 
to explaining their open and indeterminate meaning (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 
2006).  
10.3.6 Inseparability of theory, methodology and practice 
A number of critics of psychoanalysis (Grünbaum 1984, 2008; Eagle 1988; 1996, 2002) 
have insisted on a clear distinction between the theory-as-such and the tendency of its 
advocates to use immunizing gambits and other methodological tricks in the face of 
falsifying material. These authors maintain that the theoretical problems we reviewed 
above have nothing to do with psychoanalysis properly speaking, but should be laid at 
the door of individual analysts.  
In this paper, however, we follow critics like Cioffi (1998), Crews (1986) and 
Macmillan (1997), who have meticulously demonstrated that, in practice, it is all but 
impossible to indicate a point where the orthodox version of the theory ends and where 
immunizing strategies and methodological obfuscations begin (Boudry and Braeckman 
2010). This is because what Grünbaum and Erwin designate as “dubious” methodological 
                                                     
 
74 This semantically double life of concepts like ―libido‖ fulfilled two conflicting demands: on the one hand, only 
the narrow, carnal interpretation could explain why fathers threatened their sons with penile amputation and 
why libidinal drives were so inadmissible for our moral sensibilities that they had to be repressed; on the 
other hand, only the wider interpretation allowed Freud to maintain that beneath the surface of each and 
every symptom the libidinal factor is lurking. 
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practices and immunizing tactic emerge directly from theory-internal epistemic 
properties. As Cioffi wrote: 
 (W)e have no canonical statement of the theory: no agreement on what 
constitutes modifications of the theory rather than post hoc elucidations of it. […] 
What we have in Freudian theory is a combination of epistemically ambiguous 
utterances with methodologically suspect practices. (Cioffi 1998, p. 300) 
The way in which the concept of resistance has been put to use by Freud and his acolytes, 
for example, has been rightly dismissed by critics as a specimen of heads-I-win-tails-
you-lose reasoning. Nevertheless, it proves difficult to disentangle such fallacious 
reasoning from psychoanalytic theory itself, because it is effectively supported by the 
way the unconscious is conceptualized in Freudian theory. If Freud‖s model of the 
human mind is correct, and if the unconscious really is some sort of trickster in disguise, 
then indeed it becomes natural to label counter-arguments and criticisms as 
manifestations of unconscious resistance to psychoanalytic ―truths‖ and 
―interpretations‖. 
10.3.7 A cumulative effect 
The remarkably versatile and multi-directional methodology of Freudian 
psychoanalysis (Timpanaro 1976; Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998), which has long been 
noted by its critics, is the natural outcome of dividing the mind into intentional and 
antagonistic substructures. As we have seen, Freud‖s particular dynamic conception of 
the human mind creates an abundance of inferential possibilities when applied in 
hermeneutical practice, enabling the analyst to turn any psychological phenomenon 
into the symptomatic outcome of a hidden psychodynamic conflict. In addition, the 
conceptual equivocations in the theory render Freud‖s hermeneutic machinery even 
more versatile.75 As Frederick Crews wrote: 
                                                     
 
75 The therapeutic methods of free association and transference analysis, although demonstrably unavailing 
for probing another person‖s mind (Grünbaum 1984) and based on placebo effects (Jopling 2008), are not 
discussed here as one of the central methodological pitfalls of psychoanalysis, because these methods are not 
employed in psychoanalytic interpretation of human phenomena like works of art, literary texts or religion, 
and thus do not constitute the central epistemic problem of psychoanalysis. 
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Each posited subset of ―the unconscious‖ permits another strand of contrary 
motivation to be added to the already tangled explanatory skein, leaving us, if we 
are sufficiently gullible, so impressed by the psychoanalytic interpreter‖s 
diagnostic acumen that we think we are witnessing elegant and validated feats of 
deduction instead of being told a self-serving detective story in which the mystery 
itself [...] is an artefact of question-begging manoeuvres. (Crews 2006, p. 56)  
The cumulative effect of these methodological and conceptual problems is that, if the 
psychoanalytic unconscious exists, it is deprived of any capacity to put epistemic 
constraints on theoretical claims and psychoanalytic interpretations. Indeed, any 
guarantee for interpretive congruency in Freudian psychoanalysis is frustrated by the 
methodological flexibility and conceptual deficiencies inherent within the theory (Van 
Rillaer 1980, pp. 87-92; Esterson 1993, p. 242; Macmillan 1997). This was the verdict 
reached by Malcolm Macmillan in his Freud Evaluated:  
[T]he so-called discoveries are dependent upon methods of enquiry and 
interpretation so defective that even practitioners trained in their use are unable 
to reach vaguely congruent conclusions about such things as the interpretation of 
a dream or symptom [...] (Macmillan 1997, p. 516) 
Indeed, the internal feuds and factions characterizing post-Freudian psychoanalysis 
bear witness to the epistemological problems described by critics as Macmillan and 
Cioffi (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006, 2008). Already in 1962, the psychoanalyst 
Judd Marmor observed (with understandable disquietude) that, by means of the 
psychoanalytic method, confirmations could be found as easily for Freud‖s Oedipus 
complex, as for Adler‖s inferiority complex, or for Lacan‖s symbolic Father, or for Jung‖s 
anima and persona: 
[D]ependent on the view of the analysts the patients of each school generate 
precisely those data that support the theories and interpretations of their 
analysts. (Marmor 1962, p. 289) 
Returning to the main issue, we will now show that these findings resonate with the SC 
tenet that “what is believed to be” (Collins 1981a, p. 54) is in no way constrained by 
“nature” (in this case, what is going on in our minds).  
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10.4 A constructivist redescription of psychoanalysis 
10.4.1 SC and Freudian psychoanalysis: no constraints on evidence 
Our central claim is that Freudian psychoanalysis perfectly illustrates the 
epistemological predicament described by proponents of SC. Indeed, the critique of 
psychoanalysis presented in the previous sections resonates with the “debunking 
project” that is central to the program of SC. As Boghossian aptly noted: 
A social construction claim is interesting only insofar as it purports to expose 
construction where none had been suspected, where something constitutively 
social had come to masquerade as natural. (Boghossian 2006, p. 18) 
This is exactly what critics of Freudian psychoanalysis have been engaged in all along: 
exposing as “constructions” what Freudian theorists presented as genuine natural facts 
out there, waiting to be discovered.76 The received critical view of Freudian theory could 
be rephrased as follows: what psychoanalysts present as ―insights‖ and ―findings‖ are 
merely artifacts of the theory itself and of its deficient methodology; only those who 
have already embraced Freudian theory ―see‖ the described psychoanalytic phenomena 
(e.g. the phallic meaning of a dream symbol; the child‖s erotic pleasure in thumb 
sucking). 
The epistemic predicament of Freudian psychoanalysis can now be redescribed 
within the framework of SC. Take the critical observation that, in Freudian 
hermeneutics, any guarantee for interpretive congruency is frustrated by the 
methodological flexibility and conceptual versatility of the system. As Harry Collins 
would have it, “what is believed to be” in psychoanalytic hermeneutics is “in no way 
constrained” (1981a, p. 54) by what is actually going on in our minds. This perfectly 
illustrates two key tenets of SC, viz. that evidential considerations play an insignificant 
role in theoretical developments, and that the resolution of theoretical debates and 
conflicts in psychoanalysis is not driven by epistemic considerations. 
The critical observation that psychoanalysts always succeed – sometimes with 
considerable ingenuity – in molding seemingly adverse evidence into accordance with 
their theory, illustrates another tenet of SC: the ability to preserve the theory in the face 
of recalcitrant material. As Golinski put it, “given sufficient creativity and 
                                                     
 
76 After all, to be meaningful and coherent, Freudian theory has to presuppose that there is an independent 
mental reality and that the analytic method yields knowledge about it, this in spite of later attempts at a 
hermeneutical (Ricœur 1970; Habermas and Shapiro 1981) or constructivist reconstruction of psychoanalysis 
(Spence 1982; Schafer 1992; Moore 1999). 
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resourcefulness on behalf of its defenders, the existing paradigm could be maintained 
indefinitely” (Golinski 2005, p. 25). Most philosophers of science would agree that this is 
a rather implausible claim when applied to bona fide science, but in the case of 
psychoanalysis we claim that the description is perfectly accurate. Fully in line with 
Judd Marmor‖s observation, critics of psychoanalysis have often noted that there is no 
rational method to resolve the persistent disputes between the followers of Sigmund 
Freud, Otto Rank, Alfred Adler, Jacques Lacan, Daniel Winnicott, Anna Freud, Melanie 
Klein and many others. For example, when his disciple Otto Rank introduced the 
concept of birth trauma as a pre-oedipal source of neurosis (a Freudian heresy), Freud 
could only reply that he was unable to confirm the remnants of such a trauma in his 
clinical work, and he urged a reinterpretation of the material in terms of oedipal 
desires. Both schools have since then continued to find ―confirmations‖ for their own 
theoretical framework, and have failed to ―see‖ the mental phenomena described by 
their adversaries (Cioffi 1998, pp. 17-19).  
10.4.2 Historiography and sociology of psychoanalysis 
For the historiographer of psychoanalysis, David Bloor‖s “symmetry postulate” seems an 
appropriate methodological tool. Since the theoretical choice for Oedipus complex, 
death wish, inferiority complex or birth trauma does not depend on the nature of 
empirical evidence, one must resort to deeply non-epistemic factors to explain 
theoretical disputes, developments, and schisms in the history of psychoanalysis 
(Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006). As the Strong Programme recommends, the 
historiographer of sociologist or psychoanalysis should not be concerned with the 
“truth” of such or such psychoanalytic doctrine, and in all cases he should look for the 
“same kind of causes”, viz. ideological background, social networks, personal animosity, 
and cultural context.  
To give just one example, in the second half of the 20th century the doctrine of 
universal penis envy in women was progressively abandoned in many psychoanalytic 
schools. It is quite implausible that this theoretical change was driven by evidential 
considerations, for Freudians theorists had ―confirmed‖ the doctrine countless times in 
the past and touted it as one of the cornerstones of analytic theory (Cioffi 1998, pp. 27-
28). Moreover, the method of investigation remained the same, so what could account 
for this theoretical development? Instead of looking for epistemic reasons, historians of 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis would be better advised to investigate the changing 
social and cultural sensibilities of the time, which began to regard the concept as 
patriarchal and misogynist. The development of the psychoanalytic concepts of breast 
envy (Melanie Klein) and womb and vagina envy (Karen Horney) to compensate for this 
“phallocentrism” on Freud‖s part must be seen in the same light (Sayers 1987). Indeed, 
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19th century preconceptions about female submissiveness and inferiority constitute a 
good candidate for explaining the genesis of the concept of penis envy in the first place. 
This focus on sociological and ideological causes is precisely what sociologists of 
scientific knowledge like Bloor would recommend. The idea that the concept of 
universal penis envy was gaining acceptance in Freud‖s time because “Nature had 
spoken” and psychoanalysts had paid heed to Her is quite implausible in light of a 
critical assessment of Freud‖s theory and methodology. As David Bloor would have it, 
“[w]hat function does truth, or talk of truth, play in all this? It is difficult to see that 
much would be lost by its absence” (Bloor 1991, p. 40). In the absence of epistemic 
constraints on theory change, the explanatory vacuum is filled in with various 
sociological, ideological and psychological factors.  
10.4.3 The construction of meaning and the archaeological metaphor 
It is interesting to note that Freud himself acknowledged that the work of the analyst 
closely resembles the practice of (re)construction. About his analysis of the Wolf Man, 
Freud wrote: 
All I mean to say is this: scenes, like this one in my present patient‖s case, which 
date from such an early period and exhibit such a content, and which further lay 
claim to such an extraordinary significance for the history of the case, are as a 
rule not reproduced as recollections, but have to be divined – constructed – 
gradually and laboriously from an aggregate of indications. (Freud 1955b, p. 51)  
Freud also compared the psychoanalyst to the archaeologist, carefully excavating the 
buried remnants of the past and uncovering layer after layer of unconscious meaning 
(Freud 1953c, 1955a). But of course, the context of psychoanalytic inquiry does not 
resemble the direct accessibility of archaeological excavations at all, as Freud could only 
tenuously infer the existence of alleged unconscious phenomena on the basis of certain 
cues (dreams, associations, patterns of behavior) (Moore 1999). In psychoanalytic 
therapy, the archaeology metaphor reinforces the misconception that the 
psychoanalyst merely brings to the surface that which was present all along in the 
patient‖s mind.77 Freud used other realism-inducing metaphors to describe the inquiries 
of the analyst. For example, he likened the manifest dream content to a “rebus” or 
“picture puzzle”, in which symbols have to be deciphered to reveal hidden meanings 
                                                     
 
77 In that sense, the hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious full of forbidden wishes and desires, combined with 
the concepts of repression and denial, creates favorable psychological conditions for the creation of false 
insight and successful suggestion (Jopling 2008). 
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(Freud 1953a, pp. 277-278). These powerful metaphors conveyed the image of an inquiry 
into an objective mental reality out there, and they have paved the way for a 
misinterpretation of Freudian social constructions as natural, empirically-detectable 
facts.  
10.4.4 An independent argument against SC 
The first part of our central argument is that the framework of SC offers an accurate 
account of the epistemic predicament of psychoanalysis, in particular the classical 
Freudian version. We will now argue that that SC‖s applicability to psychoanalysis yields 
that it must embody a bad account of how bona fide science works. 
To secure this conclusion, we need to show that a successful description of Freudian 
psychoanalysis in terms of a social-constructivist account succeeds in virtue of 
methodological and conceptual problems that are not manifest, or at least not to the 
same extent present in bona fide science. There is some circumstantial evidence for this 
claim: many of the features we discussed are widely recognized as distinctively 
psychoanalytic, even by Freud‖s contemporaries (Borch-Jacobsen and Shamdasani 2006), 
and they were criticized on independent factual and theoretical grounds (Esterson 1993; 
Macmillan 1997; Cioffi 1998). Indeed, for many scientists and philosophers, they served 
as the basis to question the theory‖s scientific credentials (Derksen 1993; Cioffi 1998; 
Popper 2002).  
The central question remains, however, what it takes for a theory to exemplify the 
epistemic situation as described by SC. The proponent of SC can retort that our 
argument is superfluous: “Even if so-called bona fide science doesn‖t exhibit the specific 
problems you correctly identified in psychoanalysis, it is no less socially constructed”. 
Our opponent may maintain that the viability of a constructivist redescription of 
Freudian psychoanalysis is not due to the characteristic problems we mentioned, but 
due to general features that are also manifest in bona fide science. In other words, the 
specific problems we discussed are superfluous, and bona fide science is just as much 
“socially constructed”.  
However, this would entail that the various theoretical complications and loopholes 
of Freudian psychoanalysis, which have fascinated critics and defenders alike, are 
epistemically gratuitous. The proponent of SC is then committed to denying that these 
characteristic problems are responsible for what critics have condemned as the 
epistemic vacuousness of Freudian psychoanalysis, and this is quite implausible. First, it 
is simply incoherent to claim that the conceptual and methodological flaws have no 
epistemic consequences, i.e. are epistemically inert. We have documented in detail that 
their cumulative effect consists of reducing epistemic constraints on hermeneutic 
practice and theory formation, to produce spurious evidence about an object that is 
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actually an artifact of the theory (the dynamic unconscious), and to distract attention 
from this very process.78 Even defenders of psychoanalysis have occasionally 
acknowledged that these specific problems compromise the theory‖s epistemic status 
and its aspiration to be recognized as a genuine science (Eagle 1993). Second, there are 
good reasons to assume that in other respects they hindered the success of the theory, 
since they undeniably compromised its credibility in the eyes of countless scientists and 
philosophers.  
Note that our dialectical position is not committed to the implausible claim that the 
methodological and conceptual problems that plague Freudian psychoanalysis are 
entirely absent from bona fide science. Imre Lakatos maintained that every scientific 
theory builds a “protective belt” (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) of auxiliary hypotheses 
around its core claims. Likewise, the theory-ladenness of observation is a genuine 
problem that affects bona fide science as well. But this is a far cry from the stronger 
picture outlined by SC. Every theory can withstand a certain amount of anomalies using 
face-saving auxiliaries, but that does not mean that they are all on equal footing. The 
strength and imperviousness of the protective belt around a core theory is a matter of 
degree, not of absolute difference. One does not need to be a naive falsificationist to 
recognize that, in bona fide science at least, a sufficient number of empirical anomalies 
may indeed threaten a theory, especially if far-fetched modifications are in order to get 
the theory in accordance with reality. In Freudian psychoanalysis, by contrast, the 
particular methodological problems and conceptual resources we discussed ensure that 
no amount of empirical observations can seriously endanger central psychoanalytic 
propositions. No matter what nature says, psychoanalysts always hear the same voices. 
Because of its specific epistemic predicament, Freudian psychoanalysis, in contrast with 
bona fide science, exemplifies the picture of science SC defends and promotes. In that 
sense, we have uncovered an example of what science would look like if it were to 
function as SC claims it does.  
                                                     
 
78 See for example Freud‖s explicitly empiricist and objectivist rhetoric (Buekens and Boudry 2010). 
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10.5 Discussion & objections 
10.5.1 The circularity objection and the demarcation problem 
“Your argument begs the question,” the critic may retort. “On the one hand you claim 
that Freudian psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, because it displays the features 
described by SC. On the other hand, you hold that SC is a bad account of science because 
it correctly describes a pseudoscience (i.e. Freudian psychoanalysis). This is a circular 
argument.” 
This objection allows us to clarify the overall structure of our argument. First, our 
empirical argument against SC as an account of scientific practice is independent from 
traditional conceptual and philosophical objections (they were briefly rehearsed at the 
beginning of this article). Second, we do not reject Freudian psychoanalysis just because 
it fits the SC framework. We do not propose our analysis as a new demarcation criterion, 
and we do not think that our framework is capable of capturing all the features that 
characterize pseudosciences. Third, it may well be that some of the methodological and 
conceptual problems we have discussed figure in proposed solutions to the demarcation 
problem (Derksen 1993), but it does not follow that we thereby also endorse that 
demarcation criterion, nor that our argument depends on the rejection of Freudian 
psychoanalysis as pseudoscience under that supposed demarcation criterion. The only 
relevant premises in our argument are (i) the presence of these characteristics and 
defects79 in Freudian psychoanalysis, and (ii) their cumulative effect on the epistemic 
status of the theory. It may well be possible – although this was not a line we intended 
to take – to turn the case of Freudian psychoanalysis against SC on the presupposition 
that there is a correct demarcation criterion according to which psychoanalysis should 
be dismissed as a pseudoscience. However, this will not impress the defender of SC, 
since the possibility of a viable demarcation criterion separating science from 
pseudoscience is precisely what is problematic from the point of view of SC. In this 
article we tried to give an independent argument against SC, not an argument that 
simply presupposes the very characterization of science SC objects to. 
                                                     
 
79 The fact that we talk about ―defects‖ may seem tendentious. However, our argument does not depend on this 
terminology but stands in its own right. In any case, with this choice of term, we are not suggesting that we 
endorse a demarcation criterion on the basis of these characteristics. 
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10.5.2 Social constructivism and psychoanalysis as natural allies 
It is interesting to note that some contemporary psychoanalysts have themselves 
embraced some version of SC (Spence 1982; Stern 1992; Schafer 1992; Moore 1999). In 
this constructivist school, the empirical ambitions of Freud are largely abandoned, and 
it is argued that “narrative truth” or “interpretive construction” is everything a 
psychological theory (or indeed any theory) can offer. Eagle (2003) has conclusively 
argued that, by renouncing any claim at empirical insight, this postmodern version of 
psychoanalysis inevitably leads to relativism. However, one might wonder why SC has 
attracted the attention of so many psychoanalysts. It seems plausible that constructivist 
readings of psychoanalysis help neutralizing scientific and philosophical objections to 
Freud‖s theory by extrapolating the epistemological problems from which 
psychoanalysis suffers to science in general. In that very specific sense, psychoanalysts 
find a natural ally in constructivists, some of whom have been found to openly embrace 
relativism (Bloor 2007).  
10.5.3 Institutional facts 
In Buekens & Boudry (2010) we develop an account of psychoanalysis as a system of 
“institutional facts” along the lines of John Searle‖s theory of social institutions (Searle 
1995; Lagerspetz 2006) and propose this analysis as the best explanation of what really 
happens in the hermeneutic practice of psychoanalysis. The upshot of that analysis is 
that psychoanalysis is based on a confusion between natural facts and institutional 
facts: what Freud thought of as descriptions of natural facts are, to a large extent, 
declaratives that create and, when accepted by others, sustain institutional facts. In 
contrast with global SC, the reconstruction in Buekens & Boudry (2010) assumes a firm 
distinction between natural facts, which exist independently of human intentionality, 
and institutional facts. This differs from the implausible anti-realist credo of SC that all 
scientific facts are socially constructed. The argument in Buekens & Boudry (2010) 
resonates with the conclusion in this paper that Freudian theories and interpretations 
are “social constructions” rather than verifiable natural facts about the vicissitudes of 
the human mind.  
10.5.4 Conclusion 
SC approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific 
knowledge. Our aim in this paper was to take the claims of radical SC seriously and to 
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find out whether we can uncover theories which do instantiate the epistemic 
predicament as described by SC. As we have shown, (Freudian) psychoanalysis fits the 
bill, in virtue of its well-known conceptual problems, its peculiar epistemic structure 
and its methodological flexibility. The combination of what psychoanalysis pretends to 
be (i.e. a science), and the way the theory really functions (i.e. a system that produces 
arbitrary constructions), makes a redescription in the framework of SC particularly apt. 
By showing in some detail what it takes for a theory to ―create‖ its own object, our 
analysis yields an independent argument against SC as a global account of science. 
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Chapter 11.  
How Convenient! The Epistemic Rationale of Self-
validating Belief Systems  
When men wish to construct or support a theory, how 
they torture facts into their service! – Charles Mackay 
(1974 [1841], p. 459) 
 
The trouble with having an open mind, of course, is that 
people will insist on coming along and trying to put 
things in it. – Terry Pratchett 
 
 
Abstract.80 This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief 
systems and the recurrence of “epistemic defense mechanisms” and “immunizing 
strategies” across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that 
typical “weird” belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they 
exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. 
Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and 
motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind is particularly susceptible to belief 
systems that are structurally self-validating. On this cognitive-psychological basis, we 
construct an epidemiology of beliefs, arguing that the apparent convenience of escape 
clauses and other defensive ―tactics‖ used by believers may well derive not from 
                                                     
 
80 This chapter is based on a forthcoming paper in Philosophical Psychology (Boudry and Braeckman 
forthcoming). Parts of it were presented at the Fourth Conference of the Dutch-Flemish Association for 
Analytic Philosophy at the University of Leuven (2010). 
Here be dragons 
190 
conscious deliberation on their part, but from more subtle mechanisms of cultural 
selection.  
11.1 Introduction 
The satirist H. L. Mencken once wrote that: “the most common of all follies is to believe 
passionately in the palpably not true. It is the chief occupation of mankind”. Mencken 
was clearly engaging in hyperbole, but he has some statistics on his side (Irwin 2009; 
Hines 2003): according to a 1999 Gallup poll, 45% of all Americans believe that the earth 
is less than 10,000 years old and that all living species were created by God in their 
present form. A vast number of people believe that the murder of John F. Kennedy was a 
conspiracy, that the moon landing in 1969 never happened, or that the Bush 
administration was involved in the 9/11 attacks (a conspiracy theory that is also popular 
in Europe). The number of people who put faith in bogus medical treatments, or even 
the number of different bogus therapies, is alarmingly high. A 2005 Gallup poll 
conducted in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain found that ca. 25% of all 
persons questioned believe in astrology and around 20% believe that extraterrestrials 
have visited the earth recently. Even higher numbers were found for the belief in 
haunted houses and communication with the dead. Similarly, all over the world, sects 
and religious cults continue to attract followers.  
In this paper, we discuss belief systems across widely different domains and focus on 
their self-validating nature as part of an explanation of their wide appeal and enduring 
popularity. After an introductory section on the received view about weird beliefs and 
irrationality (section 11.2), we review the relevant literature on belief perseverance, 
cognitive dissonance and motivated reasoning (section 11.3). We proceed by analyzing 
the recurrence of certain epistemic defense mechanisms and immunizing strategies in 
many of the most widespread “irrational” belief systems. By demonstrating that these 
belief structures exhibit a remarkable degree of natural resistance or resilience in the face 
of disconfirmation and criticism, we challenge the received idea that they are 
intrinsically vulnerable or fragile (sections 11.4 and 11.5). In line with the emerging 
literature on cognitive constraints on the formation and distribution of beliefs (Boyer 
1994; Atran 2002; Barrett 2007), we explain the success of these belief systems in terms 
of ordinary modes of human cognition, and within the framework of an epidemiology of 
beliefs (section 11.6) (Boyer 1994; Sperber 1996; Lienard and Boyer 2006). Our 
epistemological approach is informed by, but not reducible to, the cognitive research on 
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motivated reasoning and cognitive dissonance, and makes for a level of explanation in 
its own right. Finally, we show that the epistemic “engineering” of certain belief 
systems may well derive not from conscious deliberation on the part of believers, but 
from more subtle mechanisms of cultural selection (section 11.7). 
11.2 Pseudoscience and the Paranormal 
11.2.1 The tenacity of weird beliefs 
The tenacity of belief systems that are highly implausible, or whose content contradicts 
well-established scientific knowledge, has often exasperated skeptical scientists and 
philosophers alike. Dyed-in-the-wool skeptics, however, have long come to realize that 
firm believers are very difficult to convince with evidence and rational arguments. To 
believe otherwise is to commit the “rationalistic fallacy” (Pigliucci 2002, pp. 234-236), 
the idea that all one has to do to make people abandon their pseudoscientific beliefs is 
to explain things a little more clearly. Experience with debating “believers” has 
conclusively shattered this illusion, and the phenomenon of belief perseverance in the 
face of disconfirming evidence has been well researched in psychology (Anderson, 
Lepper et al. 1980; Carretta and Moreland 1982). But why is it that rational arguments 
are generally to little avail in the domain of pseudoscience and the paranormal? 
Among skeptics engaged in the scientific evaluation of these claims, there is a 
widespread conviction that believers in the paranormal and pseudoscience are 
obviously irrational, if not plain stupid. Carl Sagan once noted that, to his regret, many 
of his skeptical colleagues find that “those [...] who believe in all these stupid doctrines 
are morons” (Sagan 1995, pp. 29-30). For example, Richard Dawkins, annoyed by the 
continuing opposition to evolution by religious fundamentalists, once remarked that 
“[i]t is absolutely safe to say that if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in 
evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid or insane” (Dawkins 1989). After all, so the 
argument goes, pseudoscientists are not capable of rational argumentation, they simply 
ignore or fail to understand evidence that does not fit their dogmatic ideas, and they 
keep committing fallacies of reasoning that have long been laid to rest (e.g. Godfrey 
1979; Estling 2005). The sentiment that some belief systems are so obviously wrong or 
absurd that no sane person would ever come to accept them, has also pervaded 
academic research on for example superstition and religious cults. In an attempt to 
explain why seemingly normal people succumb to pseudoscience and cults, some 
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researchers have argued that such belief commitments can only be sustained by 
elaborate organizational devices, psychological indoctrination and other techniques for 
distorting normal reasoning functions. Other researchers have speculated on the 
existence of a special mode of “magical thinking” (Kurtz 1986), which is disconnected 
from normal reasoning faculties, or which constitutes a pre-rational stage in the 
development of the human mind (for an overview, see Atran 2002, p. 141). 
Modern research in cognitive psychology belies these speculations and suggests that 
many of our false beliefs stem from mundane reasoning errors and biases which are 
inherent in the way the human mind processes information (Nisbett and Ross 1980; 
Gilovich 1991). For example, instead of attributing superstition to a special mode of 
“magical thinking”, researchers have documented the role of our flawed understanding 
of randomness and coincidence in the formation and persistence of superstitious beliefs 
(Gilovich 1991; Vyse 1997; Talmont-Kaminski 2008). Thus, the persistence of superstition 
emerges as a side-effect of our natural ability for pattern recognition and causal 
inference making (e.g. Foster and Kokko 2009). In evolutionary terms, the cost of 
overlooking causal relations is higher than that of occasional false positives, which 
explains the high sensitivity of our cognitive faculties to correlations in the 
environment. Nesse (2001) has termed this the “smoking detector principle”, because 
smoking alarms are designed to err on the side of caution for the same reason. In a 
similar vein, researchers are starting to approach the human penchant for magic and 
the paranormal as a natural by-product of the way our brain employs ontological 
categories (e.g. physical, biological, mental) to make sense of the world (Lindeman and 
Aarnio 2007). Paranormal beliefs are then regarded as the result of a confusion between 
the core attributes of these ontological categories. In general, cognitive psychologists 
have argued that local irrationality emerges as the inevitable by-product of our brain‖s 
ability to efficiently gather and process information (Talmont-Kaminski 2008, 2009).  
As we will see, evidence against the sheer “irrationality” or “stupidity” of believers 
has also come from sociological studies of cults and sects, which have shown that even 
the most outlandish belief systems have a form of internal logic and coherence, and that 
believers are often not the simple-minded fanatics they are taken to be (e.g. Dein 2001; 
Tumminia 1998; Lukes 2007). Moreover, cults and sects who did rely on crude 
brainwashing and mind control devices to recruit new members have generally met 
with little success (Mercier in press; Streatfeild 2007). It seems that attempting to impair 
people‖s normal reasoning abilities is an inefficient way of winning new converts for a 
“weird” belief system.  
In this paper, we want to focus on one particular misconception underlying the 
sentiments of skeptical outsiders of weird belief systems. Echoing the remarks of H. L. 
Mencken, people often express puzzlement about what they perceive as the “palpable” 
falsity of these belief systems: “How could anyone in his right mind believe such 
nonsense?” In other words, people assume that pseudoscientific belief systems are 
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“inherently fragile” (Snow and Machalek 1982) – that believers are constantly faced 
with overwhelming adverse evidence, which would compel any reasonable person to 
immediately give up such beliefs. We argue that this assumption is largely misguided, 
and that a closer look at the structure of weird belief systems reveals that believers are 
in fact well-prepared to withstand such difficulties. More specifically, once believers 
accept the central premises of the belief system in question, they have ample 
explanatory resources at their disposal to reason their way through apparent 
disconfirmations, and to withstand criticism from outsiders. Before delving into this 
discussion, however, we need to cover some psychological ground about irrationality, 
motivated reasoning and belief perseverance. 
11.2.2 The case of creationism and “blind faith”  
Almost half of the population in the United States believe that all living species were 
created in their present form by God, and that the earth is less than 10,000 years old. 
Adhering to a literalist reading of Scripture, these people also believe in the Garden of 
Eden, Noah‖s Ark and the Great Flood. It is difficult to find a belief that flies more in the 
face of modern science. Consequently, it is tempting to argue that, since the creationist 
belief system is so “palpably not true”, those who endorse it surely must be completely 
impervious to rational arguments and evidence.  
On the other hand, it is surprising to note how often creationists go to considerable 
lengths to “massage” scientific evidence into their preconceived Biblical framework. 
Moreover, they have – often with amusing results – taken great pains to overcome 
exegetical inconsistencies and other difficulties in their belief systems to answer 
questions like: How did Noah manage to get all the animals into the Ark? If Adam and 
Eve were the only humans around, did Cain marry his own sister? What did T. Rex use 
his claws and teeth for in the Garden of Eden, before death and carnivore diets entered 
the world? Why does the book of Genesis contain two apparently inconsistent accounts 
of creation?  
Of course, the arguments invented by creationists to address these problems are 
selective, distorted and heavily biased (Kitcher 1982; Pennock 1999; Pigliucci 2002), but 
there is a more interesting point to be made: for people who are blindly and 
“irrationally” committed to religious faith, many creationists have a surprising concern 
with inconsistencies and adverse evidence. Why do they not just ignore anything that 
does not fit their ideas, instead of bothering themselves with elaborate rationalizations 
and ad hoc explanations? One might object that creationists merely need these elaborate 
arguments to attract new converts, but that explanation pushes the question ahead. If 
religious fundamentalism is simply about committing oneself blindly to the truth of a 
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holy book, why do people need arguments to be convinced in the first place? In other 
words, why are creationists not more irrational?  
11.3 The Psychology of Belief Perseverance 
11.3.1 Motivated reasoning and confirmation bias 
Psychologists have found some truth in the received psychological wisdom about 
irrationality. For example, research on “confirmation bias” suggests that people actively 
avoid being confronted with disconfirming evidence (Nickerson 1998), and they 
sometimes simply fail to notice discrepancies between their beliefs and the available 
evidence (Benassi, Singer et al. 1980). This literature on “confirmation bias” is 
sometimes taken to imply that people simply “forget” failures and ignore adverse 
evidence, but the actual psychological mechanism may be more interesting: for 
example, researchers found that people betting on sport games remember their losses 
better than their wins. Rather than just “forgetting” their apparent failures, people take 
the time to scrutinize them intensely in search of elements that allow them to 
rationalize these failures away. Typically, they accept their wins at face value but rely 
on ad hoc explanations to turn their losses into “near wins” (Gilovich 1983). Researchers 
have shown that humans are remarkably creative in inventing such ad hoc explanations 
for events (Ross, Lepper et al. 1977) and in explaining away adverse evidence to rescue 
cherished beliefs from refutation (Gilovich 1991; Tumminia 1998). In a classical 
experiment, Lord and his colleagues (Lord, Ross et al. 1979) asked defenders and 
opponents of capital punishment to read two studies, one of which suggested that the 
death penalty deterred people from committing crimes, whereas the other suggested 
that it was not an effective deterrent. Both groups detected more methodological 
problems in the study disfavoring their own beliefs, and hence rated this study lower, 
while they took the study in favor of their own beliefs at face value. 
 Kunda (1990) explains that, ironically, this pervasiveness of ad hoc reasoning and 
special pleading suggests that there are limits to the extent to which people are engaged 
in “motivated reasoning”: “[T]he biasing role of goals is [...] constrained by one‖s ability 
to construct a justification for the desired conclusion: People will come to believe what 
they want to believe only to the extent that reason permits” (Kunda 1990, p. 483). This is 
because people like to think of themselves as objective and unbiased reasoners. In 
psychological terms, they place a high premium on consistency and impartiality (Kunda 
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1990; Tavris and Aronson 2008; von Hippel and Trivers in press). When people are 
motivated to cling to a belief, they do not feel comfortable with blithely ignoring 
adverse evidence or simply shutting their ears to anyone who opposes their views. 
Instead, they engage in more subtle forms of ad hoc reasoning, rationalization and 
special pleading to arrive at their desired conclusions and to justify their beliefs to 
others, e.g. reinterpreting the facts, weighing them against background knowledge, 
finding some reason to discredit the source, etc. (Gilovich 1991, pp. 54-56). This practice 
allows them to uphold an “illusion of objectivity concerning the manner in which [...] 
inferences were derived” (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987, p. 302).  
The conventional wisdom on so-called “wishful thinking” is that, as Francis Bacon 
put it, man “prefers to believe what he prefers to be true”. The psychological evidence, 
however, suggests that there are constraints on the ways in which people let their 
desires and goals guide their beliefs (Ditto and Lopez 1992). The cognitive premium on a 
flattering self-image of being unbiased and reasonable explains why many people, even 
defenders of weird belief systems, will typically scrutinize adverse evidence until they 
find some justification for rejecting or ignoring it (see the use of immunizing strategies 
in section 11.5).  
Apart from that, it is clear that the power of “wishful thinking” is limited in yet 
another respect. Often enough, people are firmly committed to weird beliefs that show 
no signs of wishful thinking at all, but in fact confirm their worst fears. For example, 
many among the most widespread irrational beliefs – eternal damnation, witchcraft, 
evil conspiracies – are positively frightening and menacing (Guthrie 1993; Atran 2002, 
pp. 75-78). If it were true that people believe what they prefer to be true, why do they 
not just prefer not to believe in these phantoms, a fortiori when the evidence for them is 
so scant? Certainly, as psychological research has shown, if people have already 
committed themselves to belief in witchcraft or hell, and have acted accordingly over a 
period of time, they may be motivated to persevere in that belief. That brings us to the 
next section. 
11.3.2 Cognitive dissonance 
In many everyday situations, believers just accept adverse evidence and revise their 
beliefs accordingly (Sperber 1990). If I think the capital of Ghana is Abidjan and I find in 
an atlas that is in fact Accra, I do not write a letter of complaint to the publisher of that 
atlas. If I thought I left my keys in the drawer and I cannot find them there, I usually 
revise my belief (still, if I am really confident or just stubborn, I can persist that 
someone else must have taken them away). Under what circumstances can we expect 
people to persevere in their beliefs and to explain away such evidence? Cognitive 
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dissonance theory suggests that, from a psychological and motivational point of view, 
there has to be something at stake.  
According to cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, Schachter et al. 1964; Aronson 
1992; Tavris and Aronson 2008), when people are presented with new evidence that 
conflicts with their previously held beliefs, this results in a form of cognitive tension 
called “dissonance”. Importantly, the strength of this uncomfortable tension depends 
on the degree to which people have invested in their beliefs, for example by way of 
public commitment, or by the time and effort spent acting in accordance with these 
beliefs (Batson 1975). If the psychological investment in a belief is high, people are more 
motivated to reduce dissonance by rationalizing away disconfirming data. In the refined 
version of dissonance theory, dissonance arises not so much because of two conflicting 
cognitions, but because adverse evidence conflicts with one‖s self-esteem as a 
competent and reasonable person.81 This accords with our earlier observation that, 
when people explain away unwelcome evidence, they do so in a way that allows them to 
uphold an illusion of objectivity. For example, if a psychic has publicly professed his 
powers and risks losing his credibility, he is unlikely to be put off his balance by blatant 
failure. Or if a believer has spent a substantial amount of time and money on astrology 
consults, typically no amount of rational argumentation and debunking efforts will 
make him renounce his beliefs. As Nicholas Humphrey noted: “psychic phenomena can, 
it seems, survive almost any amount of subsequent disgrace” (Humphrey 1996, p. 150). 
By contrast, if the psychological stakes are low, as in the everyday situations we 
mentioned above, the motivation for belief perseverance will be greatly reduced. 
Consider another example related to paranormal beliefs: suppose that Anna and Paul 
both start to suspect that they have psychic powers, but their level of confidence is not 
very high. While Paul hastens to tell his friends that he may be psychic and even 
performs some psychic readings, Anna decides to conduct an experiment on herself at 
an early point, when her beliefs are still privately held. All other things being equal, it is 
much more likely that Anna will abandon her beliefs silently when she discovers that 
they do not pan out (Humphrey 1996, p. 105), while Paul will rationalize his failures 
because he has already made a public commitment. Thus, we would predict that people 
with an inquisitive and cautious mindset are more likely to put their hunches to the test 
early on, and are less likely to be sucked into commitment to wrong beliefs like these. 
By contrast, people who rush to conclusions and start spreading the news right away 
                                                     
 
81 Aronson distinguishes three components of a positive self-image that are shared by most people: a 
consistent and stable self-image; a sense of self as a competent person; and a sense of self as a morally good 
person. In this paper, we are mainly concerned with people‖s self-image of being competent and reasonable. 
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will more often find themselves in a situation where they obstinately refuse to abandon 
a false belief.82 
A classic illustration of cognitive dissonance can be found in the landmark study by 
Leon Festinger and his colleagues, who infiltrated a doomsday cult and observed the 
behavior of the followers when the prophesized end of the world failed to come true 
(Festinger, Schachter et al. 1964). The followers who had resigned from their jobs, given 
away their material belongings and were present at the arranged place and time with 
full conviction in their imminent salvation, became even more ardent believers after 
the prophecy failed, and started to proselytize even more actively for the cult. However, 
those for whom the cognitive stakes were lower (e.g. those who kept their belongings 
and stayed home in fearful expectation of what was supposedly to come), were more 
likely to abandon their beliefs afterwards.  
Early cognitive dissonance theory required that prophecies be sufficiently specific 
and unequivocal, and that believers themselves acknowledge them to be roundly 
refuted. This aspect of Festinger‖s theory was belied by more recent studies of millennial 
cults (for an overview, see Dawson 1999), which suggest that believers afterwards rarely 
if ever recognize that the prophecy which they issued has not been borne out. Indeed, 
the denial of failure is “the common mode of adaptation of millennial groups” (Melton 
1985, p. 21). Instead of recognizing failure and proceeding to ignore it completely, as 
early cognitive dissonance theory suggested, committed believers explain away 
apparent failure by means of semi-plausible post hoc rationalizations (Dein 2001; Dawson 
1999), consistent with the psychological findings on the illusion of objectivity.  
Cognitive dissonance theory is concerned with the conditions that give rise to 
dissonance and that motivate for dissonance reduction, but as such it does not describe 
the way in which this tension is resolved. In section 11.3.1, we have already shown that 
belief perseverance is typically achieved by ad hoc reasoning and rationalization rather 
than blunt denial, and in the next section, we consider what conditions are conducive to 
this practice.  
                                                     
 
82 The James Randi Educational Foundation offers a $1,000,000 prize to anyone who is able to demonstrate, 
under controlled observing conditions, evidence of paranormal or supernatural powers. Claimants for the 
challenge are always asked to conduct a private experiment on themselves before coming to the official test. 
Interestingly, after being instructed as to how a proper self-test can be performed, many of them are never to 
be heard of again. By contrast, according to Randi‖s experience, those who do turn up for the real test, because 
they failed to conduct such a self-test (or did not do it properly), always make recourse to rationalizations to 
explain away their failure. 
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11.4 The structure of self-validating belief systems  
Cervantes‖ classic novel Don Quixote tells the tale of an elderly gentleman who is 
obsessed with books of chivalry, and has succumbed to the delusion that he is an errant-
knight on an epic mission to restore the golden age of chivalry. Although he is 
confronted with a series of tragic defeats and humiliations, Don Quixote is able to 
persevere in his grand delusion by invoking invisible malicious wizards thwarting his 
every action. But Quixote is not stupid. When the canon, one of the characters in the 
novel, is confronted with the “extraordinary nature of Don Quixote‖s madness”, he 
marvels that “in all his remarks and replies he should show such excellent sense, and 
only lose his stirrups […] when the subject of chivalry was broached” (Cervantes 2008, p. 
644).  
If an ardent believer is confronted with what outsiders perceive as clearly 
disconfirming evidence of his belief system83, he will tend to resist belief revision to the 
extent that he is able to come up with plausible rationalizations and excuses in the face 
of difficulties. As we saw, these rationalizations allow the believer to uphold an “illusion 
of objectivity”, thus reducing the level of cognitive dissonance. If we now raise the 
question as to what non-motivational factors facilitate this ability to rationalize away 
apparent failures, we can take up two different perspectives, one cognitive-
psychological and one epistemological.  
From a psychological point of view, one may ask in what way intelligence is related to 
belief perseverance. Although the received view holds that intelligent people are less 
likely to accept wrong beliefs, we submit that, once intelligent people become highly 
committed to a belief, it will prove more difficult to put them off their balance with 
adverse evidence and criticism. Just as Don Quixote had no difficulties in explaining 
away his failures and in brushing aside counterarguments, skilled reasoners are more 
proficient at inventing and constructing rationalizations in the face of difficulties, and 
they will be more prone to belief perseverance when they experience cognitive 
dissonance. Even worse, intelligent people may be more vulnerable to wrong beliefs in 
the first place. Mercier (in press) has argued that the more people rely on reasoning 
through communication to achieve epistemic improvement, the more they are likely to 
accept a number of wrong beliefs amidst the bulk of true beliefs. According to Mercier, 
this explains why highly intelligent people have the habit of endorsing some quite 
weird beliefs. For example, Michael Shermer has discussed the cases of such scientific 
                                                     
 
83 As we will see, the very notion of “clearly disconfirming evidence” will become problematic once we take 
into account the defense mechanisms and escape clauses inherent in the system.  
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luminaries as the renowned cosmologist Frank Tipler, who has tried to demonstrate the 
dogmas of Christianity with intricate mathematical and physical equations, and Harvard 
psychiatrist John Mack, who is a firm believer in alien abductions. As George Orwell put 
it in a different context: “One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like 
that: no ordinary man could be such a fool” (Orwell 1945). Shermer argues that precisely 
the intellectual skills of these individuals make them highly proficient in defending 
implausible beliefs, and hence prone to perseverance in the face of overwhelming 
adverse evidence: “Smart people believe weird things because they are skilled at 
defending beliefs they arrived at for non-smart reasons” (Shermer 2003, p. 64).  
In addition to this psychological take on the issue, we argue that it is fruitful to 
approach the problem of irrationality and belief perseverance from an epistemological 
perspective as well. What if some systems of beliefs are more resilient in the face of 
adverse evidence and criticism? What if some of them provide more explanatory and 
conceptual resources for believers to draw upon in the face of difficulties? In that case, 
the belief system itself would be conducive to belief perseverance and rationalization on 
the part of individual believers. If we accept this possibility, we can develop a 
straightforward epidemiological model of beliefs (Sperber 1990, 1996; Dawkins 1993; 
Boyer 1994, 1998): over the course of the history of human culture, millions upon 
millions of beliefs have been tried out and entertained by as many different persons, 
and only some of these are remembered, acquired and transmitted. If we accept that 
there is constant cultural and interpersonal variation in the generation and 
transmission of beliefs, it is inevitable that, for a variety of complex reasons, some ideas 
will be more successfully remembered, recalled and propagated. As Pascal Boyer noted: 
“certain features are recurrent because they are more likely to be entertained, acquired, 
and transmitted by human minds” (Boyer 1994, p. ix, 1998). Importantly, as Scott Atran 
suggested, considerations of “cognitive optimality might be at work not only at the level 
of individual beliefs but at the level of belief structures as well” (Atran 2002, p. 101). The 
claim we want to develop, is that one of the constraints that channel beliefs and belief 
structures is the degree of structural resilience they exhibit to adverse evidence and 
critical arguments. We argue that this epistemological consideration partly accounts for 
the puzzling popularity of certain “weird” beliefs systems. Note that our account must 
be distinguished from straightforward selectionist approaches of culture, typically in 
terms of memes or culturgens (Blackmore 2000; Dawkins 1976; Richerson and Boyd 
2005). Following the critiques of Boyer, Atran and Sperber, we think that memetics and 
similar approaches take a too simplistic view of the notion of replication, and they 
largely obscure the shaping role of our cognitive architecture (Sperber 2000; Boyer 
1994). Nevertheless, the seminal work on memes and mind viruses by Dawkins (1976, 
1993) and Dennett (1991, 1996) contains valuable insights into the ways self-validating 
belief structures coalesce and are rendered impervious to criticism and adverse 
evidence.  
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In Chapter 5, we have documented how many “weird” belief systems exhibit certain 
internal, structural features that render them invulnerable to adverse evidence and 
critical arguments. We have termed these “epistemic defense mechanisms” and 
distinguished them from “immunizing strategies”, which are defined as arguments 
brought forward in support of a belief system. In contrast to epistemic defense 
mechanisms, immunizing strategies are independent from the belief system at hand. 
The distinction between two types is not always clear-cut, as immunizing strategies may 
loosely draw on theory-internal resources, or develop into an integral part of the theory 
over time. 
In the following section, we will briefly rehearse the different types of the epistemic 
defense mechanisms explored in Chapter 5, which will suffice to demonstrate that the 
alleged fragility of typical weird belief systems rests on a superficial analysis. 
11.5 Epistemic Defense Mechanisms 
11.5.1 Multiple endpoints and moving targets 
In astrology and in prophetical works such as those of Nostradamus, it is typical to be 
presented with a series of ambiguous statements having what psychologists call 
“multiple endpoints” (Gilovich 1991, pp. 58-59; Hines 2003), as in the parody prediction 
by Woody Allen: “Two nations will go to war, but only one will win”. In fact, typical 
astrological descriptions are amenable both to a specific interpretation and a range of 
broader and more metaphorical ones, e.g. “a father-figure stands behind you”. This 
creates an asymmetry between what will count as hits and misses of the predictions in 
question, allowing the astrologer – or gullible believer – to switch back and forth 
between specific and broad interpretations. In a variation on this theme, a belief system 
consists of statements that are specific and exciting on first inspection, but when 
running into trouble, they are belatedly modified so as to make them trivial or 
uninteresting. The belated re-interpretation of a failed doomsday prediction on a 
spiritual level is a standard example of such a move (for specific examples, see 5.3.1.1). 
More generally still, the indeterminate and mysterious nature of many religious and 
pseudoscientific propositions ensures that they are closed to normal epistemic 
evaluation (Sperber 1990), and that contradictions and adverse evidence will go largely 
unnoticed to the believers (Sperber 1996, pp. 91-92; see also the discussion of "quasi-
propositions" in religion, Atran 2002). 
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11.5.2 Postdiction of invisible causes 
In certain belief systems, invisible causes are postulated to account for a range of 
phenomena, in such a way that their working can only be inferred ex post facto from 
the observed effects. If the causal relations and conditions in the belief system are not 
sufficiently specified, and allow for all sorts of secondary elaborations, believers can get 
entangled in subtle feedback loops between theory and observations, which keep the 
belief system forever outside the reach of empirical refutation (for examples, see 5.3.2). 
This pattern of spurious postdiction is also apparent in the way parapsychologists 
explain away null results and cherry pick data to “determine” where and when psi 
forces were active (Wiseman 2010). Likewise, cults groups often draw upon a range of 
unfalsifiable concepts and events to avert disconfirmation (e.g. Dein 2001).  
11.5.3 Conspiracy thinking  
(a) Conspiracy theorists typically believe, against the received view of a historical 
event, that a group of interested agents have been secretly pulling the strings to bring 
about the event in question, all the while carefully covering up their actions. They argue 
for this view on the basis of “errant data” (Keeley 1999, p. 118), i.e. anomalies, 
unexplained details and inconsistencies in the official story. On the other hand, when 
investigations fail to reveal the conspiracy or even flatly contradict it, believers 
typically turn the evidence on its head, arguing that this is exactly what would be 
predicted by their view. After all, conspirators, being who they are, can be reasonably 
expected to erase all traces of evidence leading to their plot, and to lead the rest of us 
astray with forged evidence (Clarke 2002).  
(b) Furthermore, the conspiratorial pattern of reasoning allows believers to explain 
away the motives for disbelief and criticism within their own belief system, for example 
by accusing the skeptics of being somehow implicated in the conspiracy themselves. In 
this way, criticism of any sort is immediately deflected and transformed into further 
confirmation of the belief system (for examples, see 5.3.3).  
11.5.4 Invisible escape clauses  
In many pseudoscientific belief systems, we are confronted with an imponderable force 
or cause that, when push comes to shove, confounds the expectations initially 
engendered by the theory, and conveniently explains away apparent failure. A host of 
such escape clauses can be found in the field of parapsychology: e.g. the idea that the 
Here be dragons 
202 
presence of inquisitive minds tends to disturb psychical phenomena, which is known as 
“negative psi vibration” or “catapsi” (for a sceptical discussion, see Humphrey 1996; 
Wiseman 2010), or the argument that psi is “actively evasive” because its primary 
function is to “induce a sense of mystery and wonder” (Kennedy 2003, p. 67) (for further 
examples, see 5.3.5). In some cases, we are dealing with an immunizing strategy that is 
independent from the belief system at hand. In other cases (e.g. parapsychology), these 
escape clauses may develop into fully-fledged epistemic defense mechanisms, forming 
an integral part of the theory.  
11.6 Epidemiology of Beliefs 
11.6.1 The development of resilient belief structures 
The central claim developed in this paper is that beliefs that develop into systems which 
are more successful in withstanding empirical failures and in “surviving” the onslaught 
of critical arguments, be it from the inquisitive believers themselves or from skeptical 
outsiders, will be more readily acquired, remembered and selected among their 
competitors.  
Of course, beliefs do not “develop” into self-validating structures all by themselves. 
Beliefs are entertained by individual agents, and they are modified and revised by 
individual agents. Over time, the problems these agents encounter within their system 
of beliefs will inspire solutions in the form of modifications, reinterpretations and 
elaborations. Not all of these changes will be equally successful from a psychological 
point of view, and hence not all of them will tend to survive. We claim that certain 
“successful” configurations of beliefs may be expected to become recurrent in widely 
different domains, despite huge cultural and interpersonal variation.84 Thus, rather than 
turning into full-blown self-validating structures all at once, we maintain that beliefs 
crystallize into such systems after a number of successive modifications and elaborations, 
which result from attempts to resolve inconsistencies and to rescue the belief system 
from apparent refutation.  
                                                     
 
84 This effect of increased epistemic resilience can be relatively small, compared to other cultural and 
cognitive constraints. However, as Liénard and Boyer noted: “In cultural transmission […] very small effects 
aggregated over many cycles of transmission are sufficient to create massive trends” (Lienard and Boyer 2006, 
p. 824). 
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Consider again the case of doomsday cults, which are literally confronted with the 
problem of surviving the day on which prophecy fails. If the day of truth arrives and the 
predicted events are not borne out, the belief system is faced with serious institutional 
crisis (Zygmunt 1970). If, on the other hand, the system is flexible enough to cope with 
eventual failure, by allowing for some convenient escape clauses, excuses or 
reinterpretations, it may withstand the impact of reality (Balch, Domitrovich et al. 
1997). For example, the cult of Jehovah‖s Witnesses has a long history of what outsiders 
perceive as blatant prophetic failures, but the movement does not show any signs of 
disappearing. This is partly because, as Zygmunt‖s study on Jehovah‖s Witnesses makes 
clear, the prophecies of the cult were phrased “in a manner that made them only 
partially open to disconfirmation” (Zygmunt 1970, p. 944). As they allow for enough 
“wiggling room”, the failed prophecies can always be retrospectively related to real 
historical events, and thus be “converted into partial successes” (Zygmunt 1970, pp. 944-
945), strengthening the conviction of the followers and renewing their proselytizing 
efforts. In other words, the belief system of Jehovah‖s Witnesses has made use of the 
defense mechanism of multiple endpoints and deflationary revisions which we 
described above.  
Of course, these reinterpretations do not present themselves spontaneously, but that 
does not mean that they are deliberately constructed by believers with strategic 
purposes in mind (see section 11.7). In the doomsday cult, a plausible post hoc 
rationalization of prophetic failure is typically suggested by the group leader and taken 
up by the other members (Dawson 1999, p. 65). Alternatively, group members may 
entertain different rationalizations and reinterpretations, in the full conviction that the 
prophecy must be true in some sense, and the solutions that emerge as cognitively 
“optimal” are taken up by other believers. In this way the belief system may slowly 
develop an increasing resilience in the face of adverse data. 
Thus, if the believers succeed in constructing elaborations on or carrying out 
reinterpretations of their belief system that make it impervious to empirical failure (to 
which they will often be strongly motivated), the belief system will survive the day on 
which the prophecy fails, and live on in this more resistant form. All other things being 
equal, the weird belief systems that reach a cultural level of dissemination tend to be 
the ones that have stabilized on a form that is immune to the empirical refutation and 
criticism from outsiders. Those that are too fragile wither away and are simply no 
longer there for us to observe.85  
                                                     
 
85 Of course, it is quite possible that the success of such a belief system is compromised by other factors 
offsetting the gain in epistemic resistance. For example, too many elaborations and defense mechanisms may 
render the belief system cumbersome and/or too complicated, hampering recall and transmission to other 
believers. In this way, the very features that account for its epistemic immunity may make the belief system 
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In contrast to doomsday prophecies, most belief system do not hinge on a single 
moment of truth sometime in the (distant) future.86 Most weird belief systems – 
conspiracy theories, homeopathy, magic healing, parapsychology, ufology, etc. – involve 
claims that are supposed to derive support from currently available evidence. 
Essentially, however, the epistemological predicament of these belief systems is no 
different, as they too have to provide for the resources to cope with unwelcome facts 
and with disbelievers. Conspiracy theories, which are equipped with built-in protection 
against empirical failure and hostile criticism from outsiders, have “succeeded” in this 
regard. Their epistemic structure guarantees that believers will always have some way 
of explaining away difficulties. As we noticed above, Don Quixote‖s delusional belief 
system was fundamentally conspiratorial in nature (Farrell 1996). Anything that was in 
apparent conflict with Quixote‖s fantasy world of knights, castles, maidens and dragons, 
was interpreted by him in terms of malicious sorcerers who make things appear 
different than they are. As with any conspiracy thinker, nothing and nobody could 
convince Quixote that the world of chivalrous knights existed only in his imagination.  
In many conspiracy theories that are currently popular on the Internet, apparently 
disconfirming evidence is interpreted as forged evidence and false information spread 
by the conspirators, and detractors are suspected of being part of the conspiracy itself, 
having been bribed by the government, or having merely been misled by the cunning of 
the evil plotters. As in the case of doomsday prophecies, the social dynamic of a group of 
believers may further facilitate this process. If a new piece of evidence turns up that 
seems to be in conflict with the conspiracy hypothesis, or a new argument is voiced by 
critics, different ways of explaining away these difficulties may be tried out, and the 
ones that are most “successful” from a psychological perspective, in virtue of their 
allowing believers to preserve an illusion of objectivity, are taken up by other members 
to become part of the belief system.  
As we saw, the conspiracy template turns up in a variety of different belief systems, 
as it is such a convenient way of dealing with problems. For example, creationists in the 
second half of the 20th century have cultivated the idea that evolutionary theory and all 
the evidence supporting it is nothing less than a satanic ploy to lure the faithful into 
disbelief (Morris 1963). Similarly, UFO believers have proclaimed for over several 
decades that there is a vast government conspiracy to obscure the real evidence for 
extraterrestrial visits to the earth (Hines 2003, pp. 257-298; Park 2002, Ch. 9). In general, 
if a group of people is firmly committed to a system of beliefs, which is then 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
less successful in other respects. As in many biological adaptations (e.g. the peacock‖s tail), it is plausible that, 
in such cases, a trade-off will take place. 
86 And even in the case of Jehovah‖s Witnesses, the prophecy is embedded in a complex network of beliefs and 
practices. 
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increasingly threatened by mounting adverse evidence, the community of (remaining) 
believers will often settle on a form of conspiracy defense. The reader may object that 
this is not what usually happens in disputes between scientists, even though many of 
them are also highly committed to a cherished theory or hypothesis. Be that as it may, 
resistance to change and belief perseverance are certainly not alien to scientific 
disputes, even though science is valued as a self-corrective enterprise that depends on 
the relentless correction and overthrow of old theories. Scientists too can be unduly 
conservative in their beliefs, but typically they resort to more sophisticated ways for 
rescuing a theory from falsification, as witnessed by the repertoire of ad hoc moves we 
explored in Chapter 6 (Boudry in press). Nevertheless, in some heated scientific 
controversies, the losing party does resort to conspiracy theorizing: see for example the 
downfall of cold fusion, the Duesberg hypothesis about the non-infectious nature of 
AIDS, and more recently, the small pockets of continuing scientific resistance to 
theories of anthropogenic climate change (Pigliucci 2010).  
11.6.2 An epistemological or cognitive approach? 
The epidemiological argument outlined in this paper emerges in light of persistent 
cognitive features that conspire to make us vulnerable to self-validating belief systems: (a) 
our proficiency at ad hoc reasoning and rationalization; (b) the motivation to reduce 
cognitive dissonance; (c) the persistence of the confirmation bias; and (d) the 
psychological premium placed on being rational and free from bias.  
Note that an analysis pertaining to the epistemic structure of belief systems accounts 
for only one factor in a more general epidemiological model of culture. In Sperber‖s 
epidemiological model of representations, a host of cognitive, psychological, ecological 
and cultural factors channel the formation and dissemination of beliefs.87 In particular, 
Sperber has focused on the “relevance” (Sperber 1985; Sperber and Wilson 1995) of 
representations to domain-specific cognitive modules. Briefly, according to Sperber, 
representations that are relevant independently of a local context will stand a greater 
chance of cultural success: “independence of an immediate context means that 
relevance will be maintained in spite of changes of local circumstances – that is, it will 
be maintained on a social scale” (Sperber 1996, p. 140).  
                                                     
 
87 In the newly emerging field of Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) (Boyer 1994; Barrett 2000; Boyer 2001; 
Atran 2002; Barrett 2004; for a recent overview, see Barrett 2007), researchers have brought these insights 
from cognitive psychology to bear on the study of religion: “much of what is typically called religion may be 
understood as the natural product of aggregated ordinary cognitive processes” (Barrett 2000, p. 29).  
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By way of illustrating how these relevance considerations apply likewise to the belief 
systems discussed here, consider again the case of conspiracy theories. Our 
susceptibility to evil conspiracy theories is not only a result of their self-validating 
epistemic structure, but is arguably also a function of at least two specific cognitive 
modules: a mechanism for agency detection (Guthrie 1993; Barrett 2000; Atran 2002; 
Barrett 2004) that is biased towards over-attribution of agency in our environment88, 
and a “hazard-precaution system” (Lienard and Boyer 2006) geared towards detecting 
danger and acting in dangerous situation.89 Seeing that conspiracies involve the secret 
and potentially threatening actions of hidden agents, we realize why they tend to 
activate the cognitive processes mentioned above, and hence why they never fail to 
command our attention. In the words of Liénard and Boyer, cognitive modules such as 
these are liable to “cognitive capture” (Lienard and Boyer 2006, p. 821) by specific 
representations that meet their input conditions. Our epistemological analysis further 
contributes to an understanding of how evil conspiracies of all stripes – cover-ups by 
the government, secret plans of the Illuminati or the Elders of Zion, etc. – often reach a 
level of wide cultural dissemination and why they are so resistant to adverse evidence.  
Although our epistemological argument is informed by research on motivated 
reasoning and cognitive dissonance, we view it as a level of explanation in its own right, 
which allows for the identification of patterns and trends that are not visible from the 
lower level of cognition. Our susceptibility to self-validating belief systems becomes 
only transparent when we connect different cognitive and psychological findings and 
pursue an epistemological approach to the problem.  
11.7 Questions of Sincerity  
Epistemic defense mechanisms and immunizing strategies may appear convenient for the 
believer who is motivated to cling to his beliefs, but in fact to think in strategic and 
intentional terms may be misleading here. If our analysis of the epistemic rationale of 
                                                     
 
88 According to cognitive and evolutionary psychologists, the hypersensitivity of these cognitive mechanisms 
makes good evolutionary sense: traces in the grass or a rustle of leaves may signal the presence of enemies, 
sickness may be the result of poisoning by a rival, etc. The cost incurred by a false negative (failing to detect 
agents) is significantly greater than the cost of a false positive (detecting agency where there is none).  
89 Another example, which we have already mentioned, is our inclination towards superstitious beliefs, which 
may be partly explained by our cognitive proficiency at pattern detection and our difficulties with evaluating 
random coincidences (Gilovich 1991). 
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self-validating belief systems is accurate, this appearance of strategic “convenience” 
may well be the outcome of cultural-selection processes rather than straightforward 
and conscious deliberation. In this respect, it is interesting to have a brief look at the 
suspicions which skeptics of pseudoscience have often voiced regarding the sincerity of 
believers. We rehearse two often-heard arguments to that effect and proceed to show 
why they are largely misguided (or at least inconclusive). 
11.7.1 Avoiding tricky situations 
Many pseudoscientists seem to carefully avoid situations that would put them at a risk 
of empirical refutation. For example, mediums and clairvoyants have all sorts of excuses 
for refusing to participate in the type of controlled test that is bound to expose their 
lack of powers all too clearly (Hines 2003). As we noted, believers consider proper 
scientific investigation of the paranormal inappropriate or impossible, arguing that the 
phenomena in question are, in the words of a skeptic, “unpredictable, unrepeatable, 
shy, highly context-dependent, droll, evanescent, dreamlike” (Humphrey 1996, p. 73). 
Likewise, not only do successful astrologers and soothsayers avoid making claims that 
are too vulnerable to refutation, but they are particularly reluctant to do so when 
questioned by skeptics. Some pseudoscientists even expressly warn against giving 
demonstrations in the vicinity of inquisitive minds. As in the words of one of Franz 
Anton Mesmer‖s followers: “Never magnetize before inquisitive persons!” (quoted in 
Mackay 1974 [1841], p. 290). For many skeptics, this suspiciously evasive behavior on the 
part of believers is a telltale sign of insincerity.  
11.7.2 When push comes to shove ... 
Many people proclaim to believe in supernatural or paranormal causation, all the while 
relying on more mundane courses of action when push comes to shove. For example, as 
Nicholas Humphrey noted, many people profess to believe in telepathy, but “when they 
themselves want to communicate to a distant friend, they play safe and write or call 
them” (Humphrey 1996, p. 55). Interestingly, anthropologists have noted that, in many 
cultures where supernatural spells and magic are used for achieving a certain material 
goal (rainfall, a good harvest, victory in a battle), people always make sure to rely on 
more down-to-earth methods as well, which suggests that they are not all too confident 
in supernatural causation as they claim to be. In a paper discussing magic and religion, 
anthropologist Eli Sagan noted: 
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A people going to war may sing over their spears in order to make them more 
effective. If there ever have been people who felt they could defeat an enemy in 
war merely by singing and who therefore dispensed with spears we have not 
heard of them. (Sagan 1979, p. 93) 
Similarly, many believers suddenly lose their professed faith in the paranormal and 
supernatural when their own lives are at stake. For example, when the chakra healer 
himself falls seriously ill, he will make sure to consult a regular doctor. In other cases, 
supernatural faith suddenly becomes somewhat half-hearted. For example, when Pope 
John Paul II was shot and critically wounded in an assassination attempt in 1981, he 
asked the surgeons not to remove his Brown Scapular during the operation, stating that 
Our Lady of Fátima would help him recover. But why did the Pope rely on scientific 
medicine and surgery in the first place, instead of putting faith in supernatural help? On 
the basis of similar examples, Humphrey and other skeptics have suggested “that most 
people know only too well how things stand” (Humphrey 1996, p. 56). 
11.7.3 No Need for Deliberation 
Against the two arguments presented in section 11.7, we submit that believers‖ 
suspicious behavior may well result from more subtle mechanisms of self-deception and 
rationalization (von Hippel and Trivers in press). We briefly show how the 
epidemiological argument presented here supports that conclusion. As for the first 
argument, it is instructive to imagine the fate of a psychic who is not so careful to avoid 
tricky situations or who is not equipped with a bag of excuses for doing so. For example, 
an astrologer who is confident enough to make very risky predictions is bound to have a 
hard time explaining his failure after the fact. A self-proclaimed psychic who recklessly 
accepts the invitation for a scientific experiment, unprepared for refutation, will sorely 
disappoint himself, not to mention the followers who witness the failure.90 By contrast, 
psychic healers and mediums who happen to come across an argument that suggests to 
them that scientific investigation of psi is impossible or inappropriate, will be less likely 
to be confronted with cases of blatant failure. Those who have learnt and cultivated 
successful excuses for shying away from tricky tests are precisely those who are still in 
the game to defend their beliefs and to convince others. 
Of course, this sketchy explanation leaves open many unanswered psychological 
questions. Further discussion may bear on how selectionist explanations translate on 
                                                     
 
90 Interestingly, the skeptical literature does contain a few cases of psychics who made a “reckless” claim, 
agreed to be put to the test, and afterwards did accept the negative verdict, or at least started to doubt their 
powers. 
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the psychological level, and how they relate to issues of intentionality. If an agent starts 
to rationalize away adverse evidence for her beliefs, either through arguments of her 
own or through ones that she has picked up elsewhere, does this not suggest a certain 
level of awareness on her part? It seems that, at least, the agent has come to realize that 
a certain situation may prove threatening to her belief. Moreover, in section 11.3.1 we 
suggested that agents consciously scrutinize conflicting evidence in search for reasons to 
dismiss it. Still, we think this is not incompatible with an agent sincerely holding a 
weird belief: precisely the agent‖s solid conviction of being right arguably motivates her 
search for flaws in unwelcome evidence (“something must be wrong with this data”). In 
any case, a thorough discussion of intentionality, self-deception and motivated 
reasoning falls outside the scope of this paper (see for example Mele 1994; von Hippel 
and Trivers in press). 
In relation to the second argument, we can apply a similar reasoning. In Chapter 12, 
we will see that people who expect the sort of supernatural or paranormal causation 
that would make more mundane courses of action to the same effect superfluous, are 
bound to be disappointed by the results. The person who asks a friend for dinner by 
telepathic means alone will surely be spending a lonely night. In general, those who 
expect tangible results from psi powers will be forced either to abandon their belief in 
psi, or to correct – by way of rationalization – their expectations on the causal power of 
psi in a way that does not make ordinary modes of action superfluous.  
As for the cases of faltering faith when life is at stake, an even more obvious selection 
process is at work. For example, it is not difficult to imagine what will happen to a 
people who relies wholeheartedly on magical spellbinding and dispensed with 
weaponry. As Sagan (1979, p. 93) dryly noted, they will probably be “all dispatched in 
the midst of their spellbinding”. Indeed, there are many documented cases of people 
who go to battle virtually unarmed because they believe they enjoy supernatural 
protection. Similarly, up until this day many religious people who are inflicted by a 
lethal disease relinquish any form of medical treatment, convinced as they are that faith 
alone – or “alternative” therapy – can save them (e.g. Peters 2008; Edgerton 1992). If 
anything, the anthropological evidence suggests that people are perfectly capable of 
sincere conviction in highly dangerous beliefs. In any case, to return to our present 
argument, even when self-proclaimed supernaturalists pursue more mundane courses 
of action as soon as life is at stake, this does not necessarily mean that their beliefs are 
insincere. Again, the apparent design may be “authorless”, resulting from a process of 
cultural selection. 
In summary, we cannot take the “convenience” of believers‖ suspicious and evasive 
behavior at face value, i.e. as a token of strategic deliberation. Rather than being the 
result of conscious deliberation on the part of individual believers, epistemic defense 
mechanisms and evasive behavior in general may exhibit what Daniel Dennett has 
termed a “free-floating” rationale (Dennett 1996, p. 78, see also pp. 164-165).  
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Note that our epidemiological argument does not deny the existence of conscious 
deliberation to the same effect. Even if the question of sincerity may often be difficult to 
resolve, it is obvious that there are a lot of conscious impostors among pseudoscientists 
and paranormal mediums (Wiseman 1997, p. 12), and that religious leaders need not 
always be sincere in their beliefs (Dennett and LaScola 2010). For example, mediums 
such as Uri Geller and faith healers like Peter Popoff have been caught cheating several 
times during performances. Thus, the decision to protect one‖s self-proclaimed 
paranormal powers from exposure can be perfectly deliberate. However, as Dennett 
notes: 
A tactic that works can be used deliberately and viciously, but it can also work – 
sometimes better – in the hands of an innocent enthusiast who would never 
dream of doing anything duplicitous. (Dennett 2006, p. 365) 
Consider magician Robert-Houdin‖s advice to performers “never [to] announce 
beforehand the nature of the effect which you intend to produce” (quoted in Wiseman 
1997, p. 42). In case something goes wrong, this golden rule allows the magician to finish 
the trick in another way, without having failed in the eyes of the public. But the same 
rationale can work without intentional action, for example in the hands of a psychic 
who has “learnt” not to announce the psi effects he intends to produce.  
11.8 Conclusion  
In this paper, we challenged the common assumption that pseudosciences and other 
forms of weird belief systems are inherently fragile. Instead, they exhibit a surprising 
degree of resilience in the face of apparently adverse evidence and criticism from 
outsiders. Based on a number of findings in cognitive psychology, we argued that this 
invulnerability of belief systems may in part explain their unabated popularity. All 
other things being equal, belief systems that allow the believer to remain outside the 
reach of refutations, or that provide some convenient ways of coping with difficulties, 
will be more likely to be selected among competing beliefs and belief systems, and more 
likely to be disseminated. In this way, our argument is intended as a contribution to the 
general question about human culture set forth by, among others, Dan Sperber: “[W]hy 
are some representations more successful in a human population, more “catching” than 
others?” (Sperber 1996, p. 58). We also noted that the use of epistemic defense 
mechanisms and immunizing strategies, together with the generally evasive behavior of 
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pseudoscientists, often strike the outsider as suspiciously convenient. However, rather 
than being the outcome of conscious deliberation on the part of believers, this strategic 
convenience may well be authorless – resulting from mechanisms of cultural selection. 
Our susceptibility to self-validating belief systems is a function of several aspects of 
the way our human “belief engine” works: its inclination towards confirmation bias, its 
proficiency at rationalization and ad hoc reasoning, its valuation of an appearance of 
objectivity, and its motivation for cognitive dissonance reduction. If we view these 
insights from cognitive psychology in an epistemological light, and if we insert them in 
an epidemiological model of beliefs, then the enduring popularity of self-validating belief 
systems and the recurrence of defense mechanisms and immunizing strategies is hardly 
surprising.  
  213 
Chapter 12.  
In Mysterious Ways: On the Modus Operandi of 
Supernatural Beings 
God moves in a mysterious way  
his wonders to perform 
(William Cowper) 
 
‘And don’t tell me God works in mysterious ways’ 
Yossarian continued, hurtling on over her objection. 
‘There’s nothing so mysterious about it. He’s not working 
at all. He’s playing. Or else He’s forgotten all about us. 
That’s the kind of God you people talk about – country 
bumpkin, a clumsy, bungling, brainless, conceited, 
uncouth hayseed. ‘ – Joseph Heller, Catch22 (1994 [1962], 
p. 206) 
 




Abstract.91 The psychology of prayer and supernatural causation has received 
surprisingly little attention from empirical researchers. This paper discusses implicit 
belief patterns about the modus operandi of gods and other supernatural agents. We 
review the available empirical literature on petitionary prayer and modes of 
supernatural causation. Building further on the concept of theological incorrectness, 
                                                     
 
91 This paper is currently under review at the journal Religion. 
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which has emerged in the burgeoning field of cognitive science of religion, we propose 
that religious believers “prefer” modes of divine action that are subtle and 
indistinguishable from the natural course of events. This psychological account is based 
on mechanisms of psychological self-correction and rationalization, confirmation bias, 
and intuitive folk physics. We proceed to extend our argument into an epidemiology of 
religious representations concerning supernatural causation, taking into account the 
different cognitive and external constraints channeling the dissemination of religious 
beliefs. 
12.1 Introduction 
Petitionary prayer is one of the most widespread expressions of religious behavior, but 
surprisingly little is known with regard to its psychology.92 Religious believers all over 
the world have attempted to engage in interactions with gods, spirits, witches, dead 
ancestors and other supernatural beings (Zaleski and Zaleski 2005), asking them to 
intervene on their behalf and bring safety, good fortune (or bad fortune for others), cure 
from illness, and many other goods. The psychological dimension of this interaction 
with supernatural beings is a relatively unexplored domain. According to believers, how 
does God go about answering prayers? Under which circumstances may one expect 
supernatural beings to intervene in the natural world? In the book of Mark, we read that 
“What things soever you desire, when you pray, believe that you receive them, and you 
shall have them” (Mark 11:24). However, even the devout will admit that these are 
rather high hopes, and often the book of Psalms is more on the mark: “Why do you 
stand afar off, O Lord? Why do you hide yourself in times of trouble?” (Psalm 10:1) In the 
Christian tradition, the problem of God‖s silence in times of trouble has been pondered 
by countless theologians and ordinary believers, and as with the classical problem of 
theodicy, many ingenious rationalizations have been put forward (e.g. Murray 1993; 
Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002; Swinburne 2004; but see Schellenberg 2006).  
In this paper we discuss a related but equally pertinent question: what explicit or 
implicit beliefs do people hold about the nature and mechanism of supernatural 
intervention in the natural world? How does God bring about things in the natural 
                                                     
 
92 Naturally, praying practices are complex and can take a diversity of forms (Zaleski and Zaleski 2005). In this 
paper, however, we confine ourselves to petitionary prayer and similar practices in other religious tradition. 
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world, of which, presumably, he is not part (for a philosophical account, see Fales 2010) 
By what means does he fulfill the needs of the person soliciting help? In other words, 
what is the psychology of the modus operandi of supernatural beings? We develop an 
epidemiology of religious representations concerning petitionary prayer and 
supernatural causation, on the basis of the concept of theological correctness and 
cognitive constraints on the formations and dissemination of religious beliefs. As a point 
of departure, we discuss a series of original experiments on the psychology of prayer 
conducted by Justin L. Barrett, an anthropologist and leading figure in the cognitive 
science of religion (Barrett 2001). 
12.2 Theological correctness 
In the newly emerged field of Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) (for a recent overview, 
see Barrett 2007; Barrett and Lanman 2008), researchers have brought findings from 
cognitive and developmental psychology to bear on the explanation of religious ideas 
and practices. CSR researchers argue that the formation and dissemination of religious 
representations is channeled by a number of domain-specific cognitive systems that are 
stable across different cultures and are noticeable in early childhood (e.g. Spelke and 
Kinzler 2007). This basic cognitive architecture makes us predisposed towards believing 
in supernatural entities such as invisible ancestors, immaterial spirits, animals that can 
change shape, ghosts, holy mountains, etc. In a review article of the field, Barrett takes 
as the main tenet of CSR the thesis that “much of what is typically called religion may be 
understood as the natural product of aggregated ordinary cognitive processes” (Barrett 
2000, p. 29).93  
One interesting concept emerging from this cognitive take on religion is that of 
theological correctness (Barrett and Keil 1996; Barrett 1999; Slone 2004), which refers to 
the discrepancy often observed between the official theology of a religion and the actual 
beliefs and practices of believers. Barrett observed that orthodox theology typically 
                                                     
 
93 Although we have framed our discussion in terms of religion, it need not be confined to traditional religious 
categories. In some cases, the practice of directing requests to supernatural entities may be better classified as 
instances of ―magic‖ or ―superstition‖ rather than (institutionalized) religion (see below). This need not be 
problematic, as one of the tenets of CSR‖s naturalistic approach is precisely a dissolution of sharp boundaries 
between such categories as religion, superstition, magic and pseudoscience. By explaining religious beliefs and 
practices as predictable by-products of our basic cognitive architecture, the CSR approach automatically 
brings religion closer to other expressions of human nature.  
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dictates properties of supernatural beings that are highly counterintuitive and that 
strain our cognitive resources, e.g. omnipotence, omniscience, eternal existence. When 
questioned about their opinions and given some time to reflect, people profess to accept 
official theology, but when they are engaged in “online” tasks, applying religious 
concepts in practice, they make tacit assumptions that violate official theology. Instead, 
believers tend to fall back on more intuitive and anthropomorphic versions of 
supernatural beings. Boyer (2001, p. 285) has termed this the “tragedy of the 
theologian”.  
For example, while Christian doctrine demands that God can attend any number of 
events at the same time, people are caught reasoning as if God answers one prayer and 
then shifts his attention to the next. To take another example, Jason Slone (2004) has 
argued that the Calvinist doctrine of predetermination is “maximally counterintuitive”, 
because it leaves no room at all for human free will, and hence has over time yielded to 
a conception of God that is more consonant with our intuitions.  
The practice of prayer faces a number of other theological paradoxes that are shared 
by all religious traditions entertaining the notion of supernatural omniscience (Johnson 
2005; Bering and Johnson 2005), in particular the three great monotheistic religions. 
First, praying to an all-knowing being such as God appears rather pointless, because God 
is supposed to be aware of my problems in any case. Second, if we make the additional 
assumption that God is morally perfect, and assuming that I request something morally 
good, God would have already done what I demand from Him anyway. But then in what 
sense can praying have any effect (Stump 1979)? If people would consistently pay heed 
to these theological doctrines, they would not be engaged in petitionary prayer. 
Nevertheless, religious believers who assent to this official theology cannot help but 
inform God about their problems, just as they would do with ordinary social actors who 
have no full epistemic access to their inner mental life. According to Barrett,  
[t]he simplification of concepts from the theological to the religious level appears 
to consist of a systematic distortion of features such that they more closely 
resemble intuitive ontological assumptions […]. (Barrett 2000, p. 30) 
In this paper, we focus on another form of cognitive tension that arises from traditional 
theology with respect to prayer. If God is an all-powerful Being, prima facie He may 
perform actions in any way He chooses.94 Religious believers are generally not 
                                                     
 
94 Of course, God cannot perform any actions that either involve logical contradictions (creating a round 
triangle), violate his other attributes (committing a sin, since He is morally perfect), or are self-defeating 
(creating a stone that He cannot lift). Further limitations may apply, but they are not relevant to our purposes, 
as people rarely pray for divine actions that involve such outright contradictions. In this context, we merely 
want to argue that there is no intuitive reason to expect an omnipotent (or very powerful) being to perform 
only certain types of action as opposed to others. 
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instructed regarding the mode of operation of the divine being to which they direct 
their requests. A similar problem applies to any supernatural being who is conceived as 
very powerful and capable of action in the natural world. As the theory of theological 
correctness suggests, however, the praying habits of ordinary believers need not reflect 
the theological doctrine of omnipotence.  
12.3 Modes of supernatural causation 
12.3.1 Ranges of action 
In an interesting paper on petitionary prayer among North American Protestants, 
Barrett (2001) applies the theory of theological correctness to divine omnipotence in 
Christianity. As far as Christian theology is concerned, he argues, God may act either 
mechanically (materializing or removing physical objects, influencing physical 
processes), biologically (affecting the health of living beings, e.g. healing a person or 
striking him with disease), or psychosocially (influencing psychological states, e.g. 
relieving my pain, giving me the strength to face an ordeal, make someone fall in love 
with me, etc.). Barrett predicts that the silence of orthodox theology with respect to 
God‖s preferred modus operandi leaves a “theological vacuum” (Barrett 2001, p. 268) that 
is filled by ordinary intuitions about what one may reasonably expect from social 
agents. Past research has established that believers intuitively conceive of God as being 
located in some distant place (viz. Heaven), even if their official theology dictates 
otherwise. Furthermore, believers know from experience that normal social actors are 
bad at mechanical “action at a distance”, whereas they are good at “affecting 
psychological states [...] at a distance” (Barrett 2001, p. 260). Because religious believers 
imagine God as a “human-like agent far away”, they think He can be expected to act 
psychosocially rather than mechanically, thus ignoring the doctrine of divine 
omnipotence in practice. Indeed, in a series of experiments with Protestant subjects, 
Barrett found a praying preference among his subjects for psychosocial instead of 
mechanical or biological acts. Subjects were presented with a number of fictitious 
scenarios describing a troublesome predicament in which divine help would be 
welcome. For every scenario, they were presented with a mechanistic, a psychological, 
and a biological solution, and asked to rate how likely they would pray for that 
particular solution. Barrett found that subjects preferred the psychological (M = 5.77) 
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solution over either the biological (M = 4.93) or mechanistic one (M = 4.23), with a 
significance level of 0,001.  
Barrett correctly points out that psychosocial action is less constrained in the sense 
that it does not require physical contact, and that the intuitions of even young infants 
are sensitive to this fact (Woodward, Phillips et al. 1993; Spelke, Phillips et al. 1995). 
However, psychosocial action reaches its own limits at distances not far beyond those of 
mechanical action. Leaving aside modern telecommunication technology, psychosocial 
action by way of speech and body language is limited to a few (tens of) meters. 
Admittedly, some methods exist for extending the radius of psychosocial action – 
waiving from a distance, sending a courier, emitting smoke signals – but these are 
limited in speed and efficiency. In any case, similar extensions are available for physical 
and biological action as well, e.g. throwing a missile, sending a drug or poison. At small 
and medium distances, psychosocial action is very efficient indeed, but beyond that 
point it soon reaches limits comparable to those of mechanical action (which, of course, 
is related to the fact that psychosocial action is really a special case of mechanical 
action). In other words, at great distance, where God presumably resides, a normal 
social actor would not be any more efficient in effecting psychosocial action than 
mechanical action. On the other hand, we already possess indirect evidence that people 
can conceive of psychosocial action at a large distance. After all, prayer typically 
consists of a silent mental act directed at God. If people believe that God listens to their 
prayers, then they believe that God can be reached by purely psychosocial means. 
Maybe people just expect that God will return psychosocial requests with psychosocial 
actions?  
The questions remains if, as Barrett supposes, mechanical action at a large distance 
strains our causal intuitions more than psychosocial action does, and is therefore 
intuitively less preferable. Although theoretically plausible, we think this hypothesis 
sits uncomfortably with the available empirical data on religious prayer practice and 
belief in supernatural causation. As for Christianity, one of the most common reasons 
for prayer are health issues (Schmied 2007; ap Siôn 2009), and Christian believers all 
over the world are firmly convinced that God can answer prayer by effecting a 
miraculous healing – a belief that has often met with dire consequences (Peters 2008).95 
According to a 2004 survey by the National Center for Health Statistics, 43 percent of the 
American adult population had prayed for their own health in the previous year 
                                                     
 
95 It might be argued that people think of disease as a psychosocial affliction, e.g. possession by an evil spirit. 
Although this may apply in particular cases, it certainly does not work as a general solution. Nowadays, in 
contrast with pre-scientific times, religious believers are often well aware of the biological nature of their 
illness (e.g. tumor, infection), but that does not stop them from praying to God and attributing their healing to 
supernatural intervention. In any case, the psychologization of supernatural causation does not work at all in 
the examples of straightforward physical causation which we will discuss next. 
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(Barnes, Powell-Griner et al. 2004). As is well known, the official procedure for 
beatification in the Roman Catholic Church requires a miraculous healing “from beyond 
the grave”.96 The reliability of such miracle reports has stirred controversy for over a 
long time (Hume 2000 [1748]; Peters 2008; Dawkins 2006), and ever since Francis Galton 
sparked the great prayer-gauge debate at the end of the 19th century (Galton 1872; 
Zaleski and Zaleski 2005; Mullin 2008; Park 2008), the alleged therapeutic effects of 
petitionary prayer have received attention from medical researchers (for a recent 
example, see Benson, Dusek et al. 2006), and even the effect of prayer on plant growth 
has been investigated (for an overview, see Francis and Evans 1995).  
Belief in supernatural causation of a biological and mechanical sort is a recurrent 
feature of religions across the world, as is the practice of appeasing, petitioning and 
asking favors from supernatural beings (Zaleski and Zaleski 2005). In his worldwide 
survey of 186 different cultures, Murdock (1980) reports that, in every single one of 
them, illness and misfortune are attributed to the actions of supernatural beings 
(Johnson 2005). Typical requests for non-psychosocial action include praying – or 
performing rituals – for rainfall or good harvest, for averting natural disasters, for 
protection on a battlefield, for pregnancy, etc.  
This solid tradition of mechanical and biological interventions is also reflected in 
virtually all religious scriptures, where supernatural beings are portrayed as capable of 
performing all kinds of non-psychological miraculous feats (next to psychosocial ones). 
Many examples from the Old and New Testament are well-known: God parting the Red 
Sea, tearing down the walls of Jericho, appearing in a burning bush, healing king 
Hezekiah and the prophetess Miriam, and of course, impregnating a virgin and 
physically coming down to earth as Jesus Christ. If people view God as someone from 
whom they may intuitively expect psychosocial action, why are accounts of non-
psychosocial forms of divine intervention so pervasive? 
12.3.2 The causal closure thesis 
In view of the pervasiveness of belief in both mechanical and biological actions, one may 
wonder whether people have any intuitive difficulties with imagining such modes of 
divine causation, as opposed to psychosocial action. Research suggests that believers do 
not show any particular interest in the causal mechanisms by which supernatural 
beings effect changes in our world, and instead like to focus on the motivations and 
                                                     
 
96 The alleged miraculous healing from beyond the grave (by the candidate saint) has to be investigated by the 
Consulta Medica, a board of physicians appointed by the Vatican, to determine whether the recovery was 
sudden and permanent, and to rule out scientific explanations for the healing. 
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intentions of these entities (Boyer and Bergstrom 2008, p. 121). We propose that it is 
instructive to approach this problem by considering the laws of the natural 
environment in which religious believers go about performing their prayers and doing 
their business. Researchers in the theological correctness framework have correctly 
outlined the ways in which ordinary cognition makes people stray from official 
theological doctrines, but they have paid relatively little attention to the way the world 
out there can effect similar constraints. In his book on theological (in)correctness, D. 
Jason Slone even writes that CSR researchers should not be much concerned with 
whether religious representation “refer to external realities”: 
The content-claims of religions are peripheral to the actual object of study in the 
cognitive science of religion. [...] Whether or not gods exist makes little or no 
difference at all to the study of brain mechanisms that are involved in the 
production of religious thought and the performance of religious actions. (Slone 
2004, p. 47) 
Slone is right that external reality does not affect the innate brain mechanisms 
responsible for religious beliefs (although of course it does so indirectly via the working 
of natural selection), but we think it is self-evident that external reality must in some 
way influence the specific representations that these cognitive mechanisms give rise to. 
If we want to develop a realistic epidemiological model of religious representations 
(Sperber 1996), we have to take into account both our cognitive architecture and the 
external stimuli on the basis of which our cognitive apparatus is operating.  
In the case of petitionary prayer, our epidemiology of representations must be 
informed by the relevant scientific knowledge on supernatural causation: (i) there is no 
credible evidence for the efficacy of petitionary prayer or other forms of supernatural 
intervention in the natural world (mechanistic, psychological or otherwise), and the 
most extensive and careful studies of petitionary prayer have yielded negative results 
(Benson, Dusek et al. 2006, pp. 378-381; Park 2008; Hines 2003; Matthews, Conti et al. 
2000), (ii) in light of foundational scientific principles such as the law of energy 
conservation (Fales 2010), interference of supernatural agents in the natural world is 
highly improbable and comes at a steep cost (viz. revising the whole framework of 
physics, see section 1.4.2).  
If we lived in a world in which prayer would regularly be answered (or some prayers, 
maybe only those of some religious creeds), this would clearly make a difference on the 
formation and dissemination of prayer practices and beliefs. For example, if the prayers 
of a certain religious creed were to work reliably for curing disease, we could imagine 
the news to spread like wildfire, and surely that religion would rapidly win new 
converts. For the sake of the argument, therefore, let us take for granted the causal 
closure thesis of nature, which holds that no physical event can have a non-physical 
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cause. In that case, soliciting the help of supernatural beings for bringing about natural 
effects anywhere in this world can never be efficacious.  
To see how this state of affairs is bound to affect the pattern of prayer beliefs and 
practices, consider the following scenario.97 Suppose I am cast up on a desert island with 
no food, no drinking water and no prospect for help. I know that ships are passing by 
occasionally, but I have no idea when the next ship is due. What if I direct a prayer to 
God and ask Him to materialize food and water before my eyes? If the causal closure 
thesis is correct, reality will soon catch up with me and I am bound to be disappointed. 
By contrast, if I pray to God to grant me strength to endure my ordeal until the next 
ship arrives, my predicament is a little different. If indeed I manage to survive until the 
next ship comes by, I might be tempted to attribute my rescue to God. We propose that 
people prefer the latter form of prayer not because of the psychosocial nature of the 
request, but rather because the effects asked for are indistinguishable from the natural 
course of events. Note that the two characterizations need not concur. If I pray for 
rainfall (for drinking water) or for a ship to come by, I am clearly requesting physical 
acts from God, but this time of a far more subtle sort than in the case of food 
materialization. A ship might have been on its course to my island in any case, and 
maybe clouds were already packing together. In these cases, no less than in the 
psychosocial example, it is impossible to distinguish divine action from the contingent 
and natural unfolding of events. Has God really intervened on my behalf, for example by 
subtly steering the boat‖s course, or influencing ocean currents, or manipulating the 
captain into taking a different route? There is no way to ascertain this, as there is no 
way to know for sure whether I would have survived a few days of starvation in any 
                                                     
 
97 The scenario is similar to one that has been used in Barrett‖s experiment (Barrett 2001, p. 261). 




Figure 6 After drinking a fake magic potion brewed by Getafix, Centurion Crismus Bonus 
believes he possesses superhuman strength, but he is soon forced to lower his expectations 
(from Asterix the Gaul by Goscinny & Uderzo).  
12.3.3 Subtle divine action 
In the conclusion of his prayer study, Barrett suggests that, in addition to psychological 
causation, people may also prefer modes of divine action that are “ambiguous”, which 
aligns well with our proposal. However, Barrett contrasts this with forms of 
“mechanistic causation”, whereas we think that mechanistic causation can be effected 
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in subtle ways as well. We can distinguish at least three kinds of settings in which 
(alleged) supernatural causality is rendered subtle and unascertainable.  
(1) supernatural agents may interfere with or manipulate complex, stochastic processes in 
which causal relations are difficult to assess, e.g. weather phenomena, natural disasters, 
luck on a battlefield, success in chance and sport games. 
(2) they may influence natural processes that are either invisible or difficult to observe 
directly, and whose causal determinants are poorly understood, e.g. being cured from or 
stricken with disease, becoming pregnant. 
(3) they may act as partial causes in conjunction with natural causes (Lupfer, Tolliver et al. 
1996, pp. 388-389), in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle the respective 
contributions, e.g. giving me the strength to win in a duel, helping me finish an exam, 
supporting a bridge that is on the brink of collapse.  
In all these cases, we have no full epistemic access to the causal relations and causal 
antecedents responsible for the effect, which allows our minds to (partly) attribute the 
event to supernatural agency. To put it in another way, explanation in terms of 
supernatural causation are parasitic upon events whose causal nexus is at least partly 
mysterious, i.e. not (fully) open to epistemic access. Note that, although the 
supernatural mode of action may be subtle and unascertainable, the alleged effect 
attributed to supernatural intervention need not be. After all, being cured from a lethal 
disease or surviving on a battlefield are quite tangible results. 
When pope John Paul II was shot and severely wounded in an assassination attempt 
in 1981, he believed that the “motherly hand” of Our Lady of Fátima “guided the bullet‖s 
path”, enabling the pope to stop “at the threshold of death” (Stanley 2000). Any form of 
robust physical or biological intervention would have sufficed to protect the pope, but 
Catholics believe that the Virgin Mary interfered in this particular, subtle way: not by 
preventing the gunman to shoot in the first place, or by directing the bullet away from 
the pope‖s body altogether, but by steering its course ever so slightly so that the Pope, 
though severely hurt, just managed to survive the assassination attempt.  
Similarly, people have no difficulties with praying for biological interventions per se, 
such as cure from arthritis or cancer, but they are unlikely to pray for an amputated 
limb to grow back. Likewise, praying for rainfall to ensure good harvest seems an 
acceptable praying habit, but asking God to materialize full-grown crops before your 
very eyes seems a little unusual, even if God is omnipotent. The point is summoned well 
in “Le Jardin d'Épicure” by Anatole France (1894), in which the French poet visits 
Lourdes with a companion who, upon seeing all the braces and crutches hanging there 
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as evidence of healing, remarks: “A single wooden leg would have been quite more 
convincing!”98 
By its very nature, psychosocial causation (e.g. possessing courage or mental 
strength, being relieved from anger or depression, etc.) is typically more complex and 
less observable compared with many forms of biological and physical causation. For that 
reason, it is plausible that the ―preference‖ for subtle modes of causation often translates 
into requests for psychosocial causation, as Barrett‖s research suggests. However, 
whereas Barrett‖s (2000) account entails that forms of biological and physical causation 
are counterintuitive in general and hence less preferred, our hypothesis predicts that 
people have no cognitive difficulty in conceiving such acts and hence are not hesitant to 
request them, provided that their mode of causality takes on subtle and unascertainable 
forms. Note that, while we argue that people regularly pray for supernatural 
interventions that de facto involve physical and biological causation, we do not claim 
that people bother to cognitively represent the precise modus operandi, either when 
making their requests (through prayer or ritual) or when attributing some subsequent 
event to a supernatural actor answering their prayer. As Boyer and Bergstrom wrote, 
people are less interested in the precise causal mechanisms of supernatural 
intervention than they are in its effects and in the agents responsible for them.  
People assume that the ancestors or gods are involved in various occurrences (bad 
crops, illness, death, etc.) but generally do not bother to represent in what way 
they bring about those states of affairs. (Boyer and Bergstrom 2008, p. 121) 
In superstition and magic in particular, we find that people are capable of belief in the 
causal powers of certain objects and events without bothering to represent the specific 
causal mechanisms involved (see for example Evans-Pritchard 1965, pp. 82-83). To give a 
few examples from Western culture, it is completely unclear how throwing a horse-shoe 
or walking under a ladder could bring about luck or misfortune, although this does not 
stop people from finding such causal beliefs perfectly credible (Slone 2004, pp. 103-120). 
This lack of interest in causal understanding aligns well with the idea developed by Dan 
Sperber and Pascal Boyer that religious explanations are “relevant mysteries” (Sperber 
1996, p. 73; Boyer 2001, p. 14): they do not so much explain events in terms of more 
simple and familiar processes, but they make use of salient and evocative mysteries 
instead.  
                                                     
 
98 The remark is often wrongly attributed to Anatole France himself, who in fact disagreed with his friend and 
argued that wooden legs would not have impressed him. 
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12.4 The psychology of supernatural causation 
12.4.1 Psychological self-correction 
How does this preference for subtle divine action develop and play out psychologically? 
Janssen et al. (1990) and Barrett (2004) have drawn attention to the rather 
indeterminate and abstract way in which religious people often describe the effects of 
their prayers (support, blessing, trust, etc.), appearing in stark contrast to the concrete 
needs which typically occasion them (e.g. serious illness). An interesting suggestion for 
this discrepancy is hinted at by Janssen et al., but not further developed in their paper: 
“It could be argued that people adapt the intended effects to the experienced effects, 
accepting a principal discrepancy between needs and effects” (Janssen, De Hart et al. 
1990, p. 105). Indeed, even if the intended effect of my prayer is something like sudden 
and full recovery from illness, it is plausible that people will eventually lower their 
expectations. Consider the famous Serenity prayer written by the Protestant theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr:  
God grant me the serenity / To accept the things I cannot change / Courage to 
change the things I can / And wisdom to know the difference. 
Instead of asking God to bring about a certain state of affairs directly, as one may expect 
an omnipotent being would be capable of, I ask him to influence my psychological 
attitude regarding my predicament. As we argued above, this mode of action (condition 
(3), as a partial cause cooperating to a natural effect) is more difficult to ascertain than 
straightforward intervention on God‖s part. Moreover, note that the very structure of 
the Serenity prayer can accommodate a certain amount of failure. If I succeed in 
changing whatever it is that I wanted to change, this is because God granted me the 
courage to do so. On the other hand, if I fail to change whatever it is that I tried to 
change and eventually I have to give up, this is because God granted me the serenity to 
realize that I could not change it anyway (and of course to know the difference). 
In general, religious believers who request miracles from God that are subtle and 
indistinguishable from the natural course of events, will have a better chance of finding 
themselves in a situation in which they can attribute the events in questions to God 
answering their prayers. A better chance, that is, if compared with those who request 
firework displays by God. As Nicholas Humphrey wrote, people must have known all 
along that full-fledged and palpable miracles just don‖t happen: “They must have known 
these sobering truths because time and again they and their fellow human beings must 
have come slap up against the evidence for them” (Humphrey 1995, p. 54). Mechanisms 
of psychological self-correction will inevitably steer believers away from demanding 
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divine acts of the latter kind, and instead steer in the direction of modes of action that 
are more or less indistinguishable from the natural course of events.  
This is not to say that religious believers who have ―learnt‖ not to pray for robust 
divine action will never find themselves in a situation in which their prayers remain 
apparently ―unanswered‖. If the causal closure thesis of nature is correct, even prayers 
for subtle modes of divine action will appear to be answered at most occasionally. 
Indeed, the history of prayer itself bears witness to the simmering doubts about its 
efficacy, as Zaleski & Zaleski noted:  
[T]he sheer abundance of devout tracts exhorting the faithful to pray often, pray 
fervently, and pray with confidence in achieving desired results suggests that 
belief in the efficacy of prayer has always needed some degree of shoring up. 
(Zaleski and Zaleski 2005, p. 333) 
The frequency of apparent confirmation will depend on the probability function of the 
event type in question (e.g. spontaneous remission of a disease, rainfall in a dry season), 
but in any case, psychological research has established that beliefs may become 
entrenched even on the basis of a small number of apparent confirmations. People are 
prone to confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998), which means that they pay attention to and 
remember confirmations of a favored hypothesis, while they quickly discard or explain 
away adverse evidence. More specifically, the psychological literature on cognitive 
dissonance and motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990; Aronson 1992; Tavris and Aronson 
2008; Melton 1985) suggests that, when firmly held beliefs are confronted with apparent 
failure, people rely on a repertoire of rationalizations. As Barrett noted in a later 
discussion of his prayer study (Barrett 2004), the whole idea of addressing a request to a 
whimsical supernatural agent automatically suggests some ways of accommodating 
failure: “prayer commonly assumes the possibility that a request could be approved, 
denied, or put off until a later date” (Barrett 2004, p. 71). In such a setting, a prayer that 
appears to be failed may in fact be granted “on a different timetable” or just be denied 
for some good reason that we mortals cannot fathom. In this way, as Barrett notes, 
“negative evidence rarely threatens belief in God” (2001, p. 74). Other rationalizations 
are possible for occasional failure: “My prayer did not fit into God‖s plan” – “Too much 
answered prayers would spoil us” –– “My praying ritual was not performed correctly” – 
“God cannot be coerced through prayer” – “the purpose of prayer is ―to construct the 
soul, not to instruct God‖” (Augustine). If believers are highly committed to their faith, 
we can expect them to be motivated to maintain belief in the goodness and 
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omnipotence of God (e.g. Kushner 1981), and to explain away failure by what Evans-
Pritchard has termed “secondary elaborations” (see below).99 
The persistence of the confirmation bias ensures that even a small number of 
apparent successes may succeed in outweighing the instances of apparent failure 
(Barrett 2004, p. 74). In the case of prayers for robust divine action, however, the causal 
closure thesis leaves little or no room for apparent confirmations. Thus, if we confine 
ourselves to personal experiences regarding the efficacy of prayer, the point is not that 
disappointment and cognitive dissonance will never arise for those who prefer subtle 
modes of action on God‖s part, but that those who demand robust actions will always 
encounter failures that occasion the need for some rationalization, and will never 
encounter occasional personal successes to compensate for the failures. The 
confirmation bias needs some events to be biased towards.  
12.4.2 Folk physics 
Besides this form of psychological adjustment, there may be purely cognitive factors at 
play in the preference for subtle modes of causation. Research in developmental 
psychology suggests that, from early infancy, humans possess an intuitive core 
knowledge about spatio-temporal objects, which is sometimes designated as folk physics. 
Looking time experiments with children reveal a number of such implicit assumptions: 
1) objects move as bounded and discrete wholes (cohesion principle ), 2) objects move 
along continuous and connected paths (continuity principle), 3) objects do not interact at 
a distance (contact principle) (Spelke 1994; Spelke and Kinzler 2007). It is not surprising 
that natural selection has endowed us with an intuitive grasp of these basic spatio-
temporal principles, because the physical environment on which our ancestors 
depended for survival really does obey them, at least at the scale of medium-sized 
objects. 
Is it plausible that people find robust forms of supernatural causation counterintuitive 
because of their violating deeply-engrained folk physics? For example, the instant 
materialization or displacement of desired objects before my very eyes would violate 
the principle of continuity. Or, to give another example, if a physical obstacle would 
suddenly disintegrate as a result of my prayer to remove it, this would surely violate the 
principle of coherence. On the other hand, we see that precisely such breaches in the 
                                                     
 
99 In the wake of scientific evidence on the inefficacy of prayer, many liberal theologians have relinquished the 
idea of divine interventions in the natural world altogether. Notably, since the prayer-gauge debate in the 19th 
century, theologians have begun reinterpreting the value of prayer on a purely moral and spiritual level, 
purging it from any form of miraculous interventionism. (Mullin 2008) 
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fabric of our natural world by supernatural agents often form the subject of religious 
narratives, legends and holy writ. The Old Testament stories about Yahweh parting the 
red sea or tearing down the walls of Jericho are clearly violations of the basic principles 
of folk physics. Furthermore, many religious traditions contain stories that seem to 
exploit violations of precisely the intuitive principles mentioned above. For example, 
Christian monks and saints are often believed to possess the ability of bilocation, i.e. 
being physically present at two different places at the same time (Nickell 1993, pp. 216-
219). Similar stories are to be found in Buddhism, Hinduism, paganism, shamanism and 
many other religious traditions. Likewise, popular stories about psychokinesis and 
action at a distance in religion and magic (e.g. transmuting water into wine) are clear 
violations of both the contact and coherence principle. 
Indeed, researchers in the Cognitive Science of Religion have argued that religious 
representations are successful precisely because they violate intuitive expectations 
about the ontological categories to which they belong. To be more precise, religious 
representations have to be “minimally counterintuitive” (Boyer 1994; Atran 2002) to 
achieve a cognitive optimum, which means that they display a small number of 
violations against a background of intuitively expected properties. Supernatural 
concepts that violate our intuitions on many different fronts typically strain our 
cognitive resources too much and are more difficult to remember and process.  
If intuitive violations are precisely what makes religious representations salient and 
attention-grabbing, it seems unlikely that robust supernatural causation per se is 
cognitively burdensome. Firework displays by God is all right as long as it is in the 
context of distant hearsay and religious mythology, but it is hardly ever the subject of 
personal experience or first-person eyewitness testimony (try multiplying bread or 
parting a sea) (see also for example Evans-Pritchard 1965, pp. 195-201). Religious 
believers are well aware that such supernatural feats are exceptional, and cannot be 
expected to occur on a regular basis. Although believers have no difficulty in conceiving 
of such past events, it is plausible that folk intuitions lower their expectations when it 
comes to personal prayer in ordinary situations. The mechanisms of psychological self-
correction which we have described can then be viewed as further enforcing this 
cognitive preference.  
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12.5 Epidemiology of representations 
Up to this point, we have described the formation of prayer beliefs and practices on the 
level of individual psychological mechanisms. We can now take this approach one step 
further and outline the ways in which larger cultural trends emerge from these 
psychological processes and intuitions. In Sperber‖s epidemiological model of culture 
(Sperber 1990, 1996), which has had a formative influence on the cognitive science of 
religion, our shared cognitive make-up acts as so many constraints through which the 
dissemination of representations is channeled. Small selection pressures in the 
transmission of beliefs, aggregated over many transmissions, will give rise to larger 
cultural trends. Liénard and Boyer (2006) and McCauley and Lawson (2002) have applied 
this approach to religious rituals, and we can now apply it to belief patterns about 
supernatural causation. Assuming that the facts of nature are the same for all, it is 
reasonable to expect that the disillusion with robust modes of divine causation will 
become part of the collective experience of religious communities (see also Barrett 2004, 
pp. 70-74). Belief in the present-day feasibility and reliability of robust supernatural 
feats, as opposed to distant hearsay and historical narratives, are unlikely to be thriving 
if they are to compete with beliefs in subtle divine causation.  
There are at least four different ways in which representations about supernatural 
causation may be passed on and disseminated in a religious community: (i) new 
members are explicitly instructed by older members regarding the things they may 
reasonably expect from supernatural beings, (ii) believers take familiar accounts of 
answered and unanswered prayers as templates for the ways people engage in 
interaction with supernatural beings, (iii) new members assimilate theological 
rationalizations from religious doctrine for why supernatural beings act in certain ways 
but not in others, (iv) they are initiated in collective prayer practices and adopt the 
habits of older members.  
Naturally, this sketchy and general outline of pathways of cultural assimilation leaves 
many questions to be answered. In the context of this paper, however, we merely want 
to draw attention to the point that not every new member of a religious community 
need go through the same stages of personal disappointment of the kind described by 
Humphrey above. By means of explicit or implicit religious instruction, cultural 
selection forces may supplement and reinforce intrapersonal selection to the same 
effect. To put it bluntly, I may refrain from asking spectacular displays by God either 
because I have myself experienced the disappointment following such requests, or 
because others have instructed me not to make them. 
To illustrate this effect of accumulated experience on religious beliefs, consider a 
second study by Barrett, in which he uses the same eight scenarios but substituted God 
with a “comparably endowed super-agent” (Barrett 2001, p. 264). Subjects were asked to 
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consider a futuristic supercomputer (Uncomp) with comparable God-like powers, but 
“components physically located all over the earth” The term “praying” was replaced by 
“asking for”. Barrett found that subjects in the Uncomp group did not have any 
preference for either mode of action and explains this in terms of the non-locality of 
Uncomp. Our account suggests a different explanation: subjects had no experience with 
the fictitious Uncomp, whereas of course practicing believers had plenty of experience 
with directing prayers to God. Whereas religious believers have had ample opportunity 
to adjust their conception of God‖s modus operandi on the basis of experience, and have 
also been exposed to a long tradition of religious believers with similar experiences, 
none of this holds for Uncomp. A futuristic computer with God-like powers is simply a 
fictitious character invented by the experimenter, which is quite a different matter 
from God (at least for those who believe that God is not a fictitious character). Thus, 
subjects have no reasons not to accept the stipulated omnipotence of Uncomp at face 
value, which explains their relative lack of preference for either mode of action.100  
Note that there may be still other ways in which certain praying practices (or 
patterns of belief) may be conducive to a process of self-validation, and thus possess an 
“advantage” in terms of cultural dissemination. First, belief in the biological healing 
powers of supernatural beings may achieve cultural success in virtue of the fact that 
genuine faith on the part of the person afflicted may engender a placebo effect, the 
result of which may afterwards be attributed to God‖s help. Second, if I pray to God to 
give me the strength to face a difficult ordeal, my act of praying and my faith in God 
may itself increase my self-confidence and reduce stress levels, resulting in a form of 
self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, we have to take into account a self-validating 
selection effect regarding the people who, other things being equal, are still around to 
recount their miraculous healing or rescue, as Nicholas Humphrey‖s Law of the Efficacy 
of Prayer makes clear: “In a dangerous world there will always be more people around 
whose prayers for their own safety have been answered than those whose prayers have 
not.”101 
                                                     
 
100 Another and even more simple explanation is that Uncomp is explicitly described as having components 
“physically located all over the earth” (Barrett 2001, p. 264, our italics), whereas God presumably is not to be 
thought of as a physical entity. This difference by itself may account for the greater preference for physical 
causation in the Uncomp group.  
101 The “law” was posted on the EDGE Question Center, 2004, retrieved from 
http://www.edge.org/q2004/q04_print.html 
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12.6 Different forms of supernatural causation 
Thus far, we have mainly focused on the Christian tradition, describing how the 
psychology of supernatural causation plays out in the practice of petitionary prayer 
directed to a single divine being. In cultures with very different supernatural beliefs and 
religious practices, however, we might expect to find similar preferences for subtle 
modes of action. An interesting case study is provided by Evans-Pritchard‖s landmark 
anthropological investigation of magic and witchcraft among the Azande in Sudan. The 
Azande believe that some members of their community are witches and possess the 
mystical power to injure and kill other individuals, to harm their crops, to make houses 
collapse etc. Indeed, the Azande invariably attribute death, disease and other forms of 
misfortune to the malignant action of witches, thus making no distinction between 
different modes of causation (psychosocial vs. biological or mechanical). As Evans-
Pritchard noted, however, the Zande people are certainly not unaware of the natural 
causes leading to such events. Interestingly, they believe that the mystical cause of 
witchcraft acts through a chain of natural causes, making a subtle contribution as a “co-
operating cause” (Evans-Pritchard 1965, p. 72). 
For example, when the Azande attribute the collapse of a mud house to witchcraft, 
they know very well that, as it happens, a colony of termites has been gnawing through 
the pillars of the house and undermining its foundations. Although they accept this 
natural cause of the event, they insist that only witchcraft explains why this particular 
house collapsed at that particular moment. Again, we see that the actions of the 
supernatural agent – in this case, a human being endowed with supernatural powers – 
are believed to contribute as a partial cause to some event, which renders the 
supernatural modus operandi subtle and virtually imperceptible. As Evans-Pritchard 
notes, “[t]he attribution of misfortune to witchcraft does not exclude what we call its 
real causes but is superimposed on them and gives to social events their moral value” 
(Evans-Pritchard 1965, p. 73). Why don‖t witches just make the house collapse at one 
stroke, instead of acting indirectly and through the efforts of termites? On the other 
hand, how would the belief that witches may destroy houses at a single stroke fare in 
the Zande community, compared with the belief that they consistently employ the 
services of ants or other seemingly natural causes? 
The Azande also regularly consult oracles about the various threats of witchcraft and 
about the courses of action to take in their life. In one of the most respected Zande 
oracles, a poison is administered to a fowl, following a number of elaborate 
preparations, and a question is put to it. The oracle is believed to provide a yes/no 
answer depending on whether the fowl survives or dies. After taking note of a series of 
such divinations, Evans-Pritchard notes that there is no objective way to predict 
whether or not the fowl will die, given the amount of poison or the size of the fowls. To 
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all intents and purposes, the fate of the fowls is a matter of chance.102 As we have argued 
before, precisely such stochastic processes, to which human beings have no epistemic 
access, are psychologically optimal for belief in supernatural causation. Because they 
allow for regular confirmations, they are conducive to self-validation, a process that is 
augmented by the kinds of questions and the way they are typically phrased. Among the 
Azande, as we saw in section 6.3.2, apparent oracular failures are explained away or 
reinterpreted by “evasive secondary elaborations” (Evans-Pritchard 1965, p. 319) that 
are provided for by the belief system itself: improper preparation of the poison, the 
violations of taboos, interference of witchcraft or evil magic, refusal of the oracle to give 
the right answer. In section 5.3.2 we have argued that, when the causal relations in a 
belief system are underspecified and the effects are ambiguous, this engenders subtle 
forms of inferential circularity, rendering the belief system impervious to adverse 
evidence. 
12.7 Discussion 
In many religious traditions, in particular the three monotheistic faiths, supernatural 
beings are conceived as very powerful or even omnipotent agents who can act in any 
way they like. As the theory of theological (in)correctness has revealed, however, 
religious believers typically do not respect such counterintuitive theological doctrines 
when they are engaged in everyday religious practice, even though they may endorse it 
when explicitly questioned and given some time to reflect. The concept of theological 
correctness has sparked a renewed interest in the psychology of petitionary prayer, 
which is still a relatively unexplored domain. Barrett‖s study on prayer is a very 
welcome exception, but his account suffers from a conceptual problem: the 
characteristic distance range of psychosocial as opposed to mechanistic action is largely 
similar, which complicates his argument about an intuitive preference for supernatural 
causation of the former kind. 
On an empirical level, the hypothesis defended by Barrett sits uncomfortably with 
the fact that beliefs in supernatural beings acting mechanically and biologically are 
pervasive all over the world (Johnson 2005; Murdock 1980). We have set up a different 
                                                     
 
102 The same point holds for the other oracles in the Zande belief system (the behaviour of termites and the 
manipulation of some rubbing-board) (Evans-Pritchard 1965, pp. 352-386). 
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account of theological incorrectness and framed it in the context of our best scientific 
knowledge about the efficacy of prayer and the evidence for the causal closure thesis of 
nature. Viewed in that light, we saw that people will developed ―preferences‖ for 
supernatural interventions that are subtle and indistinguishable from the natural 
course of events. These different modes of action need not be cognitively represented as 
such by believers – as indeed believers do not care much about modes of supernatural 
action – but they may emerge from the psychological mechanisms of self-correction and 
cultural selection forces.  
Our account suggests that people stray from orthodox theology not only because of 
the way their minds work, but also in virtue of how the world looks like (and the 
interaction between both). In an epidemiology or religious representation, both our 
innate cognitive make-up and the structure of external reality impose selective pressure 
on representations. In particular, we argued that, if the causal closure thesis is correct, 
and given that the causal structure of our world is partly inscrutable, beliefs in subtle 
and unascertainable modes of supernatural causation will achieve a cognitive optimum 
(Boyer 1994; Slone 2004; Boyer 2001), because they are more susceptible to occasional 
―confirmation‖ and less vulnerable to repeated disconfirmation. In line with Chapter 11, 
we have argued that psychological mechanisms of self-correction and basic principles of 
folk physics will steer believers away from beliefs in robust and palpable forms of divine 
action, an effect that is further enforced by cultural selection. Further research may 
extend this approach to attribution of supernatural agency in general (i.e. not related to 
prayer), for example in terms of divine punishment and retribution for moral 
transgression. It will be interesting to know whether, in such cases as well, believers are 
fond of Gods that move in mysterious ways. 
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Conclusion 
‘I can't believe that!’ said Alice. 
‘Can't you?’ the Queen said in a pitying tone. ‘Try again: 
draw a long breath, and shut your eyes.’ 
Alice laughed. ‘There's not use trying,’ she said: ‘one can't 
believe impossible things.’ 
‘I daresay you haven't had much practice,’ said the 
Queen. ‘When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-
hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six 
impossible things before breakfast.’ – Lewis Carroll, 
Through the Looking-Glass 
Where pseudoscience goes wrong 
After a long journey through the hinterland of science, we can retrace our steps to draw 
a number of general conclusions. In the first part of this thesis, we challenged the 
common philosophical wisdom on the supernatural and the problem of demarcation. 
Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) fails to live up to its scientific pretension not 
because it is involved with a supernatural designer per se, but because it exhibits general 
telltale signs of pseudoscientific discourse: IDC theorists refuse to flesh out their design 
hypothesis and prefer to make use of convenient immunizations that make the theory 
impervious to criticism; the concepts devised by IDC advocates are ill-defined and suffer 
from equivocations in a way that transforms their central argument into a moving 
target; the theory is too vague to allow for specific predictions and to achieve any form 
of genuine explanatory unification; the bulk of IDC literature consists of purely negative 
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arguments, launched with the sole purpose of distorting evolutionary theory and 
sowing doubt among the public at large; etc.  
Because IDC invokes supernatural entities, and because it is guilty of all those 
pseudoscientific sins, critics of the theory have conflated both issues and have rushed to 
the conclusion that one is intrinsically connected to the other. But this seems to be an 
example of what psychologists call the representativeness bias, i.e. a tendency to assume 
that the data which happen to be available are representative of the category to which 
those data belong. Because we have become so accustomed to supernaturalists 
committing these pseudoscientific sins, and because we have grown weary of creationist 
hypotheses that, when push comes to shove, boil down to “God did it and His ways are 
mysterious”, we can hardly imagine that any other supernatural hypothesis would be 
viable. But this is mistaken. In the world we happen to live in, there is simply no way to 
make sense out of the living world in terms of supernatural design except by retreating 
to the claim that God did it and His ways are mysterious. If there was even the remotest 
possibility of fleshing out the supernatural design hypothesis in a way that did not run 
slap up against the facts, creationists (and theists in general) would surely be the first to 
spread the gospel. Only by highlighting in what ways supernaturalists might have 
succeeded does it transpire how miserably they have failed.  
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Figure 7 A status quaestionis of the IDC literature. Are we dealing with an intrinsic problem 
associated with supernatural hypotheses? 
A corollary of our view is that science is in principle open to extraordinary evidence 
for the supernatural, but that its current verdict on all supernatural hypotheses 
proposed thus far has been uniformly negative. In fact, our claim is more modest than 
what defenders of Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism (IMN) claim: as we see it, there is 
no compelling reason why supernatural interactions with the natural world, in the 
sense we have defined those terms, would be closed off to scientific investigation. If 
anything, the burden of proof is on those who exclude the supernatural from the 
purview of science a priori. They need to come up with an airtight and nontrivial 
definition of natural and supernatural causes that explains why the latter can never be 
amenable to scientific investigation. A defender of Provisory or Pragmatic 
Methodological Naturalism (PMN) can stick to a working definition of the supernatural, 
and is making no stronger a claim than that at least some of the phenomena satisfying 
that definition are amenable to scientific investigation. 
The only viable philosophical route towards discarding supernatural causation from 
science a priori is either to set up an argument establishing that the very idea of entities 
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beyond space and time is impossible because it rests upon a category mistake, or that 
the idea of causal interaction between the natural and supernatural realms cannot be 
made coherent (Fales 2010). Once we accept the metaphysical possibility and possible 
causal efficacy of the supernatural, however, as most defenders of IMN make an explicit 
point of emphasizing, the methodological strictures of IMN no longer make any sense.  
The principle of IMN is based on a confusion between accidental features of the 
supernatural hypotheses that are on offer and intrinsic problems with the supernatural, 
but as we have argued in Chapter 2, it is also for a large part prompted by the political 
motivation to install a truce between science and religion. If science is perceived as 
being in irresolvable conflict with religion, so the argument goes, and if a choice 
between both magisteria is forced upon the public at large, then an overwhelming 
majority will side with the forces of darkness.  
Although we appreciate the political rationale behind this strategy, we have argued 
that ruling the supernatural out of science by philosophical fiat is counterproductive, 
philosophically incoherent and misleading. Most importantly, it plays right into the 
hands of IDC proponents. Always eager to cast evolutionists in the role of closed-minded 
and dogmatic materialists, IDC advocates have presented the strictures of IMN as a 
symptom of metaphysical prejudice against supernaturalism. Indeed, detractors of IMN 
view the principle as some kind of immunizing strategy of scientific naturalism, the use of 
which is the very antithesis of the scientific attitude, as we have seen in Chapter 5. 
Without a commitment to metaphysical naturalism, and in the absence of a sound 
methodological rationale, the a priori rejection of supernaturalism seems unfair indeed. 
In addition, the accommodationist strategy of dealing with religious dogmatism 
threatens to backfire on science, making some of the most solid arguments for evolution 
unintelligible, and fostering a misleading image of major scientific achievements. The 
position we have defended throughout the first part of this work (PMN) does not suffer 
from these philosophical and strategic complications:  
(1) At least some supernatural hypotheses entail empirically detectable consequences, and are 
thus open to scientific investigation. 
(2) As a matter of principle science is open to paranormal and supernatural claims, although 
the prospects of such hypotheses being borne out are extremely dim, and no sensible 
scientist wants to waste much time and resources investigating these claims. 
(3) The absence of God (and other supernatural entities) from the corpus of scientific 
knowledge is not a result of metaphysical prejudice or methodological exclusion, but of 
contingent scientific failure. The deck was not stacked against the Almighty to begin with, 
quite to the contrary. 
(4) Darwin‖s empirical case against special creation by supernatural intervention is perfectly 
respectable and was a major factor in overturning the program of natural theology. 
(5) Evolutionary theory does not inexorably lead to atheism, but there is no avoiding that it 
has undermined one of the most compelling – one is tempted to say the only respectable – 
argument for theism. 
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Chapter 7 is an illustration of the way we think the scientific pretensions of theories like 
IDC should be confronted: not by appealing to the naturalistic strictures of science and 
settling the matter by analytical definition, but by getting down into the trenches and 
confronting the conceptual and empirical shortcomings of IDC head-on. At the same 
time, Chapter 7 clears up the conceptual fog around irreducible complexity and shows 
why there have been several, apparently contradictory lines of criticism against the 
argument. In this case, luckily, this is not due to shaky philosophical doctrines on the 
part of some IDC critics, but it is entirely to blame on Michael Behe‖s own vacillations in 
his definition and use of irreducible complexity. 
Incidentally, such a direct line of attack has also been pursued by most defenders of 
IMN in tandem, including by Judge John E. Jones in his ruling on the Kitzmiller vs. Dover 
case. As we have argued in section 2.4.5, however, this makes their case against IDC open 
to the charge of incoherence, or at least of superfluousness. Why bother to put forward 
empirical arguments against IDC if its claims can be safely ruled out from the outset?  
For many scientists, philosophers and liberal theologians, IMN embodies the modern 
modus vivendi between science and religion much in the same way as the principle of 
Non-Overlapping Magisteria did for Stephen Jay Gould and his followers.103 By keeping 
scientific inquiry at bay and relegating the supernatural to a wholly separate domain, 
defenders of IMN have tried to safeguard a place for religion to which science cannot 
reach, but they have done so at the expense of philosophical integrity.  
How to deal with pseudoscience 
The first chapters of this doctoral thesis drive home the point that it is one thing to 
correctly recognize a pseudoscience for what it is, but quite another to find the 
appropriate philosophical and scientific weapons to confront it. We cannot afford a 
casual and complacent attitude towards pseudoscience, notably when it comes to the 
latest spate of creationist protestations against evolutionary theory. The luxury of being 
“obviously” on the right side of the fence may have the perverse effect that one does 
not even bother to support one‖s position with the best rational arguments. But even a 
theory that is wrong beyond any reasonable doubt deserves to be taken seriously and 
                                                     
 
103 Interestingly, in his latest book our colleague Massimo Pigliucci (2010) offers an excellent rebuttal of 
Gould‖s NOMA solution (Gould 1999), but he fails to notice that the IMN position adopted in the ruling of Judge 
Jones is itself more politically convenient than philosophically accurate (Boudry 2010).  
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confronted with careful arguments, particularly when its defenders exploit every 
opportunity to cast themselves in a victimized role and complain that they are not 
being given a fair hearing.  
This is not to say that the strategy as we propose it does not face some difficulties of 
its own. To even engage with creationist opposition at all may leave uninformed 
bystanders with the impression that there is a legitimate scientific debate going on, or 
that evolutionary scientists are forced on the defense. It is even more difficult to explain 
why some hypotheses are no longer seriously investigated at all, except insofar as they 
still enjoy wide support from the public at large (the same perverse effect is apparent in 
the case of public scares about, for instance, the link between cell phone radiation and 
cancer, or between vaccination and autism). Evolutionary theory has been in the 
indisputable scientific pole position for so many decades now, and any respectable 
alternative has been discredited since so long ago, that the decisive historical reasons 
for its victory have faded into the background. The evidence in favor of evolution by 
natural selection per se, and the damaging empirical and conceptual problems facing the 
different versions of natural theology and vitalism that were entertained until the end 
of the 19th century, are simply no longer part of the cutting-edge scientific debates 
nowadays. Were it not for the continuing resistance from the creationist fronts, the 
need for the current spate of books expressly aimed at didactically laying out the 
evidence for evolution would be much less pressing (Coyne 2009b; Dawkins 2009; 
Pigliucci 2002; Scott 2009; Sarkar 2007). 
We cannot ignore the politically powerful and well-organized creationist movement, 
but neither can we afford to use philosophically dubious doctrines for countering their 
arguments. Creationists are proficient at poking holes in evolution even when such 
holes exist only in their imagination, so a fortiori we should not allow them an 
opportunity to discover a real hole. As Philip Kitcher put it: 
Creationist literature is especially creative in its misunderstandings, in pinning 
odd views on the opposition and then playing “Gotcha!” […] creationists can 
manufacture spurious problems faster than evolutionists can unmask their 
sophistries. (Kitcher 2007, p. 71) 
Likewise, as we have argued in Chapter 3, we should not be using outdated and 
misleading metaphors that unwittingly fuel design intuitions and play right into the 
hands of creationists. It is of little use if we succeed in keeping creationism out of the 
classroom if we still allow the use of covertly creationist metaphors in biology textbooks 
for no sound scientific reason. Of course, this does not mean that we should do away 
with design talk in biology altogether, as the notion of design is vital to any discussion 
of biological adaptation and functionality (Dennett 1996). However, we should be 
cautious in using detailed mechanistic metaphors that stretch the design metaphor 
beyond its limits. A careless use of mechanistic and informational metaphors is ill-
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advised especially in the light of current research in cognitive and developmental 
psychology, which suggests that persistent misconceptions about evolution are 
grounded in the cognitive architecture of our mind. For example, experiments with 
young children reveal their proneness to what has been termed “promiscuous” 
teleology: children intuitively prefer explanations in terms of purpose and intentional 
design over simple causal explanations, even for natural phenomena where no design is 
involved. Deborah Keleman has even suggested that children are “intuitive theists” 
(Kelemen 2004; Kelemen and Di Yanni 2005), in the sense that they are intuitively 
disposed towards viewing the natural world in terms of artificiality and teleofunctional 
design. If indeed there are deeply-engrained cognitive limitations and biases that hinder 
the acceptance of evolutionary theory (Blancke, Boudry et al. in press), then a fortiori we 
have to be cautious in employing metaphors that bolster these intuitions about design 
and artificiality.  
Method in madness 
This last point about our cognitive susceptibility for design reasoning can be viewed as a 
prelude to the third part of this dissertation, in which we draw upon a wide array of 
cognitive research to explain why belief systems that display certain structural features 
are so pervasive and culturally successful. Before outlining this argument in an 
epidemiological framework, we have offered a purely theoretical analysis of 
pseudosciences in terms of immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms. 
In addition to the examples offered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, which were drawn from 
a wide range of different domains, we have elaborated on a number of specific case 
studies in the subsequent chapters: the concept of irreducible complexity in IDC, the 
theory-internal explanations for obscurity and conceptual incoherence by Lacan and his 
apologists, and the methodological and conceptual complications in Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  
From a philosophical point of view, epistemic defense mechanisms are particularly 
interesting, because they lend the system of beliefs in question a kind of self-validating 
rationale. In Chapter 11, we have drawn upon research on cognitive dissonance, belief 
perseverance and rationalization to construct an epidemiological framework that 
explains the cultural success of these self-validating beliefs. By outlining the free-
floating rationale underlying these belief structures, we have shown that there need not 
be much conscious deliberation involved in the construction of their protective shield, 
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and that cultural selection forces plus mechanisms of psychological self-correction may 
spontaneously give rise to such constructions. Our analysis has shown that, contrary to 
the prevailing opinion about the fragility of weird belief systems, there is substantial 
method in madness. Not surprisingly, intelligent people are anything but invulnerable 
to irrational beliefs, because they above all are proficient at rationalization, ad hoc 
reasoning and belief perseverance in the face of difficulties.  
The third part of this thesis was explicitly framed in the epidemiological approach to 
culture developed by Dan Sperber, and the cognitive and selectionist turn in the 
scientific study of religious beliefs. The general question put forward by Sperber and 
researchers in CSR is why certain cultural representations are more successful than 
others. By figuring out the cognitive and epistemic constraints through which the 
dissemination of cultural representations is channeled, through small incremental 
effects, we are able to explain larger cultural trends. As Liénard and Boyer have put it: 
In cultural transmission […] very small effects aggregated over many cycles of 
transmission are sufficient to create massive trends. (Lienard and Boyer 2006, p. 
824) 
One possible objection against our approach is that we stack the deck against certain 
theories by calling them “weird” to begin with, as if their implausibility has already 
been established beyond reasonable doubt, and only the question of their pervasiveness 
remains to be answered. How indeed do we decide that a belief system is “weird”? Is 
that assessment not based on a subjective notion of weirdness? We do not think that 
much hinges on this terminology, as the epistemological analysis of these belief systems 
must stand on its own merits. If our analysis is correct, the beliefs and belief systems in 
question propagate not in virtue of their standing in certain relations to reality, but 
rather due to the way in which they are enmeshed with other beliefs and to the way our 
minds operate. The self-validating rationale exhibited by these beliefs ensures that they 
are not constrained by the way the world actually is, and this allows them to take on 
weird contents.  
The most parsimonious view about such belief structures is that they propagate for 
no other reasons that the ones just mentioned. In other words, establishing their 
resilience and self-validating nature does not equate with demonstrating that they are 
wrong, but it is good circumstantial evidence for that thesis. Although it is by no means 
impossible for such beliefs to be true, their truth would be a matter of sheer luck or 
coincidence. In Chapter 10, we have belabored that point in the context of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, arguing that the epistemic structure of Freudian doctrine, together with 
its flexible methodology, ensures that there are no significant constraints on theory 
formation in psychoanalysis. Likewise, in Chapter 11, we have argued that conspiracy 
theories and certain paranormal belief systems, simply by virtue of their internal 
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structure and their rich conceptual resources, may have a shallow ring of plausibility 
that is completely disconnected from their relation to any objective facts out there.  
An important theme that is developed throughout the second and third part of this 
work is that the study of pseudoscience and irrational belief systems sheds light on the 
nature of human rationality itself. Just as optical illusions and visual impairments are 
informative about the fabric of visual perception, the study of irrational belief systems 
allows us to gain better access to the intricacies of human cognition. Though he has not 
often been quoted approvingly in this work, Sigmund Freud has captured this principle 
with a beautiful metaphor:  
If we throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks; but not into haphazard pieces. It comes 
apart along its lines of cleavage into fragments whose boundaries, though they 
were invisible, were predetermined by the crystal´s structure (Freud 1964, p. 59). 
The idea that irrationality is the outcome of a special mode of thinking, disconnected 
from normal reasoning functions, is being progressively abandoned by cognitive 
scientists and psychologists. Rationality and irrationality are better conceived as 
opposite sides of the same coin (Talmont-Kaminski 2007, 2008). The present study on 
pseudoscience vindicates this more sophisticated view on rationality and its dark 
counterpart.  
(1) On closer inspection, many forms of persistent irrationality are predictable side-effects of 
reasoning heuristics that are quite efficient in the appropriate contexts for which they 
evolved. 
(2) Believers are not the simple-minded fanatics for which they are often mistaken, and 
intelligent people are anything but invulnerable to irrational belief systems. Quite to the 
contrary, there are some compelling reasons to think that intelligent people are more 
prone to irrational thinking than others.  
(3) Popular pseudoscience and other weird belief systems are more complex and less fragile in 
the face of adverse evidence and criticism than is commonly assumed. The assumption 
that they manifest distinct modes of irrational reasoning, disconnected from and opposed 
to rational reasoning processes, has not been borne out.  
In Chapter 12, we have applied the cultural selection framework developed in section 
11.6 to belief formation about the modus operandi of supernatural beings and the efficacy 
of petitionary prayer. Assuming the causal closure thesis of nature, which we have 
argued for on a posteriori grounds in Chapter 1, we noted that it is highly unlikely that 
belief in the efficacy of prayer is pervasive because of the actual occurrence of 
supernatural intervention, psychosocial or otherwise. A number of psychological, 
cultural and cognitive explanations are available for tackling the problem of explaining 
the persistence of belief in “theo-mundane causation” (Fales 2010). We have developed 
an epidemiological framework that explains not only why such beliefs may nonetheless 
be thriving, but also why they take on specific, culturally successful forms. On the basis 
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of a number of cognitive considerations, and the nature of observational confirmation, 
we have argued that beliefs in modes of divine action that are subtle and 
indistinguishable from the natural course of events are most attractive, because they 
are more conducive to occasional confirmation and more resilient to persistent failure. 
The demarcation problem 
The debate about methodological naturalism, the demarcation problem and appropriate 
strategies for dealing with pseudoscience is reminiscent of a philosophical controversy 
in the 1980s between, among others, Michael Ruse, Larry Laudan, Philip Quinn and 
Barry Gross (reprinted in Ruse 1996a; Pennock and Ruse 2009). In 1981, Michael Ruse 
appeared on the witness stand of the McLean v. Arkansas trial on the teaching of 
“scientific creationism” in biology classrooms. In his expert testimony, Ruse offered a 
set of demarcation criteria for distinguishing real science from pseudoscience such as 
creationism, which were eventually taken up by judge William Overton in his ruling: 
(1) It is guided by natural law. 
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law. 
(3) It is testable against the empirical world. 
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word. 
(5) It is falsifiable. 
In a short article following the trial, Laudan (1982; reprinted as Laudan 1996b) takes 
issue with Ruse‖s involvement in the trial and his proposed set of demarcation criteria, 
arguing that it is full of “woeful fallacies” (1996b, p. 354) and presents a “false stereotype 
of what science is and how it works” (p. 355). In a second and influential essay (Laudan 
1983; reprinted as Laudan 1996a), Laudan takes his critique one step further, 
proclaiming that all past philosophical attempts to separate science from non-science 
have failed, and in the end declaring the death of the demarcation project (Laudan 1983; 
reprinted as Laudan 1996a). In the first part of this doctoral thesis, we have defended an 
approach for dealing with pseudoscience that is in some sense congenial to Laudan‖s 
proposal. As Laudan has dismissed the term pseudoscience as a “hollow phrase” which 
any honest philosopher should get rid of, whereas we have employed it extensively 
throughout this work, it is instructive to revisit the philosophical aftermath of the 
McLean v. Arkansas trial and Laudan‖s critique in particular. This allows us to clarify 
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where exactly we follow Laudan‖s lead and where we part ways with him in, as it 
appears, perfectly diametrical directions.  
Laudan is right that Ruse‖s definition of science leaves a number of loopholes for 
creationists to exploit, and that it does not reflect a consensus among philosophers of 
science. In particular, we follow his argument that creationist claims are not 
intrinsically untestable (see 1.4.5), and that it is important to distinguish between 
establishing the existence of a phenomenon and explaining it in a lawlike way (see 1.4.2 
and 1.4.3). Finally, we sympathize with Laudan‖s conclusion that, rather than trying to 
find a silver bullet that will put an end to creationist nonsense for once and for all, we 
should “confront their claims directly and in piecemeal fashion by asking what evidence 
and arguments can be marshaled for and against them” (Laudan 1996b, p. 354). 
However, Laudan‖s conclusion on Ruse‖s involvement in the trial and especially his 
obituary of the demarcation project are premature. As for his indictment of Ruse‖s 
testimony, Laudan seems to ignore that Ruse was standing as a witness in a trial on 
biology curricula and the separation between church and state, not in a academic 
conference on philosophy of science. Ruse‖s list is a rough and ready demarcation that is 
intended to suit specific legal purposes, not an attempt to finally resolve the 
demarcation problem. Although it is perfectly respectable to quarrel with some of the 
proposed criteria, Laudan extends remarkably little charity to Ruse and seems largely 
insensitive to the legal and constitutional issues that were involved in the case (Gross 
1983; Pennock 2009; Ruse 1996b). In the context of this work, however, Laudan‖s 
sweeping pronouncement on the demarcation problem is more interesting.  
First, we should note that a large part of Laudan‖s critique of demarcationism comes 
down to nitpicking and pointing out irrelevant complications that have no epistemic 
import. For example, Laudan lists several forms of knowledge which, although certainly 
deserving epistemic warrant, are sociologically not recognized as “science” (e.g. 
singular historical claims, football strategies, literary theory, etc.). Laudan seems to 
think that this is most damning to the conception of science versus pseudoscience, but 
we beg to differ. For a number of understandable reasons, disciplines such as history 
and literary theory are not commonly included under the umbrella of “science” 
properly speaking, although any reasonable person would acknowledge that there is 
reliable knowledge to be found in these domains. For example, there is a very 
interesting philosophical discussion going on about the distinctive nature of historical 
science, as opposed to experimental science (e.g. Cleland 2002), but this is not what 
keeps the philosopher of pseudoscience awake at night. The distinction that interests 
the demarcationist is not that between forms of reliable empirical knowledge that are 
sociologically and institutionally classified as science and those that are not, but 
between those forms of empirical knowledge that rightly deserve epistemic credit and 
those that fail to live up to their pretensions. If one acknowledges that historical inquiry 
can produce knowledge that is on a par with good science, the question is whether and 
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how we can distinguish this from what David Aaronovitch has termed “voodoo history” 
(Aaronovitch 2010). To the extent that the received history of the second world war 
deserves to be called scientific, Holocaust denial certainly does not. Does anyone want 
to quarrel over whether Holocaust denial ought to be labeled as either voodoo history 
or pseudoscience, or maybe pseudo-history or failed history?  
A more fundamental problem facing Laudan‖s diatribe is that, even if it is futile to 
construct a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining science that will 
survive close philosophical scrutiny, that does not mean that the demarcation problem 
has ceased to exist. If anything, it is Laudan who clings to an old-fashioned 
demarcationism, because he is unable to envisage any other way in which the 
distinction between science and pseudoscience could be rendered intelligible.  
First, it may be more fruitful to view the categories of science and pseudoscience in 
terms of Wittgenstein‖s notion of family resemblance (Vermeir 2009): although there is no 
unique and essential feature shared by all pseudosciences, we can find a web of 
overlapping similarities that distinguish individual pseudosciences from bona fide 
science. The distinction between science and pseudoscience may be “vague” in a 
technical sense: while there are borderlands in between both domains, populated by 
specimens of theories that are interesting in their own right, we can readily point to 
paradigm cases of both bona fide science and pseudoscience. For example, in Chapter 5, 
we acknowledge that scientific theories are tested in bundles, and every scientific 
research programme has a protective set of auxiliary hypotheses around its core 
hypotheses. Resilience to falsification is a matter of gradients, but that is not say that we 
cannot come up with straightforward examples: if a face-saving auxiliary purchases no 
theoretical progress (in the senses we have discussed) to balance the resulting loss in 
theoretical simplicity, the move may be rightly dismissed as ad hoc. Much philosophical 
attention has been devoted to interesting borderline cases of adhocness in the history of 
science, and sometimes this has fostered the opinion that there is no consistent and 
objective way to explicate the notion of adhocness. In Chapter 6, however, we have 
drawn upon examples of pseudosciences to illuminate our inchoate notion of 
adhocness. By revealing a systematic pattern of evasive reasoning in typical 
pseudoscience, while at the same time acknowledging forms of theoretical protection in 
genuine science, we have vindicated and at the same time qualified Popper‖s insistence 
on the importance of empirical boldness in theory formation. When viewed in that light, 
Laudan‖s take on the demarcation project is like for a biologist to dismiss the concept of 
“mammal” because of such interesting in-betweens as the platypus. 
Second, Laudan‖s argument that Ruse and Overton have “egregiously confuse[d] 
doctrines with the proponents of those doctrines” (Laudan 1996b, p. 353) shows that he 
is not acquainted with much pseudoscientific literature. Philip Quinn has echoed 
Laudan‖s complaint in his own comment on the Arkansas v. McLean case, and we have 
already encountered it in section 6.4.3: 
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The requirement is that a theory be falsifiable by empirical evidence, not that its 
adherents admit that it has been falsified if and when it has been. (Quinn 1996, p. 
381) 
However, our discussion in Chapter 5 has shown that it is not always fruitful, nor indeed 
consistently possible, to follow Laudan‖s and Quinn‖s lead and frame the issue of 
demarcation purely in terms of logical relations between a set of propositions (the 
doctrine) and empirical observations. No sooner had we introduced the distinction 
between immunizing strategies and epistemic defense mechanisms, than we had to 
problematize and partly retract it. Indeed, one of the main purposes for introducing this 
distinction was to show that, in the most interesting cases, it cannot be rigorously 
maintained. To the extent that these pseudoscientific moves are already implicit in or 
provoked by the system of beliefs itself, we have decided to talk about epistemic defense 
mechanisms. By contrast, if the belief system does have identifiable borders and 
distinctive content, and if the face-saving move in question falls outside these 
theoretical bounds, then we are dealing with an immunizing strategy. At the end of 
Chapter 5 and in section 6.4.3, we have stressed that there is no general and foolproof 
way to identify the theory-as-such and evaluate its scientific credentials. Inevitably, we 
had to move our focus to the attitude of pseudoscientists themselves, and we arrived at 
the conclusion that, at least to a certain extent, pseudoscience is simply what 
pseudoscientists do. Again, by insisting on a demarcation purely on the basis of 
doctrines and by dismissing any consideration for the attitude of pseudoscientists as “ad 
hominem” (see also Quinn 1996, p. 381), it is no wonder that Laudan is ready to 
announce the death of the demarcation project.  
The demarcation problem will not yield to an easy and clear-cut solution, as Laudan 
and others have pointed out, but that makes it all the more interesting and challenging 
from a philosophical point of view. We concur with Laudan that the problems of 
Intelligent Design Creationism or “scientific creationism” cannot be reduced to a 
violation of some basic rule of science that is written in stone, but this is a far cry from 
arguing that theories like creationism do not deserve to be labeled as pseudoscience. How 
would Laudan call an endeavor which miserably falls short of evidence for it while being 
abundant in evidence against it, whose empirical and conceptual problems have been 
repeatedly exposed by its critics, and which, in spite of all this, continues to be touted as 
scientific or worthy of credence by its adherents, on the basis of spurious evidence and 
unsound arguments? Don‖t we want some term to distinguish this from bona fide 
scientific knowledge, or from respectable but discarded hypotheses in science? Has 
Laudan another word in store for us? It is telling that, in the course of his diatribe 
against the demarcation project, Laudan himself uses language that implicitly commits 
him to a quite definite and prescriptive view as to what is and is not science. For 
example, he talks about a “false stereotype of what science is and how it works” (1996b, 
p. 355) and elsewhere he states that “this requirement [about natural laws] is an 
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altogether inappropriate standard for ascertaining whether a claim is scientific” (1996b, 
p. 353). 
While reading the different chapters on pseudoscience in this work, some readers 
may have felt that Laudan‖s critique looms large over this whole project. Nevertheless, 
we have decided to postpone an extensive discussion of Laudan‖s famous essay till the 
very end of this dissertation, because we think that the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. Now that we have covered quite some ground in the hinterland of science, we 
are in a better position to counter some of Laudan‖s objections. Hopefully, the present 
work has shown that the study of pseudosciences is worth pursuing and enriching for 
philosophers. Is it fair then to say about demarcationism, with Mark Twain, that the 
rumors of its death have been greatly exaggerated? 
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List of abbreviations 
MN  Methodological Naturalism 
IMN  Intrinsic Methodological Naturalism 
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IC  Irreducible Complexity 
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